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ABSTRACT 
The intra firm diffusion, that is the process leading a firm to extensively use new (or 
superior) technologies, is a key step to promote the growth and the competitiveness of 
a nation. However, even when advanced technologies are readily available within the 
market, the process leading a firm to replace the old with those new technologies can 
take several years, quite often decades. In existing economic literature this aspect of 
technological change has been almost completely neglected. In fact, despite its 
relevance, there exist only two relevant pieces of work in the area (Stoneman, 1981 
and Mansfield, 1968). This thesis has pointed out the weaknesses of this literature on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds and has explored alternative theoretical 
approaches to modelling the intra-firm diffusion process. This has lead to the 
derivation of a new theoretical model, solidly grounded within economic theory. This 
model determines how changes in costs, price expectations (economic constraint), 
production organisation at plant level, existing and previous technologies 
(technological constraints), consumer demand and market structure (market 
constraint) and uncertainty can influence the degree of technology adoption by a firm. 
The impact of uncertainty, price expectations and market structure play upon the 
firm's investment decision in a new technology, have never been studied before. 
Moreover, using sophisticated statistical and econometric tools, this study also tests 
the validity of this theoretical approach, across a cross section of firms in the UK. 
engineering and metalworking sector. 
The theoretical model presented in this thesis is based upon neo-classical investment 
literature and provides a rationale explaining the potential unprofitability of a rapid 
transfer of all firm's production to a new technology. This can be seen as a unique 
contribution to the understanding of the determinants of the adoption of a new 
technology, while the empirical analysis provides considerable insight into a area 
where to date, little research has previously been completed. 
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Chapter 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an era of increasing globalisation of markets, firms are increasingly exposed to 
world competition. This means that firms need to be producing at competitive costs in 
order to sell their products. There are many ways to contain costs and increase 
productivity. Among the several strategies, the firm might change the structure of its 
organisation, the qualitative aspect of its prod1:lct or the production process of its 
output. Such changes, being new for the firm, are more commonly known as 
organisational, product or process innovations. 
This Thesis focuses on the latter type of innovations and in particular on the process 
leading the firm to purchase innovative capital goods incorporating a new technology. 
'New' technology here means any advanced, cost reducing, technology that is newer 
than the existing, or 'old', technologies owned by the firm. Consequently the new 
. 
technology is not necessarily the 'latest technology on the market' but it is a 
technology that is new to the firm. 
The adoption and in particular the extent of use of a new technology by a single firm 
is a very important step in the process of technology transfer. However, for many 
years most of the literature on the economics of technological change has been 
primarily concerned with the generation of innovation, i.e. invention and R&D, which 
is only the first step in the technological process change. Consequently the application 
of innovations (adoption! extent of use) especially at the firm level has been relatively 
overlooked even though it is a key step in the realisation of benefits from 
technological change (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995). 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
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The generation of innovations (i.e. R&D) is important but it is only a sufficient and 
not a necessary determinant of adoption. It does not guarantee that all the firms within 
an industry immediately adopt them or adopt them at all. In fact on markets many 
advanced and old technologies do co-exist and even if they are accessible to the firm, 
a relevant proportion of old technologies are still available after several years from 
first appearance of more advanced technologies. This suggests that many firms do not 
immediately adopt the advanced technologies or if they do, they do not use them 
extensively in their production processes. 
If one looks at existing studies on technology spreading, what is surprising to many is 
that the spreading of a new technology within an industry often takes several decades 
from first appearance on the market. Moreover, even after first adoption, firms often 
decide to only slowly replace their existing capital stock with a more advanced capital 
stock incorporating new technology. Whether it be a new consumer technology or a 
new producer (process) technology spreading across or within firms, the time period 
between first use of the technology and say 100 percent usage of that technology, is 
often many years and sometimes does not even reach complete diffusion (See for 
example the spread of steam engines in Mansfield -1968 and 1975-, the work of 
Battisti and Stoneman -1997, 1999, 2000- on the spread of adoption of Unleaded 
petrol, Karshenas and Stoneman -1992- on the spread of colour TV; etc). 
If one believes that technological progress is the key to success, (or even in some 
cases survival), in order to reduce costs and remain competitive then, even when a 
technology is ready available on the market then: 
1) Why do some firms not adopt the advanced technology ,. what are the constraints to 
first adoption of a technology by each firm? 
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2) When firms do adopt a new technology why do firms not transfer immediately all 
their production to the new technology, but wait; what are the constraints to 
technology use; and what are the determinants of the rate of replacement of the old 
by the new? 
A simple answer to these questions might be that many firms do not behave rationally 
or at least not as economic theory would predict. However, this does not sound very 
realistic. In fact, if one does believe in rational behaviour by economic agents (Le. 
agents aim to maximise their profits) there should be an explanation as to why it is 
rational for a finn not to completely adopt immediately an advanced cost reducing 
technology, but rather wait. Once the reasons for this are understood, one should also 
be able to understand the timing and the determinants of the intra finn process of 
technology transfer within a firm as well as within an industry. 
There exists an area of study in the economics of technological change, traditionally 
referred to as technology diffUSion, that has looked at the process by which the use 
and/or ownership of a new technology spreads over time. Most of this literature is 
almost totally concerned with answering the first set of questions (1) above, 
concerning the process that leads firms to first adopt innovative technologies and the 
characteristics of first adopters i.e. inter firm diffusion (see Karshenas and Stoneman, 
1995 for a survey of these studies). However, the extent of use ofa technology within 
a firm (2), has been almost completely ignored. This thesis aims at answering the 
second set of questions deepening the understanding of intra firm diffusion, that is 
the process determining the time path of use of a technology within a firm from a 
point immediately after first use until diffusion is complete for that finn. In fact, if 
one is interested in the extent of use of a new technology in an industry, then it is just 
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as important to understand the development of technology use within the firm after 
first use (intra -firm diffusion) as it is to understand the pattern of first use across 
firms (inter firm diffusion). 
From the existing intra firm literature on technology diffusion, and even more so the 
rest of the economic literature, our knowledge of the factors that determine the rate of 
replacement of old with new technology within a firm is very limited. At present there 
exists only two relevant pieces of work on intra firm diffusion and they go back to 
Mansfield (Mansfield, 1968) and Stoneman (Stoneman, 1981), since 1981, no 
relevant theoretical advancements have been made in the area. 
Common to many inter-firm diffusion studies, the Mansfield Model assumes that the 
spread over time of use of a new process embodied in a new capital good follows an 
S-shaped curve and what leads to the spread of a technology over time is just 
information acquisition about the true performance of the technology. This is 
basically a disequilibrium process driven by passive information acquisition . 
. However, as shown ina later chapter of this thesis, this does not seem to have 
empirical support or, at least, it is not robust across different technological 
specifications and presents a series of theoretical weaknesses which are difficult to 
accept. 
Stoneman (1981) presents an alternative sophisticated equilibrium model based upon 
Bayesian learning showing that diffusion is faster the greater is the true profitability of 
the new technology. However, despite the sophisticated theory, the Stoneman Model 
is intractable empirically. This indicates that there is still an enormous gap in the 
literature concerning the understanding of why, if it is so advantageous to use a new 
cost reducing technology, some firms do not use it extensively. 
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This thesis aims at fully covering this gap in the literature, explaining why it might be 
rational for a firm to not immediately transfer all its output to the new technology but 
rather to wait. It also aims at harmonising the micro and macro viewpoints bringing 
attention to the need to more closely look at the complexity of the process of 
technology transfer within a firm from a point immediately after first adoption until 
the diffusion is completed for that firm. This involves a new approach to the 
determinants of the diffusion process based on economic theory and robust to 
empirical evidence. 
The route followed in this study leads to the specification of a new theoretical 
equilibrium intra-firm model solidly grounded in the economic theory of investment. 
This model determines, for a single firm, the optimal replacement path of the old with 
the new technology, taking into account how firm characteristics, changes in costs, 
uncertainty, expectations and market structure can influence the degree of technology 
adoption by a firm. Excluding the Stoneman model (1981), equilibrium models for 
intra-firm diffusion have never been studied. For this reason, the theoretical model 
presented in this thesis can be seen as a relevant contribution to the theory of the 
determinants of the adoption of new technology. 
The paucity of data on, intra-firm diffusion has been for years one of the main 
limitations to empirical analysis. Data on the level of adoption are not collected 
systematically and ad hoc periodical surveys are the only, rare, source. The data set 
used in this study come from a survey of technology adoption carried out over a 
sample of UK firms in the engineering and metalworking industry sector undertaken 
by the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CURDS) at the University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne. The survey has been conducted three times: in 1981, 1986 and 
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1993. It contains longitudinal data on finn characteristics, inter finn measures of 
diffusion, such as first adoption dates for five technologies, and some other relevant 
infonnation about the detenninants of the diffusion processes. the 1993 survey also 
contains intra finn measures of diffusion such as the percentage of machines tools of 
the finn that in 1993 incorporated each of the four (out of five) process technologies 
in the sample. The four technologies being: Numerical control of metal cutting, 
fonning or joining machinery (NC), Computerised numerically control of metal 
cutting fonning or joining machinery (CNC), Coated Carbide or Ceramic Tools or 
inserts for metal cutting (CoT) and Microprocessors incorporated into processes 
(Micro). The fifth technology present in CURDS sample is Robots. However, the lack 
of infonnation about the finn level of ownership has lead us to exclude it from this 
study. 
The list of the variables and the characteristics of the full data set are detailed in 
AppendixA. 
The thesis is organised along the following lines. Chapter 2 explains why intra finn 
diffusion is important. Chapter 3 discusses, theoretically and empirically, the existing 
literature in the area. Chapter 4 presents two different economic approaches to 
modelling the profitability of adoption (i.e. stock effects). Chapter 5 presents a new 
equilibrium intra finn model based upon neoclassical assumptions, adjusted for 
uncertainty and price expectations. Chapter 6 presents the necessary statistical caveats 
and the econometric techniques used to estimate the intra finn diffusion model. In 
Chapter 7 the results of the testing procedure is presented in detail for the 
technologies in the CURDS sample. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study with a 
summary of the main findings. 
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Chapter 2. 
THE INTENSITY OF TECHNOLOGICAL REPLACEMENT IN UK 
MANUFACTURING. WHY INTRA FIRM MATTERS. 
2.1 Introduction 
The process of adoption of superior technologies is a very important step in the 
process of technology transfer. It reflects the dynamism and the flexibility of an 
industry to be innovative. Consequently, the speed of technology replacement of the 
old with the new technology is a key variable in generating industry productivity 
growth and competitiveness (Doms et aI, 1995, Barro Sala I-Martin 1995, Aghion 
1998, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Verspagen 1991, 1992, Rosemberg 1994, 
Mansfield 1963aJb, 1968, etc). However, even within a given industry, the timing of 
first adoption and the extent of use of advanced technologies are very heterogeneous. 
Despite advanced technologies being available on the market, technology replacement 
both within a firm and within an industry takes many years and sometimes, for certain 
technologies, does not even reach 100% replacement of the ,existing 'inferior' 
technology. 
The inter firm diffusion literature has partly explored technology transfer by looking at 
the determinants of first adoption, i.e. when the firm adopts for the first time at least 
one unit of the new advanced cost reducing technology (see Karshenas and Stoneman 
1995 for a survey). It also models the speed of technology spread across firms. 
However, to be an adopter does not necessarily mean to be an extensive user. In fact, 
within an industry some adopters produce 100% of their output on the innovative cost 
reducing technology but several other own only small proportions of it and produce, 
say, only 10% of their output on the new technology. Consequently, the total amount 
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of technology ownership, or alternatively the industry output produced on the new 
technology, does not equal the proportion of first adopters. To look only at the inter 
firm spread of ownership of a technology, i.e. number ofusers,~ould overestimate the 
impact of technology use at the industry level and at the same time it would 
underestimate the potential benefits from adoption. 
In order to evaluate the within industry extent of use of a technology, one needs to 
understand the dynamics and characteristics of technology spreading. The latter is 
determined not only by the timing of first adoption by a firm (inter firm diffusion) but 
also by the firm's specific timing and speed of the replacement process of the old with 
the new technology after first adoption (intra-firm diffusion). 
The literature on intra firm diffusion is extremely limited even though it is one of the 
main determinants of the firm's innovative capability. 
This chapter, using the information in the CURDS data set, shows why intra firm 
diffusion is important. It also, preliminarily explores the spread of use of a set of 
advanced technologies both across and within the sample of UK firms. In particular, 
section 2 shows the different pattern of intra versus inter firm adoption of a set of 
technologies in the CURDS sample. Section 3 presents different indicators of 
technology diffusion and how sensitive they are to the measurement used. A final 
section measures the relative importance of the within firm level of adoption (intra-
firm diffusion) and the total number of adopters (inter-firm diffusion) upon the overall 
industry level of use of new technology. 
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2.2. Patterns of technology adoption: Inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion 
In any economy, there are many examples of new technology spreading, where, by 
new technology is meant a process innovation or an advanced cost reducing 
technology incorporated in capital goods. However, data upon the spread of use is not 
systematically collected by any official statistical agencies. The paucity of suitable 
data for analysing the diffusion of this phenomenon is one of the main reasons why 
intra firm diffusion has been relatively ignored in the literature. 
The CURDS data set is one of the rare data sets that provides information on intra 
firm diffusion, in this case for a sample of 343 establishments in the UK Engineering 
and metalworking sector on the pattern of ownership and use over time of four 
technologies: Numerical control of metal cutting, forming or joining tools (NC); 
Computerised numerical control of metal .cutting forming or joining tools (CNC); 
Coated Carbide or Ceramic Tools or Inserts for metal cutting (CoT); and 
Microprocessors incorporated in processes (MICRO). For each technology it provides 
information on the date at which each firm first adopted the four technologies (if 
adopted by 1993). This gives direct evidence on the within industry spread of use of 
the new technology i.e. the pattern of inter-firm adoption since the appearance of the 
new technology. The survey also provides information on the level of ownership of 
the new technology by each firm in the 1993 sample l and consequently the pattern of 
intra-firm diffusion of the new technologies. 
1 The data set provides longitudinal data on technology first adoption based upon 
retrospective questions asked in the three surveys carried out in 1981, 1986 and 1993. Data 
on the extent of use of the technology have been introduced only in the last survey, 
consequently they are available only for the 343 firms in the 1993 sample. 
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Figure 2.1. Inter firm diffusion orNC, CNC, CoT and Micro 
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Source: CURDS data set - personal elaboration 
In order to give an idea of the difference between inter and intra firm diffusion, the 
two measures of technology diffusion are illustrated graphically. Figure 2.1 shows the 
pattern of inter-firm diffusion since the appearance of each new technology up to 
1993, while Figure 2.2 plots the level of intra-firm diffusion among the cross-section 
of firms in 1993. 
Figure 2.2 Intra firm diffusion ofNC, CNC, CoT and Micro 
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Percentage of machine tool stock incorporating technology j 
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I 
Source: CURDS data set - personal elaboration 
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In Figure 2.1 the inter-firm path of the four technologies is measured over time as the 
share of adopters in the UK engineering industry from the date of first appearance of 
the technology on the market up to 19932• 
As predicted by the large majority of the studies on the timing of first adoption of a 
cost reducing technology (see Griliches 1957, Mansfield 1963a1b, 1968,1993, Davies 
1979, Mahajan et al 1990, etc.), the four curves show the traditional inter-firm S-
shaped diffusion path. This pattern is characterised by a low speed of diffusion in 
early years, which increases in the central diffusion period up to the inflection point, 
after which use tends asymptotically to the ceiling or saturation level (~1 00 % of 
adopters). 
Figure 2.1 also shows that, despite the number of years from their appearance, i.e. NC 
(1955), CNC (1968), CoT (1949), Micro (1971), by 1993 none of the technologies 
have completed the process of technology spreading, adoption levels being between 
78% and 90%3 of eligible firms. This means that despite the number of years from 
first appearance of the technologies, between 22% and 10% of the firms still have to 
adopt them for the first time. Moreover, each technology spreads over time at 
different speeds. 
In particular, NC and CNC are an example of two substitute technologies. NC 
technology appeared in the UK. in 1955. It is much older than CNC and shows a much 
slower diffusion pattern than CNC. CNC, the Computerised version of NC, first 
2 The share of adopters at time t is the cumulative number of firms that have introduced the 
new technology at the end of each observed year. 
3 A particular characteristic of the data is that for each of the technologies there exists a 
proportion of establishments that have adopted the technology prior 1993 but that in 1993 
register zero ownership. This means that the technology has been dismissed. Those 
establishments have been included in the measurement of inter-firm diffusion in Figure 2.1. 
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appeared in the UK in 1971 and spread very quickly. In 1983-84 the number of CNC 
users becomes greater than the number of NC users. The faster speed of diffusion may 
be due to the spillovers from the accumulated experience gained by the use of NC, 
which can be regarded as an old generation ofCNC. In 1993 the proportion of firms in 
the sample that have adopted NC and CNC are, respectively, 76% and 81 % of the total 
eligible firms within the sample. 
CoT, first appearing in 1955, is a technology enhancing the performance of both CNC 
and NC. CoT spreads much more slowly than the other two technologies but, in 1993, 
the proportion of adopters is much higher than NC and CNC, CoT having being 
adopted by almost 90% of the eligible firms. This is due to CoT being a (multi) 
complementary technology and to the increasing number of users ofCNC and NC (or 
both) adopting the technology4. 
Microprocessors incorporated into processes (Micro), similar to CNC, appeared on the 
UK market at the beginning of the seventies. Its spread of use has occurred at a much 
slower (and constant) rate than CNC. In 1993 it had been adopted by about 76% of the 
British engineering and manufacturing firms in the sample reaching almost the same 
diffusion level as NC and CNC. 
Based upon the evidence of the inter-firm diffusion in Figure 2.1 one might conclude 
that: a) the adoption pattern is technology specific, each technology being 
4 The joint adoption of NC and CoT is an example of technological complementarity in the 
production process. Figure 2.1 shows the simultaneously of their adoption path, that is 
proved to lead to cross technology effects, i.e. the presence of one technology does affect the 
presence of the other. From Figure 2.1 it is also possible to see the impact on NC of the 
appearance of its substitute CNC and the complementary of the last one with the CoT. See 
Colombo and Mosconi (1994), Stoneman and Kwon (1994) on simultaneous diffusion of 
multiple technology and interconnections between technologies such that the diffusion of any 
one technology is not independent of the diffusion of another technology. 
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characterised by its own speed of diffusion; b) in 1993, the within industry processes 
of technology diffusion of the four technologies is slowly moving towards completion, 
with level of use ranging between 79% and 90% of userss• Furthermore, the high 
number of years from first appearance of the new technology might legitimate the 
assumption that, in 1993, the proportion of output produced on the new technology, by 
those firms that have adopted the technology especially at early' years, is quite high, 
i.e. approaching 100 %. If this were true, a large proportion of the firms would have 
already completely replaced their old machinery with the new, and the percentage of 
users would fairly reflect the industry output produced on the new technology. 
Figure 2.2 shows the intra firm level of adoption of the four technologies as the 
percentage of machine tool stock that incorporates the new technology for the sample 
of adopters in the UK engineering industry in 1993. Contrary to what one might have 
expected, the level of adoption is quite heterogeneous. In 1993, only a small 
proportion of firms have completed the replacement process of the old with the new 
technology and despite extensive first adoption, only a small proportion of total 
industry output is being produced on the cost reducing advanced technologies. 
NC technology is the oldest technology in the sample and thus one might expect that 
the process of intra-firm diffusion would have proceeded further. In 1993 only 118 
firms still had NC machines in their capital stock, implying that 31 % of the sample 
had previously adopted but were no longer users in 1993. 
5 Only those firms that are potential or actual users of the technology have been included in 
the sample. Those firms for which adoption is not applicable (i.e. not compatible with their 
production) are not included. This means that between 21 % and 10% of the firms in the 
sample are still potential adopters. 
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The rationale for this is obviously going to be related to the supercedence of NC by 
CNC in that one might expect that as CNC is adopted it replaces NC (see Figure 2.1). 
Among the users of NC machines, in 1993 only 3.3 % of the 'sample claim that the 
tool represented more than 50 % of the machine tool stock of the establishment. 
CNC is a relatively young technology complementary to NC machines tools. 
However, of the sample of343 finns, 222 had adopted it by 1993, of whom 212 where 
still users in 1993. The extent of intra-finn use is however limited. The proportion of 
the machine tool stock of the establishments that incorporates CNC is less than 20 % 
for 52 % of the finns and only 7 % have a proportion in excess of70 %. 
CoT is a cheap technology complementary to NC and CNC technologies enabling the 
latter to be more productive. 226 finns in the sample had adopted the technology by 
1993 but at that date only 192 still used the technology. However, the extent of intra 
finn diffusion of CoT is generally higher than for the other two technologies. Thus 
nearly 6 % of the sample register 100 % use, whereas 36 % report that the proportion 
of the machines tool stock incorporating CoT is greater than 50 %. 
Microprocessors incorporated into processes (Micro) appeared on the UK market at 
the beginning of the seventies. By 1993, out of the 244 potential adopters, 185 finns 
have adopted this technology but only 155 of them were still currently using it. The 
distribution of the within finn extent of use of Micro is very skewed to the right due to 
the high concentration of finns, which own only a small proportion the new 
technology. About 66% of the current users report that the proportion of the machine 
tool stock incorporating Micro technology is less than 30%. Only 7 % have a 
proportion in excess of 70 %, among them only 2% are using the technology at 100%. 
The empirical evidence upon the intra and inter finn adoption pattern of the four 
technologies in these manufacturing industries seems to suggest that despite the high 
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level of inter-firm adoption, in 1993, the average industry output produced on the new 
technologies is very low and highly heterogeneous. Consequently despite the number 
of adopters, the whole industry is still not fully exploiting the potential benefits from 
the cost reducing technologies. This proves that, if one is interested in measuring the 
benefits from adoption of a new technology within an industry then it is as important 
to look at the the level of ownership within a firm (intra firm diffusion) as it is to look 
at determinants of first adoption of a new technology among firms (inter firm 
diffusion). 
The next section further explores the relative impact of inter versus intra firm 
diffusion on total industry output produced on new technologies. 
2.3. Measures of technology diffusion 
The empirical evidence on the diffusion pattern of the set of technologies in the 
CURDS data set (Le. NC, CNC CoT and Micro), has shown that the spread of use of a 
technology can be measured by either the number of adopters within an industry 
(inter-firm diffusion) or by the within firm extent of use of the new technology (intra-
firm diffusion). It has also been pointed out that the number of adopters, as an 
indicator of the extent of use of a technology in the industry, can be very biased. It 
does not take into account that the ''within'' level of technology use is highly 
heterogeneous and to be an adopter does not necessarily mean to be an extensive user. 
Within an industry there are firms that (a) have adopted the technology at some point 
in the past (adopters),(b) firms that could but have not yet adopted the new technology 
(potential adopters) and (3) firms for which the technology is not suitable to their 
production process (non-eligible). For obvious reasons the latter are not considered in 
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this study and as such have been dropped out of the sample. Among the adopters there 
are finns that are currently using variable levels of the new technology (users) and 
those that have in the past but by 1993 are no longer using the technology (ex-users). 
This shows that further to the definition used, the measure of technology spreading is 
very sensitive also to the base popUlation used. 
The indicator of the overall spread of adoption of a new technology that takes into 
account this heterogeneity across finns and over time, is the level of industry output 
produced on the new technology. This reflects both increasing numbers of technology 
adopters within an industry and their variable level of use of the new technology. 
Table 2.1 summarises the main indicators of technology diffusion within the industry 
for the four technologies over a cross section of finns in the CURDS 1993 sample. In 
particular column one and two show the average total industry output produced by the 
new technology and the percentage of finns in the industry that have adopted the 
technology by 1993. The last two columns show the average extent of use as the 
average percentage output produced on the new technology by first adopters (column 
3) and current users (column 4t. 
6 The information contained in the CURDS data set concerns the proportion of capital stock 
of the firm incorporating the new technology. This is the intra-firm definition based upon the 
stock of new technology owned by the firm. The corresponding flow definition is the 
proportion of output produced on the existing technology. One might argue that they are not 
equivalent. However, given the heterogeneity of the firms level of use, the firms productivity 
differentials, due to the different combination of inputs used their production system, can be 
reasonably eliminated by calculating the industry average and assuming that the differentials 
are normally distributed around it. 
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Table 2.1. Major indicators of within industry technology diffusion in 1993 
(percen tages) 
2 3 4 
A verage Industry Industry number of adoptersb Average Output per adopter" Average Output per current 
Output" (inter-firm adoption) (intra industry use) userd 
(intra industry use) 
Total eligible firms Total eligible firms Adopters Current Users 
7.0 78.6 8.27 16.32 
(268) (211) (211 ) (liS) 
20.6 82.0 25.1 27.8 
(270) (222) (222) (212) 
40.0 90.3 41.S 49.0 
(250) (226) (226) (192) 
13.8 76.1 18.2 21.7 
(244) (\85) (185) (\55) 
NOTES: a) Average industry output produced on the new technology by the total number of 
eligible firms in the sample (current users, ex users, potential adopters); b) Proportion of 
adopters over the total number of eligible firms; c) Average industry output produced by those 
firms that have adopted the technology (users and no longer users); d) Average output 
produced by current users. Number of firms in brackets. 
SOURCE: CURDS data set- Personal elaboration 
Table 2.1 shows that despite between 76% and 90 % of the eligible finns in the 
sample having adopted each of the technologies (column 2), the proportion of output 
they produce with each technology is only between 8% and 42% (column 3). 
If one excludes from the sample those adopters that are no longer using the technology 
(ex users), this proportion is slightly higher, ranging between 16% and 49% (column 
4). At the industry level only 8% to 40% of total output is produced with the new 
technologies (column 1). This would suggest that, despite the number of adopters (or 
current users), the potential benefits from the use of the new technology are still far 
from being fully exploited. Table 2.1 also shows that the different measures of 
technology diffusion are very sensitive to the definition used and they reflect the fact 
that, within an industry, current users do coexist with potential adopters and ex-users. 
This heterogeneity can be better seen looking at each single technology. 
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NC is the oldest technology in the sample. In 1993, on average, around 16% of the 
capital stock owned by the current users incorporated NC . However, the current users 
(115) are around a half of those firms that have in the past adopted NC (211). The 
other half are no longer using it, presumably because it is now regarded as obsolete 
technology slowly being replaced by CNC, the advanced computerised version. This 
proportion is even less if one considers the total sample of eligible finns, i.e. potential 
adopters, current users and ex users (268). Consequently, despite the number of 
adopters being about 78.6%, only 7% of total industry output is produced on NC. 
Similar to NC, in 1993, about 82% offinns have in the past adopted CNC but in 1993 
only 43% are currently using the technology, on which they produce, on average, 28% 
of their total output. As a result, only about 20.6% of industry output is produced on 
CNC. 
As expected, CoT is the most popular technology being complementary to both NC 
and CNC. By 1993, 90.3 % of the finns in the sample have adopted it and most of 
them (95%) are still using the technology in their production processes, producing 
each an average of 50% of their output on this technology. The resulting total industry 
average output produced on CNC is around 40%.Consequently the difference between 
the finn average (50%) and the industry average level of output (40%) produced on 
the new technology is mostly due to around 10% of the eligible firms within the 
industry not having yet adopted CoT. 
Microprocessors are used in only 13.8% of the total industry production processes. 
Among the current users (64%) the average current level of ownership is 21.7%. The 
difference between the average industry use and the firm's average use is due to the 
fact within the industry there are adopters that, in 1993, have ceased its use (12%) and 
firms that still have to adopt Microprocessors for the first time (about 24%). 
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In the light of these results, it is possible to conclude that the measure of use of a new 
technology is very sensitive to the indicator used as it is a function of both the 
increasing number of adopters (and ex users) and the output produced by the current 
users of the technology. As they change over time so does the total industry use of the 
technology.This also suggest that, if one is interested in measuring the industry 
benefits from the spread of a cost reducing technology then it is important to look at 
the average output produced on the cost reducing technology (intra firm diffusion) and 
not simply at the number of users (inter firm diffusion). 
The next step in this preliminary study is to disentangle the relative contribution of the 
number of adopters (inter-firm effect) and the average firm level of use of a new 
technology (intra-firm effect) upon the spread of use of a new technology within an 
industry as measured by industry output produced on the advanced technology. 
2.4. Relative impact of inter vs intra firm diffusion 
In light of the differences in the inter and intra firm approaches to the measurement of 
the industry extent of use of a technology, it should now be evident that to refer only 
to the level of industry adopters (inter firm diffusion) does overestimate the industry 
level of use of a new technology. Moreover, while the decision to become an adopter 
is irreversible, to extensively use the technology can take several years and can be 
subject to permanent or temporary interruptions, depending upon the firm's internal 
and external conditions. The complexity of this investment decision gives rise to 
different timings of inter firm first adoption and different levels of intra-firm extent of 
use of the new technology over time. 
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The level of total industry output produced on the new technology reflects both 
effects. Leaving aside, for the moment, the ex-ante determinants of the investment 
decision, this indicator of technology adoption can be used to 'measure the ex-post-
relative importance of intra- versus inter-firm diffusion upon the spread of a new 
technology within an industry. This can be done by using simple algebra. 
Assume that the industry level of use of a new technology (DJ 'can be written as the 
industry output produced on the new technology j, (Ytj) over the total output of the 
industry (YJ: 
(2.1) 
where Y tj equals the sum of the output produced using technology j by each firm i that 
has adopted technology j (Y tj=~i Ytij) and Y, equals the sum of the total output 
produced by all firms in the sample (Yt=~i Yti). Moreover, using averages instead of 
absolute measures one can rewrite Y tj as the average output produced on technology j 
(f tj=~i ytijlNtj) times the total number of adopters (Ntj) within the industry, Le. 
Y,=Nt, f t,. The same can be done for the total industry output YI, with respect to the \J J' ~ 
average total output (f t= ~i YtilNJ produced by each of the N firms, within the 
industry, i.e. Yt= Nt Y t. This allows one to rewrite (2.1) as : 
(Ntj Y Ii) 
D t = -----------
(Nt YJ 
7 The above preposition is expressed in term of flows rather than stocks, i.e. YntlYt. However 
one could just as easy define D as to represent the stock of the new capital good owned by the 
firm without materially changing the problem. 
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or equivalently as (2.2): 
Ng Yg 
Dt = (------) ... (------) (2.2) 
Nt Yt 
(LEVEL ANALYSIS) 
where N/Nt is the proportion of adopters over the total number of firms (inter firm 
effect), and Y tjl Y t is the industry average output produced with the technology j, by 
those firms who have adopted, over the average total output produced across all firms 
(intra firm effect). 
Using the log transformation, equation (2.2) can be rewritten in additive form as (2.3): 
Ntj Yg 
log D t = log ----- + log ------ (2.3) 
Nt Yt 
Further, dividing both side of equation (2.3) by logDt and using percentages instead 
of proportions allows one to derive the relative importance of inter-firm and intra-firm 
effects upon the spread of use a technology j within an industry at each point in time 
as: 
100% = Relative inter firm effects (%) + Relative intra firm effects (%) 
log(inter firm adoption)nog(total industry use) +log(intra firm adoption)/log(total industry use) 
(RELATIVE ANALYSIS) 
Moreover, by first differencing equation (2.3) one can derive (2.4): 
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dlogDt dNjt 1 dNt 1 
------- = (------- ---- - ------ ---) + 
dY jt l' dY t 1 (-------- ----- - ----- ------) (2.4) 
dt dt dt 
(GROWTH RATE ANALYSIS) 
Equation (2.4) illustrates that the rate of growth of the industry level of use can be 
split into two components: (i) the intra firm growth rate and (ii) the inter firm growth, 
rate. This is a useful indicator as it shows the direction and the intensity of the growth 
of the inter and intra firm effects over time. 
The implications of this derivation can be better explained using a practical example. 
For ease of presentation only the diffusion of CNC machine tools is reported. Similar 
results have been obtained for the other technologies in the CURDS sample. 
In Table 2.2, column 2 shows the average industry usage of CNC, while columns 3 
and 4 show, respectively, the inter and intra-firmS effect in absolute level as in 
equation 2 (LEVEL ANALYSIS). Column 4 and 5 show the relative impact of inter and 
intra firm effects upon the total industry current level of technology adoption 
(RELATIVE ANALYSIS). Finally columns 6, 7 and 8 show, respectively, the speed of 
the spread of industry adoption, inter and intra firm effects, with their relative impact 
in brackets (GROWTH RATE ANALYSIS) 9. 
8 The measure of intra-firm diffusion is available only for 1993. Retrospective information 
has been interpolated over time from the point of first adoption to 1993 and the resulting pool 
industry average calculated for each year. 
9 One might object that equations 1-3 assume that establishments are homogeneous. In order 
to take into account that establishments are different in some important characteristics, the 
same exercise has been carried out weighting each component by the size of the establishment 
i.e. number of employees and turnover. The results do not change significantly especially 
when the relative effects are compared. The interested reader can find all the details of this 
exercise for CNe, in Appendix B. For this reason and for brevity of presentation only the 
unweighted form is discussed here. 
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Table 2.2 CNC INTER AND INTRA FIRM EFFECTS 
LEVEL ANALYSISa RELATIVE ANAL YSISD Il>ROWTH RATES ANALYSISc 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prop. of Prop. of Prop. of 
Year Industry Industry Output INTER-firm INTRA-firm Industry Industry Output 
Output Adopters per adopter Impact (%) Impact (%) Usage Adopters (%) per adopter (%) 
(D) (NnlN) (Yn·/Y·) Log(NnlN) Log(Yn ·/Y·) D(YnlY} (dNnlNn-dNIN) (dYn ./Yn t_dyt/P 
1993 0.228 0.82 0.278 13.41% 86.59% 0.577 0.152 0.489 
(23.64%) (76.36%) 
1986 0.099 0.70 0.142 15.58% 84.42% 0.675 0.372 0.516 
(38.81%) (61.19%) 
1981 0.032 0.47 0.068 22.02% 77.98% 0.940 0.912 0.328 
(73.56%) (26.44%) 
1975 0.002 0.04 0.046 50.96% 49.04% . . . 
NOTE: a) Level analysis: Dtj= YtjlYt= (NtjINV( l' tj Il' V; b) In Log analysis: log (YtjIYV= 
log(NtjINV+log(l' t/l' V; c) Growth rate analysis: dlogDtj = [dNjlNj-dNIN] + [dY tjlY tj • 
d Y tl Y t ] where: l' tj=LiYtijlNtj and Y t =LiYtilNt i=l .. N 
SOURCE: CURDS data set - personal elaboration 
Based upon the figures in Table 2.2 (column 3), in 1993 the inter firm diffusion of 
CNC is still an ongoing phenomena. The number of adopters has increased over time 
from 4% in 1975 to 82% in 1993. However, in 1993, after about 23 years from first 
appearance of the technology, about 18% of the eligible firms still have to adopt CNC 
for the first time. 
The speed of inter firm diffusion (column 8) indicates that there is a large increase in 
the number of first adopters from when CNC first appeared on the market up to the 
point of inflexion in 1982 (i.e. GRI981=O.972). After that date the growth rate is still 
positive but decreasing, tending asymptotically to its ceiling or saturation level (i.e. 
GRI986=0.372 and GRI986=O.152 in 1993). In other words, as already seen in Figure 
2.1, the time path of CNC first adoption follows the traditional S-shape growth curve 
slowly moving ,in 1993, towards its maximum or saturation level. 
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Table 2.2 also shows the pattern of the intra finn effect over time. Column 4 indicates 
that the finns over time gradually increase their proportion of output produced on the 
new technology from about 5% in 1975 to about 14% in 1986.' In 1993 the average 
rate of replacement is still far from 100 %, being, on average, only 28%. 
In column 9 the growth rate analysis indicates that the intra finn diffusion does not 
follow the inter finn S-shape path but rather increases exponentially over time, with a 
modest start (0.328 in 1981) which increases over time (0.52 in 1986 and 0.50 in 
1993). The total industry output produced on the cost reducing advanced technologies 
(column 2) is slowly increasing over time reaching 23% in 1993. This corresponds to 
about 82% of adopters each producing on average about 28% of their total output with 
the new technology. These figures are even lower in previous years. 
The comparison of the relative importance of the inter and intra finn effects upon the 
total average industry output produced on the new technology is illustrated in the 
central part of the table (column 5 and 6). In the first years after appearance of the 
new technology the inter firm diffusion process has a relatively higher impact than the 
intra firm effect and it accounts for almost 51 % of the technology spread. However, 
its relative importance is annually decreasing over time compared to the intra firm 
effect. The latter shows an initial relative impact of 49 % while for the rest of the 
period its magnitude is almost 4 times that of the inter firm effects. 
Form this one can conclude that the inter-firm effect has played a significant role in 
the first years from the appearance ofCNC (1970). However, for the remainder of the 
period up to 1993 the intra firm effect has exerted a much greater impact than the inter 
firm effect upon the proportion of industry output produced on the new technology. 
Counterfactual analysis can show this in a much more straightforward way. 
Controlling for each single component one can isolate the impact it exerts on the 
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spread of the new technology. For example, assuming 1986 as the base date and 
imposing the counter factual assumption of an unchanged inter firm effect up to 1993, 
the proportion of output produced on the new technology would have been 0.12. 
Keeping, instead, the inter firm effect stationary as the base case, that is no inter firm 
diffusion since 1986, the increase in the proportion of output produced on the new 
technology would have been about 0.20 in 1993. This implies that in 1986 the intra 
firm level of adoption of a new technology, in absence of inter firm effects, would 
have increased the average industry output produced on the new technology almost 
twice as much as inter firm effects alone. If, instead the base case is kept equal to 
1975, the total output produced on the new technology in absence of changes in intra 
and inter firm effects would have been respectively 0.022 and 0.003 in 1981 and 0.03 
and 0.01 in 1993. This would indicate that inter firm effects exert a greater impact 
upon diffusion in early years of adoption than in later ~ears, while the reverse is true 
as time goes by. It also indicates that in order to increase the proportion of output 
produced with the new technology, both intra and inter effects should grow over time. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter, using the information contained in the CURDS data set, has looked at 
different indicators of inter and intra firm technology diffusion showing that the 
diffusion path over time is technology specific, Occurs at different speeds and the level 
of ownership of the new technology across firms is quite heterogeneous. 
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In 1993, the within industry spread of adoption (inter firm diffusion) of the four 
technologies here examined (NC, CNC, CoT, Micro), is slowly moving towards 
saturation the technologies having been first adopted by between 76% and 90% of the 
firms in the industry. 
In the same year, the firms' extent of use of each technology (intra-firm diffusion) is 
quite low, ranging between 8 and 42%. Despite the relatively high number of users 
and the years since the launch ofthe technologies, only a small proportion of firms are 
close to completion (or have completed) the replacement process of the old with the 
new technology. The resulting proportion of total industry output produced on the cost 
reducing technologies is even lower, i.e.7% to 40%, the difference between the two 
measures being due to the coexistence of ex-users with potential, intermediate, and 
total users. If one further compares these values with the measure of inter firm 
diffusion, the discrepancy is even bigger. This indicates that to use only the proportion 
of adopters as a measure of technology diffusion would be quite wrong. What 
determines the total industry output produced with the new technology and the 
industry benefits from adoption is a combination of the number of adopters (inter firm 
diffusion) and the proportion of output produced by the adopters (intra firm diffusion). 
This chapter has also shown that in early years, the inter firm effects exert a slightly 
higher impact on diffusion than intra firm effects, while the for the rest of the period 
the opposite is true. The impact of intra-firm diffusion on the total industry output 
produced on the new technology is persistently higher than the inter firm level of 
adoption and its importance greatly increases over time. For these reasons, and 
because the intra firm effect has been widely overlooked, this thesis concentrates on 
the spread of the new technology within firms rather than their spreading across firms. 
The next chapter reviews the existing literature in the area. 
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Chapter 3. 
THE EXISTING THEORY OF INTRA-FIRM DIFFUSION 
3.1. Introduction 
Within the literature concerning the economics of technological changes a more 
specific· area of research, labelled technology diffusion, focuses on technology 
adoption. A large majority of such studies looks at inter firm diffusion which is the 
process leading to first adoption of a new technology (Davies 1979, Stoneman 1986, 
or more specifically David 1991, Mansfield, 1963a1b, 1993, Reinganum 1981a1b/c, 
Stoneman and Kwon 1998, Stoneman and Toivanen 1997, Colombo and Mosconi 
1995, etc.). However, contrary to inter firm diffusion studies, and despite its relevance, 
there exist only two significant pieces of work on intra firm diffusion: the seminal 
contribution of Mansfield (1968), based on a disequilibrium process driven by passive 
information acquisition, and Stoneman (l981a), which is an example of an 
equilibrium model based on Bayesian learning. Both models consider information 
and uncertainty to be the keys to explaining why it is rational for firms to not 
completely switch immediately to new technology (Stoneman, 1983). 
This chapter aims at looking in more detail at the two models present in the existing 
literature on intra firm diffusion and testing their validity for the technologies in the 
CURDS data set. Following an equilibrium approach it also preliminary explores the 
possibility that, similarly to inter firm effects, there exist intra-firm effects and they 
significantly affect the extent of use of a new technology. Such hypotheses has never 
been explored in the current literature and as such it is considered a useful route to 
follow to deepen the understanding of the within firm process of technology transfer. 
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The chapter is structured as follow. Section 2 presents the Stoneman model. Section 3 
presents the theoretical assumption of the Mansfield model and tests econometrically 
the validity of its predictions using the CURDS data. This section also highlights some 
of the theoretical weaknesses of this type of approach. In section 4 a distinction is 
made between equilibrium and disequilibrium approaches to modelling the firm 
adoption pattern of a new technology. Section 5 presents a preliminary intra firm 
equilibrium approach to explore, on an empirical basis, the existence of factors 
traditionally present in the inter firm literature. Section 6 concludes this chapter 
summarising the main findings. 
3.2. The Stoneman model 
The Stoneman model (Stoneman, 1981) is the first and only model of intra-firm 
technology diffusion solidly grounded in economic theory. The basic idea behind this 
model is that the firm's choice of technique is endogenous and based upon learning 
from experience about the characteristics of the technology. Learning occurs in a 
Bayesian manner and together with the adjustment costs associated with the decision 
to invest, generates the time path of usage of the new technology. 
In mathematical terms Stoneman defines at as the proportion of the firm's fixed output 
produced with the new technology at time t and assumes that the firm determines the 
desired level of at, defined as a;, according to a mean-variance approach to technique 
choice. It is also assumed that the firm has to choose the optimal combination of new 
(n) and old (0) technology, each having expected anticipated returns Normally 
distributed (N(J..lnt;cr2nJ and N(J..lot;cr2oJ. The resulting combination of old (l-aJ and 
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new (aJ technology generates the expected returns from their joint adoption as in 
(3.1): 
Ilt = at Illlt + (I-at) Ilot 
crl
2 
= a/ crnl2 + (1 -aJ2 crol2 +2a, (l-aJ crnol (3.1) 
The entrepreneur then chooses a l by maximising the utility function U (3.2) in which 
C is defined as the disutility of the adjustment costs that arise when a l is changed: 
(3.2) 
Following Chipman (1973), Stoneman specifies H()l;cr2) as: 
b>O a>O 
Setting a=l and maximising U with respect to )l and cr2 he determines the level of 
new technology ~se (al*) that would be desired ifthere were no adjustment costs: 
(3.3) 
After some manipUlation and other caveats, assuming that the firm acts in myopic 
manner, such that given ai_I it chooses a l to maximise (3.2), Stoneman derives the 
optimal level of investment in the new technology in presence of non-zero adjustment 
cost (3.4): 
(3.4) 
where b is a risk coefficient, and crllOl is the correlation between the returns to the new 
and old technologies so that: 
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a not = pant a ot 
Stoneman further assumes that the returns from the old technolqgy are known, fixed 
and held with certainty with time invariant distribution, i.e. N(llo;cr2
o
), (because the 
entrepreneur is supposed to already know by experience its properties) so that: 
The entrepreneur initially uses the new and old technologies in the proportion (a.;'; 
I-a;'). However, as time proceeds he monitors the performance of the new technology 
and adjusts his anticipations of the returns to the new technology in a Bayesian 
manner leading to changes in both at and at- (Stoneman, 1986). 
The corresponding original a priori distribution of the mean returns to the new 
technology at time t, N(llnt; snJ, is then adjusted every time returns are experienced by 
the entrepreneur. The adjustment in the anticipated variance, being proportional to the 
uncertainty of the returns experienced over time (a2 nJ, is expected to fall over time 
approaching the real variance of the returns (a /). At the same time, the anticipated 
mean return (IlnJ may rise or fall depending on whether the expected mean return is 
greater or less than the true mean return approximating the real average return ( ~ n). 
As the anticipated estimate of a l / and Jlnt change over time also the desired level of 
new technology (at*) will change, until the true mean and variance of the returns to 
the new technology is established and this will establish the post diffusion level of use 
( a). The latter results from the combination of: (i) the true mean and variance of 
returns to the new technology; (ii) the true mean and variance of the old technology; 
(iii) the firm's initial estimate of Ilnt and crnt; and (iv) the firm's risk, yielding: 
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where ~ and ;; / are respectively the true mean profitability of the new technology 
and the variance of its returns. 
Stoneman (1981) shows that under certain conditions the path of at, as it tends 
towards a, will be sigmoid. His model also justifies why some technologies do not 
diffuse as, based upon consideration about the 'true' profitability of the new 
technology, the preferred level of use at'" may decline over time, and once a; falls 
below at the diffusion is halted and perhaps reversed. If, however, at· remains above 
at for all t <oc , then the diffusion does proceed (Stoneman, 1983). 
In summary the Stoneman model is a sophisticated theoretical model based upon 
economic theory, where the decision to further adopt a technology is based upon an 
instantaneous decision (Tonks, 1986). The latter is rational, in that at all times the 
level of use maximises the utility of the decision maker, given his anticipations of 
returns, risk and costs of adjustment. However, despite its sophisticated theory based 
upon profitability considerations, it is intractable empirically. 
The alternative existing model of intra firm diffusion was first developed by Mansfield 
(1968). This model, traditionally referred to as epidemic model, has played a 
dominating role within the diffusion literature. Contrary to the Stoneman model, in 
this model learning is by infection and not from experience. 
Its theoretical assumptions and the testing of its validity on empirical grounds over the 
technologies in the CURDS data set, are explored in the following section. 
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3.3. THE MANSFIELD MODEL 
3.3.1. Epidemic modelling: the Mansfield information based a'pproach 
According to Mansfield (1968) the spread of technology can be likened to an epidemic 
where diseases are assumed to spread by contact between individuals. By implication 
the use of a new technology will be spread as individuals make contact with one 
anotherl. 
The Mansfield model assumes that a firm acquires a new technology by purchase of a 
capital good that embodies the technology (i.e. the disease) and defines Sjjl as the 
amount of new technology j the firm i owns at time t and S"jj as the amount of new 
technology j that the firm i will own when the diffusion process is complete .. Then he 
rewrites the proportion of capital stock bec~me 'infected' by the new technology in 
the interval t to t+ 1 as the additions to the stock of the new technology in time t over 
the gross additions still to be made: 
I For example, if, in a constant population P, one allows Nt to be the number of individuals 
affected by the disease, and N* the number not immune to the disease, then at time t there are 
P-Nt individuals not affected, of whom N*-Nt are susceptible to the disease. In mathematical 
terms this is can be written as: 
dNt = ~l(NtlN*)(N*-Nt)dt 
where, under the assumption of homogeneously mixing population, the average number of 
persons infected, dNt. in a small time interval dt, would be equal to the probability for a 
susceptible individual to meet an infected person and being infected in the small time interval, 
~,(NtlN*), times the susceptible number in the time t, (N*-NU' Solving this differential 
equation yields the well known Logistic curve: 
NtlN*= lI(1+exp-(a+~t») 
where a is the constant of integration and ~ is the constant rate of infection from the infected 
to the non infected. This is just one example of models based on epidemic spread of a disease 
(Banks,1991). 
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Sjjl+1 - Sjjl 
W .. = ----------------IJI 
SOij - Sijl 
(3.5) 
He then hypothesises that, for film i adopting technology j, the rate of technology 
transfer Pij, is a positive function (G) of: 1tij' the expected profitability of adoption 
(modelled as time invariant); Ujjl ,a time varying measure of the risk attached to 
adoption; Mjj ,a measure of the size of the finn and Cj ,a measure of the liquidity of 
the finn (both these latter tenns being considered time invariant). In mathematical 
tenns he writes: 
(3.6) 
Mansfield then argues that the risk of adoption, Ujjl, depends upon the number of years 
from the first adoption by any finns to the date when the technology is first used by 
the firm i, Ljj. The longer the firm waits, the more information about the true 
profitability of the technology it gains from the experience of other adopters. As time 
proceeds the amount of infonnation available lowers the firm's uncertainty and as it 
does so diffusion proceeds. On this ground he then assumes that the reduction in 
uncertainty is inversely related to the level of usage of the technology by the firm, i.e. 
Specifically he assumes that: 
(3.7) 
yielding, after substitution of (3.7) into (3.6.), that: 
(3.8) 
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On the basis that there would (seem to) exist an important analogue to the classic 
psychological laws relating reaction time to the intensity of the stimulus, Mansfield 
assumes that Wijt in (3.5) can be approximated within a relevant'range by a quadratic 
function of 7tij' Lij , Sij/S·ij, Mij , Cj • By taking Taylor's series expansion and the 
dropping of higher order terms, it is further assumed that (3.5) may be written as: 
(3.9) 
Substituting from (3.5) into (3.9) and writing the result as a differential rather than a 
difference equation yields: 
(3.1O) 
Equation (3.10) indicates that, for a firm, the increase in use ofa new technology (dSJ 
is a function of the probability of obtaining 'information by contact' about the 
technology in a small time interval dt, P ij{S/S*), times the additions to the new stock 
still to be made (S*-SJ. This is the expression typical of several sigmoid epidemic 
models2• It is the standard logistic curve with the speed of intra-firm diffusion given 
by the linear combination Pij and has the solution: 
S .. /S* .. = lI(l-exp{-A .. t.,-a» I) I) PI) I) (3.11) 
(3.12) 
where a. is a constant of integration and it represents the date of first adoption by the 
firm. 
2 See footnote 1. 
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The element of novelty of this model with respect to the traditional epidemic models, 
is that Pij (the rate of diffusion) is finn specific and is a linear combination of 
exogenous time invariant factors. 
The Mansfield model in essence states that there is a final level of use of the 
technology S*ij and over time the finn will approach this level as it accumulates 
experience from use and the uncertainty attached to use declines. So, basically it is 
uncertainty from the poor information on the performance characteristics of the 
technology that deters risk averse firms from further acquiring such technology. He 
thus constructs the model where the uncertainty is reduced over time as a result of 
learning from experience. The resulting diffusion path is logistic (see 3.11). The 
factors determining the decision to further use the technology enter into p, the speed 
of diffusion, which is assumed to be constant and a linear function of the date of first 
use, firm characteristics (size and liquidity) and the expected profitability of adoption 
(see 3.12). It is further assumed that the end point of the diffusion process, i.e. the 
saturation stock, is 1, that is at the end of the diffusion process all the existing 
technology is replaced by the advanced technology. 
Although the Mansfield model has been widely used in the empirical literature it has a 
number of problems, many of which are common to the standard epidemic models. 
Some of the empirical weaknesses and theoretical inconsistencies are quite difficult to 
ignore. The next section 3.3.3.considers empirical and section 3.3.4. theoretical 
problems. 
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3.3.2 Testing of the Mansfield model 
The Mansfield model suggests that the intra-firm adoption pattern tends to follow a 
sigmoid path. This means that the firm will gradually transfer 'its production to the 
new technology and the pattern can be modelled over time by a Logistic curve. with 
use ranging from some positive number at the date of first use. to a saturation point at 
the date of complete diffusion. Moreover. it suggests that its rate of growth is a 
function of economic factors. such as profitability. size of the firm, liquidity and risk, 
yielding the model specification: 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
This section aims to test empirically some of the main hypotheses underlying the 
Mansfield model3 and in particular whether for each technology j: 
HI) the intra firm diffusion path is Logistic; 
H2) the end point of the diffusion process is 1. i.e. at the end of the diffusion process 
all the old technology is replaced by the new technology; 
H3) the speed of diffusion is a linear function of the other users at the date of first use 
(Lij)' firm characteristics. such as size (Mij ) and liquidity of the firm (Ci) and the 
expected profitability of adoption (1tij). 
H4) the speed of diffusion (~i) is a time invariant constant; 
The testing of each of the above hypothesis has been carried out comparing the 
performance of: 
3 Part of this study has already been published in Stoneman and Battisti.1997. 
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T 1) alternative statistical distributions of technology ownership such as the Gompertz 
statistical distribution4• 
T2) alternative models with fixed (~j=l) and variable saturation p~ints (~j<l) 
T3) the same model but with and without the inclusion of exogenous variables, i.e. 
univariate and multivariate specification 
T4) both fixed and stochastic parameter model specifications, i.e. Harvey's structural 
vs classical parameter specification 
All of these hypotheses are tested over the sample of UK engineering and 
metalworking establishments and for three technologies in the CURDS data set: 
Numerically Controlled machine tools (NC), Computerised Numerically Controlled 
machine tools (CNC) and Coated and Carbi4e Tools (CoT)s. 
The statistical packages used for this analysis have been chosen ad hoc for each type 
of model specification: SPSS for non linear modelling, STAMPS for Structural 
(stochastic parameters) modelling, LIMDEP7 for Two Stage Least Squares, Weighted 
and Unweighted NLS, OLS and other distributional functions. 
Below the variable specifications and the testing of the model are presented by steps. 
4 Example of Gompertz distribution of technology spread (TI) was proposed by Dixon (1980) 
in alternative to the Logistic distribution proposed by Mansfield (1968) then used by Griliches 
(1957) with variable saturation point (T2). 
5 Only three out of the four technologies available in the CURDS survey were chosen. The 
main reason being that they are a good example of complementary (Cot) and substitute 
technologies (NC and CNC); their testing was enough to give a clear indication of the 
robustness of the Mansfield model. 
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a) Variable specifications 
The dependent variable in the first equation (3.7) of the Mansfield model concerns the 
firm's level of ownership of the new technology (SIJt /SIJ*). This 'key variable on intra 
firm diffusion can be found in the CURDS 1993 survey and is measured as the 
percentage of the machine tool stock of the firm that in 1993 incorporates each of the 
four advanced technologies (DijJ. 
In order to take into account that the model is a disequilibrium one, SIJt /SIJ· is here 
measured for each technology j by the multiple, lI~j ,of the proportion of machine 
tools stock (DiJJ of establishment i that incorporates the new technology j at the date 
of survey in 1993, i.e. 
where ~j is the limiting value of Dij as ~j tends to infinity. In Mansfield's theory ~j =1, 
meaning that at the saturation point -at the end of the diffusion process- the firm will 
have replaced 100% of the old with the new technology. 
For each technology j, tlJ in equation (3.11) is measured by TIj the number of years in 
1993 since first adoption of the technology j by the establishment i, so that the 
estimating equation becomes: 
D·· = "-./(I-exp(Jt ..... T. - a)) IJt 'l'J Pll IJ (3.13) 
Some of the elements of the PIJ vector as specified in the second equation (3.12) of the 
Mansfield model were not directly observable in the CURDS data set, however it 
contains information on: 
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i) For each j the proportion of finns in the sample using the technology j at the date of 
adoption by establishment i, L'J 
ii) An indicator of firm size, the employment level of the finn In 1993, 
1986,1980,1975 and 1970, M,(t). 
Data concerning the expected profitability, 1tit, and the liquidity of the firm, Cij are not 
available. There is no obvious measure for Cij but 1tijt may be approximated by a linear 
function of firm characteristics and industry dummies with coefficients to be estimated 
but differing across j. Thus data on the following variables have been used as 
(imprecise) proxies for these but which may also be of interest in their own right:. 
iii) whether the establishment undertakes in house R&D, a dummy variable, 
R&Ddumi, taking the value 1 if it does and ° if it does not (data available for 1993, 
1986, 1980, 1975) 
iv) whether the firm is export intensive or not, a dummy variable, Expduml' equal to 1 
if the percentage of total output going for export is greater than 20% and 0 otherwise 
(data available for 1993, 1986 and 1980). 
This allows one to specify the final estimating equations of the Mansfield model (3.11 
and 3.12) as (3.14): 
Djjt = cj>j 1(I-exp(-~ij*Tij - a)) + eij where cj>j=1 
~jj = ct + c2 .R&Ddumj + c3 .Expdumj + c4 .Mj + cs.Ljj (3.14) 
A particular characteristic of the data is that for each technology, and especially for 
NC machine tools, there is a considerable proportion of establishments which have 
adopted the technology at some date prior to 1993 but in 1993 register zero ownership. 
Thus it is necessary to distinguish between adopters (i.e. finns that have adopted a 
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technology at or before 1993) and users (adopters with a positive value for D .. in 
IJ 
1993). This implies that, for each technology there are two samples that one can use: 
(i) sample A, which covers all adopters of the technology for some of whom D .. will be 
1J 
zero in 1993 and (ii) a restricted sample, sample B, covering only those finns for 
whom Dij ~o in 1993. Theoretically the Mansfield model is unable to deal with finns 
that have adopted the technology but no longer use that technology and as such one 
would expect that the results from using sample B will be the better results6• 
b )Testing procedure 
By its non linear nature the above model is very difficult to estimate, often yielding : 
quite unsatisfactory residuals, i.e. they are highly auto correlated and heteroscedastic 
and give spurious results (see Dixon 1980, Heeler and Hustad 1980, Granger and ' 
Newbold 1977, Mahajan and Wind 1986, Karshenas and Stoneman 1992, Zettelmeyer . 
and Stoneman 1993, etc). One way to overcome this problem is to estimate several 
specifications (both nonlinear and linearised versions) and choose ad hoc estimators of 
the logistic curve which would allow one to model most of the variability of the 
diffusion process. This is the standard general to specific econometric procedure 
(Harvey, 1987). Consequently, various logistic specifications are separately estimated 
for each technology j. Below, for notational consistency, greek letters are used for 
popUlation parameters, while roman letters for their sample estimates7• 
6 Further details on definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables are detailed in 
Appendix C. 
7 This section only comment on some of the estimates, selected upon their relevance to the 
argument. For space limit and for ease of presentation the other estimates are omitted. 
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There are several approaches to the estimation of the Logistic curve. Harvey (1989, 
1993, 1984aJb) summarises the possible approaches to estimating Growth curves as: 
(a) level analysis (i.e. non linear specification); (b) proportions (i.e. linearised model); 
and (c) differences. Moreover, he further distinguishes between the structural and the 
classical parameter specification of each type of model. For the univariate case these 
are summarised in Table 3.1. and their extension to the multivariate case is 
straightforward. 
Table 3.1. The model specification 
GENERAL MODIFIED EXPONENTIAL FUNCTION 
Yt= Ilt + Et 
Il(t)= $(1 + pel f(t)k 
where 
K=1 --. Simple Modified Expo; K=1 --. Log(Gompertz) ; K = -1 --. Logistic 
LOGISTIC MODEL (K-I) SPECIFICATIONS (classical approach) 
Levels $ 
Dt= WeightedlUnweighted Non Linear 
(I + pelf(t) Least Squares 
Proportions Log (Dt/ex-DJ] = logp + yt +Et Ordinary Least Squares 
(see Harvey, 1989) 
Differences Ordinary Least Squares: 
-
Log ADI = P log DI_I+ (S +y t]-tEt (see Mar-Molinero ,1980) 
- Alog D, = -Y + yt D, +(yO D-'J +Ttl (see Levencach and Reuters, 1976) 
LOGISTIC MODEL (K=-l) SPECIFICATIONS (classical approach) 
Levels Log D, = Iltl-tE1 Maximum likelihood 
t t t (t)+Il (see Harvey, 1989) J.1 I = Il 1-' -Yt-' + Y exp Il I-I I 
YI =YI-' +~I 
Proportions Log (Dtl $-Dt)] = logp + 1101 + EI Maximum likelihood 
1l0t = 1l0t-' +Pt-' +Ill (see Harvey, 1989) 
PI = PI-' +~I 
Differences log AD, = P log Dt_.+ Il·t+£' Maximum likelihood 
1101 = Ilol-' +PI-' +Ill (see Harvey, 1984b) 
Pt =PI-. +~I 
Notes: The classification of the Logistic specifications is outsourced from Harvey (1993 
pg 149-150) to which one should refer for the proofs 
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In this study only the level (a) and proportion (b) analysis have been used. The third 
one (c) would have required the dependent variable, i.e. the level of use of the new 
technology (DJ, to be specified in tenns of first differences. However, the lack of 
lagged tenns for the dependent variable has excluded this possibility. 
The initial model estimates are restricted to a simplified version of the Mansfield 
model that specifies the extent of diffusion simply as a function of the number of years 
from first adoption (Table 3.1. Univariate levels specification) and tests the hypothesis 
that the time path of diffusion is logistic (HI), with a fixed saturation point, i.e. ~j=I 
and with a constant speed of diffusion ~ij' The estimating equation specified as (3.15) 
with an additive error tenn eij is estimated using non linear least squares: 
D .. = 1 / (1 +exp(- a -P" T.) +e .. u u u (3.15) 
The best diagnostics are given by weighted NLS (where the weights are Tij) with the 
weighting being used to correct for heteroscedasticity in the estimates. However in 
these estimates, using either sample A or sample B, none of the coefficients are 
significantly different from zero and the explanatory power of the regression (adjusted 
R2) peaks at 0.1. The result suggests that the Logistic curve is in fact a very poor 
summary of the data. 
Given that very few finns have actually replaced all the existing technology with the 
new technology the next step is to allow the ceiling, ~j. to be estimated directly by the 
model (see Griliches 1957, Dixon, 1980). By comparing estimates when ~j is 
predetennined (~j=I) with those when ~j is estimated within the model (~j =¢). one is 
also able to test whether ~j SI (H2). The model reduces to (3.16): 
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(3.16) 
The estimates of this variant using unweighted least squares (Table 3.2) are a slight 
improvement on the previous estimates. 
Table 3.2. Logistic model-NLS 
Sample A 
Technology CNC CoT NC 
Sample size 133 198 92 
Ceiling ( ¢ j) 0.3474 0.6288 0.5115 (7.584) (6.320) (0.082) 
Constant ( a) -0.7289 -0.9551 -0.3420 (-1.875) (-1.574) (-0.017) 
"" 0.2835 0.15453 -0.0027 Adj speed ({3) (1.869) (1.744) (-0.170) 
Adjusted R~ 0.098 0.116 0.039 
F 10.02 7.98 1.31 
[p=0.274] [p=0.OO05] [p=O.274] 
Note: t-value m brackets slgmficant at 5% m bold 
Source: CURDS-personal elaboration 
SampleB 
CNC CoT NC 
210 154 151 
0.3391 1.0006 0.3038 
(7.048) (1.347) (0.038) 
-1.8162 -1.3639 -0.407 
(-2.075) (-1.866) (0.992) 
0.2770 0.0660 -0.0189 
(1.960) (1.467) (-0.076) 
0.095 0.111 0.013 
11.5 1 8.56 0.48 
[p=O.OO] [p=O.OO] [p=0.62] 
However for NC machine tools none of the estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. For CoT using sample B the estimate of ~j (¢ j) is greater than 
unity although using sample A it is less than unity at 0.63. For CNC, using sample B 
yields significant estimates of ~j' ex. and ~ of the right sign. Again, however the 
adjusted R2 is less than 0.1. Restricting the value of ~j to equal unity for all j does tend 
to lead to some improvements in the results. For NC technology the results are still 
poor (although the estimate of ~ is significant it is of the wrong sign), but for CNC 
and CoT technologies using either sample A or B, the estimates of ex. and ~ are both 
significant and of the correct sign (although again R2 is only 0.1). 
Despite the several attempts none of the empirical results are very supportive of the 
logistic hypothesis (HI). As an alternative hypothesis the Gompertz growth curve has 
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been used to test how well it would approximate the data. The Gompertz curve may be 
written as (3.17) 
D jj= exp( -exp( a + p . T ij) + ejj (3.17) 
Using NLS on either sample A or sample B, the Gompertz curve works as well (or as 
badly) as the Logistic curve. When applied to NC it yields an insignificant estimate for 
p, but for CNC and CoT our estimates for a. and p are of the right sign and significant 
(see Table 3.3.). 
Table 3.3. Gompertz model-NLS 
Sample A 
Technology CNC CoT NC 
Sample size 169 133 92 
" -0.7508 -0.3564 -0.4333 a (-5.721) (-1.948) (-3.864) 
" 0.0410 0.0439 -O.OIE-l P (4.166) (3.861) (-1.581) 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.12 0.04 
F 18.65 6.00 2.70 
[p=0.10] [p=O.OO] [p=O.10] 
Note: t-value In brackets; slgnificant at 5% In bold 
Source: CURDS-personal elaboration 
SampleB 
CNC CoT NC 
210 154 151 
-0.8180 -0.5512 -0.7506 
(-6.235) (-3.012) (-4.375) 
0.0426 0.0449 -0.0054 
(4.383) (3.995) (-0.996) 
0.10 0.11 0.012 
21.27 17.43 0.95 
[p=O.OO] [p=O.OO] [p=0.33] 
This result indicates that there is almost no evidence that the pattern of intra finn 
technology adoption strictly follows a Logistic distribution, leading one to conclude 
that hypothesis (HI), that the intra finn diffusion follows a Logistic curve, is difficult 
to accept. However, these initial estimates constrain pjj to be the same for all i whereas 
the Mansfield model allows the speed of diffusion. (}jj, to vary across firms (H3), i.e. 
~j 
D jj = ---------------------------- +eij (3.18a) 
(1 +exp( -a - p ij*T j) 
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where 
(3.18b) 
This model can be estimated by two stage weighted least squares which is similar to 
the procedure applied by Mansfield in his original article (1968). However, as 
suggested by Dixon (1980) one should take into account that the explanatory 
regressors are themselves estimates with different standard errors. More advanced 
econometric techniques such as a non linear least squares method are here used in 
testing the reduced form of the logistic model specification for each j (see Griliches 
1957,1980, Srivasan and Mason, 1986, etc.l This implies specifying the model as: 
¢j 
D ij= ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ejj (3.19) 
(1+exp(-a-(Po+ Pl*RDdumj+ P2*Expdumj+ P3*M j+ P4"'Ljj)*Tjj» 
Alternatively this specification may be linearised (Table 3.1. Proportions approach) 
and estimated by OLS using fixed (~= 1) or variable (¢ ~1) saturation levels as in 
Romeo (1975): 
(3.20) 
In both cases the best results are achieved if the estimate of ¢, is restricted to unity and 
J 
one considers only those firms that use the technologies at some positive level in 1993 
(i.e. Sample B). 
8 Also non-weighted non-linear least squares have been estimates but these are no 
improvement over those reported in this section. 
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Table 3.4: Logistic curve, weighted non-linear least squares (sample B) 
Dij = ¢ j II +exp( a + (jJ 0 + jJ /.R&Ddumi + jJ 2· Expdumi + jJ J Mi + jJ 4-Lij )T ij)+eij 
Technology CNC CoT NC 
Sample size 194 129 91 
4> 1 1 1 
A 
-3.2803 -3.3109 
-2.6484 a 
(-3.996) (-2.762) (-6.749) 
A 0.1073 0.0899 
-0.22333 Po (2.570) (2.188) (-2.114) 
A 01877 0.04402 0.0469 PI (1.234) (2.761) (1.189) 
A 
-0.0180 -0.0130 0.0682 Pl (-1.714)* (-1.022) (1.889)** 
A 0.21E-4 -0.IIE-4 -0.51E-3 p, (1.862) ** (0.820) (-2.053) 
A 0.0018 0.0023 0.0093 /34 (2.561) (2.356) (2.775) 
R2-adjusted 0.11 0.18 0.15 
F 4.27 5.22 2.72 
[ p(F)] [p=O.OOI] [p=O.OOO] [p=0.02] 
Notes: weights Tij ; asymptotic t-test in parenthesis; significant at 5% in bold; *p=0.09 and 
**p=0.06 
Source: CURDS-personal elaboration 
Table 3.5. : Logistic curve: Iinearised version, OLS estimates (sample B) 
log(Dij I ¢ rDij)= a +( jJ 1 + P 2 .R&Ddumi + P 3 .Expdumi + P 4 .Mi + P 5 .Lij )Tjj+eij 
CNC CoT NC 
Sample size 193 123 91 
4> 1 1 1 
Intercept -3.4375 -2.1674 -2.3792 
(-7.949) (-3.166) (-6.163) 
Tij 0.1044 0.0453 -0.0706 
(3.741) (1.431) (-2.254) 
R&Ddulll; Tjj 0.0285 0.0488 0.0412 
(1.501) (1.979) (1.685)* 
Expo~*Tij -0.0128 -0.0042 0.0113 
(-0.878) (-0.204) (0.692) 
MI*Tij 0.118E-4 O.18E-4 -0.255E-4 
(0.652) (0.874) ( -1.322) 
Lij*Tij 0.00149 0.00104 0.00257 
(2.597) (1.321) (2.515) 
Adj.R2 0.15 0.12 0.13 
F 8.01 4.45 3.57 
[ p(F)] [p=O.OOO] [p=O.OOI] [p=0.006] 
Notes: t-test in parenthesis; significant at 5% in bold; *p=0.096 
Source: CURDS-personal elaboration 
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Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. present the estimates across the three technologies only for 
those models giving the best diagnostic and goodness of fit (see also Stoneman & 
Battisti, 1997). One may note that in each case the expl~atory power of the 
regressions judged by the R2 value or the F statistic is still low. Whatever the 
specification, it never explains more than 18% of the variance of the (restricted) 
sample. It is also clear that the patterns of significance found are sensitive to the 
estimation method employed. The NLS estimates are very sensitive to the starting 
values assumed. Moreover, although there is some evidence based on the significance 
of the estimate of ~2 that time since first adoption does affect the diffusion process, 
for NC machine tools the sign is wrong in both sets of estimates. This in itself leads 
one to believe that even under the most favourable circumstances (~o = 1 and using 
Sample B) the hypothesis that the Mansfield model adequately represents the diffusion 
process for NC machine tools cannot be accepted. 
For CNC and CoT the results are an improvement although still very sensitive to the 
estimation method. Using the linearised estimates the estimate of ~2 for CoT is not 
significant (in fact only the coefficients ~ 1 and ~3 are significant). For CNC only ~2 
and ~6 are significant). 
To allow for a more dynamic and flexible structure, and to test whether the parameters 
do change over time (H4), the Mansfield model has also been estimated with 
parameters varying over firms (see Harvey 1989, 1984a). This is the correspondent of 
the structural modelling over a sample of cross sectional observations (see Table 
3.1.lStructural approach). By the means of the Kalman Filter and Maximum 
Likelihood estimator the model can test for the presence of structural stylised facts not 
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picked up directly by the traditional fixed parameters regression models (see Harvey, 
1984b, 1989, 1990). The econometric specification of the Mansfield model, based on 
the structural model with explanatory variables and local trend being: 
where ait· is the stochastic drift, ~it is the stochastic slope and the residuals (€ijl, flit and 
~it) are Nonnally independent distributed variables with zero mean and variance CJ£2, 
CJr/ and CJ~2 respectively. In economic tenns this specification allows the speed of 
diffusion to be stochastic (i.e. ,to change over time) and to be updated each time a new 
observation is made available in the system (i.e. changes in the exogenous variables). 
Given the cross sectional nature of the data set, the dynami~ structure has been 
modified as to change across finns rather than over time. The resulting dynamic drift 
accounts for firm specific affects. However, the results from estimating this type of 
model over the technologies in the CURDS sample are not reported as they do not 
show any significant improvement with respect to the previous models. 
Considering these results in their totality one can conclude that the Mansfield 
predictions (i) are not consistent with the NC diffusion patterns observed and (ii) have 
limited explanatory power when applied to the diffusion of CNC and CoT 
technologies. The most common problems are: a) wrong parameter estimates, the 
parameter estimates often show the wrong signs or magnitudes compared to what the 
theory would suggest; b) poor forecasting performance, which varies across different 
technologies; c) unsatisfactory diagnostics and d) very low explanatory power (max R2 
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~ 0.18). In addition, going back to the four basic original hypotheses of the Mansfield 
Model, it seems that the actual diffusion patterns (HI) can be just as well summarised 
by a Gompertz growth curve as a logistic curve. This implies the non-uniqueness of 
the model specification, i.e. different curves with different properties fit the data 
equally well. There is also no clear cut indication as to whether a fixed saturation point 
(H2) and a variable speed of diffusion (H4) improve the modelling of the three 
technologies in the CURDS data set. Moreover, neither the estimating procedure 
originally used by Mansfield nor any other estimating technique has given satisfactory 
evidence that the speed of diffusion (~J is a linear function of exogenous variables 
(H3). 
On the basis of these results it is very difficult to accept that the Mansfield approach is 
a valid method for modelling the intra firm diffusion process. Thus the Mansfield 
model explains only a small part of the diffusion patte01 ofNC, CNC and CoT. This 
leads one to conclude that the model seems to rely overly on 'inappropriate' a priori 
restrictions on the nature of the process of information spreading. In other words, 
Mansfield's learning seems to explain very little of the diffusion process. 
In the next session the theoretical weaknesses of the Mansfield Model are further 
discussed. 
3.3.3 Theoretical weaknesses of the Mansfield model 
The previous study has shown that for the three technologies in the CURDS data, 
there is little support for the predictions of the seminal disequilibrium model. On 
empirical grounds the Mansfield model fails to give satisfactory results. 
so 
Further to the empirical weaknesses there are also theoretical weaknesses which are 
difficult to accept. They can be found in the existing literature and some of them are 
summarised below. 
First of all there is no good reason to believe that the within firms ownership of new 
technology follows a logistic distribution. 'The Logistic function results purely from 
the arbitrary restrictions placed on the Taylor's series expansion used in the model' 
(Stoneman, 1983). Moreover, on empirical grounds, for the CURDS sample of UK. 
firms and for three technologies, the Gompertz function fits the data as well (as badly) 
as the Logistic curve (see section 3.2. and also Stoneman and Battisti, 1997). 
As pointed out by Griliches (1957), Dixon (1980) and also Chow, (1967) the satiation 
stock of the diffusion process is not always unity. The intra finn process does not 
necessarily lead to full replacement of the new technology, in which case the 
maximum level of adoption is less than the maximum and should be modelled 
empirically. The information spreading model explains only a small part of the 
observed diffusion pattern and the model relies overly on unjustified a priori 
restrictions on the nature of the process of information spreading (Stoneman, 1983). 
This criticism is in line also with the finding when testing the model over the CURDS 
sample. The latter indicates that the distributional shape of technology ownership does 
not follow a Logistic curve (see section 3.2. and also Stoneman and Battisti, 1997). 
Mansfield assumes a constant diffusion speed, p, but there is no justification why 
profitability, liquidity and the size of the investments of a further increase in the level 
of usage of a new technology (ni, Ci, Mi) are constant over time (Karshenas and 
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Stoneman, 1995 and Stoneman, 1984)9. This is also in line with the empirical 
findings (over the firms in the CURDS sample) providing no evidence that the speed 
of technology diffusion is either a time invariant constant or a linear function of the 
variables specified in the Mansfield model (see section 3.2. and also Stoneman and 
Battisti, 1997) 
Another objection concerns the assumption of homogeneous population. In fact 
Mansfield assumes that the population of potential adopters is homogeneous and 
constant over time. This sounds quite unrealistic given that the spread of a new 
technology can take several decades and the population size of the industry changes 
over time (see Davies, 1979 for a discussion on heterogeneous population) and as it 
does so also the base population changes. 
It is also assumed that adopters do not incu~ any costs of search._The epidemic model 
considers potential adopters to be passive recipients of information rather than active 
seekers of information. (see Midgley et aI, 1992). 
Mansfield neglects any cost of acquiring new technology and advertising in time t 
(Glaister 1972; Gould, 1970; Tonks, 1986; Metcalfe, 1981). To think that all that is 
necessary is that firms purchase a new capital good that embodies the technology may 
be itself too limiting. In fact it is important to consider the cost of acquiring new 
technology in time t, or at least the price ql (or the quality adjusted price) which may 
9 In the Mansfield model the decision on use depends on risk, uncertainty and profitability, 
but how and why is not specified. In Mansfield, risk is risk as to the uncertainty attached to the 
profitability of the new technology. It reduces over time, but the firm estimate ofthe expected 
profitability (I1i) is constant, the uncertainty with regard to which reduces over time. It must 
therefore be only learning that its estimate ofI1ij is the right one. The only driving force is 
that risk will reduce with usage and is related to Sit/S*i. But this seems to be a very strange 
story (Stoneman, 1983). 
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be changing (falling) over time (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993, Stoneman and Kwon, 
1994)10. 
Mansfield completely ignores any technology generations. He assumes that the nature 
of the technology is unchanged over time or at least ignores any changes in the nature 
of the technology (See for an example the discussion by Griliches (1980) in reply to 
Dixon (1980), on changing technology over time and also Mahajan and Wind (1986) 
II. This is unreasonable if one thinks, for example, of computer based technologies or 
other technological improvements which might arise over time. 
Mansfield's infonnation spreading mechanism ignores any external infonnation 
sources. In fact, one would tend to think that if a finn had information, the whole firm 
would have access to that infonnation so the infonnation spreading of the epidemic 
model is irrelevant (see Davies, 1979 and Karshenas and Stoneman 1995). 
The Mansfield Model does not take into account any technology complementarity and 
substitutability, (see pioneering work of David, 1975 or Wozniak, 1984) or more 
generally the process of replacement of the old with the new when complementary or 
substitute technologies are introduced into the system. In fact the presence of a 
10 The incorporation of a supply side in such models can intemalise the reduction in quality 
adjusted price over time. Moreover, the firm may in fact face a number of adoption costs 
when introducing the new technology. Thus, for example, it may be that off-the- shelf 
embodiments are not available and the technology must be adapted to meet requirements (for 
an example see Stoneman, 1990). In addition there may be training costs or further 
management and organisational costs attached to introducing new technology. In the limit, 
technology may be purpose built for a firm in which case the study of diffusion becomes a 
study of customer supplier relationship 
11 The cost of technology acquisition are also addressed in the work of Cohen and Levinthall 
(1989) who illustrate that firms that spends upon R&D are more easily able to assimilate new 
technology. There may thus be complementarities between technology generation and 
technology adoption. 
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substitute technology within the firm might speed up the diffusion process due to the 
increasing 'endogenous learning' from the experience of the old technology. The same 
should apply to the extent of use of a complementary technology, aimed at enforcing 
the performance of the existing technology. There may thus be complementarities 
between technology generation and technology extent of use (examples of this kind of 
epidemic or endogenous learning effects can be found in applications to inter firm 
studies by Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Stoneman and Kwon, 1996, Colombo and 
Mosconi, 1995 and also Hannah and McDowell (1984». 
Further to the weaknesses outlined by the existing literature, there are other limitations 
of the model. 
Mansfield assumes that learning is at the heart of technology spreading. However, it is 
not clear whether the learning Mansfield refers to is learning about how to use the new 
technology (learning by doing) or learning about the existence of the technology by 
other firms (learning by the experience of the others). In both cases this interpretation 
doesn't seem to be very realistic considering that the diffusion process within a firm 
might take many decades12• If one interprets learning as the capability of the firm to 
catch up with most advanced and competitive systems of production Mansfield's 
explanation doesn't sound very acceptable (Battisti 1998). 
The Mansfield model is not capable of dealing with those firms that have used the new 
technology in the past but that are no longer users of the technology despite inter firm 
diffusion not being completed. In fact ex users and first adopters do coexist in the 
same industry. In the Mansfield model only the sample of users is modelled. The 
12 See Chapter 2 for examples of timing and pattern of adoption of technologies outsourced 
from the CURDS data set. 
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reasons for dismissal of a technology before reaching complete replacement by some 
ofthe firms is completely neglected. 
The Mansfield model does not take into account that firms, for several reasons, might 
decide to temporarily suspend the adoption of the new technology. This would imply 
that there is no reason to believe that the firm monotonically increases its level of 
output up to complete replacement of the old with the new technology. There are 
many circumstances in which the firm might decide to suspend the replacement 
process. Moreover, this decision might be a) temporary, due for example, to an 
unfavourable temporary financial position; b) permanent, due,· for example, to a 
superior technology appearing on the market or to the disappointing performance of 
the new technology, the latter leading the firm to simply dismiss the new technology 
and shift back to the old technology. This suggests that the process of technology 
transfer might be better modelled by a step function rather than a monotonic 
continuous logistic curve (Battisti, 1998). 
The epidemic model also implicitly assumes that there exists some investment 
schedule followed by the innovative firm, according to which the replacement of new 
over old technology changes over time until (full) replacement is completed. 
Considering once again that intra-firm diffusion might take several decades, 
uncertainty as to changes in factor prices, market characteristics (in the long run) and 
unexpected appearance of superseding technology might easily lead to unsuccessful 
investment plans. Consequently, the firm might change its schedule and not 
necessarily increase the level of adoption of the new technology. In fact what seems to 
be a more reasonable explanation of the firm's investment decision is that the firm 
decides upon the basis of short (or medium) run considerations on profitability of the 
investment. This will depend on the firm's specific production system, its economic 
ss 
and financial conditions and the market characteristics in which the firm operates at 
the time the decision is made. Moreover, given the increasing competitiveness of 
markets, a firm, in order to remain competitive, should be able to introduce new cost 
minimising technologies and to remain flexible to changes. This means that the firm 
should operate at its optimum at each moment in time, upgrading its position as new 
information about changes in the environment in which she operates occur and 
consequently changing its medium and long run plans (Battisti, 1998). 
The Mansfield model does not adequ~tely deal with the uncertainty surrounding 
investment in a new technology. In fact, the new technology can be compared to any 
other assets where the buyer (i.e the entrepreneur) can exercise the option to wait. 
There are many reasons further to learning that might cause the firm to delay buying 
the new technology. They are, for example, the financial position, changes in the 
market conditions via changes in the demand and inputs prices etc. Moreover the new 
technology being new to the firm is expected to be characterised by uncertainty about: 
i) its productivity, ii) the capability of the firm to fully exploit its potential; and iii) the 
real profitability ofthe technology. 
Another aspect ignored by the Mansfield model is that the profitability of adoption 
might change under different market scenarios and this might influence the decision to 
further invest in the new technology. Market scenarios may be expected to exert 
different pressure upon the firm depending on the position of the firm in the market. 
Whether a firm is a monopolist or a competitive firm should have some relevance 
upon the intensity of technology adoption. 
All these theoretical and technical limitations lead one to abandon the epidemic 
disequilibrium approach (i.e. Mansfield type approach) in favour of the equilibrium, 
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Stoneman type approach which seems to be better capable of dealing with the 
dynamism of the firm and its surrounding environment. This should also release one 
from the constraints of the epidemic approach and thus allow one to deal with most of 
its weaknesses. Equilibrium models have been widely explored in the inter firm 
literature, which provides a good starting point for intra-firm diffusion analysis. 
In the next session the salient features of the equilibrium versus disequilibrium 
approaches are explored. 
3.4 Equilibrium versus Disequilibrium models 
The existing literature on intra firm diffusion is quite scarce and it mainly relies upon 
the two existing information based models:- the Stoneman model and the Mansfield 
model. However, for different reasons, neither of them seems to provide a 
comprehensive and exhaustive explanation of the process of intra-firm technology 
transfer. Consequently, this study explores alternative approaches to modelling the 
intra firm diffusion process that move away from reliance on information spreading. 
As suggested by Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) particularly useful routes are 
indicated by the inter firm literature where equilibrium approaches have been widely 
explored, as opposed to the disequilibrium approaches typical of the epidemic models. 
The difference between the two approaches relies on the relationship, as time 
proceeds, between the current level of use (SijJ and the post diffusion level of use of 
the new technology (Sjjt*), i.e. the stock of the new technology that the firm i will own 
when it is saturated with the good, or equivalently the post diffusion proportion of 
output produced on the new technology. 
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According to epidemic modelling, in each period the firm adjusts its current level of 
use of the new technology until the satiation point, is reached. What drives this 
adjustment process over time is mainly information acquisition. This is a 
diseguilibrium approach which, in essence, states that diffusion is a disequilibrium 
process (see also Gold's Critique to these type of models, Gold 1981). There is a final 
level of use, Sdi *, and a current level of use, Sdit' of the technology and over time the 
finn i will approach this level of use 
Sdi*= limSdit (3.21) 
1-+<10 
Moreover, at industry level the final level of usage (Sd *) is equal to the sum of the 
finns' final level of use of the new technology (Sdt): 
i=l, ...... N (3.22) 
What this is telling us is that, basically, the eqUilibrium industry level of use, Sd*' is 
not time dependent. 
The Mansfield model is an example of a disequilibrium model where as the finn 
accumulates experience from the use, the extent of the further use induced by a given 
reduction in risk is dependent upon the date of first use, finn characteristics (size and 
liquidity) and the expected probability of adoption. In other words economic factors 
influence the diffusion process through the speed of adjustment. 
The alternative equilibrium approach tends to assume that there is perfect infonnation 
in the economy on the existence and nature of new technologies and thus, for a given 
population size and in each point in time, the stock of new technology owned (SeiJ 
S8 
equals the optimal level of adoption (Scit*)' as if the technology were not new at all but 
were like any other good. 
(3.23) 
At industry level the final level of usage (Sct*) equals the current level of usage (Scit') 
across firms: 
(3.24) 
Contrary to disequilibrium models, the equilibrium industry level of use does change 
over time. It is also believed that Sci: is a function of at least relative prices and 
income. For this reason it does change with prices and incomes and as such it is time 
dependent. Seit* may therefore be compared to the demand for the good that would be 
derived from the standard utility maximising perfect-information models of 
consumer/producer behaviour found in a standard micro-text book (Stoneman 1984, 
pag.65). As a result, the factors concentrated upon in the epidemic/information spread 
approach play no role in the diffusion process. 
The Stoneman (1981) model is the first attempt to modelling intra firm diffusion using 
an equilibrium model. However, apart from the Stoneman Model, equilibrium models 
have never been applied to intra-firm studies. This seems, however, to be a particularly 
useful route to follow. There exist many examples of eqUilibrium models applied to 
inter firm studies summarised as Order, Stock and Rank effect models. They are 
discussed in the following section where a preliminary intra-firm empirical model 
derived from this literature is presented. 
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3.5. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF A NEW APPROACH 
3.S.1.Exploring an alternative equilibrium intra-firm approach 
The existing literature upon inter firm technology diffusion argues that the 
determinants of first adoption of a new technology by a firm can be summarised in 
Rank, Stock and Order effects. 
The rank effect model ranks firms in terms of the benefit to be obtained from the use 
of the new technology assuming that potential users are different in some important 
dimensions (see. David 1991, Davies 1979, etc.). The benefit from adoption is 
independent of the number of users of the new technology and adoption is. mostly 
determined by the characteristics of the firm (Le. firm size, liquidity,etc.). 
In the stock effect models (Reaganum, 1981 a, 1981 b, 1983, Quirmbach, 1986, etc.) it 
is assumed that the larger is the number of users of the new technology the lower is 
the gross benefit from adoption (due to the decline in price of the final product as 
supply increases). 
In the order effect model, the firm's position in the adoption order determines its gross 
return from adoption. So firms high in the adoption order get greater return than those 
lower down in the adoption order on the ground of pre-emption (see Funderberger and 
Tirole, 1985) or factors such as prime geographic sites or limited pools of skilled 
labour (Ireland and Stoneman, 1985). In other words, as opposed to the epidemic 
effect, as use grows the stock and order effects exert a negative impact on adoption 
behaviour. The higher the number of rivals who have adopted the technology within or 
across industry, the lower is the profit gain and the less is the firm motivated to 
increase the level of adoption. 
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A first attempt to use an 'equilibrium' approach to modelling the intra finn diffusion 
processes would suggest that it is necessary to incorporate the above inter finn type 
effects as well as epidemic effects into models of intra finn diffusion (see Karshenas 
and Stoneman, 1993). The resulting equilibrium model would then predict that factors 
that drive the intra finn diffusion process for a new technology are firm heterogeneity 
and finn interaction. These kind of effects have been widely explored in inter finn 
studies (see Colombo and Mosconi, 1995, Karshenas and Stoneman 1993, Stoneman 
and Kwon 1996, etc. or Karshenas and Stoneman 1995 for an extended survey) but 
have never been applied to intra finn studies. 
Following the intuition of Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) rank, stock and epidemic 
effects have been incorporated into a model of intra finn diffusion (although for 
obvious reasons the order effects had to be excluded from the model not being 
applicable to intra-finn studiesI3). 
On a pure empirical basis l 4, to get some preliminary insight into the role of such 
factors, the model has then been tested for the technologies available in the CURDS 
data set. In addition, in order to take into account some of the problems met with the 
Mansfield model, the new model is fonnulated so as to be distribution free and to 
allow the inclusion of those firms that, despite have used the technology in the past, 
are no longer user in 1993. In essence this model extends the economic factors 
13 Order effects assume the existence of higher profit gains due to first movers advantage and 
factors such as pools of skilled labour or geographic sites (see Ireland and Stoneman, 1985 
and Fudenberg and Titole, 1985). This effect would suggest that returns depend upon the 
order of adoption. This means that once first adopted, the firm would always find profitable to 
immediately shift to the new technology. For this reason the order effect is abandoned. 
14 Part of this preliminary analysis has already been published in Stoneman and Battisti 
(1997). 
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included in the vector of independent regressors beyond those suggested by Mansfield 
(see section 3.1.2), using the insights provided by inter firm diffusion theory. 
Therefore, following the 'alternative' equilibrium inter-firm approach to modelling the 
intra firm diffusion process, the new model of intra firm diffusion is specified as: 
Djjt= f(Rank, Stock, Epidemic Effects) 
The variables used to measure the impact of the equilibrium and the epidemic effects 
are sourced from the CURDS data set for the three technologies: NC, CNC and CoT. 
The epidemic effects are represened by T jj and Lij as in the Mansfield model. The rank 
and stock effects are represented by: (i) the profitability of adoption and (ii) some 
measure of the cost of adopting the technology, by assuming that the extent of use ofa 
technology j by firm i is to be related to the profitability and the cost of extending use 
over time. The latter is, for example, the ca.:;e when late adopters benefit from lower 
purchase prices in the years following first adoption. However, in this analysis, given 
the cross sectional characteristics of the data set, the time dimension of this variable is 
lost as the cost of extending use (i.e. buying new technology) in 1993 is the same for 
all firms. For this reason it does not show any variability across the sample of firms 
and thus cannot be included as an independent regressor IS. 
The profitability of extending use can be proxied by a number of variables. These fall 
into three classes: 
(i) Firm characteristics in that one might expect different types of firms to have 
different expected profit gains. Mi, R&Ddum and Expdum are included as 
independent regressors to which is also added, Ri the turnover of the firm, as an 
alternative size indicator. 
15 An alternative would be to pool the technologies and thus introduce variance in costs but 
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(ii) Other technologies owned by the firm in that it is quite possible that different 
technologies are complements or substitutes in the production process. Thus for 
example it has been argued that a firm with CNC or NC machines will get greater 
return from the use of CoT than a firm without. Alternatively it may be that if a firm 
acquires CNC then this will replace NC machines. Further. a firm with NC machines 
may get a greater or lesser return by installing CNC machines than a firm without NC 
machines. To take account of these arguments a series of dummy variables, OJ 
G=CNC, NC and CoT), are created taking value 1 if the firm has adopted CNC, NC or 
CoT technologies prior to 1994, (i.e. allowing simultaneous adoption in 1993) and 0 
otherwise. 
(iii) Use ofthe technology by other firms. The inter firm diffusion literature argues (on 
the basis of economic theory) that the profit gain from adoption of a technology by a 
firm will be negatively related to the number of previous adopters in the industry to 
which it belongs (on the grounds that adoption forces down industry prices). One 
might thus expect that profit gains from further intra firm diffu.sion will also be related 
to the number of other firms in the industry using the technology. In addiction, other 
industry characteristics e.g. the rate of growth of sales may also affect profitability. A 
series of Dummy variables, 01 -015, reflecting the industry in which the firm is 
located, and ISHARE for each j as the share of firms in the industry to which the firm 
belongs that have adopted technology j by 1994 are also included. 
In summary the determinants of adoption of the 'alternative' intra-firm model can be 
summarised as: 
OJ= f(M, R&Odum, Expdum, R, 0ZI. Dz2, Ishare, DI-DIS, T} 
this goes behind this preliminary investigation. 
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Where Dj defines the current level of ownership of the technology J' while D and D 
, zl z2 
indicate whether the finn has also introduced in its production process the other two 
technologies (zl:;t:j and ~:;t:j). 
Before proceeding further it is worth remembering that a particular characteristic of 
the CURDS data is that for each of the technologies, and especially for NC machine 
tools, there is a considerable proportion of establishments which have adopted the 
technology at some date prior to 1993 but in 1993 register zero ownership. It is thus 
necessary to distinguish between adopters (i.e. finns that have adopted a technology at 
or before 1993) and users (adopters with a positive value for Dij in 1993) . The two 
groups from now on are simply referred to as samples A and B, respectively. 
In the estimates of the Mansfield model the best results were achieved using sample B, 
where previous adopters with zero use in 1993 were excluded from the sample. Such a 
restriction on the sample, means that it not only does .not explain zero use, but also 
wastes infonnation by not including those finns that have zero use and yields 
inconsistent parameter estimates. In statistical tenns the specification that allows one 
to test for the shape of different distributions over both the restricted and the complete 
sample, without losing any infonnation in the sample, is the Tobit model or Censored 
regression model. The statistical details of the Tobit model and the final model 
specification are provided in the following section. 
64 
3.5.2. Testing the alternative intra-firm model: the Tobit specification 
The alternative specification of the intra firm model presented in the previous section, 
aims at modelling the extent of use of the new technology. However, for a significant 
proportion of firms that could use the technology, the proportion of output produced 
with the new technology is zero. Traditional regression analysis fails to account for the 
qualitative difference between limit (zero) observations and nonlimit (continuous) 
observations (Greene, 1981, 1993 and Amemiya, 1984). In fact one cannot use any 
continuous density to explain the conditional distribution of the proportion of 
machinery incorporating the new technology, because the continuous density is 
inconsistent with the fact that there are several observations at zero. 
To exclude the zero observations causes censoring in the sample while their inclusion 
destroys the linearity assumption of the linear regression model and makes OLS 
inappropriate (Maddala, 1994). The standard approach that enables one to use the 
extra information and to overcome the censoring, is the Tobit or Censored regression 
model (Tobin, 1958). 
The Standard Tobit model (or Type I Tobit) for a dependent variable y over a set of 
independent regressors X is defined as in (3.25) : 
i =P'X +E j Ej - N(O,0'2) 
yj=O ify/ ~O 
yj= Yi· ify/>O (3.25) 
where X is the vector of independent regressors and Ei are residuals, normally 
distributed with mean zero and common variance 0'2. The censored variable (y) is a 
random variable transformed from the original (y*). This model can be easily applied 
to estimate the parameters of the 'alternative' model, such as: 
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(3.26) 
where Dijt is the current firm level of ownership of the new technology, X is the set of 
regressors representing stock, rank and epidemic effects and P represents the marginal 
effect of the index or latent variable (ME[DO]) . P also measures the impact of the 
economic factors on the intra-firm diffusion level over the total sample of fim1s, 
whether they are users or not: 
a E[DjOlxj] 
------------ = p 
(3.27) 
The impact of the independent regressors on the diffusion level of only those firms 
that use the new technology at a positive level (Djjt>O), is measured by the marginal 
effect on Djjt, given the censoring at point zero. Such a value can simply be obtained 
by scaling the vector of the parameters by the probability of positive use in the 
uncensored regression calculated over the sample mean of X, i.e.ME[DjjtIDjjt>O]: 
~(B' X) 
= p--
a (3.28) 
where X is the sample mean of Xjjt. The reSUlting vector of coefficients shows the 
direct impact of changes in the independent regressors on the level of use of the 
technology by fim1s that use at a positive level. 
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Given that there is no clear expectation as to the statistical distribution of the intra-
finn diffusion process it is here assumed that D*jj' is Nonnally distributed4 as in the 
original Tobin (1958) exposition. This is reasonable given that data on the current 
level of ownership of a new technology are only available in the 1993 survey, yielding 
a single cross-section specification of the model. This assumption also simplifies the 
estimating procedure. All coefficients can simply be estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood (ML). In fact when D*ij' is assumed to be Nonnally distributed, ML 
estimates are very similar to those provided by the OLS. In fact the slope of the highly 
non-linear conditional mean function in this model appears to be approximated rather 
well by the OLS estimates. However, OLS estimates are not consistent and usually 
give smaller estimates than ML estimators. OLS can approximate ML values if 
divided by the proportion of the non l~mit observations in the sample, i.e. 
(OLS/number of finns which have already adopted) == ML. 
The testing procedure used in this section consists of estimating the Tobit model 
separately for each of the three technologies including all the above variables as 
regressors and to then refine the estimates into a more parsimonious model by 
removing non significant variables (in order of least significance) until further 
removals affect the explanatory power of the regression. However some of the' 
independent regressors may violate the assumption of exogeneity so Instrumental 
5 The Tobin model (Tobin, 1958) presented in this session is not robust to variations from the 
normality assumptions (see Amemiya, 1984). However, research is ongoing on alternative 
distribution, where non-normality is present, such as: Weibull, exponential or log-normal (see 
Maddala, 1994). For the moment Normality is the best assumption for the intra firm model 
discussed in this session (i.e. normal distribution in time t of the level of ownership over the 
cross section of firms). For future research, if a panel data set became available, alternative 
distributions wiIl be considered. 
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Variable methods have been used with regressors being instrumented by their lagged 
values (Maddala, 1992). 
Table 7.6 presents the results of the parsimonious regressions for each of the three 
technologies. For each technology there are two columns of coefficients. The first 
refers to the impact of the independent regressors on the diffusion level of all firms, 
whether they are users or not, the second measures the impact of the independent 
regressors on the diffusion level of only those firms that use the new technology at a 
positive level in 1993, i.e. marginal effects l6• 
For CNC technology the diagnostic statistics of the regression are reasonable. The j-
testl7 for non nested models (J=0.791 , t-statistics 4.705) indicates that the Tobit is a 
better model than the Mansfield logistic model and thus the model is explaining a 
greater proportion of the variance of diffusion. T jj , Le. time since first use, impacts 
positively and significantly but Ljj , the proportion of firms using the technology at date 
of first use is never significant. Several measures of firm size have been tried. The 
revenue measure is never significant. However the employment measure is significant 
with a positive coefficient. 
16 The sample statistics for the data set (using Sample A) can be found in Appendix C. 
17 The J-test (Davidson and McKinnon, 1981) is used to compare the forecasts of the Logistic 
Mansfield model (dM*) against those of the Tobit model (say dT*) on the basis that their 
combination should produce a level of technology ownership (D) with smaller forecast error. 
The compound model being D= (1- \jI) dM* + \jI dT* 
This model can be estimated by OLS and if\jl is not significantly different from zero, then the 
Tobit model does not add anything to explain D. If it is significant then the Tobit model 
explains D over and above the Mansfield model. 
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Table 3.6. Tobit Estimations 
Technology CNC CoT NC 
Variable Censored Adjusted Censored Adjusted Censored Adjusted 
Sample size 194 194 154 154 91. 91 
Tij 0.01287 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.00087 0.00081 
(3.595) (3.592) (2.602) (2.548) (0.384) (0.104) 
M(1970) 0.00011 0.0001098 
(1.825)· (1.853) 
M(1975) 0.00005 0.00004 
-0.1625 
-0.00015 
(1.827)· (1.859)· (-1.763) (-1.629)· 
M(1993) 
-0.00017 
-0.00015 
(-1.394) (-1.331) 
D 0-25 0.180 0.167 
(2.981) (3.01S) 
D 25-75 0.239 0.223 
(3.861) (4.006) 
D 75-125 0.279 0.2597 
(3.909) (2.959) 
D> 125 0.235 0.218 
(3.381) (3.589) 
RDdum 0.0352 0.033 0.049 0.037 0.0121 0.01129 
(0.969) (0.985) (0.820) (0.121) (0.766) (0.298) 
Expdum . -0.047 -0.044 0.06189 0.05744 
(-1.449) (-1.417) (1.611)·· (0.104) 
DCoT -0.155 -0.144 -0.14054 -0.1304 
(-3.412) (-3.0S7) (-2.271) (-1.111) 
DCNC 0.243 0.183 
(3.569) (4.599) 
ISHARE 0.27825 0.25823 
(3.906) (0.571) 
·p=0.068 ·p=0.058 ·p=0.068 ·p=0.103 
··p=0.10 
Conditional 0.282 0.277 0.229 
Mean 
Scale factor 0.929 0.754 0.928 
LogL 49.135 -62.40 41.3997 
Note: Sample A. Industry dummIes suppressed to save space. FIgures In parenthesIs are the 
ratio of the coefficient estimate to the estimated asymptotic standard error. Significant at 5% 
in bold 
Various fonns have been specified for the employment measure including instruments 
reflecting employment in 1970, 1975, and 1986. However, the empirical results 
indicate that a series of dummy variables, reflecting the class size to which the finn 
belongs in 1993, are most effective. Up to 125 employees the level of intra finn 
diffusion increases with finn size after which it declines. The R&D and Export 
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dummies are not significant in the parsimonious form but are occasionally significant 
in other formulations. They always however carry positive and negative signs 
respectively. 
Of the technology use dummies, nearly all firms that have CNC have previously 
installed NC and thus there is insufficient variation to estimate a coefficient on the NC 
dummy. The CoT dummy is significant but negative. One would have expected that as 
CoT and CNC are complementary that the dummy would carry a positive coefficient 
but this is not so. A possible explanation for this is that DCOT is in fact an 
endogenous variable and explained by the other variables already incorporated in the 
model. Few of the industry dummies are significant (only that for industry 3, Pumps, 
Valves and Compressors, is significant in the parsimonious version. This is the 
industry with the highest proportion of adopters). If the industry dummies are replaced 
by ISHARE, the share of firms in the industry to which the firm belongs that have 
adopted technology j by 1993, this variable carries a positive coefficient, the opposite 
to that expected, but the coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. These results 
thus suggest that significant factors affecting the diffusion of CNC technology are 
basically time since adoption, firm size, and the use of CoT technology. 
The results for CoT technology are reasonably similar. T ij again acts positively and 
significantly but Lij does not. Firm size, here instrumented by employment in 1975 
also acts positively and significantly. The export and R&D dummies again are not 
significant. The coefficient of DNC is not significant that of DCNC is significant and 
positive (although recall that most firms with CNC have also previously installed NC). 
This is as expected. If CoT is complementary to CNC (and NC) then one would expect 
those firms that have CNC to be more likely to use CoT and to use CoT to a greater 
extent. Only the dummy for industry 13 (Ball, Roller Plain and Other Bearings) is 
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significant. The ISHARE variable generally was not significant. For CoT therefore, as 
with CNC, the significant factors affecting intra finn diffusion are basically time since 
adoption, firm size, and the other technologies in use. Again the diagnostic statistics 
are good and the J-test (1=0.646 with t=2.703) suggests that this is a better model than 
the Mansfield model. 
It is with NC technologies that the Tobit estimation should come into its own for this 
is the technology with the largest proportion of firms with zero use. The superiority of 
this model is also shown by the good diagnostic statistics and the significance of the J-
test (J=0.718 with t=5.625) indicating that this model can account for a higher 
variability of the diffusion process than the Mansfield Logistic specification. In none 
of the estimates did Tij ever carry a positive coefficient. This would be consistent with 
a technology that was at one time being di~fused but has for some years been in the 
process of replacement. The replacement technology is probably CNC but there is not 
sufficient variability in the sample to test for this. The Lij variable is never significant. 
Firm size instrumented by employment in 1970 and 1975 is significant, but the 
coefficients imply a negative relationship. The larger the firm the smaller the 
proportion of NC machine tools in the machine tool stock in 1993. This would be 
consistent with larger firms installing more CNC and thus replacing NC machines. 
The export dummy is significant but the R&D dummy is not. The DCOT dummy 
carries a significant negative coefficient and two industry dummies (Industrial Plant 
and Steelwork and Electrical Machinery) are significant. The ISHARE dummy is also 
significant if included alongside these two industry dummies. These results are 
obviously different from those for CNC and CoT, but perhaps what one might expect 
for a technology now being replaced. 
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In summary, in the Tobit model the factors that drive the intra firm diffusion process 
for a new technology are basically time since first adoption, firm size, and the other 
technologies in use. Moreover, this model suggests that as newer technologies are 
introduced, older technologies (e.g. NC) will be used less extensively. These results 
hint that what is significant in the determination of the use of a new technology within 
the firm are: rank effects, represented by the size of the firm; technological 
complementarities, (i.e. technological characteristics of the firm production system); 
and epidemic effects via the significance of time since first adoption. So epidemic 
effects are significant but are not the only determinant of adoption. 
Few of the dummies representing the intra industry number of adopters (ISHARE) 
were not significant for CNC and CoT, but they were from NC, which is a very old 
technology which is no longer sold on the market. This finding can be interpreted as 
indicating the non significance of stock effects (implicitly represented by the 
increasing number of competitors which have adopted the technology), given that the 
epidemic effects are picked up by the time from the firm's first adoption (T). 
This preliminary result also indicates that rank effects are important although largely 
neglected by the existing intra-firm literature. Among such effects are the impact of 
the price and cost of adoption (i.e. profitability) of a new technology, technology 
constraints (i.e. input substitutability) and technology expectations. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Intra firm diffusion is one aspect of the process of technology transfer that has largely 
been ignored by economists. In the existing literature there exist mainly two models: 
the Mansfield (1968) and the Stoneman (1981) model. 
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The Stoneman model proposes a theory of intra-firm diffusion grounded solidly within 
economic theory. Its strength relies on the mean-variance approach to the choice of 
techniques based on rational maximising behaviour. In this framework learning occurs 
in a Bayesian manner and the expected level of use of the new technology is related to 
relative profitability, uncertainty, attitudes to risk and adjustment costs. The 
Stoneman approach is an example of an equilibrium model where at each point in time 
the current level of use of the new technology equals the optimal level of use so that 
the firm is in equilibrium at each point in time. However, despite its sophisticated 
theory the Stoneman model is intractable empirically. 
The Mansfield epidemic model predicts that the infectiousness of the innovation is 
determined by its financial characteristics, such as liquidity, size of the firm, expected 
profitability and risk.It also predicts that the diffusion path is logistic. The Mansfield 
model is basically a disequilibrium model according to which the firm increasingly 
uses the new technology until it reaches over time the optimal level of adoption, i.e. 
when it has adopted the new technology 100%. The Mansfield model has been tested 
empirically however, it does never explain more than 18% of the total variability of 
the intra firm diffusion process for the technologies in the CURDS data set. Moreover, 
there is only limited support for the hypothesis that the diffusion process follows a 
logistic curve. Alternative distributions, like the Gompertz (see Dixon, 1980), seem to 
fit the adoption pattern just as well as the Logistic one, throwing severe doubts about 
the Logistic assumptions. A further problem is with firms that have adopted a 
technology at some past date but now have zero use of that technology, i.e. ex users or 
firms that have temporarily suspended the adoption. The Mansfield model does not 
provide any explanation for this. The Mansfield model is inherently a disequilibrium 
model and also on theoretical grounds the Mansfield model fails to consider important 
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aspects of the diffusion process. In alternative to this, the equilibrium approach has 
been discussed leading to some insights on how it can be extended to the analysis of 
intra firm diffusion. Examples of equilibrium models can be found in the inter firm 
diffusion literature but, if one excludes the Stoneman model, have never been applied 
to intra-firm studies. For these reasons an alternative preliminary approach has been 
defined, based around the use of a Tobit model. This model takes into account the role 
of rank, stock and the epidemic effects, outsourced from the inter-firm literature, as 
well as technology complementarities in the process of intra-firm diffusion. It also 
enables one to better exploit the information in the CURDS sample and the 
observations on zero use. 
Although the Tobit model should be considered only as a preliminary exploration of 
the possible equilibrium approach to intra-firm technology diffusion, it provides a 
number of new insights into the understanding of the process of technology adoption 
within a firm. 
The empirical estimates hint that what is significant in the determination of the use of 
a new technology within the firm are rank effects and epidemic effects, via the 
significance of time since first adoption. So, epidemic effects are significant but are 
not the only determinant of adoption, moreover there is ambiguity as whether 
epidemic effects also pick up stock effects. The latter are in fact significant only for 
NC, the oldest of the technologies. In order to draw a more conclusive answer as to the 
importance of profitability considerations upon further extent of use of a new 
technology, it is necessary to further explore their role upon intra-firm diffusion. In 
fact, although stock effects do playa major role in inter-firm studies, this aspect has 
been largely neglected by the existing intra-firm literature. There is also still 
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uncertainty about the role played by different market structures upon the speed of 
technology replacement. 
The inter firm literature would also suggest that price expectations, the cost of 
adoption of a new technology as well as technology constraints (due to inputs 
substitutability in the production process of the firm) play an important role upon 
diffusion (see for example the empirical inter-firm analysis of Stoneman and Kwon 
1996, Karshenas and Stneman 1993). However, their impact upon intra firm diffusion 
has never been investigated. 
All this indicates that there is a clear need for an economic theory of intra firm 
diffusion based on an equilibrium approach, which is able to deal with the role of: (i) 
technological constraints to adoption and complementarities between technologies; 
(ii) the cost of acquiring the technology (and price expectations); (iii) uncertainty; (iv) 
market structure, i.e. monopoly or competition between firms. 
The next two chapters aim at developing such a theoretical model capable of dealing 
with the weaknesses ofthe existing literature on intra-firm diffusion. 
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Chapter 4. 
DIFFERENT WAYS OF REPRESENTING A NEW TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
INTRA FIRM STOCK EFFECT 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have highlighted the importance of intra firm technology 
transfer and the weaknesses of the existing literature in the area. On a pUrly empirical 
level they also explored the possible impact of those factors that have already been 
proved to affect inter firm diffusion, i.e. rank, stock and epidemic effects (order effects 
do not apply). Among these only rank effects significantly affect the intra-firm 
diffusion of the three technologies in the CURDS sample, i.e. NC, CNC and Micro. It 
was not possible to reach a definite conclusion about the significance of the epidemic 
and the stock effects. 
In the inter firm literature the stock effect would predict that the benefits from 
acquisition for the marginal adopter decrease as the number of adopters increases. In 
each point in time, for a given cost of aquisition there will be a number of adopters 
beyond which adoption is not profitable. However, as time proceeds, those costs tend 
to fall making adoption more attractive. In such models the return from adoption 
results from endogenising the output decision of the firm. As firms acquire the new 
technology, their production costs fall. This leads firms to expand output and to reduce 
price and this reduces the profitability of further adoption (see Reinganum, 1981a, 
1981b, 1983, Qurmbach, 1986 and also Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995 for a survey of 
the empirical applications of these effects). This type of model basically predicts that 
the adoption of a technology is mainly driven by changes in the returns from adoption 
over time. 
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Similar to the inter firm literature, it is plausible to assume that what determines the 
intra firm extent of use of a new technology is related to the expected profit gains from 
its further use. In fact, in equilibrium, the optimal level of adoption of the new 
technology is such as to equal the marginal increase of operating profits with the 
marginal cost of adding one unit of the new technology. Consequently, it might be that 
for a given cost of adoption in time t, the extent of use will be limited. As the firm 
adopts the advanced technology its marginal cost of production reduces, generating 
higher marginal profits. However, as it does so the firm might want to expand its 
output. At the aggregate level (or alternatively for a monopolist firm), in order to meet 
the demand for that good, the increased amount of output has to be sold at a lower 
price, leading to a shift in the marginal profit from the extensive use of the technology. 
Consequently, if marginal profit gains decrease with the extent of use of the new 
technology (or if marginal costs of adding new capital equipment increases, for 
whatever reason) there is no incentive to immediately replace the entire stock of the 
old production technology (i.e. there is intra-firm diffusion). 
Figure 4.1. Impact of a cost reducing technology 
p 
p. I-------..l.rl--'K. 
~ ~~----~~~~----------
L-______ ~~~~, --------~~~------~~()~-------> 
Y Y MR 
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Figure 4.1 shows the implications of different levels of adoption of a new cost 
reducing technology for a monopolistic fIrm (or equivalently an industry). 
In the pre-adoption period the fIrm produces output Y which is determined where 
marginal costs equal marginal revenue (B). The fIrm sells that amount at the price P 
that consumers are willing to pay for that quantity, which is represented by the 
(inverse) demand function, D. In the pre diffusion period, when the fIrm owns only 
Ko, the production costs are MCo and profIts are P ABCo. 
As soon as the fIrm adopts the fIrst unit of the technology its marginal cost of 
production shifts down from MCo to MCt, where MCt lies somewhere between MCo 
and MCn• The shift (MCo-MCJ is a function of the proportion of the capital stock in 
time t incorporating the new technology, or equivalently the reduction in costs 
associated with the use of the new technology. If a fIrm decides to replace all its 
existing capital stock with the new technology, without output expansion, its profit 
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gains will be CoBCnD'. However, as costs decrease the firm might wish to increase its 
supply of output up to Y'. If the fIrm is a monopolist it will have to reduce its price 
from P to P', in order to sell this amount of output. In Figure 4.1, as output expands 
from Y to Y', profits from the extent of use of the new technology increase from 
PABCo up to a maximum of P'A'B'Cn, and profit gains from adoption will range 
between P'A'B'Cn minus PABCo' depending upon the amount of new technology 
owned by the firm. This will continue until it is still profitable for the firm to extend 
the use of a new technology. However, although profits may increase with the extent 
of use, only a few firms immediately adopt the new technology completely (see 
chapter 2). One of the explanations can be that there are decreasing profit gains from 
further adoption making extensive replacement not attractive. In fact, if profIt gains 
are increasing with the level of adoption, i.e. profits are unbounded, then it would be 
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rational for the firm to immediately adopt all the technology. If instead profit gains 
decrease with the extent of use of the technology, as hypothesised by the inter firm 
literature, then these profits are bounded and decreasing with the extent of adoption. 
This would provide the rationale as to why the firm might not find it profitable to soon 
adopt all the new technology. One might then conclude that, similarly to the inter firm 
stock effect, to any given acquisition cost corresponds an optimal level of intra firm 
adoption of the new technology. 
In the intra-firm literature this hypothesis is still unexplored. Consequently, in order to 
understand whether the speed and the extent of further use of a new technology is 
subject to 'intra-firm stock effects', one has to look at the pattern of profit gains from 
adoption. In particular one has to answer the following questions: 
• Do profit gains shift to the right or to the left as more output is produced on the new 
technology? That is, are profit gains bounded or unbounded as new technology 
ownership increases? 
• What is the optimal level of adoption for a competitive . firm compared to a 
monopolist firm? 
This chapter aims at answering the above questions and explores the presence of such 
intra-firm stock effects upon the spread of use of a new technology. The final aim is 
to define a new intra firm stock model capable of explaining the determinants of the 
replacement process of the old with the new technology. 
There are several ways of representing a technology and the benefits associated with 
its use. This study looks at two of them. On the basis of the assumption that the 
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optimal level of adoption is given by the combination of inputs and the level of output 
that minimise the finn costs and maximise the finn revenue, the first approach defines 
the new technology via the reduction in costs brought about by the further adoption. 
The resulting profit gains from adoption are expressed as a function of the reduction in 
total production costs (8 CJ associated with the extent of use of the new technology 
(i.e. Cost function approach). The second approach defines a technology via the flow 
of output that is produced on the set of technologies owned by the finn, where the new 
technology is just one out of the wider set used by the finn. In essence this approach 
assumes that there exist technology specific operating costs depending upon the 
characteristic of the machines in use. The corresponding total costs are the sum of the 
cost of production using each technology (C,=Lj C (Yj yjJ), which in turn are a function 
of the technology specific proportion of output (y) produced on each machinery (i.e. 
mUltiple technology approach). 
The main difference between the two approaches is that in the first case a small 
increase in the new technology ownership leads to a shift in total cost and an output 
expansion so that at the margin, the relative benefits from adoption are determined by 
supply-output effects (see figure 4.1.a). In the second case the cost reduction is 
proportional to the extent of use of a new technology and is independent of output 
expansion so that the resulting benefits from adoption are independent of demand. 
This chapter looks at the contribution of each approach to the specification of the intra 
firm diffusion model of technology adoption and at the possible implications under 
different demand curves and different market scenarios. The impact of market 
structure upon the extent of use of a new process (intra finn diffusion) has never been 
explored before. For this reason the behaviour of the firm in deciding how much to 
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adopt will be examined within both a monopolistic and a competitive environment. 
The oligopolistic market is represented by the intermediate situation between the two. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 investigates whether profit gains from a 
shift in total operating costs are bounded or unbounded by looking at the supply-
output effect brought about by a reduction in costs and the firm's decision to expand 
its production. The implicit assumption is that the reduction in costs is due to the 
further acquisition of a new technology ('Cost function approach'). To more explicitly 
measure the extent of use of a new technology, total cost are also expressed as a linear 
combination of the cost of producing on each type of capital stock owned by the firm 
(i.e. new and old). Moreover, to allow for more flexibility in the model this hypothesis 
is also tested under different demand constraints, namely a constant elasticity demand 
and a linear demand function. 
Section 3 aims at defining the optimal level of intra firm adoption of the new 
technology, based upon the impact of technology substitution on the total capacity of 
the firm. The replacement of the old with the new technology is here driven by the fact 
that new, advanced machines are designed to produce at lower costs and with higher 
productivity ('Multiple technology approach'). Moreover, the decision to adopt a new 
technology can be affected by the position of the firm in the market. The impact of the 
market structure upon the extent of use of a new process incorporated into a capital 
good, i.e. intra firm diffusion, has never been explored before. For this reason the 
behaviour of the firm in deciding how much to adopt will be examined under different 
market scenarios. A final section summarises the finding of this chapter. 
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4.2. COST FUNCTION APPROACH 
4.2.1. The profitability of increasing use of a new technology: 
Consider the case of a single finn (a monopolist) that sells a single output good (yJ 
The total revenue of the finn will depend on the amount of supply it chooses to 
produce, R(yJ=p(yJ.Yt, at the current costs Ct. The profit maximisation problem of this 
finn can be written as: 
max R(yJ -C(yJ = max PI (YJ·YI - Ct·Yt (4.1) 
where, for the moment, costs are simply costs per unit of output. 
The amount of output that the finn wants to sell depends upon the price at which it 
sells its output and the current production cost. The relationship between price and 
output can be represented by: i) the Inverse Demand Function, p(y), which is the price 
that consumers are willing to pay for any given amount of output, or ii) the elasticity 
of substitution E= yIp. dp/dy, which is negative for ordinary down sloping demand 
curves, i.e. dp(y)/dy<O (Stafford, 1971). 
From (4.1) the change in profits due to an output expansion is defined as (4.2a): 
(4.2a) 
The first order condition for profit maximisation indicates that the level of output that 
maximises profits is such that Marginal revenue (P(yJ + p'(YJ YJ equals Marginal 
1 In tenns of differentials (4.2b) can be rewritten as: p(Yt) d(y)+ p'(YV d(Y).Yt= Ct .d(y) 
This means that a monopolist considers producing an extra unit of output (dy), he will increase 
his revenue ofp(y*) dey), but in order to sell dy he has to reduce his price by p'(y*)dy and will 
loose his revenue on each of the y* units he is selling. The sum of these two effects gives his 
marginal revenue. If MR exceeds the (Marginal) costs of production, the monopolist will 
expand output. The excess stops when MR and Me balance out (Varian, 1984). 
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(4.2b) 
and 
Assuming that ct falls as the use of the technology increases, one may derive from 
(4.2b) that: 
Imposing the first order condition (4.2b), the first three terms cancel out and (4.2c) 
reduces to (4.3): 
(4.3) 
This indicates that decreasing unit costs will yield profits increases proportionately to 
the level of output. (4.3) can also be rewritten as (4.4)., which shows that profit gains 
per unit of output are proportional to the reduction in costs (ct-Ct_l ) 
(4.4) 
From (4.3), the impact on the profit gain ofa change in costs can be defined as (4.5): 
(4.5) 
The sign of (4.5) determines the curvature of the profit function with respect to 
changes in costs. Consequently, in order to determine whether profit gains from costs 
reduction are bounded or unbounded (d27t/d2ct >1<0) it is important to determine the 
sign of the rhs of(4.5) ,i.e. dYtl dCI 
From (4.2a) the optimal level of output YI* is given by (4.6): 
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(4.6) 
which after substitution in (4.1) allows one to express profit just as function of the 
optimal level of output and the slope of the (inverse) demand curve: 
1tt = _y*2 t .p'(YJ (4.7) 
Using (4.7) one can derive the first order condition of profit maximisation per unit cost 
as: 
or equivalently: 
d1t/dct= - dy/dct · YL (2. p' (yJ + Yt· p"(yJ) (4.8) 
From (4.8) and (4.3) one gets (4.9): 
dy/dcI ={ p' (yJ + [p' (yJ + YI' p"{YJ]}-1 (4.9) 
and substituting (4.9) into (4.5) one can rewrite (4.5) as (4.5 '): 
(4.5') 
The term into brackets is the inverse of the second order condition for output 
maximisation, i.e.: 
(4.10) 
where p t'(YJ is the slope of the demand curve and [p/'{YJ Yt + p/{yJ] is the slope of 
MR. However, the sign of (4.5') is not as straightforward as it might seem, and the 
results in the literature are in fact contrasting. Hahn (1962) has proved that (4.1 0) is 
negative, i.e. d1t/ldy/ <0. This concavity condition indicates that the MR curve is 
steeper than demand, i.e. [Pt"(yJ Yt + p/(YJl < p/(yJ and would imply that unit profits 
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from unit cost reduction (see 4.5) are convex (d21t/d2ct >0), and bounded, i.e. with 
decreasing profit gains from adoption. 
However, Seade (1980) proves that the negativity assumption of (4.10) holds only for 
local linearizable stability solutions. In fact he adds a further interpretation of this 
inequality. He rewrites: 
(4.11) 
where p' is the slope of the demand curve and the term p/' Yt I Pt' is the elasticity of 
the slope of demand (Eso). He then proves that certain kinds of demand curves might 
violate Hahn's assumptions especially when some dynamic adjustment is introduced. 
Seade concludes that the slope of the demand curve matters and it is the sign of the 
elasticity of the slope of demand that determines the concavity or the convexity of the 
relationship. 
Seade demonstrates his theory within an oligopolistic framework. This section deals 
with a monopolistic market but the argument still holds. In fact, if we assume that the 
monopolistic firm faces an isoelastic (inverse) demand such as: 
then p'(YJ and p"(YJ are respectively: 
dpt/dy, =A Tj Ylll-1 <0 
dp/ldy,2 =A Tj (Tj-l) Y111-2 >0 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
Given that the monopolist will always produce where the elasticity of demand 11,,<-1 
(see Varian, 1990), than the rhs of (4.13) is negative, while the rhs of (4.14) is 
positive. 
From (4.13) and (4.14) one can derive the elasticity of demand (Eo=p'p/y) as Eo=ll, and 
the elasticity of the slope of the demand (ESD = P"y/ p') as (4.15): 
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(4.15) 
which is negative. 
Substituting (4.13) and (4.14) into (4.10) allows to specify the second order condition 
for profit maximisation with respect to output as (4.16): 
(+). (+) .(-). (+) 
and correspondingly (4.17): 
f21t/d2Ct=- {A. y'1-t. 11. (11 +1)}-1 >0 
(-) (+). (+). (-). (+) 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
The sign analysis (signs are in brackets) tells us that the relationship between profits 
and output (4.16) is concave while the relationship between profit and costs (4.17) is 
convex. This means that there are decreasing profit gains from output expansion and 
increasing profit from cost reduction but the corresponding profit gains are concave, 
i.e. decreasing with the cost reduction2• These results are represented in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2.Monopolist facing an isoelastic (inverse) demand curve:Pt=ayl1 t (£so<O) 
p 
"rc 
Ae 
y y 
2 The shape of profit gains is determined looking at the second and third order condition of 
cost minimization: d21tt/d2ct=- {A.y'l-l.l1.(l1+ l)}-1>0; 
d31tt!d3cr-{A.y'l-2.11(11+1).(11-1) }-l <0 
While the first indicates that profit gains increase with the cost reduction, the second indicates 
that they are concave, i.e. bounded. 
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The first plot simply shows the negative relationship between output and prices via the 
constant elasticity demand curve. The second plot shows the results of (4.16) 
indicating that profits from output expansion are increasing but bounded. The last plot 
shows the cost constraint (4.17) indicating that there are increasing profits from cost 
reduction. However, the shape of the profit gains is concave, i.e. they are bounded, 
therefore they increase but less than proportionally with cost reduction (see footnote 
2). Moreover, from the comparison of (4.16) and (4.17) the growth rate in profit gains 
per unit of output is greater than the profit gains from the reduction in costs. 
If, instead of an isoelastic curve, the firm faces a negatively sloped linear (inverse) 
demand curve such as: 
then p'(YJ and p"(YJ are: 
dpt/dYt =b 
dpt2/dYt2 =0 
b<O 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
The rhs (4.18) is negative while (4.19) is equal to zero, meaning that the demand 
function has got a constant and negative slope, i.e. with elasticity of the slope of the 
demand equal to zero: 
ESD=O (4.20) 
Substituting (4.18) and (4.20) into (4.5') yields: 
(4.19) 
which is negative. 
Moreover, from (4.19) condition (4.5) becomes: 
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(4.20) 
which is positive. 
(4.19) and (4.20) show that, similar to the constant elasticity of demand case, when 
the finn faces a linear demand function, the relationship between profits and output is 
concave while the relationship between profits and costs is convex. 
Figure 4.3. Monopolist firm facing a linear (Inverse) Demand curve: Pt=a+bYt 
(8SD=0) 
11 
Ac 
y y 
These results are summarised in Figure 4.3. The linear demand function is represented 
in the first plot. The second plot shows that there are decreasing profit from output 
expansion (equation 4.19), while in the third plot profit gains are constant and they do 
increase with the reduction in costs (equation 4.20)3. In other words, profits from a cost 
reduction linearly increase with the cost reduction so that the monopolistic finn will 
always find it profitable to switch immediately to lower costs of production, i.e. the 
new technology. 
3 The shape of the profit gains under linear demand function is determined looking at the 
second and third order condition of cost minimization: d21tt/d2ct =-1I2b >0; d31tt/d3ct = O. 
While the first indicates that profit gains decrease the second indicates that they are constant, 
i.e. unbounded. 
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Moreover, profit gains due to output expansion (4.19) increase faster than the increase 
due to the reduction in cost (4.20). 
The previous results, (4.17) and (4.20), indicate that the elasticity of the slope of 
demand (Eso) is inversely related to the curvature ofthe (inverse) demand function, and 
it takes its sign from whether the latter is concave or convex. The higher in absolute 
value the elasticity of the slope of demand (Le. the more is the demand curve convex) 
the lower are profit gains from further adoption. 
Figure 4.4. Profit gains with output expansion 
o Y Y' 
output 
Note: see equation (4.4): d1t/Yt = - dCt >0 
Figure 4.4. represents this result graphically. For a firm producing output y, the profit 
gains from a cost reduction (ct_t-cJ are constant and depend on the current level of 
output produced (y) (see equation 4.4). However, in the case of output expansion (Le. 
from y to y') , the corresponding benefits from cost reduction are inversely related to 
the slope ofthe elasticity of the demand (Eso)· 
If the firm faces a negative Eso (inverse) demand curve, when expanding output the 
profit gains from a cost reduction are bounded and decreasing relatively to the 
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reduction in costs. This indicates that the finn might not necessarily decide to 
immediately shift all its production to the new cost reducing technology but instead 
wait; a simple output expansion might generate high enough profits without requiring 
further investments in production. On the other end, if the finn faces a zero ESD 
(inverse) demand curve, Le. a linear demand curve, then profit gains from further 
adoption are constant and unbounded. 
In summary one can conclude that the benefits from cost reduction and/or output 
expansion are a function of the level of output produced. More importantly, profit 
gains depend upon the curvature of the (inverse) demand function, and their sign 
depends on whether the latter is concave or convex. 
Based upon these results, for a monopolist, the speed of the introduction of a new cost 
reducing technology depends upon the elasticity of the slope of the (inverse) demand 
curve it faces in the market for its product. 
Table 4.1. Profitability of adoption in presence of output expansion 
ESD 1t\=f(cJ 1t\=f(yJ d1t\=f(dcJ 
Monopoly 
-isoelastic demand function Negative Convex Concave PositivelBounded 
-linear demand function Zero Convex Concave ConstantlUnbounded 
In particular, if the finn faces a demand with zero elasticity of the slope (Eos=O), (for 
example a linear elasticity curve) then profits per unit of output are bounded and profit 
gains decrease with the cost reduction. If instead the elasticity of the slope is negative 
(EDS=~O) (for example a isoelastic demand curve) profits per unit of output are bounded 
and profit gains decrease (more than proportionally) with the cost reduction per extra 
unit of output. 
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If one assumes that the shift in Me is brought about by the purchase of a cost reducing 
capital embodied technology, this result would suggest that in absence of output 
expansion the profit gains from adoption (ct_1-cJ are proportional to the level of 
ownership of the new technology. The higher the extent of use, the greater the cost 
reduction and the higher the profits gains will be. However, as the firm decides to 
expand its output, the benefits from the use of the new technology will depend upon 
the shape of the demand curve. This is an important result, showing that the marginal 
benefits from adoption do not necessarily increase with the extent of use of a new 
technology; this might explain why firms do not immediately adopt all the new 
technology but instead wait. However, the result does not hold across different 
demand functions. This leads one to conclude that, consistently with the inter firm 
diffusion studies, for a profit maximising firm profitability considerations may playa 
relevant role in the decision to invest. However, as specified in this model, the intra-
firm stock effect does not necessarily slow down the extent of use of a new 
technology. Even if very informative, this approach does not provide a measure of the 
optimal level of intra firm ownership of a new technology. So far the extent of use of 
the advanced technology has been implicitly measured via the reduction in production 
costs. 
The next section aims at deriving the optimal level of intra-firm adoption, by imposing 
that the shift in costs (or equivalently profit gains) can be expressed as related to the 
proportion of new technology incorporated into the capital stock of the firm. 
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4.2.2. The optimal level of technology adoption 
The model presented in this section is an extension of the one presented in the previous 
section. The only difference is that now total costs are specified as a combination of 
the cost of production associated to each type of technology. Assume, for simplicity, 
that the firm owns two sets of technologies: the 'new' technology (~) and the set of 
existing, or 'old', technologies 0<0). 
One way of representing a superior technology is via the reduction in production costs 
brought about by its relative level of use. This is done by expressing the total costs of 
production of the firm (CJ as the combination of the unit costs of production of the 
new (Cnt= cn.~J and the existing technologies (Cot= co.~J so that: 
Ct(Cop CnJ 
where Cnt and Cot are the technology specific cost of production and are a function of 
the level and type oftechnology in use by the firm. For simplicity, assume also that: 
I) marginal costs equal average costs both for the advanced (MCn) and the existing 
(MCo) technology: 
MCo=ACo=co 
MCn=ACn=cn 
where CO' the unit cost of production with the new technology, is less than co, i.e. cn<co' 
II) Total marginal costs can be represented by a convex function of Co and cn which 
lies between MCo and MCn (see figure 4.1): 
(4.21) 
where a E [0;1]. 
a, the proportion of production undertaken with the new technology, is here taken as a 
measure of intra-firm diffusion. 
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(4.21) also implies that a change in cost (dcJ due to a change in the optimal 
combination of new and old technology (daJ is equal to the shift in the costs of 
production with the old and the new technology : 
(4.22) 
which is negative, being Cn <co, and constant, being d2c/d2a t = o. 
After substitution of the cost function (4.22), the generic profit function of the firm can 
be specified as (4.23): 
(4.23) 
The optimal combination of input, proxied by a.t is defined by imposing the first order 
condition for profits maximisation: 
(4.24) 
In the previous session (4.2.1) it has been proved (see equation (4.3) that whatever 
shape of the demand function, the first term on the rhs of (4.24) leads to: 
(4.25) 
This means that there are increasing benefits from technology adoption. In order to see 
whether profits are bounded or unbounded one has to determine whether the 
relationship between profits and'a is concave or convex. 
Substituting condition (4.25) and (4.22) into (4.24) yields: 
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(4.26) 
(-) . (-) 
Which is positive, (cn-co) being less than zero. That means that there are positive 
profit gains and they are a function of the cost reduction brought about by the use of 
the advanced technology. 
From (4.24) the second order condition of profit maximisation with respect to a.t is: 
(4.27) 
The second tenn of (4.27) equals zero as d2c/d2a.t=O Moreover from (4.24) one can 
rewrite (4.28): 
(4.28) 
(4.28) indicates that the convexity or concavity of profits depends upon the sign of 
d21t
t
/d2ct. The latter, as already shown in section 4.2.1, depends upon the elasticity of 
the slope of demand (Eso). Consequently, in the monopolist case one might want to 
distinguish two cases according to the shape of the (inverse) demand curve, yielding 
the following results: 
a) If the finn faces an isoelastic demand function (pt=AYtll) with Eso=11-1<O then from 
(4.17) (see section 4.2.1): 
This indicates that: 
(4.29) 
(+) . (-) 
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while 
@37tt / d3a t= d37t/3dct·(cn-co) >q 
(-) . (-) 
It is straightforward to see that the sign of (4.29) is negative, meaning that the benefits 
from the extensive use of a new technology are concave and therefore decrease with 
its level of use, i.e. profit gains are bounded. 
b) If the firm faces a linear demand function (Pt= a+bYJ with Eso=O then from (4.20) 
(see section 4.2.1): 
and 
while: 
(+). (-) 
@31t/ d3a t = d31t/3dct ·( cn-co) =q 
(0). (-) 
(4.30) 
In this case there are positive and concave profit from adoption (a), while profit gains 
associated with the extent of use of a new technology are decreasing and constant. 
Figure 4.5. Extent of use (a) and profitability (7t) 
.. ~ 
/ 
a. 
.. ~ / .~ 
a. 
(b) 
Note: (a) non-linear demand function; (b) linear demand function. 
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These results are consistent with the previous finding (see section 4.2.1.) and are 
summarised in Figure 4.5. The first two graphs on the left (Figure 4.S/a) show that for 
a firm facing a isoelastic' demand curve, there are increasing concave profits from 
adoption. This indicates that profit gains do decrease with the extent of use of the new 
technology (a) or equivalently they decrease with the reduction in cost brought about 
by a decrease in a. In the case of linear elasticity case (see figure 4.5/b): profit gains 
from the adoption of a new technology increase with the level of adoption (a ). Similar 
to total costs (see table 4.1), the benefits from the extensive increase in the adoption of 
a cost reducing technology are constant lunbounded and the greater the level of new 
technology ownership, i.e. the lower the cost reduction, the higher profit gains are In 
particular, in the case of linear demand the firm will get decreasing but constant return 
proportional to further adoption, while in the case of isoelastic demand, the firm will 
face returns less than proportional to the increased extent of use. Consequently, 
decreasing profit gains, expecially for isoelastic demand goods, could lead the firm to 
delay adoption until costs of acquisition fall. 
These results show that the hypothesis of decreasing returns from adoption (i.e. Stock 
effects) as the inter firm stock effect would suggest, do exist but both intensity and 
direction depend upon the shape of the demand curve and their sign is determined by 
the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve (£so). 
For these reasons and because we have not been able to derive an expression for the 
optimal level of capital accumulation, the Cost function approach is abandoned. 
An alternative route defined the "Multiple technology (or Vintage) approach" is 
explored in the following session. 
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4.3. The multiple technology approach 
Another approach to explaining the dynamic of technological replacement is to look at 
the flow of output that is produced with the current technologies and the benefits 
associated with the extensive use of the latest ones. In fact at each moment in time the 
firm's capital stock can be represented as made up of machines with different 
productive potentials, where older machines embody more outmoded techniques 
which were best practice at the time they were introduced. On the contrary newer 
machinery embodies improvements in knowledge and can produce more efficiently at 
best practice standards of efficiency in the use of all the input of production (Salter 
and Reddaway, 1966). This means that each machine is characterised by different 
productivity and different marginal costs so that within a firm the same amount of 
output can be produced at different costs according to the characteristics of the 
machines in use. Because the extent of use of each technology is related to the type of 
machinery, this approach is defined Multiple technologl. 
Under the assumption that the firm produces at maximum capacity all the time, the 
capacity (xjJ of each unit of capital good can be assumed to be equal to the amount of 
output it can produce, which, in turn, is determined by the productivity of the specific 
type of technology it embodies. In this way each unit of machinery in use by the finn 
4 This approach similar to the Vintage literature in the sense that they both look at the impact 
of the introduction of a new technology on the total capacity of the firm and assume that is 
the aging of the existing machinery what determines its replacement rate (see Malcomson, 
1975, 1982, etc.). However, contrary to the Vintage literature, the proportion y is not a 
function of the age but rather the type of,technology incorporated in the machinery j in use: Xj 
= YiY. A similar approach can also be found in Salter and Reddaway (1966) in explaining the 
replacement process of the existing capital stock and the scrapping of old with newer more 
advanced machinery. In their model, they relate the age of each machinery to the output per 
man hour. 
97 
is technology specific and can be represented by the proportion (y) of total output (yJ 
it can produce. Moreover, this proportion (y) is technology specific and reflects the 
productivity of each technology in use, that is: 
(4.31) 
Being Y E [0;1] and LYj =1, it is immediate to see that the total capacity of the total 
capital equipment owned by the finn equals total outputs: 
In this light total operating costs CI can no longer be expressed simply as the cost per 
unit of output, i.e. TC= CI 'YI' as the cost approach would suggest (see section 4.2). 
Costs are rather a function of the flow of output that each machine is capable of 
producing, i.e. ClYj YJ, and total costs, i.e. TC= ClYJ are the sum of the costs of 
producing on each machinery: 
(4.32) 
or equivalently, assuming that costs are homogeneous of degree one and using 4.31, 
they can be rewritten as: 
where by definition L Yj =1. 
5 On the same line it is possible to show that the output produced on each machinery is 
determined by the technology specific productivity and equals Ytj = (Yj)-l Xjt where total 
output is a function ofthe sum of each technology specific capacity, Yt=~j (Yj)-l Xjt . 
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In Figure 4.6. the total capital stock of the finn (x =~j xj ) is represented on the 
horizontal axes, as the sum of each type of capital embodied technology j. Moreover, 
each type of technology j owned by the finn is represented as Xj (where j=I, .. n.) and it 
is sorted from the newer 0=1} to the older O=n}. The vertical axes defme the operation 
cost associated with each type of machinery. 
For ease of presentation, for each technology it is assumed that marginal cost equals 
average cost. Under this assumption each step of the cost function represents the cost 
associated to the characteristics of each technology the finn owns at time t, where XI is 
superior to, i.e. more cost reducing than, X2 . Given that the cost to produce on old 
machinery is higher than to produce on newest machinery the total costs at time t are 
represented by the straight split line. 
Figure 4.6. Costs and the capacity of each machinery owned by the firm 
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Alternatively, plotting the average and marginal cost of production for each 
technology, the total cost step function of the finn can be represented in tenns of 
continuous functions as in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Total costs and multiple technology choice 
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By assuming that any new investment is made up of machines of the latest type, more 
productive than the older ones, and assuming that the firm uses these machines at full 
capacity, technology replacement can be measured as the impact of the introduction of 
a new technology on the total production costs of the firm. In fact, going back to 
Figure 4.6. as the firm acquires a new technology XNEW' the cost function (MC) shifts to 
the right due to the further reduction in production cost, i.e. MCt -> MCt+], and some of 
the oldest technologies (Le. those on the right) are eventually disregarded. The impact 
of the adoption of the new technology is represented by the dotted line in Figure 4.6. 
Consequently the higher the extent of use of the new technology the lower is the cost 
of production. The minimum cost corresponds to the complete replacement of the 
existing capital stock with the more advanced technology. 
In mathematical terms assume, for simplicity, that the firm owns only two sets of 
technologies: the advanced technology (xnJ and the existing technologies (xoJ 6• 
6 This assumption greatly simplify the mathematical complexity of the models in presence of 
multiple technologies, without changing the nature of the problem. 
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Assume also that the productivity of each type of capital is technology-specific, i.e. 
lower for the older technologies (Yo<:'{n and Yo+Yn =1) and that each machinery is fully 
utilised so that Xjl = Yj YI' Under these conditions, the capacity of each machine can be 
represented by the proportion of total output it can produce Xjl = Yjl where j=o,n, so that 
in each moment in time total output the firm produces equals the total capacity YI=Lj Xjl 
or equivalently: 
where YOI =Yo 'YI and Ynl =Yn 'YI are the units of output produced in time t, respectively 
on the old (xoJ and the advanced technology (xnJ. 
In this framework the profit maximising problem for a monopolist firm can be re-
written as: 
j= old, new (4.33) 
where total revenue (TR) depends on the total quantity produced on each machinery 
(i.e. the current capacity of the firm l:j Xjl = Y J, while total cost (TC) is the cost of 
producing on each type of technology j available within the firm (see equation 4.32). 
The first order condition for profit maximisation with respect to the capacity of each 
technology j is given by the partial derivative with respect to each technology j: 
(4.34) 
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Using the Lagrangean multiplier it can be easily proved that, in equilibrium, the 
marginal cost of producing on each technology should be equal (see figure 4.8) 7; 
(4.35) 
Figure 4.8. Total costs of multiple technology plant and extent of use of a 
technology 
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Knew K TOT 
Mr' new 
I 
I 
/ 
x 
Figure 4.9 shows this property for a finn using two technologies. For this firm the total 
marginal cost curve is simply the horizontal summation of the individual MCj curves 
of producing on each type of technology (MCTOT =~j MC(xjJ). The quantity XTOT is 
sum of the production capacity on each type of technology (XTOT =Xo+XNEW) and 
7 This case is similar to the multiplant monopolist, for which total revenue depends on the 
quantity produced in each plant and the total costs in each plant. Marginal analysis indicates 
that the marginal revenue for the output as a whole must equal MC in each plant. In fact if the 
MC were lower in one plant, additional production would take place in the plant until 
MCi=MCj=MRTOT 
where MRTOT is the overall marginal revenue MRt= Pt (!:j XjU. In addition, for the first order 
condition of output maximisation to hold MR must increase less rapidly than the MC in each 
plant, i.e. MR-MC ~O (Kamerschen, Valentine, 1977). 
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correspond to where MCTOT intersects MRTOT' Graphically, this is represented by the 
distance of each type of Xj from the origin of the axes, i.e. OXTOT=~j OXj (and it can be 
seen that d(O;xo) = d(xToT-xNEw»' Given that the firm uses the existing machinery at 
full capacity, the optimal amount of each technology is determined where marginal 
cost of producing on each technology are equal, i.e. MCjt = MCt. Any amount of 
technology produced above that level would move total production cost away from 
MCt • 
In a dynamic framework as the firm acquires more technology with superior capacity, 
the latter replaces an existing one, and eventually the oldest and more expensive 
technology, i.e. the one on the extreme left like MC I , is no longer used. In this case the 
total cost curve (MCTOT ) shifts to the right (MCToT') and the shift is proportional to the 
amount of output (Le. total capacity) produced on each unit of new technology. 
Returning to the mathematical modeling, assume that the cost of producing on each 
technology are Co and Cn and that they are a function of the capacity corresponding to 
the new (xJ and the old technology (xo): 
Further, apply a translation of the axis where the origin is at the intercept of the cost 
functions (i.e. d=(O;O», then allow that total costs and marginal costs to be specified 
as a function of the total capacity of the firm: 
TC. = 112 b. y.2 
J J J (4.36) 
(4.37) 
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where j = new, old and bn is less than bo because the new technology is cost reducing. 
If one interprets bj as the slope of the MCj curve, then bn <bo implies that the cost 
function MCo is steeper than MCn (see Figure 4.9). 
Equation (4.35) has shown that under profit maximising behaviour the marginal costs 
of production of each technology must be equal ( MCn =MCo ) and they are 
determined where MRToT intersects MCToT ' In mathematical terms this means that: 
(4.38) 
From (4.38) one can derive the optimal level of output produced on the old technology 
(y/) as a proportion (bn/bo) of the output produced on the latest technology (Yn): 
(4.39) 
(4.39) allows us to endogenise Yo such that the total output Yt in (4.32), can be written 
solely as a function of Yn: 
(4.40) 
from which the optimal level of output (Yn *) is: 
(4.41) 
(4.41) indicates that the optimal level of output produced on the new technology is a 
proportion (bj(bo+bn» of the total firm' output (Yt). Symmetrically, substituting (4.41) 
into (4.39) one can express the total output produced on the old technology as a 
function ofYt: 
(4.42) 
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The total costs corresponding to the optimal level of output produced on the old and 
the new technology ,i.e. TC= f(yo· ; Yn·), can now be written solely as a function ofYt 
and bn. In fact substituting (4.41) and (4.42) into (4.36) and adding them together 
yields: 
or equivalently: 
(4.43) 
For a monopolist that produces its output using only two technologies (Yn and Yo) and 
facing the generic (inverse) demand function, i.e. Pt = fey), and the cost function (4.43) 
the profit maximising function is: 
(4.44) 
The first order condition of (4.44) with respect to output is: 
where Zt = 112. (bn .bo)/(bo + bn) . 
Then the change in profits due to a change in the proportion of new technology in use 
is measured by differentiating (4.44) with respect to bn: 
d7t/dbn = (P'(YJ . Yt + p(yJ - 2 . Z . YJ . dy/dbn - Yt2 • dzld bn (4.46) 
From (4.45), the first term in the rhs of (4.46) must be zero. Calculating the 
derivative of z with respect to bn in the second term of (4.46) and substituting in (4.45) 
yields: 
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(4.47) 
which can be further simplified using (4..41) so that: 
I d1t/dbn =- 112 . Ynt2 <0 I (4.48) 
which is negative. This suggests that the lower is bn , i.e. the slope of the cost function, 
the flatter is the cost curve and the higher are the profits from the cost reduction (see 
Figure 4.9). 
In order to see whether the profit gains from adoption are bounded or unbounded one 
has to look at the sign of the second order condition for profit maximisation . From 
(4.4 7) it is possible to write: 
where from (4.40) it is easy to derive (4.49) : 
Moreover, with some simple manipulation one can also derive: 
where, given (4.40) , the above expression can be rewritten as: 
d[b/{bn+bo)]1 dbn = -Ynt2/Yt2 
Finally replacing (4.40), (4.49) and (4.50) into (4.58) yields: 
(4.49) 
(4.50) 
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which is equal to zero: 
(4.51) 
This indicates that profit gains from the further use of a new technology are constant. 
Together, conditions (4.48) and (4.51) imply that total profits are a positive function of 
the cost reduction brought about by the adoption of a new technology, indicating that 
profit gains from adoption would not be binding in the decision to extensively use a 
new technology. 
So far the Multiple technology approach has assumed that the firm is a monopolist. 
To take into account that firms might operate in different market scenarios, the 
Multiple technology approach model has been extended to the competitive case. Given 
that the extent of use of a new technology is independent of demand, the same results 
are obtained for the monopolistic and the competitive case. Profit gains from extensive 
use do linearly increase with the extent of use. Contrary to the 'cost function' approach 
they are not constrained by the (inverse) demand of the firm' final product and are 
unbounded whatever the specification of the demand curve is. 
In summary the Multiple technology approach assumes that the impact on 1tt of a unit 
change in bn is proportional to the output produced on the new technology (equation 
4.48) or similarly to the total output of the firm (equation 4.47). In equilibrium (4.47) 
and (4.48) are equal, and both equal to zero (d1t/dbn=O) and the optimal proportion of 
output produced on the new technology can be expressed as: 
Y·n/Yt*= blbo+bn 
This indicates that the proportion of output produced on the new technology is a 
function of the slope of the marginal cost curve. The higher is bn in absolute value, the 
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lower the proportion of output produced on the new technology. This situation is 
represented in Figure 4.9 where bn, the inclination of the MCn curve, indicates the 
intensity of use of the new technology. the more the new technology is used (Le. the 
lower is bn ) the lower will be the total MC of production (MCTOT) due to the 
reduction in MCn• On the contrary, the greater is bn the higher is the slope of the 
marginal cost curve and the higher TC will be. 
Figure 4.9. The intensity of technology replacement (bJ j=n,o) 
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Moreover, the first and second order conditions for profit maximisation (4.48 and 
4.51) have shown that profits increase with the level of intra-firm diffusion (d1t1 Id 
bll<O) but profit gains from further use ofa new technology are constant (d27t1 /d2 bn=O). 
This means that the benefits from adoption do increase over time with the extent of use 
of a new technology but profit gains are constant. 
This result indicates that the level of use of a new technology is related to the 
profitability from extended use, but it does not provide evidence to support the inter 
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finn stock effect hypothesis of decreasing marginal profits from the further use of a 
new technology. 
It also shows that the optimal combination of new and existing technologies is 
independent of the demand for the final output and yields the same results in both the 
competitive and monopolistic case. This would indicate that the optimal level of 
ownership of a new technology is independent of market structure. 
Finally, like the Cost function approach, it does not tell us why it is profitable for a 
finn not to switch immediately to the new technology but wait. 
4.4.Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at explaining whether the stock effects, proposed by the inter finn 
literature, do significantly affect the level of intra finn diffusion. 
Stock effects would predict that what determines the current level of ownership of a 
new technology are mainly profitability considerations about decreasing profit gains 
for further adoption. In fact, if the profit gains are bounded then they may be a 
disincentive to immediately replace all the existing capital with the most advanced 
one. This would explain why firms do not immediately switch to the new technology 
but wait. Moreover, if it is assumed that profit gains are finn specific and that some 
finns might find it profitable to switch only when costs reach a certain level, this 
would also explain the heterogeneity of the technology ownership across finns. 
This chapter has used two different approaches to modelling the relationship between 
profits gains and total production costs in order to determine whether profit gains are 
bounded or unbounded. The first approach (cost function approach) implicitly assumes 
that the cost reduction is proportional to the extent of use of the new technology: as the 
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finn adopts more technology its total costs reduce and as they do so the finn increases 
its output. In order to meet the demand for the increased output the firm has to sell it at 
lower prices reducing the profit gains from the cost reduction. The resulting benefits 
from the extent of use, generated by the difference between the gains from cost 
reduction and the marginal revenue from the reduced price, have been measured by 
the profit gains from further adoption. However, it was not possible to detennine a 
priori whether profits gains are increasing constantly or exponentially with the level of 
adoption of a new technology (~cJ. In particular the shape of the profit gains -
differential of the cost-profit curve- has been proved to depend upon the type of the 
demand function for the firm's final output. In the case of an isoelastic demand profit 
gains are concave and decrease more than proportionally with the change in the extent 
of use, i.e. follow a concavelbounded curve; whereas using a linear demand function 
profits gains are constant and increase, constantly, with the change in the extent of use. 
This is an important finding that, contrary to Hahn (1962)'s assumption, indicates that 
optimality conditions and convergence in economic modeling can be highly affected 
by the type of demand specified (via the elasticity of the slope of the demand). 
To determine the optimal level of adoption of the new technology the cost approach 
has also been extended to make explicit assumptions about the cost of production with 
the new (Kn) and the old (Ka) technology. By expressing total costs as a function of 
the proportion of capital stock, profits gains remain undetennined, as they depend 
upon the curvature of the demand function. Moreover, this does not lead to a final 
specification of the optimal level of ownership. 
The last approach used in this chapter defines the extent of use via the impact of the 
introduction of a new technology on the total capacity of the finn. However, with the 
110 
Multiple technology approach the benefits from adoption are again unbounded, while 
the optimal combination of the new and the existing technologies is independent of the 
shape of the demand curve and yields the same results in both the monopolistic and the 
competitive case. 
In summary the approaches followed in this chapter aimed at explaining why it might 
not be rational for a firm not to immediately switch to a new technology but wait. The 
results seem to indicate that there exist stock effects but the direction and the intensity 
of its impact is not consistent across different specifications, instead depending upon 
the shape of the demand curve. What the results consistently seem to suggest is that 
the decision of the firm to increase the proportion of more advanced machinery is 
mostly driven by: a) the relative reduction in the price of the technology over time; b) 
the higher productivity of the new technology with respect to the existing one. 
However, these factors are not explicitly modelled by either of the two approaches 
explored in this Chapter. Moreover, neither of the specifications takes into account that 
the reduction in costs might have a cost itself: the investment cost to buy the new 
technology. 
Together with these weaknesses there are still several unanswered questions which 
have emerged from the review and the testing of the existing literature (see Chapter 3). 
For these reasons the next chapter presents an alternative approach, here defined as the 
Production Function Approach, to explaining why it might not be rational to 
immediately switch to a new technology. 
This approach based on neo-classical economic theory and can be considered an 
extension of the milestone Jorgenson model of investments (1970 and 1965). 
The innovative contribution with respect to the neo-classical theory is that the total 
capital stock of the firm needs to be explicitly modelled as a stock incorporating the 
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new (~) and the old technology (~) each characterised by different productivity, 0.
0 
and a.n respectively. This implies a new definition of the inputs in the production 
function and consequently a new specification of the production function of the finn so 
that: Y= f(L, Ko,~; p, 0.0 , a.n), where a.n > 0.0 due to the advanced property of ~ 
with respect to ~. Moreover, by the means of mathematical optimisation procedures, 
it can be modified to account for the role that price expectations, technological 
constraints, existing and previous technologies and uncertainty play in the adoption 
decision of the finn. By its nature it can be considered an equilibrium intra firm model 
aiming at determining, for a single firm, the optimal replacement path of an old with a 
new technology in each point in time. This model should also specifically take into 
account the impact of different market scenarios upon technology diffusion. 
This approach will be presented in detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. 
A NEW EQUILIBRIUM INTRA FIRM: MODEL 
5.1 Introduction. 
This chapter aims at developing a dynamic equilibrium model that addresses the 
major issues arising from the analysis carried out in previous chapters. The latter has 
pointed out that, to better understand the spread of ownership of a new technology 
within a finn, it is important to understand the role exerted by: 
(i) profitability considerations (stock effects); 
(ii) technical constraints to the adoption of, and complementarities between 
technologies; 
(iii) the cost of acquiring the technology and price expectations; 
(iv) market structure, i.e. monopoly vs competition between finns; 
(v) uncertainty. 
In order to do so, one needs to redefine the concept of technology adoption at finn 
level. This can be done considering that the current level of ownership is the result of 
economic, technical and market evaluations about further use of a new technology. 
In Chapter 4, even if it was not possible to exactly measure their impact, it has been 
shown that stock effects may playa relevant role in the decision to further use a 
technology. Stock effects suggest that the decision to further acquire a new technology 
is based upon profitability considerations driven by the reduction in operating costs 
(economic evaluations) and the resulting decline in output prices from output 
expansion (market evaluations). Given that what triggers the possibility of further 
adoption of a new technology are its cost-reducing properties, this must have a cost 
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itself, which is the investment cost to buy the new technology. Because of this 
characteristic, the decision to further adopt a new technology can be likened to an 
investment decision, which has been widely studied in the economics literature. 
However, a new technology has the characteristic of being productively superior to the 
existing old technology owned by the firm, and therefore cannot be treated as any 
other good. Further to economic and market evaluations, the investment decision must 
take into account the necessary adjustments that the investment would impose on the 
existing production process at plant level (technical evaluations). In fact, both chapter 
2 and 4 have shown that higher productivity of the new technology plays a key role in 
the decision to further expand its use. 
Moreover, the decision to invest in a new technology is influenced by the relative 
reduction of acquisition costs over time; this indicates that acquisition prices are 
important and that expectations about future (quality adjusted) prices might have a 
role in the decision to further invest in a new technology (see for example Stoneman 
and Karshenas and Kwon, 1996). A theoretical model of intra firm technology 
diffusion must explicitly account Jor this possibility 
There are also reasons to believe that the speed of adoption could also be affected by 
the level of market concentration via, for example, the impact on factor and output 
prices, therefore affecting the profitability of further adoption. So far, the question as 
whether the position of the firm on the market might influence its decision to invest in 
a new technology has been left unanswered. 
Other factors that still need to be dealt with have emerged since Chapter 2, indicating 
that within a firm the spread of use of a new technology takes several years. This 
implies that the decision to use a new technology is better modelled within an 
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intertemporal scenario where variables and objectives are not timeless, but change over 
time according to the evolution of the firm and the market in which it operates. 
In this framework, the firm's decision to increase the proportion of more advanced 
machinery could be subject to uncertainty about its future performance due to possible 
changes in: the demand for its final good; the price of the technology (possibly a 
decline); the price of the other inputs; its financial position, etc. Despite its relevance, 
this hypothesis has not been explored in intra firm studies and needs to be taken into 
account 
This chapter aims at developing a new intra-firm model built around stock effects that 
can deal with all these aspects affecting the decision of the firin to invest in a new 
technology. 
Chapter 3 has pointed out that the best route to modelling the firm's decision to use a 
new technology is to use the equilibrium approach, as an alternative to the 
disequilibrium approach. This would assume that the outcome of the firm's choice is 
optimal at the time the decision is made and it is in equilibrium in each moment in 
time from soon after first adoption until the firm is saturated with that capital good. 
The resulting adoption pattern can be discontinuous and not necessarily increasing 
, 
over time; this suggests that one should use a dynamic maximisation problem to select 
the time paths of the variables. For this reason the theoretical model presented in this 
chapter is built using the optimal control theory. This dynamic optimisation 
procedure, unlike the disequilibrium approach, is distribution free and not necessarily 
monotonic. 
The route followed to modelling all the aspects of intra firm technology adoption has 
lead to the definition of a model that is built upon standard neo-classical investment 
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theory. This approach is built upon profitability considerations (i.e. stock effects) and 
can be considered an extension of the milestone Jorgenson model (1963). However, in 
contr~t with Jorgenson's model, capital is no longer treated as a homogeneous and 
unique good (KJ. It is instead considered here as a combination of new or superior 
(~J and old or existing (KaJ technologies, where the new technology is superior, and 
has a higher productivity than the existing technology (an>ao). Moreover, the intra 
firm technological process is defined from when the firm adopts the first unit of a new 
technology. This implies that the firm's production possibility set shifts from a 
standard two factors to a three factor production function, i.e. from Yt= f (Lt,~; p, a) to 
Yt= f (Lt,~t,~t; p, an·ao)· The model is distribution free and it is specified so that 
after the diffusion process is completed for the firm, one returns again to a two factors 
production function, i.e. y=f(L,~; p, an) or y=f(L,~; p, aJ, depending on whether 
the firm decides to fully replace its capital stock or to switch back to the old 
technology. 
With respect to Jorgenson's approach this model has also been modified to take into 
account: the influence of the relative cost of the two technologies and the expectations 
about their future prices; the technological characteristics of the current production 
system (such as complementarities between technologies and technological constraints 
to the adoption; uncertainty and market structure. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 defines the main assumptions of the 
model. Section 2 describes the main steps of its mathematical specification. In section 
3 the optimal replacement rate is discussed under different market scenarios. Section 
4 summarises the results derived under different market scenarios, i.e. monopoly and 
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perfect competition. Section 5 comments on the measures of intra firm diffusion and 
the optimal path of technology replacement. Section 6. shows how uncertainty is 
included in the model and section 7 presents the role of expectations. A final section 
derives the final equation that will be used in the next chapters to empirically test this 
new framework. 
5.1 Theoretical assumptions 
Assume that two kind of technologies are available on the market: the standard or old 
(0) and the advanced, or new (n) technology. The standard technology includes the 
combination of the existing, or old, technology/ies while the advanced technology 
includes only the new one 1. Moreover, the firm can acquire any, both or only one of 
the technologies and the firm's level of ownership can be identified as the proportion 
of capital stock incorporating the new (~) and the set of existing technologies (Ka). 
Suppose also that the firm uses only the standard technology until it decides to adopt 
the advanced technology after which the firm can decide to invest in both, neither or 
only one of the available technologies. 
1 In reality, the firm produces its final output using a wide range of capital goods whose age 
and technological content is often highly heterogeneous. This implies that the firm faces 
multiple, rather than dual, investment decision. The best model for this type of investment 
would ideally underpin from the vintage literature (see for example the original 'clay-clay' 
model, e.g. Smallwood (1972). Isard (1973), etc. and the 'putty-clay' model. e.g. Bishoff 
(1971). King (1972), Mizon (1974), Malcomson (1975, 1982,) Salter (1966), etc.). This 
hypothesis has been explored. However, the mathematical complexity becomes intractable 
when the technological content and uncertainty are added to the vintage of each technology. 
For this reason it has been preferred to simplify the model to two sets of technologies 
hereafter defined as 'old technology', which includes all the existing technologies, and new 
or advanced technology whose extent of use is here investigated. 
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In this model capital is always utilised and, following the equilibrium approach, at 
each instant t the firm decides how much to invest in each technology according to 
profitability considerations. The firm's ~bjective is to maximise the discounted stream 
of profits net of Investment expenditure on each technology at each point in time, 
which can be written as (5.1): 
(5.1) 
where eon is the discount factor and Yt ,Lt ,GInt and GIot are output, labour and 
investments in existing or old (0) and advanced or new (n) technology and prices are 
respectively: Pt, WI' qnt ,qot' 
Assuming that the capital stock of the firm evolves over time by investments in 
physical capacity, which are firm specific and sunk, leads to the definition of the 
transition equations or equations of motion for the state (Kal and K"J and the control 
variables (GIot and GInJ: 
dK"t=GInt-oK"t 
dKat=GIot-oKat (5.2) 
This is the capital accumulation constraint, where d~t G=n,o) is the rate of change of 
the flow of capital services, ~t G=n,o) is the level of the stock ofcapitalj and oe[O;I] 
is the depreciation rate. This indicates that, at each moment in time, the net investment 
in each capital good (K" and/or Ka) equals gross investments (GIn and/or Glo), less 
depreciation (0), which is itself proportional to the capital stock. 
Equation (5.2) has the following properties: 
i) Investments are irreversible by assumption (Arrow, 1968) and non-negative: 
GIl\ ~o and (5.3) 
118 
ii) Capital reduces by depreciation 
This means that the capital stock owned by the finn reduces over time by an amount 
equal to the depreciation rate. This can be seen by replacing condition (5.3) into 
(5.2.) in the absence of gross investments, Le. when GIj, =0: 
j=new, old 
This also implies that capital has zero second-hand value, Le. investment is a sunk 
cost (Takayama, 1995). 
One would expect that, from the moment soon after the adoption of the first unit of 
the advanced technology, the finn would start replacing its existing capital stock so 
that GInt>=O and GIot=02. However, for several reasons, an advanced technology 
might not necessarily end up dominating the existing one3. Unlike disequilibrium 
models, there is no optimal (or saturation) point to technology adoption. 
Consequently, no constraints are imposed in the maximisation procedure as to which 
technology to invest into at each moment in time. The finn's decision is determined 
2 This the case when the firm decides to invest only in the advanced technology (GInt>O) so 
that the existing level ofKot reduces over time by an amount proportional to the depreciation 
rate, e.g. dKot=-B Kot.The letter occurring every time gross investment equal zero (GIot= 0). 
3 This can be the case of a new technology with a performance lower than expected, leading 
the firm to switch back to the old technology. It might also happen that, for several reasons 
the advanced technology does not completely dominate the standard technology (see for 
example the case ofNC and CNC in chapter 2 figure 1).The diffusion process of an advanced 
technology might also be interrupted by the appearance on the market of a newest even more 
profitable technology (Ks). This is the case of nested and multiple technologies (see for 
example Stoneman and Kwon, 1994; Colombo and Mosconi, 1995,etc) which are not 
explicitly considered here. However, their inclusion in the model would be straightforward as 
Ks would simply become "the' new technology (Kn) replacing the set oftechnologies already 
owned by the firm. 
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by what is optimal at that very moment in time, i.e. is finn specific. This also means 
that the adoption path of the new technology must be distribution free. 
On this reasoning the initial conditions of the model are defined such that at the 
beginning of the period soon after first adoption (to+) the finn owns an unspecified 
initial stock of each technology (Kuto+~l and Kato+~l) so that: 
lim ~.to+ ~l and 
Ka(O+)= Ka.to+ 
lim Ka.to+ ~ 1 (S.4a) 
However, over time the finn moves away from this initial level choosing its optimal 
inputs combinations according to profitability conditions. 
One would expect that the proportion of advanced technology ~) over the total 
capital stock (~+Ka) progressively increases over time from initial adoption, say 1 per 
cent, up to 100 per cent. However, as time proceeds, the finn might not find it 
profitable to continue investing in the new technology, and the maximum level of 
adoption at the end of the diffusion process might be less than 100 per cent. This 
implies that at the end of the period, the optimal accumulation path might lead to 
different terminal conditions: i) the complete replacement of the old with the new 
technology ( Ka(T)=l; ~(T) Free); ii) the complete replacement of the new with the 
old technology after an initial period of adoption (Ka(T) free; ~(T)=l); iii) the 
replacement of the existing technology with a third even newer technology 1(" so that 
both ~ and Ka reduce over time (~(T) Free; Ku(T) Free). 
Given that the diffusion path of a new technology is not known, no a priori restriction 
is imposed on the capital accumulation path of the firm and both terminal conditions 
are left to be free such that: 
Ka(T ") = KaT-
lim KT- ~1 
~(T")=~T­
lim~T- ~l 
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The corresponding transversality conditions for Ku(T) = FREE imply that 
lim A(i) = 0 
lim A(i) K; (i) =0 i=new, old (5.4b) 
This is equivalent to saying that the shadow price (A(T» of the stock of capital (Kn or 
Ko) left at the end of the diffusion period (T) must be zero. For this relation to hold, if 
the quantity of capital at the end of the period is positive, then its shadow price must 
be zero. If, on the contrary, at the terminal date the shadow price has a positive value, 
then the optimising agent must leave no capital at the end of the period, i.e. K(T)=O 
(in our case K(T) =1). Hence the product is zero either way (see Barro Sala I Martin, 
1995)4. 
Assume also that the firm is constrained by its own production possibilities defined by 
the modified Cobb-Douglas production function, F(Lt, ~t' ~J where labour (LJ, 
4 Another interpretation of the tenninal condition can be given looking at the following 
specification for a general maximisation problem in the presence of only one kind of capital 
good (K) where both initial and tenninal constraints have been added to the end of the 
function: 
L= J [H(A; t;K;u)+ A'K]dt -A(T)K(T)+A(O)K(tO) 
where the multiplier A(T) (i.e. the costate variable) can be interpreted as the marginal effect 
on the maximum value ofa small reduction in the level ofKT,aV/aKT = -A(T) (see Lambert, 
1985) .In our case, given that K(T) = Free, in order not to be binding the end-point KA(T) 
that is achieved cannot be bettered in maximum value tenns and the marginal value A(T) is 
zero, or vice versa, K A(T) should tend to zero and A(T»O. On the light of this interpretation 
a reduction in KT ([K"T - KT]<O) is a relaxation of the constraint and cannot reduce the max 
value, i.e. A(T) ~o. Further if the constraint does not bind [K~(T) >KT]>O then a small 
change in KT makes no difference to the solution and 8V/8KT = -A(T) should be O. 
Conversely if 8V/8KT = -A,(T)<O then the constraint must bind 
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existing (KuJ and advanced technologies (~J are the inputs with paramet (A ers p, (lo, 
y= A Lf3v aov an 
t ~ t .L~t .L~t (5.5) 
Moreover, (5.5) has the following properties: 
(i) constant economies of scale, i.e. (lo+(ln+~=l 5 
(ii) positive marginal rate of substitution among inputs: 
(iii) different marginal capital productivities, i.e. (lo<(ln 
(iv) the function is twice differentiable with positive and diminishing (strictly convex) 
marginal productivity with respect to each input (i.e. the production function marginal 
productivity rule) so that: 
F Ko = of IO~t = (lo(Y IKoJ 
(5.6) 
(v) each input is essential for production, that is the marginal product of capital or 
labour, approaches infinity as ~ or L goes to zero and approaches zero as ~ or L goes 
to infinity: 
J=n,o 
lim_Kjl>o F Lt = 00 lim_Kjl>ex> F Lt = 0 
5 Although the latter assumption is not strictly necessary. 
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The latter is called the Inada condition (Jnada, 1963) and in order to avoid this limiting 
situation one also has to impose that the minimum amount of each technology owned 
by the finn is at least one unit over the whole period of observation i.e. ~~1 "t 
te ]to;T[ where to is the adoption date and T is the end of the diffusion process. This 
means that we focus exclusively on the process of technological replacement within 
the intra-finn diffusion period, when the finn owns at least one unit of the new 
technology, until almost the end of the diffusion process, when the firm owns at least 
one unit of the old technology. In this way the pre and post-diffusion period, when the 
finn operates within a different technological possibilities set (represented by the 
standard two factors (L,~,O) production function) is excluded from the model6. 
6 Even if the Inada condition (Inada 1963) was originally defined for a two factors production 
function, its extension to a three factors production function is straightforward and does apply 
at the extreme points of the intra firm diffusion curve. In fa~t at the initial and terminal point 
of the diffusion path one would expect: 
and 
representing the pre-diffusion period, when the advanced technology has not been adopted 
yet (Kn(to - =0), and the post diffusion period, when, in theory. the old technology is 
completely replaced by the advanced technology (Ko(Ti")=O). 
This type of problem has been overcome by the specification of the initial and the end point 
conditions which assume that immediately after first adoption (when t=to+) limKn(to+)~l 
and Ko(to+»1 and at the end of the diffusion process (when t= T-) limKo(T-~l and 
Kn(T-)~l • which is equivalent to saying that at the extreme points of the observation period 
the firm always owns at least one unit of each technology. This can be better understood 
thinking that in the pre and the post-diffusion process the set of technological possibilities of 
the firm is a function of only two factors Y rf(Lt,KiU where i=n/o. and during the process of 
technological replacement the firm shifts to a three factors production function Y t=f(Lt,Kot, 
Knt)· 
___________________________ 0 ___________________________ ---------------0------------------------> time 
t e]to;T[ t=T 
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Equation (8) (property (iii» also shows that the two sets of technologies incorporated 
in capital goods are not perfect substitutes. ~ is superior to ~,and therefore has a 
higher elasticity of substitution with respect to output, CIo<CI.. This means that in 
order to produce a given level of output, under constant economies of scale and 
constant labour input, the amount of ~ needed to replace ~ is less than the amount 
replaced of the existing capital good (~), due to the higher productivity and the cost 
reducing property of the more advanced technology. 
A second constraint concerns the market characteristics of the firm. 
In the original traditional neoclassical model (1963 and 1965), it is assumed that the 
firm is a price taker for all Pt, wt, qt. This means that output can be sold in any 
quantity at time t at price Pt, and the firm's choice of Labour (LJ and investments 
(GI;J does not affect their respective prices (WI and qJ for each time t. Moreover, in 
his empirical testing Jorgenson uses both level of output and prices as independent 
variables ignoring the demand function constraint, leaving completely unexplored how 
the capital accumulation path differs under different market scenarios. 
The exclusion of the extreme points is justifiable on the ground that, firstly the process of 
intra-firm technology adoption, by definition, focuses only on what happens within the 
interval from a point immediately after first adoption (to +) until the diffusion is (almost) 
complete for the firm (T-), that is when the firm owns at least one unit of each capital goods, 
i.e. Kit~1 V i=new, old and t e]to+;T-[ and uses three factors of production. 
Secondly the determinants of first adoption, i.e. when the firms first introduces the new 
technology and first changes its production system to a three factors production function, 
have been widely explored by the inter-firm literature. 
Thirdly the post-diffusion process, i.e. when the firm uses only the advanced technology, 
despite interesting on its own, is of no particular interest here as the process of technology 
replacement is terminated and the advanced technology is no longer a new technology to the 
firm. 
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The inter-fInn diffusion literature has looked extensively at the influence of different 
market scenarios upon the investment decision of the fInn. However. its impact upon 
intra fInn diffusion has never been studied. Chapter 4 has attempted to explore this 
possibility but the results about the impact of market concentration upon the within 
fIrm extent of use of a new technology were inconclusive. For this reason, the 
replacement decision is here explicitly modelled under the two extreme cases of 
monopolistic and competitive markets. The different scenarios are modelled via the 
demand function the firm faces on the market;: 
In the monopoly case, the fIrm is allowed to be a price setter where pnces are 
determined by the inverse demand function8 (5.7) explicitly introduced as a constraint 
in the maximisation procedure: 
P =A V'1 t I (5.7) 
In the competition case the final price is a function of the industry price determined by 
the total industry output (Vii) ofthat final product (pIt = f(VIJ with the elasticity of the 
inverse of demand equal to ,,1. This means that the final price is exogenous to the fIrm 
and independent of the fIrm's fInal output (VJ. In this framework the fIrm is a price 
taker and can produce any amount of its fInal good, as long as it sells it at the market-
detennined price, i.e. PI = pIt: 
V t = f(plJ (5.8) 
7 Extension of the decision theoretic approach to the oligopoly case should result in an 
intermediate solution between competition and monopoly. However, ifthe hypothesis of no 
strategic interaction among firms is relaxed the current model might need extra attention in 
the derivation of the optimal solution. 
S The constant elasticity function has arbitrarily chosen. However there is no a priori 
expectation on the shape of the demand curve and the model can be easily extended to other 
specifications 
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(5.8.) is the demand function for the firm with constant infinite elasticity of output 
with respect to price. 
The mathematical derivation of the optimal conditions for capital accumulation, for 
both the monopolistic and the competitive firm, are presented in the following section 
where the different market scenarios are compared. 
5.2 DERIVATION OF THE MODEL 
5.2.1. The Monopolistic firm 
The present value of the firm is here represented by the integral of discounted profits 
and the market value of the assets of the firm, or equivalently as the net present value 
of net cash flows for all future times. For a monopolist, the Hamiltonian for the 
optimal control problem can be written as: 
(5.9.m) 
The first term on the RHS of (5.9.m) is the discounted stream of profits, i.e. total 
revenue (PI YJ minus the current costs of production (w,Lcqll,Glm-qo,GloJ, where the 
discount factor is (e'~ and r is the interest rate. The remaining two terms of (5.9m) 
account for the investment expenditure on the new and old technology at each point in 
time, where b is the depreciation rate and the A's are the costate variables 
(mathematical multipliers) for the two capital accumulation constraints. Moreover, as 
the firm is a monopolist, it faces an inverse demand function such that PI =A ylTI , so 
that (5.8.) can be rewritten as: 
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(5. 10m) 
Since the market value of the assets of the firm is fixed, the maximisation of the 
integral of discounted profit results in the path of accumulation of capital resulting 
from the maximisation of the present value ofthe firm. 
The Hamiltonian first order conditions for a maximum are: 
Conditions I-IV, applied to (5.1 Om) yield the following equilibrium conditions: 
I) the market price of capital equals the shadow demand price of capital: 
II) marginal product equals factor price: 
A(l1) ytTl-\ (dY /dLJ = wt 
III) and IV) are the so called costate equation of motion yielding: 
e-n(A 11 y;r\-\ (dY Id~J) = +&Ant -dAnt 
eon (A 11 y;r\-\ (dY IdKaJ) = +& Aot -dAot 
dA indicates how the policy decisions of the firm will affect the rate of change of 
capital via the depreciation of the shadow price (Chiang, 1984 p.208). 
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Moreover, after substitution from I) the latter can be rewritten as9: 
(A 11 ytTl-1 (dY I<IKaJ) = (r+8) qot -dqot 
(S.lOm) 
Equation (S.lOm) shows that in equilibrium the marginal revenue per extra unit of 
output produced with the recently acquired technology, equals its marginal costs. 
The LHS of (5.10m) is the impact on total marginal revenue (A 11 YtTl-I) of the shift 
in capital marginal productivity per extra unit of capital stock (dYt /d~Jwhile the rhs 
of (S.lOm) is the Jorgensonian (Jorgenson, 1963,1965, 1967, 1970, etc) 'user cost of 
capital' per extra unit of capital: 
j = new, old (5.11m) 
. 
cnt and Cot are the implicit rental values of capital services supplied by the firm to itself 
where qit is the unit price of capital, 8 is the depreciation rate of the existing capital 
stock and r is the discount rate. 
The interpretation of (S.llm) is straightforward if one looks at each separate element 
of the shadow price of Cjt. In fact, following Junankar (Junankar, 1972) 'qil is the 
opportunity cost of putting q dollars in capital goods, i.e. q dollars would earn, if put 
on the financial market, qr dollars; qt 8 is the depreciation cost, if 8 of capital goods 
'vanishes' then its value in dollar is qt 8; dqt is the time derivative of q, i.e. the rate 
9 In the first step of the maximisation procedure (condition I) yields thatqjt=Ajtert (j=new, 
old), the differential of which is dqjt =rAjt ert + dAjtert =r<ljt+ dAjtert (j=new, old). From the 
above it easy to derive that Ajt =qjt e-rt and dAjt =(dqjt-rqjue-rt 
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of appreciation of the price of capital goods' So if capital goods are appreciating 
rapidly then the implicit cost of capital, Cjt, is lower. In other words, Cjt decreases the 
lower the purchase price qjt of the j technology but increases the larger the rate of 
depreciation (-dqjJ of the capital good. 
In summary, this condition indicates that the current cost of the new technology 
corresponds to an increase in capital stock (d~J which is optimal to the firm. The 
resulting profit gains from cost reduction lead the firm to further produce on the cost 
reducing technology and expand its output. Moreover, in order to meet the demand for 
that output the firm has to lower its selling price, reducing the marginal revenue from 
the original output expansion. This will continue until it is still profitable for the firm 
to extend the use of the new technology. In summary, there exist intra firm stock 
effects and the optimal level of technology ownership can be explained by profitability 
considerations. 
From the Hamiltonian first order conditions II) III) and IV), one can derive the 
Hamiltonian productivity conditions of each input: 
oY/oLt=wtl A" ytTl-1 
oY /o~t= Cnt I A" y tll- t 
OY /oKot= Cot I A " ytTl-t (S.12m) 
Substituting the production function marginal productivity rules (5.6.), and after some 
manipulation, (S.l2.m) can be rewritten as the marginal product constraint (5.13m), 
according to which, what determines the optimal level of each input (L·, ~., ~"), 
129 
are: input price, technological constraint (via the elasticity of substitution of the 
inputs) and output supply constraints (the elasticity of demand) 1 0: 
(S.13m) 
In this case, all the variables that the firm can control can be specified as a function of 
the demand constraint (Yt; 11), the technological production possibilities (~; 0.0 ; a.n) and 
In summary (S.13m) confirms the presence of stock effects, as the optimal level of 
technology ownership is inversely related to its current marginal cost and IS 
proportional to the finn marginal revenue. Consequently, in a dynamic framework, 
what detennines the further use of that input over time is its relative speed of growth, 
i.e. the profit gains. 
The optimal input levels of the finn (S.13m) can also be used to detennine the 
optimal output path (Y*) given its technological possibilities (5.S) -i.e. the output 
10 Junankar (1972) commenting on Jorgenson's model says 'these marginal productivity 
conditions are the so called 'myopic decision' criteria': they say that although the firm is 
involved in dynamic optimisation process it equates the marginal product of each input at 
time t with the ratio of input and output prices also at time t' . However, it is here the view that 
the presence of the implicit cost of capital incorporates a sort of expectation about future 
prices and it is preferable to refer to those conditions as 'quasi-myopic' decision criteria. The 
details of which are discussed in a later section on price expectations and uncertainty. 
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corresponding to the optimal level of the control variables Y,*= f(Lt*,~t*,~,*)- and 
the corresponding optimal price (P*=f(Yt*» as: 
yOt = f(LtO, KutO; Ka;) = [A (1') (~/wl (a/cnt )an (ajcoJIlo)]I/(I-1]) 
and 
P*t = f (Y,*) = AII (\-1]) [1') [(~/wJ P (cnt Ian) an (co/aotO] 1]/(\-1]) 
(5. 14m) 
Equation (S.14m) shows that the current level of output is a function of the 
technological constraint of the firm, the input prices and the elasticity of the demand 
for its final good, (Y1*= f (~, an. a o , Wt, cnt , co!,,1'). 
(5.14m) also shows that the optimal price is endogenous and is proportional to the 
level of output that can be produced with the current production function. The 
proportionality factor is related to the inverse elasticity of the demand for the good 
(1')>-1). This means that the optimal level of output implicitly incorporates the price 
adjustment to meet the demand for that good. 
After substitution of the optimal output path (5.14m) in the marginal product 
constraint (S.13m) it is possible to derive (S.lSm) the optimal level of ownership of the 
new technology Kut** corresponding to the firm's optimal inputs output. (Kut **= 
f(Lt* ,Kut*, Yt*), that is: 
(5.15m) 
According to (S.ISm) the optimal demand for the advanced capital good (Kut** ) is a 
function of the demand for the final product (market constraint), the input costs 
(economic constraints) and the optimal combination of inputs used in production 
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which in tum are a function of their relative pnces and their productivity 
(technological constraint): i.e. ~t** = f (wt, Cnt ,Cot, Pt ; P, <lu. no , ,,). 
In a dynamic framework (S.ISm) shows that what leads to a decrease over time of c 
nt 
(and thus to an increase of K**nJ is a decrease over time of qnt. It also shows that a 
rapid reduction in the price of the new technology over time (d~t= qn(t)-qn(t-l) <0 ) 
can lead to an opposite effect: it might slow down the diffusion of the new technology. 
In other words, while price (qnJ speeds up intra finn diffusion, expectations of rapidly 
decreasing prices have an opposite effect they might lead the finn to wait (see fur 
further discussion on price expectations pp. 163). 
However, equation (S.ISm) also shows that the optimal level of ownership of the new 
technology does not only depend upon its current acquisition cost, but also on the 
optimal amount of output the finn decides to produce. The finn, in deciding the 
current level of production, is constrained to meet the demand for its final output via 
the elasticity of demand" (market constraint). In fact, an output expansion would lead 
the firm to reduce the selling price of its products reducing the profit gains from cost 
reduction. 
Similarly to (S.13m), equation (S.ISm) shows the existence of stock effects and that 
the optimal level ofl<"t** depends upon the reduction in production costs and the shift 
in the marginal revenue from output expansion. In a dynamic framework, the decision 
to extend the technology ownership will be detennined by their speed of reduction 
(profit gains), or similarly by the slope of the marginal revenue and marginal cost 
curves. The optimal level of output depends upon the speed with which they decrease 
over time. 
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Takayama (1985, 1994, etc.) has pointed out that one of the weaknesses of the neo-
classical model of investments arises from looking at the marginal product constraint 
used by Jorgenson, where ~ * = (a P1YJ/cl • He bases his criticism upon the fact that, 
assuming unlimited output expansion, investment are unbounded, i.e. they go to 
infinity11. 
Jeorgenson, in his two-input model does not specify any demand constraint and 
consequently considers only the generic competitive case where prices are exogenous 
to the firm. In this framework, the result in (15m) is extremely important because, 
using three, rather than two factors of production and allowing for different market 
scenarios, it provides a rationale as to why investments cannot simply go to infinity in 
the presence of price changes (dqnJ. 
(15m) also shows the existence of stock effects, and that these determine the 
intensity of technology diffusion. Moreover, further to the market {PJ and economic 
effects (cnJ, the optimal level of capital ownership is also determined by the 
technological constraints of the firm, via the current cost of the other inputs and the 
existing production system of the firm. The latter can be better seen by endogenizing 
the final demand for Y*t' i.e. using (5.l4m) into (5.l5m), and defining, in time t, the 
11 Also Haavelmo (1961) and Lerner (1944) and later also Tobin (1967), commenting on the 
final specification used by Jorgenson (i.e dYt/dKt=ct/pU have argued that 'according to the 
Neoclassical theory, i.e. Jorgenson model, if the firm is competitive and small enough and all 
prices are assumed or expected constant, then also the amount of investment is also constant 
over time. Moreover, as price changes then the firm can and would adjust instantaneously to 
the desired stock of capital. The instantaneous adjustment of capital implying that 
investments It are unbounded' (see Takayama 1985, pp.685 and also Takayama 1994, 
pp.517). 
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finn's optimal 'Capital-output' ratio path as the proportion of current optimal output 
(y* J, produced on the new technology (K**nJ: 
(5.16m) 
Equation (5 .16m) indicates that, given the optimal amount of current output Y*, the 
extent of use of a new technology is detennined by input costs and the relative partial 
elasticities (y* 1K··n,=f(w" cn,' Cot; p,an,ao))' While the latter are constant and firm 
specific, the fonner do change over time and the direction of their change detennines 
the finn's extent of use of the new technology', This shows that not only 'costs' and 
'marginal revenue' considerations determine the level of new technology ownership, 
but also the finn specific productivity arising from the current input mix. 
With simple algebraic manipulation, assuming constant economies of scale, I.e. 
13+ a o+ a n=l, (5.16m) can be rewritten as: 
This shows that the extent of use of the new technology, for a given current (optimal) 
level of output, is directly proportional to the level of its price qnt (i.e. increase in cnJ, 
while it is inversely proportional to changes in the other factors' prices. The 
proportionality factor, is given by the elasticity of substitution of the relative inputs, 
i.e. 13, a o and an' Moreover, it shows that, under constant economies of scale, the 
impact of the cost of the advanced technology, i.e.lp+aol, is higher than for each of the 
other two production inputs, i.e. Ip+aol>IPI and Ip+aol>laol. 
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As an alternative to the flow specification (5.16m) of the optimal pattern of 
technology ownership, one can define ~ stock specification as the proportion of the 
firm's total capital stock incorporating the new technology (5.17m). 
(5.17m) 
Equation (S.17m) shows that what determines the optimal replacement path of the new 
technology are the relative change in the costs of the two technologies (cn/coJ and the 
firm specific technological constraint (ujun) corresponding to the current firm specific 
productivity of the two capital stocks 
The next section discusses the perfectly competitive market model 
5.2.2. The Competitive firm 
In the case of perfect competition most of the model remains the same, except that now 
the output price is exogenous and independent of the final output produced by the firm. 
This means that the firm is a price taker, and produces its output (Y J so that its 
marginal cost equals the current market determined price p\. In an optimal control 
framework the competitive firm will maximise the Hamiltonian function subject to the 
(constant elasticity) demand function constraint Yt = f(pIJ. All the other assumptions 
remain the same as in the monopoly case yielding: 
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The Hamiltonian first order conditions for a maximum are: 
In the competitive case condition (I) yields: 
The second condition (II) indicates that marginal product equals factor price yielding: 
p\ (dY /dLJ = WI 
Condition (III) and (IV) are the costate equation of motion and it easy to prove that 
they equal (5.IOc): 
(5.IOc) 
and 
j = new, old (5.IIc) 
The rhs of (5.1 Oc) shows that the marginal revenue per unit expansion of capital stock 
equals the marginal physical productivity of new technology, i.e. current output price, 
p\ per unit of output times the capital output ratio for that specific technology j, 
dY /dKjt' Moreover, given that output price is exogenous, the optimal level of 
technology use will be determined by the size of the unit cost reduction (5.1 Ic). 
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Similarly to the monopolistic case, (5.10c) indicates that, in equilibrium, the marginal 
revenue from producing on one extra unit of new technology equals the marginal user 
cost of capital of that technology, i.e.' the implicit rental value of capital services 
supplied by the firm to itself(5.1Ic). 
After substituting in (5.10c) the production function marginal productivity rule (5.6), 
one can derive the Hamiltonian marginal productivity rule as in II), III) and IV): 
dY IdLt = w/ p\ 
dY IdKat = co/ p\ 
dY IdK,ll = cn/ p\ (5.12c) 
From condition (5.12c) it is possible to derive the marginal product constraint for each 
input of production as in (5.13c): 
Lt* = (~/Wt )P\ Yt· 
Kat* = ajcot p\ Yt 
K.,t* = a/cnt pit Yt (5.13c) 
Equations (5.13c) show that the control variables are a function of the technological 
production possibilities (~; a o; an), the input prices (WI; Cot; cnJ and the current output 
price (P J. Contrary to the monopolistic case the optimal inputs combination IS 
independent of the demand constraint, because the firm is a price taker. 
Similar to the monopoly case, the optimal inputs level (Lo, K.,0, Ka°) are determined 
by economic constraints (costs), the technological constraint (elasticity of substitution 
of the inputs) and a market constraint (output price). 
Substituting (5. 13 c) in (5.5), that is constraining the optimal level of inputs (5.13c) to 
lie within the technological possibilities of the firm (5.5), and assuming constant 
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economies of scale, allows one to specify the optimal output path as a function of the 
(S.14c) 
where the firm's optimal output price, being independent of the firms current output, is 
simply:. 
P* =p I I I 
Equation (S.14c) shows that the optimal level of output is proportional to total revenue 
(p\y J where the proportionality factor is a function of the technological constraint of 
Substituting (S.14c) in the marginal product constraint (S.l3c) one can derive the 
optimal accumulation path for K"t. as : 
j=new,old (S.15c) 
which states that in equilibrium the optimal level of capital accumulation for a given 
level of output (YI·) is independent of market demand and is a function of: (a) the 
level of output; (b) the relative substitutability of the inputs (technical constraints) and 
(c) the current price of the inputs of production (economic constraints). In contrast 
with the monopolistic case, the optimal level of technology ownership is independent 
of output demand (market constraint) . 
One might argue that, in line with the Takayama's critique (see footnote 10), under 
competition the accumulation path could grow unbounded due to changes in the factor 
prices or to the decision to produce an infinite amount of output. However, it can be 
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shown that, also in this case, the investments in a new technology are bounded and 
only under very strict conditions, they equal to. immediate replacement. The bounding 
factors are determined by the characteristics of (and the compatibility with) the current 
production system of the firm, so that for a given level of output the optimal capital 
ownership is determined by the relative cost and the technological performance of the 
existing (old and new) capital stock. This can be better seen by using the Marginal 
product conditions (S.13c), that show that the optimal proportion of capital stock 
incorporating the new technology equals the productivity ratios and the costs of both 
existing and old technologies. This yields (S.16c): 
(S.16c) 
Furthermore, using equation (5 .14c) and the advanced capital marginal product 
property (S.13c) (or alternatively S.lSc), it is possible to derive, for a competitive 
firm, the optimal 'Capital-output' ratio as in (S.17c): 
(5.17c) 
Equations (5.16c) and (5.17c) suggest that the determinants of the speed of 
replacement of the old with the new technology is the productivity ratio (an lao) and 
the price differential of the two technologies (co/cnJ· 
Moreover, equation (5.16) and (5.17) are the same in both the monopolistic (m) and 
competitive (c) cases. 
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5.3. MONOPOLISTIC VERSUS COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR 
5.3.1. Two measures of intra firm diffusion 
The previous section highlights the differences between the optimal behaviour of the 
firm under two extreme market scenarios, the monopolistic and competitive cases, 
whose main results are summarised in Table 5.1. 
The first step of the optimal dynamic control modelling has used the Hamiltonian first 
order conditions and the production function (technological) marginal productivity 
rules to derive the Hamiltonian productivity conditions of the variables of interest (see 
Table S.l/1.a). The Hamiltonian marginal productivity rules show that the optimal 
output-input ratios are a function of the respective marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
In essence this condition indicates that there exist stock effects in the spread of use of a 
new technology as the marginal revenue from increasing its use MR( dY /dKn'), is a 
function ofthe reduction in marginal cost that it brings about (cnt= (r+3) qllt -dqn.): 
A TJ y tll-1 (dY IdKn'» = (r+3) qnt -dqllt (5.10m) 
and 
(S.lOc) 
Under perfect competition, (S.lOc) is exactly the same as in Jorgenson model, showing 
that the marginal product is a function of the relative prices of output (P.) and input 
costs (cj ,). However, if the competition assumption is relaxed the output/capital 
expansion, due to a cost reduction, starts to influence its market price (see 5.lOm). 
The latter is represented by the implicit consumer demand. 
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In essence (5.l0m) and (S.lOc) show that the finn will choose its optimal level of 
inputs on the basis of profitability considerations: the contribution to profits of the 
cost reduction and the shift in marginal revenue from output expansion .. 
The rhs of (5.l0mlc) is the same in both competitive and monopolistic case which 
indicates that the expected profit gains from further adoption depend upon the shape of 
the marginal revenue function. While in the competitive case, in each time t, this 
linearly increases with the output expansion (MRc= (p\).YJ, in the monopolistic case 
it depends upon the shape of the demand function (MRc= A 11 Ytl'l). 
In essence, this result is in line with the finding in chapter 4, stating that the extent of 
use of the new technology depends upon the shape of the demand function for the 
final good (market constraint). 
However, this section has also proved that this is not the only constraint the finn has 
to face in detennining the level of use of the new technology. This can be seen 
looking at the optimal value of the control variables, i.e. the variables the finn can 
control for, in Table.5.1 row h. There, what detennines the optimal level of each 
input are: (i) input price (economic constraint); (ii) input ehisticity of substitution 
(technical constraint); and (iii) output supply constraints, such as the elasticity of 
demand in the monopolistic and simply output prices in the competitive case (market 
constraint). 
(i) and (ii) indicate that the decision to further invest in a new technology reflect the 
relative cost of the input and is not independent of the current status of the plant and 
the means of production already in use by the finn. This would also justify why it is 
important to look at the role of complementary and substitute technologies in the 
spread of use of a new technology. 
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This is an important result stating that the level of use of a new technology depends 
upon the size of profit gains from adoption (stock effects), but also on: a) the market 
position of the firm, i.e. whether monopolistic or competitive market; and b) the 
technical and the economic characteristics of the new relative to the existing 
technologies. 
While the former is bounding only for a monopolistic firm, the latter affect any firm 
despite its market position. 
Table 5.1. Summary of the intra-firm model: monopoly Vs competition 
Monopoly rCompetition 
a. 
dYt/dLt = Wt I pIt Marginal Productivity dYt/dLt = Wt IA(l1)Yt 'I-I 
(Hemiltonian) dYt/dKnt = Cnt IA(ll) Yt 'I-I dY t/dKnt = Cnt I pIt 
dY tldKot = Cot I A(l1) Y t 1)-1 dY t/dKot = Cot I pIt 
h. 
Lt* = (~/wt) pIt Yt Marginal products Lt* "" (Wwt)A (1'\) Yt'l 
KOt*={aolcot)A(l1) Yt'1 KOt*= (ao/cot> pIt Yt 
Knt*=(an/cnt) A(l1) Yt'l 
-
Knt* = (an/cnt) pIt Yt 
c. 
y* r[A (11) (~/wt>~ (an/Cnt )an (ao/cot)aO)] 11 (1-'1> y* rpIt Y t.(~/wt)P( an/enttn Optimal output path 
Y t *= feLt * ,Knt * ,Kat *) (aolcot)aO 
d. 
P*r AI/(I-'I) [11 [(~/wt>P (cnt Ian t n (cot/ao)a01 "'(1-'1) P*rp1t Optimal price (P*t) 
e. 
K** nr[a(ll+ 1)1 1/(1-'1) (WWt)P('I/(I-'I) K**nrYt a(~/wt)-P( an/Cnt) 1 Optimal capital path 
given optimal output (an/cnt )1+<>n.'1/ (1-'1) (ao/cot),lo '1/ (1-'1) an (aolcot)_aO 
K**nt= f(Y*f) j=n,o 
Measures of intra-firm diffusion 
f. 
Optimal iV*tlK* nt = (13/wt>'~ (an/cnt t n -I (ao/cot)ao 
capital-output ratio 
g. 
K* nt I(K* nt+ K* ot) = 11 (1+ (aol an) (cnt/cot) Optimal stock of 
New technology 
Replacing the optimal values of the production inputs, i.e. Lt*, Kut*, Kat* (as in S.l./b) 
into the Cobb-Douglas production function it is possible to derive the optimal output 
path (y* J for each optimal combination of inputs (Table 5 .1.1c), the optimal price for 
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that output (Table S.l./d) and the optimal accumulation path of the stock of advanced 
technology corresponding to that output via the marginal product condition (Table 
S.1./e). For a monopolist both y* and K** show that the optimal accumulation path of 
output and capital are a function of technological constraints, supply constraints and 
inputs prices, while the output price effect changes considerably according to. the 
position of the firm in the market, i.e. competition and monopoly. 
In the monopolistic case, in presence of labour (LJ and shadow price of Kal constancy, 
a reduction in cnl leads to an increase in the optimal level of advanced capital, which is 
proportional to the size of the inverse elasticity of demand (T)) and the current level of 
the other inputs. The market demand and the technological constraint are binding for 
the firm, and therefore investments cannot just go to infinity as price decrease12. 
In the competitive case ifthe shadow price ofKuI (cnJ, labour costs (wJ and output are 
all kept constant, an increase in COl leads to a decrease of the optimal level of Knl' 
However, given that the firm can produce any amount of output at the given price, the 
only binding factors to investments are the technical constraint (Table 5.1.1e). 
This is a very important result because it demonstrates that, contrary to the 
J orgensonian model13, investments can be bounded. This also provides a rationale for 
why firms do not immediately switch to the new technology. Furthermore, from the 
12 See previous discussion on the Takayama (1991) critique to the Jorgensonian approach to 
unbounded investments 
13 Jorgenson in many of his paper on the econometric testing of his theory, uses the 
following specification (i.e. marginal product of capital):K* t_= Cl (Yt Pt>/ct 
In our view, this is a serious mistake as he completely ignores the different degree of 
industrial concentration leading to different output demand conditions. The higher is the 
degree of market concentration the more collinear both prices and input will be. Secondly, he 
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marginal conditions (S.13). it has been proved that the optimal level of use of the stock 
of new technology is proportional to the factors relative prices and substitutability. (see 
table S.l/g): 
(S.16m/c) 
In (S.16) the optimal capital input combination for a given level of output. is a 
function of both economic (c.icoJ and technology specific factors (aol aJ. It also 
indicates that the proportion of capital stock incorporating the new technology is a 
proportion of user cost of capital of the two capital inputs (colcoJ. The proportionality 
factor (ao Ian) is the elasticity of substitution of Ka and K,.. with respect to YI • 
The second measure of intra firm diffusion derived in the model shows that the capital 
output ratio YI /K,.I depends on the optimal technological combination of all the inputs 
(Lt. K,.t. KaJ whose optimal level is determined by their relative prices (see table 5.1If): 
(S.17m/c) 
The main difference between (S .16) and (S .17) is that one refers to the flow while the 
other to the stock of new technology. Moreover. the capital accumulation constraint is 
the same for both the monopolistic and the competitive case. 
(S.17) is in essence the output to capital ratio and models the proportion of output 
produced on the existing capital stock. However. the current proportion of output may 
be the result of not only the current investment in K,. but also past investment in K,. as 
does not consider that there are technological constraints due to the existing inputs of 
production and completely ignores the factors substitutability. 
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well as other changes occurred within the firm. As such it cannot be used for 
comparisons across firms and over time (see Demetriades, Devereux and Luintel, 1998 
discussion on productivity of capital over time). 
The next section further discusses the implications of the two expressions for the 
capital accumulation path of the new technology. 
5.4. The capital accumulation path equation 
The intra firm model has led to the definition of two expressions for the optimal 
accumulation path of the capital embodying the new technology. These are the 
proportion of output produced per unit of new technology (5.16) and the proportion of 
total capital stock incorporating the new technology (5.17): 
YtlKut =(~/WJb (a/cnJan-1 (ajcoJ ao 
and 
(5.16m1c) 
(5. 17m1c) 
Equation (S.17m1c) shows that the optimal level of use of the new technology depends 
upon both the economic and technological substitutability between the two capital 
inputs used in the production process, and not on the level of output produced. 
Equation (S.16m/c) shows that the capital output ratio Yt~tdepends upon the optimal 
technological combination of all the inputs (Lt, ~t' KaJ whose optimal level is 
determined by their relative prices. While the first one refers to the stock, the second 
refers to the flow of optimal technology ownership. 
145 
Together (5.16) and (5.17) yield an important result showing that: 
i) both the optimal capital output ratio (5.16 mlc) and the proportion of output 
produced on the new technology (5.17 mlc) are independent of the output demand 
constraints and show exactly the same value for the monopolistic and competitive 
cases; 
ii) whether one uses a flow or a stock definition, the spread of new technology, for a 
given level of output, is mostly driven by the relative cost (cn/coJ and technological 
performance (aj an) of the existing types of capital. 
The latter is immediate if one looks at equation 5.17 where for the firm it would be 
optimal to immediately switch completely to the new technology only if (aol an) 
(cn/coJ=O. This can occur only if the user cost of capital of the old technology 
increases (in absolute value) much faster than for the new one so that it would no 
longer be profitable for the firm to use it. This might be the case for an old technology 
whose. (quality adjusted) price is very high due to obsolescence and restricted 
availability on the factor market. This reasoning also proves that lower prices (or at 
least quality adjusted prices) can speed up the diffusion of a technology via a change in 
its user cost of capital. Another way to see this is to rewrite (5.17) as (5.18)14: 
(5.18) 
(5.18) shows that the ratio of the new to the existing technology is a function of the 
relative shadow prices and the firm specific rate of substitution between the two 
14 Using simple algebra the rhs of (5.17) can be written as: Knt / (Knt+Kot) = 11 (1+ 
(KotlKnV, so that: 11 (1 + (KotlKnV) = 11 (1 + (aol an) (cnt/coU. At this point, the derivation 
of(5.18) is immediate. 
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capital inputs. Given that the productivity ratio is constant over time (un/uoJ, the 
proportion of advanced technology will increase as cot>cnt. The higher the price 
difference the faster the diffusion will be. Moreover, given that by definition un>uo, if 
the cost of the two technologies were equal, cot=Cnt, the proportion of new technology 
that would be optimal to the firm would be: 
This indicates that the proportion of capital stock incorporating the new technology 
should be higher than the existing/old capital stock, due for example, to the higher 
productivity of the new technology, but not necessarily equal to one. 
Relaxing the assumption of u's constancy across firms it is possible to incorporate 
firm heterogeneity and firm specific competencies (rank effects). In fact, different 
firms do have different core competencies and technological capabilities and this lead 
to different firm-specific production systems and firm-specific optimal levels of 
ownership of the new technology. As such, it is reasonable to expect that the 
productivity of each technology is firm specific, i.e. uji , and is different across firms. 
This would explain why, at the same point in time, firms coexisting on the same 
market do have different equilibrium levels of adoption of a new technology. This 
leads to a redefinition of firm skills and learning about the production possibilities of 
the firm. In fact, the firm is not a passive recipient of information, like in the 
Mansfield (1968) approach, but it is rather a processor of information with its own 
speed of learning from its own experience. The higher are the core competencies of the 
firm in processing information and in making it operative, the faster diffusion will be. 
This would also justify why the adoption of certain technologies might be faster if 
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the fIrm currently uses, or has in the past used, a preVIOUS generation of the 
technology, or why firms doing R&D are more likely to adopt advanced technology. 
This definition of learning is also different from the Stoneman (1981) approach where 
it is assumed that the firm does not have perfect information about the performance of 
new technology but learns about it over time from its own experience about the true 
profitability of the technology. In fact it is not only learning based upon the true 
profitability what influence the decision to further use a new technology. 
In essence the intra firm model suggests that, whether information reaches the firm 
exogenously, like in the Mansfield Model, or endogenously, like in the Stoneman 
Model, what is really important is the fIrm's capability to process that information and 
to be dynamic and flexible to changes. In fact, what differentiates firms is the speed of 
processing this information, and the capability to innovate its production process. 
While information can be bought, the capability to use it depends upon the expertise of 
the firms (Le. accumulated experience from the adoption of similar technologies, 
current status of the production system, entrepreneur attitude to risk, etc.) and some 
firms might not have the skills for doing so. In other words, the core competencies of 
the firm are what generate different speeds of technological adoption. Leaming is in 
fact firm specific and different firms do learn in different ways from their own 
experience and the experience of the others, even when this is readily accessible. In 
this light, the spread of information cannot be the main determinant of adoption, 
particularly after decades since the appearance on the market of a new technology, like 
in the case of Ne, eNe, and Micro. It is not the accessibility of information but rather 
the capability to decode , assimilate and process information and of making it 
operative that is different from firm to firm. This would explain why, even if firms can 
access the same amount of information, they use it differently. This would also be 
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in line with Battisti and Pietrobelli (2000) who found that, within an industry, clusters 
of finns with different technological competencies do coexist on the same market. The 
clust~rs are detennined by the characteristics and the technological (and human) 
competencies of the firms. 
This section has presented an equilibrium inter-finn model based on the neo-classical 
theory of investment, aimed at explaining the optimal replacement of an old with a 
new technology by a finn over time. This model provides evidence that there exist 
stock effects and that their influence upon the level of usage of a new technology 
depends upon the shape of the market demand faced by the finn (market condition). 
This model also shows that the spread of new technology is also driven by changes in 
costs (economic condition) and technological perfonnance of the advanced technology 
(technical condition). While the fonner are exogenous, the latter reflect the core 
competencies of the finn in processing information about the new technology and its 
own technological capabilities in combining and efficiently using the inputs in its 
production system. The higher are both the performance characteristics of the 
advanced technology and the reduction in its shadow cost, the faster will be the 
replacement process of the old with the new technology. This model also indicates that 
the extent of use of a new technology is not independent of the existing technology in 
use by the finn. This indicates that the decision to further use a new technology is 
influenced by the existing complementary and substitute technologies in use within a 
finn. 
The proportion of output produced on the new technology is equally affected by the 
same conditions. Finally, whether a finn is a monopolist or operates on a perfectly 
competitive market, the investment decision over the new technology and its optimal 
149 
level are driven by the same factors and are bounded by the technological conditions 
ofthe finn. 
In fact, whatever definition of intra firm diffusion (Le. optimal capital output ratio or 
proportion of output produced on the new technology) the optimal level of adoption is 
independent of the output demand constraints and shows exactly the same value for 
both the monopolistic and the perfectly competitive case. 
The next session presents how uncertainty associated with the investment decision of 
the firm, can be inserted into this intra-firm model. 
5.4. THE REPLACEMENT DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
5.4.1. Uncertainty: a real option approach to investments in a new technology 
The intra-firm diffusion model presented in the previous section is strongly based upon 
the neo-classical theory of investment (see Jorgerson 1963) which provides a list of 
possible explanatory variables for investment expenditures. The variables are: 
interest rate, changes in the price of investment goods, labour cost, output, and 
changes in output prices in the competitive case. By means of optimal control 
techniques the model has been modified to determine the specification of the optimal 
accumulation path for the control variables (~, ~ and Glo, GIn). The resulting 
optimal firms technology ownership is shown to be a function of relative productivity 
(ao,an) and the relative costs of each type of capital (cot, cnJ. While the former is firm 
specific, the letter changes over time. This model basically indicates that the firm 
decides upon the combination of inputs according to the level of prices at the time the 
decision is made, assuming that the firm has rational expectations and perfect 
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information about the characteristics of the market and the technology itself. However, 
given that investments are irreversible, the uncertainty of future demand or cost 
conditions should be taken into account because once the firm decides to invest it 
cannot just disinvest should the market conditions change adversely15, In fact, the 
firm might find it more profitable to wait for new information about prices, costs and 
other market condition before it commits its resources. The value of waiting can 
profoundly affect the decision to invest and its opportunity cost must be included as 
part of the total cost of investing. As a result the Net Present Value rule 'Invest when 
the value of a unit of capital is at least as large as the purchase cost and the installation 
cost of the unit' is not appropriate in an uncertain world (Pindyck, 1988). 
Irreversible investments under uncertainty have been studied by financial economists 
and their Option pricing technique have resulted in an elegant solution to the problem. 
The milestone work of McDonald and Siegel (1986), proves that in the case of a 
single irreversible investment project with uncertain pay-offs, a firm should invest in 
the project only when the expected pay-off exceeds the cost by an amount that 
depends on the level of uncertainty, As a result the investment decision should be 
taken when the marginal value equals the total cost of the unit, the total cost, 
including the purchase and installation cost plus the opportunity cost of exercising the 
option to buy the unit. In this light, the problem of investing is similar to exercising 
an option. The higher is the uncertainty about the future the higher is the value of the 
firm's investment option and hence the opportunity cost of irreversible investing 
(Pindyck, 1988). This is because the higher the variability of its environment the more 
15 Is not profitable to disinvest due to the sunk cost of the investments. In absence of second 
hand market the optimal scrapping would be by obsolescence- see Arrow's condition, Arrow 
(1968). 
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reluctant the firm is to invest, as higher variability worsens the 'worst case scenario in 
which the firm regrets the irreversible investment decision' (Bertola, 1998). 
Within a firm several technologies are used at the same time, each being characterised 
by different levels of uncertainty depending on their performance, productivity, 
average profitability, price, age (date of their first appearance on the market and date 
of first adoption by the finn), etc. This would require a mUltiple uncertainty approach 
to the finn decision to invest. However, its mathematical complexity would make the 
model almost intractable. 
An alternative approach is to look at the uncertainty associated with investments in 
two different sets of technologies: the old technologies, including all the existing 
technologies (0); and the new technology (n), including only the advanced one. 
One approach would be to assume that the set of old technologies, being already 
known to the firm, is characterised by a lower degree of uncertainty than the advanced 
technology. The latter, being new, is more uncertain. Alternatively following the 
Stoneman (1981) approach to intra-firm technique choice one might assume that only 
the new technology is surrounded by uncertainty about true profitability while the 
profitability of the set of old technologies is already known with certainty having 
already been extensively used by the entrepreneur. 
However, given that the replacement process takes several years, there are several 
other elements of uncertainty that might affect the investment decision. They are not 
necessarily technology specific and concern uncertainty about: future demand or input 
(or competitive output) prices, interest rate, performance of the new technology, etc. 
To select only one factor would yield biased results while to include too many would 
make the mathematical derivation ofthe model too complicated. 
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For these reasons, it is here preferred not to specify the sources of uncertainty affecting 
the specific investment decision but to proceed by adopting a generic specification of 
uncertainty about the finn's future revenuel6. 
In the intra-finn diffusion model, the investment decision can be compared to the 
decision to invest in a project (e.g. to 'invest in a technology'). In mathematical tenns, 
the benefit from an investment project can be expressed in tenns of the discounted 
cash flows given the flow of infonnation available at time t17. Define this present 
value as Vt. Because its future values are unknown, it is assumed that Vt evolves as a 
Brownian motion where the future values are lognonnally distributed and with a 
variance that grows linearly with the time horizon: 
(5.19) 
where z is a standard Wiener process and equals Et (dt) 112 and Et is a nonnally distributed 
random variable with mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The remaining parameters 
are growth (m) and uncertainty (0"). 
16 This approach is similar to the summary indicator of business conditions used by Bertola 
(1998) that defines a summary variable as a loglinear function of geometric Brownian motion 
processes like wages, productivity and demand which are expected to growth at a some 
constant mean rate but the realised growth rate are random, normally distributed and 
independent over time. The corresponding drift and standard deviation parameters of the 
process of the variable payoff being the linear combination of the primitive processes. In 
other words, uncertain profitability is a result of different level of uncertainty affecting any of 
the dete~inants of the investment decision. 
J 7 Alternatively following McDonald and Siegel (1986) the present value is the market value 
of a claim on the stream of net cash flows that arise from installing the investment at time t. 
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Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) one can suppose that the investment project is 
like an infinitely lived factory that produces a profit flow, 7tt , that follows a geometric 
Brownian motion with drift: 
(5.20) 
The above equation tells us that the current value 7tt is known to the firm , but future 
values of 7tt are unknown and are lognonnally distributed with a variance that grows 
with the time horizon. In other words it is assumed that the value of the project (Le. to 
invest in a technology) grows at some constant mean rate, but the realised growth rates 
are random, normally distributed and independent over time. 
If Vt is the value of the investment opportunity (Le. the value of the option to invest), 
then the payoff from investing at time t is Vrl, where I is the cost of the investment 
assumed known and fixed. The decision to invest is here compared to the decision as 
to when to exercise an option, i.e. the right but not the obligation to buy a share of 
stock at a specified price. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that an intra firm investment in a new 
technology does not last forever, contrary to the opportunity to invest which is4 
available in 'perpetuity'. This means that the firm has got the chance to start investing 
in further projects, as the old expires due to capital obsolescence. Following Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994 pag.202) if one assume that the lifetime of the project is random and 
follows a Poisson process then if the project has survived up to time T , there is a 
probability 8dT that the project will die within the following short time interval dT at 
the rate of depreciation 8. The corresponding probability distribution function of the 
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random lifetime, e.g. the probability that the project dies by obsolescence before T, is 
l-e-81 and the corresponding probability density function of T is 0 e-liT. 
In this light the fIrm would want to maximise the expected present value of the option, 
subject to (5.20) so that: 
F(V) = max E[(VT· I) e-(rI-O)T] with r>O and 101<1 
where r is a discount rate and 0 is the depreciation rate. The resulting condition for the 
existence of a maximum imposes that the variable growth rate (ro) is greater than the 
discount and the depreciation rate i.e. m< r+o. 
Hence, following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) VI is given by 18: 
v = E J co 1t e- (rt8)(s-l) ds = 1t / (r +0 -m) 
tIS t (5.21) 
The usual Marshallian rule is to invest as long the value of a unit of capital is at least 
as large as the cost ofthe unit (VI ~ I) would yield (5.22): 
1t, ~ (r +o-m)1 (5.22) 
where (r +o-m) is the overall option value mUltiple. The flow cost equivalent part of 
(5.22) would suggest that 101 increases by the Poisson death parameter because the 
sunk cost of investment (I) must be recouped over a shorter expected lifetime. 
J 8 It is possible to prove that if 1tt is given by equation (5.20) then V(1tV=log (ltV is the 
following simple Brownian motion with drift: F=(oo-1I202) dt +0 dz. So that over a fInite 
interval t, the change in the logarithm of1t is normally distributed with mean (oo-1I202)t and 
variance Ot2 (see Dixit, 1991). 
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However given that Vt is stochastic the dynamic modelling approach suggests that the 
firm should invest when Vt reaches the critical value V* (rather then Vt ~ I) so that it is 
optimal to invest once V~V*. By using the Bellman equation and expanding the 
function using Ito's Lemma it is possible to find the optimal solution under the 
boundary constraint: F(O) =0 , F(V*)=V*-I and F'(V*)=I (see Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). The resulting critical value V* at which it is optimal to invest (VI ~V*) is: 
V* = P/(I31-1) I (5.23) 
where PI is the larger root of the Bellman quadratic (differential) equation, i.e. 
PI =112- fjJ/cr2 +"'[fjJ/ci-1I2f+2 (r+8)/cr2 , cr2 is a measure of the random 
variability of the future value of the investment, while fjJ , r and 8 are respectively the 
drift of the payoff from the project, the interest rate and the depreciation rate. 
Substituting (5.23) into (5.21), the optimal critical value for the payoffs yields 
(5.24) 
This is clearly greater than (5.22), indicating that uncertainty increases the option value 
to wait. However, this can be seen more explicitly by substituting the root (PI) into 
(5.24), yielding 
The latter allows rewriting the critical level of profit (5.24) as (5.25): 
(5.25) 
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Equation (5.25) is almost identical to the fonnula of the infinite lived project (5.22), 
except that now the option value multiple is increased by the uncertainty factor. The 
flow cost equivalent indicates that uncertainty can increase the investment cost. When 
this happens, the firm might find it more profitable to exercise the option to wait. 
In the absence of uncertainty (0- =0), the right hand side of (5.25) equals the neo-
classical investment Jorgensonian rule, invest if the profit per unit of capital equals its 
7tt = (r+o) I (5.26) 
In summary, equation (5.25) says that when future profits are uncertain the threshold 
7t* must exceed the user cost of capital. So when profits are uncertain the finn must 
wait before investing. Moreover, Dixit and Pindyck prove that (5.26) is the optimal 
timing rule (7tt• = (r+o)I). This would suggest that in the case of the Marshallian 
investment rule it is better to wait before investing even if there is no uncertainty, 
because waiting allows the postponement (and thus) discounting ofthe payment I. 
The next step of the analysis concerns how the intra-firm diffusion model presented 
above in this chapter can take into account uncertainty in future profits in the presence 
of a dual investment decision. 
J 9 In terms of total cost, the neo-classical optimal initial investment into an infinitely lived 
factory would equal the initial investment (lto= Ktopto) based only on current prices, i.e. dqt 
=0, where the user cost of capital would simply equals cto=(r+8)qto. The rule invest when the 
profit gain (d1t=1tto) per unit of capital (I) equals its user cost d1t/dK=cto, reduces to 1ttofKto= 
(r+8)pto. Or in term of total investment (1ttofIto)= (r+8) as in (5.8). See next section for more 
details. 
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5.4.2. Uncertainty and intra-firm investment decision rules 
Contrary to the traditional neo-classical approach, i.e. the Jorgenson model (1963), the 
model of intra-firm investment behaviour does not treat capital as a unique and 
homogeneous good. It rather focuses on the replacement process of the old or existing 
technology by a new more advanced technology. In this framework, the infinitely lived 
factory project can be extended so as to allow two types of investments. Let In and 10 
be the values of two investment projects on a certain number of units of old (0) and 
advanced technology (n) so that for an existing firm Ij,to=dKj,toPj,to j=n,o. Then assume 
that they are affected by the same market uncertainty but they are independent of each 
other, i.e. the firm can choose to invest in any of the two projects or in a combination 
of both projects. The Hamiltonian first order conditions and the costate equations of 
motion of the intra-firm model would yield two different expressions for the two types 
ofprojects (i.e. investments in the two capital goods) which are: 
d7t/~=cnt 
1t/dKa = Cot (5.27) 
(5.27) indicates that, for each project, the payoff per unit of capital introduced should 
be equal to the user cost of capital (or the rental value) of the technology specific 
machinery. 
Assuming that: (i) the firm decides upon the initial investment in the initial stock of 
capital (dKj=Kj) such that the incremental variation of the payoff equals the total initial 
payoff (d7tto _ 1tto); (ii) changes in prices are zero at initial point (dqto =0) and 
consequently Cj,to =(r+B)pj,to ; and (iii) both types of capital are subject to the same 
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depreciation rate, conditions (5.27) can be rewritten, in the absence of uncertainty, as 
(5.28): 
1tnt = (r +8) Pot * ~ = (r +8) 10 
1tol = (r +8) Pnl * ~ = (r +8) ~ (5.28) 
This expression is similar to (5.25) and indicates that profit gams from the 
introduction of a certain amount of capital input is proportional to the investment on 
each capital stock. 
In absence of profit uncertainty, the firm will invest when total benefits from each 
project (lj) are a proportion (r+8) of the value of the total Investment on each capital 
stock (In +10): 
(5.29) 
However, when there is uncertainty about future profits, the real option model (5.25) 
suggests that the two factors should be corrected so that (5.29) becomes: 
and the two marginal investment decisions in ~ and ~ are respectively: 
1t1Ko = (r +8 + 112 ri PI) Pil 
1t/K2 = (r +8 + 1/2 ri PI) P21 
(5.30) 
(5.31a) 
(5.31b) 
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The model thus assumes that the profit from an investment in a technology is 
proportional to its price and the proportionality factor is subject to uncertainty about 
future profits20. 
As it is specified, condition (S.3Ialb) treats investments as a single initial investment 
(dKu,=Ku,) and this can be a problem. In fact, by definition, the intra firm model 
excludes the initial (as well as the end point) investment decision and looks only at the 
firm decision to investing in further units of capital after first adoption. 
This problem can be easily overcome by assuming that incremental units of 
investments are independent of the amount of technology already owned by the firm 
(Pindyck, 1988)21. So, if model (5.30) holds at the initial point t=O then it should be 
20 The basic model of irreversible investments has introduced the parallelism between the 
firm's option to invest and a financial call option where the state variable was the value of the 
project, V, for which is stipulated an exogenous stochastic process. Alternatively, one could 
have used a more specific definition of the source of uncertainty. In fact fluctuations in V can 
be due to fluctuations in the input prices, final output demand, technology conditions in 
various markets, etc. On purpose this has been avoided and we do not go too deep into the 
details of all the sources of uncertainty. To work with such a level of generalisation has 
allowed to greatly simplify the mathematical complexity ofthe problem. 
21 Following Pindyck (1988) the optimality condition that must hold if the firm is investing 
is l1V(K*,Z)=k+M'(K*;Z)Where K* is the optimal capital 
stock while l1 V is the value of the unit of capital or the present value of the expected flow of 
incremental profit generated by the existing installed unit and l1F is the value of the option to 
buy one more unit of capital, at any time in the future. Though the firm should invest until the 
value of a marginal unit of capital l1 V(K;Z) is equal to its cost: the purchase cost, k, plus the 
opportunity cost l1F(K*;Z) of irreversibility exercising the option to invest in the unit rather 
than waiting and keeping the option alive. So the amount of capital already in place and the 
value of the firm W, is the sum of two parts: W=V(K) +F(K)This can justify the adaptation 
of the model to the intra-firm diffusion decision rule, where incremental units of new/old 
capital stock the firm are continuously added over time. 
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valid at each subsequent moment. This allows rewriting (5.30) in terms of differentials 
as: 
dlt/dK,. = (r +0 + 112 (}"2 PI) Pnt -dPnt 
dlt/<iKo = (r +0 + 112 (}"2 PI) Pot-dpot 
(5.32a) 
(5.32b) 
(5.32) is equivalent to the Hemiltonian first order maximisation condition constrained 
by the costate equations of motion and after substitution of the marginal product as 
derived in section 5.2. Moreover, the rhs of 5.32a and 5.32.b are the user cost of capital 
corrected for uncertainty, i.e. 
c* nt = (r +0 + 112 (52 PI) Pllt -dPnt 
c* ot = (r +0 + 112 (52 P I) Pot -dPot 
(5.33a) 
(5.33b) 
They are a positive function of a reduction in the price of the technology (-dqjtj=n,o) 
and are proportional to the level of the price of the technology (qjt j=n,o), the 
proportionality factor being the sum of discounting (0), depreciation (r) and 
uncertainty (112 (52 PI). 
It is immediate to notice that in absence of uncertainty , i.e. (}"2 =0, (S.33aJb) reduces 
to the Jorgensonian user cost of capital, i.e. Cjt = (r + 0 )qjt -dqjt" Uncertainty, if 
present, would lower the impact of a price decrease (dqjt<O) upon the further extent of 
use of the new technology. This also means that in order to increase the proportion of 
new technology via a price change, i.e. a reduction in c*jt, the relative increase of the 
price of the technology j should be at least as large as the depreciation plus interest rate 
and uncertainty: 
j=new, old 
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The adjustment for uncertainty to the intra finn model of technology adoption 
presented in Chapter 5 is straightforward. Substituting (5.33a/b) in the optimal capital 
accumulation path of the finn, it is possible to derive the optimal level of intra finn 
diffusion corrected for uncertainty as: 
(5.34) 
or equivalently 
~I (Kut+~J = 1/[1+ ao/an • c*n/c·oJ] (5.35) 
where the a's are the parameters of the production function, while the c's are now the 
Jorgensonian user cost of capital adjusted for uncertainty (5.35), 
Equation (5.34) basically indicates that the optimal level of intra-finn technology 
adoption of a new technology is: (i) directly proportional to the relative capital 
productivity i.e. relative elasticity of substitution of the inputs and (ii) inversely 
proportional to the relative cost (Le. the user cost of capital) of the new to the old 
technology subject to a certain degree of uncertainty (1/2 ci PI). Uncertainty as here 
specified, refers mainly to future profitability the finn cannot directly control for. As 
such it will affect the level of ownership of the two sets of technologies with the same 
intensity. Consequently, what influences the relative costs in (5.34) are merely the 
level (qjt j =n,o) and the change in the prices of the two inputs, (qj,t+1 -%tj=n,o). 
The changes in the price implicitly assume that the finn operates under perfect 
foresight and knows exactly what prices will be from one period to another. This is 
equivalent to saying that the finn has got perfect infonnation about the market and 
future price changes. This assumption is quite strong and should be tested empirically 
as it might as well be that the finn knows only part of the infonnation about the 
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variables of interest. Not knowing what the level of prices will be, its investment 
decision could be a function of the expected (qEj,J rather than the current price (dqjJ. 
To use only the latter might lead to serious misspecification. The neo-classical 
investment model does not explicitly take into account the possibility of price 
expectations even though they can play a determinant role in the decision to invest. 
The following section presents different ways price expectations can affect the 
decision to invest in a new technology. 
5.5. Price expectations 
In the neo-c1assicalliterature, (Jorgenson, 1963 1965, 1967a/b, 1970) the firm decides 
upon how much to invest according to the level of prices at the time the decision is 
made, except for the price of capital services, or the user cost of capital, specified in 
this study as: 
Moreover it is assumed that the firm chooses the optimal level of capital (K"'t) for the 
period such that the profit gain from an extra unit of capital input equals its cost22: 
E(dn/dK) = q(r+o) - dq 
t t t t j=old, new (5.36) 
The first part of the rhs of (5.36) accounting for discounting and depreciation, i.e. 
(r +0), the second accounting for price changes, i.e. dqt' 
22 See Blanchard and Fisher (1989) pp. 296 for a proof. 
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These assumptions remain almost unchanged when applied to the dual model of 
replacement of the old with the new technology under uncertainty. Introducing 
uncertainty into the surrounding environment of the firm, the expected profitability of 
an extra unit of one of the two types of capital, yields: 
E(d1t /dK. ) = (r + 0 + 112 cr2 13 \ q. -dq. 
1 JI "11 JI where j = 0, n (5.37) 
The difference with respect to (5.36) is that in (5.37) the firm faces two different types 
of capital inputs, with technology specific user costs of capital and productivity. The 
user costs of capital being equal to the actual price of an extra unit of technology 
specific capital stock, adjusted for interest rate, depreciation and uncertainty, i.e. 
(r+3 +112 cr2 '\) q. ,plus the change in price, i.e. dq.23. One might also reinterpret the P fl fl 
user cost of capilal (in the rhs of 5.36) as a measure of the long tenn price path once 
short run oscillations (dq. ), around its observed values (qJ.J are subtracted. 
JI 
This seems to suggest that the firm adjusts its investments in each moment in time 
(instantaneously) according to the underlying movements in the secular trend rather 
than to short run price oscillations and that the finn knows with certainty what the 
price change will be from one period to the other. This assumption is quite strong as it 
assumes that the finn operates under perfect infonnation about changes in the variables 
of interest. Moreover, as assumed by the theoretical intra-finn model, 
23 In future study it might be interesting to extend this model as to include capital price 
expectations (weighted or unw.eighted with certain probability distributions) also for the other 
prices in order to take further account of uncertainty. 
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investments are irreversible and capital disposal occurs by depreciation, i.e. with zero 
second-hand value. Under this assumption the profit maximising firm is more likely 
not to respond instantaneously to changes in price but rather adjusts its current level of 
use of each capital stock to the desired optimal level based upon expected future price 
changes. This is an important aspect of the model as it directly affects the intra-firm 
level of use of the existing technologies via the changes in the user cost of each type of 
capital (see equation (5.35». This implies that the type of price extrapolation the firm 
bases its decision upon may be a crucial element in the derivation of the optimal intra 
firm level of use of a new technology. 
For ease of presentation let the current proportion of each technology j (SjJ be simply 
expressed only as a function of the past and current level of prices (d%t= %cqjt-,) so 
that: 
j=new, old 
The implicit assumption behind this specification is that the time lag between the 
decision to invest and the delivery of the goods is only one period . Moreover, the 
adjustment to the desired capital stock j to price changes occurs immediately and is a 
function of the level of prices which are known by the firm with certainty. This is 
equivalent to say that the firm operates under rational expectations and formulates its 
investment decision under prefect foresight about future changes in the input prices. 
However, it is also possible that the firm does not know exactly the price of the 
technology from one period to another and it bases its investment decision upon 
partial information. Consequently the current level of ownership, S., corresponds to 
Jt 
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its price expectations (qjtC) rather than the price (q) when the actual investment takes 
places, so that: 
The rational expectation approach was firstly introduced by Muth (1961) and 
subsequently implemented by Lovell (1986), Pesando (1975), Friedman (1980), etc. 
The basic idea behind these models being that the specification of expectations should 
be consistent with the rest of the model rather than being ad hoc. Basically, it assumes 
that the difference between the realised and the expected value should be uncorrelated 
with all the variables in the information set at the time the expectation is formed. This 
is because the economic agents are supposed to have perfect information (i.e they 
know all the variables in the information set) and they know the exact values of the 
parameters of the model. There exist different tests for rationality (see Wallis (1980), 
Revankar (1980), Hoffman and Shmidt (1981), etc), among them, one could use the 
weak rationality test based upon the significance of the relationship between forecast 
error (qc. -q.(}) and the variables in the information set (ltI) so that: Jt+J j t 
or 
Rationality would imply that a\=O and the observed values (d%J can simply replace 
the expected values in the final model estimate (i.e. the firm knows exactly what 
prices will be). If the forecast errors exhibit a significant non zero mean and serial 
correlation (significant a\), then the information contained in past forecast errors is 
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not fully utilised in fotming future predictions and the hypothesis of pnce 
expectations must be accepted (Maddala, 1992). This test, even if quite 
straightforward, would require that qej t+l is known and should be collected using ad 
hoc surveys. Alternatively, there are two approaches to estimating and testing rational 
expectation models. One involves obtaining an explicit expression for the expected 
value from the model, substituting this in the model and then estimating the model 
using any parameter constraints that are implied (e.g. Wickens, 1982). The second 
involves substitution of the realised value and using some appropriate instrumental 
variables (see for examples Maddala, 1992). 
Price expectations are not available to us and the alternative approaches would be of 
limited applicability in the intra fitm model presented in this and later chapters. The 
stochastic nature of the price approximation and the resulting forecasting error, would 
make it difficult to handle the non linear nature of the technology replacement 
equation (5.34). This, together with the significant loss of degrees of freedom and 
multicollinearity arising from the exogenous infotmation set would make the model 
intractable empirically. An alternative would be to just test for the presence of price 
expectations, rather their absence. 
There exist a wide literature on expectations, which basically assume that 
expectations are based upon the observation of past realisations of the relevant 
variables for which expectations were formed. This type of models can be categorised 
as Static or simple lag models of instantaneous adjustment and Dynamic Models. The 
static models would assume that the current optimal level of ownership of the capital 
stock is a function only of the price level in the previous period, i.e. Sjt=a+B 1 qj{I_I)' 
Dynamic models are more sophisticated and make use of time lags to account for 
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incomplete or lagged responses by the economic agents to changes in economic 
conditions. Examples of this type of approach are the finite polynomial lags model 
(see the milestone work of Fisher (1937) or more specifically Almon (1965) for an 
application to capital appropriation and expectations) or infinite lags or geometric 
lags model (Koyck 1954, Cagan 1956 and Nerlowe 1958). They basically assume 
that the effect of one variable upon the other is not contemporaneous but can be 
gradual over a sequence of time periods, yielding a distributed lag relationship, i.e. 
Sjt=a+Bl qj(t-I) + ... +Bzqjt.z with z= finite/infinite. The resulting expected price qC is a 
weighted average of past values of qit with geometrically declining weights. These 
types of models have in common that they are difficult to estimate. Among the 
several problems, the number of lags can cause a relevant loss of degrees of freedom, 
multicollinearity among the lagged variables and unreliable parameter estimates. An 
alternative specification, derived from the geometric lag approach, is the Adaptive 
Expectation model which basically assumes that expectations are upgraded in each 
moment in time with an adjustment proportional to the error in the previous 
realisation: 
or equivalently 
qc = y. q + (l-y.) qe jt J j(t-I) J j(t-I) 
where the weight of the error lies between zero and 1 (0< Yj <1) and the nearer is Yj to 1 
the greater the influence of the latest observations in determining the current price 
expectation. 
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Further to the Adaptive Expectation model there are other approaches to price 
expectations and there are also several models that explicitly take into account 
dynamic adjustment of the dependent variable (SjJ to price expectations (if they 
exist). They basically assume that when variables are disturbed from their 
equilibrium, they do not adjust inst,antly but there are some lags in adjustments to the 
new equilibrium position. Examples of such models are the Partial Adjustment 
model, the Nerlowe (1958) model, the Error Correction model (Granger, 1986; Engle 
and Granger, 1987; Johansen and Juselious, 1990, etc.) and the rational lags 
distribution model (Maddala 1977, Lucas and Rapping 1969, etc.)24. The latter has 
also been used by Jorgenson (1963, 1965, 1966, 1970 etc.) in testing his neo-classical 
investment model. However, even if of interest of their own, the nature of their 
dynamic adjustment is not compatible with the dynamic of the intra-firm model for 
mainly two reasons. Firstly the model is basically an equilibrium model assuming 
that, in each moment in time, the observed level of capital equals the desired level of 
capital (see Chapter 3 for a full discussion). Secondly, the non linear nature of the 
intra firm model would make very uneasy the introduction of lagged values of the 
dependent variable. Moreover, the structure of the residuals would yield to a model 
almost intractable empirically. Thirdly, even in absence of price expectations, past 
levels of use of a new technology (i.e. dependent variable) are not available, except 
for 1993. 
24 See also Fisher and Tanner (1978) for a comparison of the empirical study on adaptive 
expectation and polynomial distributed lag models and also Bischoff (1978) for applications 
to modeling the demand for capital goods including Jorgenson's approach. 
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A third approach to investigating the nature and the role of prices is based upon the 
belief that there might exist an asymmetric response to price rises or falls. If so, the 
best model specification should be based upon the irreversible function approach. The 
reason for different reactions to price rises or falls is that the fixed or durable assets of 
the finn have an opportunity cost, which is usually referred to as the scrap value, 
which is well under their acquisition costs. Consequently, while a rise in input price 
might lead to the acquisition of a new technology, a fall in prices does not lead to the 
scrapping of such durables whose acquisition was justified when prices were high. 
The irreversible or asymmetric response functions do take into account the 
asymmetric elasticity of substitution of investments with respect to price rise or fall. 
This type of approach was first explored by Twenteen and Quance (1968) in their 
applications to the agricultural supply function and afterwards by Saylor (1974), 
Houck (1977), etc. In their model they split the price variable (qt) in two parts, one 
accounting for positive (q{), the other for negative (q/) changes in prices. In tenns of 
technology adoption this can be rewritten as: 
J=o,n 
where a is the intercept, l and yf are coefficients and prices can be specified as: 
so that when YI=1 if [q·t- q·(t 1)]>0 and 0 otherwise, and y =1 if [q. - q ]<0 and 0 
J J - 2 Jt j(t-I) 
otherwise. 
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In a later study Wolffram (1971) proposed a modified version of the above, saying 
that it is more likely that changes occur when prices are higherllower than the 
maximum/minimum level reached in the past i.e. threshold level: 
where Y, =1 if q. > q. MAX and 0 otherwise, and Y2 =1 if q. < q. MAX and 0 otherwise jl jl jl jl 
where the threshold can be calculated, for example, by weighted or simple non-centred 
moving averages (Traill et aI, 1978). 
It is reasonable to expect that, when the price of the capital stock increases the firm is 
more likely to wait. Vice versa, when prices decrease, the firm might be more willing 
to invest immediately. Which one of the two specifications is the best can be 
determined only empirically. However, also in this case the nature of the price 
specification, i.e. via the user cost of capital, would make it very difficult to test these 
assumptions empirically. 
In summary, there are several approaches to the fonnulation of price expectations and 
rationality. However, there are several empirical and conceptual constraints to their 
applicability and testing over the intra finn model of technology replacement. The 
alternative route followed in this section moves from a slight modification of the 
naYve extrapolative expectation models (e.g. Ferber 1953, Maddala, 1992). It allows 
one to test the hypothesis of rationality against the hypothesis of imperfect 
information without specifying ex ante the nature of the price expectations. This 
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model would simply assume that the relationship between expected prices and 
observed prices could be written as: 
The intra firm model (equation 5.17 or 5.18 or similarly 5.34 or 5.35) would assume 
that Yj= 1, so that, in each moment in time, the change in the expected price equals the 
observed change (dqejt=d%t), i.e. the firm operates under perfect foresight and has got 
perfect information about future prices (rational expectations) 25. 
This hypothesis can be tested empirically via the significance of the coefficient of the 
change in price (y)26. If Yj turns out to be is significantly different from 1, the 
hypothesis of rational behaviour must be rejected in favour of price expectations 
25 Despite the tenn 'rational' appears in the definition of this type of expectations, it is worth 
emphasising that the specification used in this model is not the rational 'old' lag distribution 
tipical of the rational lag model heavily criticised by Lucas. The Lucas' critique (Lucas 
1972, 1976) is not in favour of the ex-post estimate of exogenous changes in the variables, on 
the ground that the structure of economic models is based upon behavioural relationship 
derived from optimal decision rules of economic agents who can anticipate the movements of 
relevant variables (Wallis, 1980). Consequently, he believes that any exogenous changes in 
the nature of these movements cause themselves changes in the optimal decision rules, hence 
'any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models' (Lucas 
1976, pp.41). This invalidate any ex post analysis of the effectiveness of an actual policy, or 
equivalently of any ex-post changes in the exogenous variables in isolation, based upon their 
impact before and after this change occurred (i.e. lags structure). This is because as soon as 
the economic variables change also the economic system does making difficult to isolate their 
impact (see Wallis 1980 for more technical details). However, it is not in the aim of this 
chapter, to enter this discussion about rationality. 
26 Given the cross sectional ~ature of the data set and the nature of the (non linear) model 
(5.17) this study will be limited to the testing of any possible deviations from the assumption 
of perfect foresight, rather than the testing of possible types of expectations and dynamic 
adjustment of the investment in the new technology. 
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(dqejt= Yj·dqjJ. This would indicate that there is a discrepancy between the firm's 
. . . 
exp~ctation and the observed price. The resulting discrepancy, (Yj). being proportional 
to the forecasting error made' by the frnn in predicting the level of prices27 can 
approach 1 from above or below (Yj >< 1), depending on whether the firm expectations 
over-estimate or under-estimate the change in prices. The nearer is Yj to 1 the closer is 
the expected value to. the observed value .. 
How the firm reacts to changes in price is very important, especially if one is 
interested in policies, aimed at promoting diffusion via price interventions and fiscal 
. . . . .. . . . 
incentives to the acquisition of further technology by innovative firms28. 
J:his sectign has presented ~ow pric~s expect~tions af(ect the l~vel of a new 
technology ownership. It has also shown how the intra-firm diffusion model enables 
ohe to test the hypothesis or perfect' foresight' and rationality versus incomplete 
information or, more generally, the role of price' expectations. 
Some might argue about using a completely empirical approach to the definition of the 
" ., . ~. . 
problem. However,- as Granger (1995.) has emphasised" to follow an empirical 
approach to the opti~al dynamic structure is co~on practic,e in econ~mics give? 
, 2~ One possible speci~cation of the formulation of expectations being, for example, t4at the 
expected price change'in the next period (d4ejt) is proportional t6 that in tM previous period 
(~qjt), so that: 
or equivalently 
qejt+ 1 -qj(t-l) = Yj (<Ij(t) -qj(t-l)) 
qejt+1 =Yj qjct) + (l-Yj)qj(t-I) • 
where, again, 1j measures the discrepancy between the firm forecast and the observed price 
• . ' .~. ~ -. oJ • 
that in absence of expectations should be equal to I. However, thi6 is only one of the pessible 
price expectations that is not necessarily imposed to the testing of the model. 
173 
.. 
that, quite often, the dynamic structure of theoretical economic models IS not 
specified. 
The next session summarises the main determinants of intra-firm adoption and how 
they have been specified in the final estimating equation. 
5.6. The estimating equation 
The model of intra firm diffusion presented in this chapter defines the optimal 
adoption path of a new technology via the rate of substitution of the existing (Ka) by 
the advanced (K.t) capital stock ofthe firm: 
(5.34) 
where an and 0.0 are the productivity parameters (Le. YI=~ Ka,Q.o ~Ian LI~) and c* nl and 
c* 01 are the shadow prices or the user cost of capital corrected for uncertainty. 
This section aims at deriving the final specification of the intra-firm model suitable to 
empirical testing. By means of statistical and econometric tools the validity of its 
assumptions and the robustness across different technologies will be tested over the 
sample of firm in the CURDS data set. However, there are a number of problems 
associated with the nature of the model (5.34) and the information available in the 
CURDS data set. 
28 See for further discussion on the role of expectations Karshenas and Stoneman 1993 , , 
Nickel, 1978, etc. Other approaches to expectations, i.e. expected technological 
improvements can be found in Rosemberg 1976a1b, 1971, 1994, etc). 
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The first problem is, that due its non linear nature, this model is very difficult to 
estimate econometrically29. A solution is to express the dependent variable in terms of 
proportions of total capital stock of the firm, so that: i) Ist=K/(~ +1<.,) j= new, old and 
ii) ~t+kot=1. Then applying a log-linearisation to (5.34) yields (5.38): 
(5.38) 
In logarithmic terms, (5.38) indicates that the proportion of capital stock incorporating 
the new technology is a function of the relative productivity and the difference in the 
shadow costs of the new and the old technologies. Equation (5.38) can now be easily 
estimated by OLS. 
The other problems one has to fact in testing the intra-firm model are: 
l)The first element of the rhs of (5.38) is firm specific and differs across firms 
The CURDS data set contains several indicators of firm characteristics and technology 
adoption over time, but does not explicitly contain information about the firm specific 
capital productivity «lni, (lci) This implies that the first element in the rhs of (5.38) is 
not directly observable. 
2) The second element of(5.38) changes over time, but not across firms, (co/cnJ. 
29 Alternative simulation techniques might have been used to test the validity of the model. 
This possibility has been excluded on the basis that the marginalist analysis allows to 
determine the relative impact of each determinant of adoption. It is less subjective than 
simulations and allows to use the rare empirical evidence upon adoption behaviour of the 
firm over different technologies. 
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The CURDS data set does not contain information upon the level of ownership of the 
technology over time. The level of technology ownership being available only in 1993, 
restricts this analysis to the behaviour of the cross section of firms in 199330. 
Moreover, as specified in (5.38) the model does not allow one to explicitly test the 
hypothesis of rationality versus price expectation and to measure the impact of 
uncertainty in determining the extent of use of the advanced technology. 
The following sections explain how those limitations have been overcome in the final 
model specification. In particular it looks at how the time dimension of (cot ICnt ) and 
the space dimension of (a/ a o ) are combined in the final model specification. Below 
each component is discussed in detail and describes how the information in the 
CURDS data set has been used in the modelling of the determinants of adoption. 
5.6.1. Space dimension of(a"Jao,} 
As seen in section 5.3. of this chapter, the productivity ratio a/ a o in (5.38) reflects 
the firm's technological constraints at time t, and depends upon the firm's modality of 
production. This type of information is not available in the CURDS data set and for 
this reason cannot be directly specified in the model. 
However, a/ a o , being firm specific, reflects the core competencies of the firm, such 
as: dimension, management, organisation and other technology in use, etc. For its 
nature, it can be compared to what is defined as a rank effect in the inter-firm 
diffusion literature. The latter recognises that (potential) users differ in some 
30 See appendix A for the variables contained in the CURDS data set 
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important dimensions proxied by the characteristics of the firm (David, 1969, 1991; 
Davies, 1979). Similarly, in the intra firm diffusion model the (capital specific) 
productivity ratio can be interpreted as a measure of the firm specificity determining 
the technological production frontier and the optimal adoption rate. If the a.' s differ 
across firms one has a reason why, despite firms facing the same shadow prices, they 
decide to adopt different levels of technologies. It is difficult to define and measure 
the intra firm rank effects , not only from the theoretical point of view , but also 
empirically. However, the CURDS data set contains several indicators of firm 
characteristics that can be used as a proxy for this. Their. definition and the 
justification for their inclusion are summarised below: 
Establishment Characteristics in 1993 
It is generally argued that larger firms can diversify the risk of experimenting with 
new technologies better than smaller firms, due for example to economies of scale or 
to participation in research and development (Shumpeter, 1911, 1984). The 
consequence for this being that adoption will be faster the larger the firm. The 
majority of the empirical studies, based upon inter-firm rank effects to technology 
diffusion do confirm this prediction. Early work of Mansfield (1968), Romeo (1975) 
as well as Hannah and MacDowell (1984), Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Saloner 
and Shephard (1995), Noteboom (1993) and more recently also Colombo and 
Mosconi (1995) find that size of the establishment shows a significant and positive 
impact upon the spread of technology adoption. However, there are also some other 
studies that reach the opposite conclusion such as the Oster study (1982) on the 
diffusion of the basic oxygen furnace and continuous casting. She finds a negative 
effect of firm size on adoption probabilities. This controversial result will be kept in 
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mind, but being less a common finding, the expected coefficient sign will be left to be 
positive. 
The variable used in the testing of the size effect is the number of employees (lejJ 
(available for 1993-1986-1981-1975 and 1970), where lagged, weighted and 
unweighted smoothing averages have been used to avoid simultaneity and 
endogeneity problems. Moreover, binary size-class variables, will be specified to 
capture size effects in both absolute and relative measures. 
The Shumpeterian hypothesis that formalised R&D exerts a positive impact upon the 
use of a technology is also in line with a later study by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
who illustrate that firms which spend upon R&D are more easily able to assimilate 
new technology. On the other hand Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) found no 
significant impact of R&D upon inter firm adoption. The variable accounting for 
R&D is here defined by the ratio of employees doing in house R&D to the total 
employment of the firm(R&D). The alternative, due to the high number of missing 
values for some of technologies, is a dummy variable also available in the CURDS 
data set (RdumjJ. The latter takes value 1 if firms do in house R&D and zero 
otherwise, without requiring the exact number of full time equivalent employees 
engaged in R&D. Whether one uses the former or the latter indicator, the impact upon 
intra firm diffusion, if significant, is expected to be positive. 
Another variable used to proxy the rank effect is the age of the establishment (AGE). 
It is included on the basis that older firms generally have accumulated knowledge that 
allows them to assess new technologies better than younger firms do. However, also 
the opposite might be true. Younger plants may be better able to adopt advanced 
technologies than older plants whose capital stock may be outdates and less 
compatible with new technologies being adopted (Baldwin et al. 1998). Empirical 
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studies upon the spread of adoption of a sample of technologies in US manufacturing 
industry have yielded contrasting results. Dunne (1994) has found no significant 
relationship between establishment age and inter firm adoption for a range of 
technologies and for several industrial sectors, while Little and Triest (1996) has 
found a negative relationship between the number of new technologies adopted by the 
firm and the firm age. The latter indicating that older firms are slower to take up with 
new technologies. On the contrary, in a study by Noteboom (1993), the impact of age 
upon the adoption of computers in small scale retailing, in the Netherlands has turn 
out to be positive and significant. Therefore, the impact of age is difficult to predict a 
priori and its significance is left to the empirics. 
Other variables included in the model are: whether the firm is export intensive, i.e. 
exports >20% or >50% of its output (EX20 and Ex50) and the industry sector the firm 
belongs to (dummy- DIt where 1=1, .. 15, up to two three digits SIC classification). 
They are included on the basis that each firm faces different markets for their products 
and different input costs depending also upon the sector to. which they belong. 
Consequently the coefficient may be significant but the expected sign, being sector 
specific, is difficult to predict a priori. 
The last two variables are whether there has been any change in the ownership of the 
firm since 1986, (dummy-OWNER) and whether the firm, as an establishment, 
belongs to an industrial group (dummy-GROUP). The former reflects the possible 
impact of a change in management, while the second reflects the impact of 
information via internal routes about technology performance and technological 
competencies. While the sign of the first one, if significant, is undetermined, the 
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second, if significant, is expected to be positive. In fact, Cainarca et al (1990) have 
found that 'business groups' compared to 'indipendent firms' do show higher rates of 
adoption of FA systems. However, Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) using the 
CURDS data set found that the distinction between establishments and firms is not an 
important one for inter firm diffusion. The same result can be found in Dunne (1994) 
in his study on a range of technologies in the US manufacturing industries, where 
single plant and multiplant producers have tum out to utilise the technology at similar 
frequencies. 
Financial Status/liquidity of the firm 
Financial conditions of the firm, at the time the investment decision is taken, are 
believed to play a relevant role in the adoption decision. This hypothesis has been 
'tested by Mansfield (1963) in the diffusion of diesel locomotives in the US between 
1925-1959. He finds that liquidity of the firm has a positive and significant sign. 
However, since his study the firm credit system has become much more sophisticated 
and diversified, For this reason the expected sign can (but not necessarily must) be 
significant and positive. Three different variables have been used to model the 
financial position of the firm they are: (i)dummy variable profit or loss in 1990/91, 
1985/86, 1980/81 (dummy- PLit ); (ii) N years average real profit per unit of turnover 
between 1986 and 1993 (lturnoverNYiJ; and (iii) the average real turnover between 
1986 and 1993 weighted by the number of employees (larwtjJ. While the first refers to 
a point observation the other two take into account that the firm might use the 
smoothing average of its financial liquidity in recent years. The smoothing average 
also avoids problems of simUltaneity in the model due to causality between the 
investment decision and the consequent reduction in liquidity, The best variable will 
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be selected empirically according to the relative contribution to the model explanatory 
power. 
Production System Characteristics in 1993 
The characteristics of the production system are expected to affect the adoption of a 
new technology considerably. For example, Colombo and Mosconi (1995), suggest 
that CAD and CAM systems, like NC stand alone machine tools, were originally 
oriented towards the realisation of highly complex (often customised) parts typical of 
plant of the 'job shop' kind, i.e. with a wide product mix composed of highly 
differentiated products and production to order in small batches. On the contrary 
Flexible Automation production were originally aiming at coping with the need of 
conversion to flexibility of mass production by plants with no job shop, mainly 
involved in line productions of a limited number of rather standardised designs. On 
this basis they conclude that plants with no job shop are more likely to pioneer 
adoption of flexible manufacturing and assembling systems, while plants with a job 
shop will perform better as regards the introduction of NC or CNC and also computer 
aided and engineering equipment. 
The type of production organisations available in the CURDS data set have been 
specified by a series of dummy variables such as: engineer to order (PS 1), make to 
order (PS2), make to stock (PS3), Job shop (PS4), mixed (PS5). Their expected sign 
is technology specific and cannot be generalised to all the technologies in the CURDS 
sample. 
Colombo and Mosconi (1995) also report that systems like CAD, CAM or NC stand 
alone, were originally oriented towards the realisation of highly complex (often 
customised) parts, which were produced in small batches, and were particularly 
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suitable for finns which required very rapid introduction of new or improved 
products (Carlsson, 1984). 
Under this aspect also the average batch size (Lbatch) is included on the rhs of the 
model. Being technology specific, its significance and its sign will be detennined 
empirically. 
Introduction of new technology/systems by 1993 
Interdependencies and complementarities are believed to play a relevant role upon 
diffusion based upon the principle that the finn's capabilities reflect its stock of 
knowledge and technical and managerial skills, all of which are enhanced by the use 
of previous technologies (Baldwin, 1998). Despite the theoretical attempts to model 
the adoption of complementary or substitute technologies, there exist very few 
empirical studies of this. Among them Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Stoneman 
and Kwon (1994), Colombo and Mosconi, 1995, Stoneman and Toivanen (1997) etc. 
have found that inter finn adoption of a technology is not only affected by variables 
related to itself but also by variables relating to other technologies. Moreover, the 
degree of complementarity can affect the probability of simultaneous adoption. 
Consequently a series of dummy variable outsourced from then CURDS data set is 
here used to indicate previous adoption of complementary and substitute technologies 
such as NC, CNC, CoT, Micro and Robot. Other innovations introduced by 1993 are: 
CAD, Microprocessors incorporated in products (M-PROD) 
Managerial innovations and quality awarding by 1993 
As emphasised by the managerial literature, managerial as well as organisational 
innovation can generate complemetarities from the use of other existing technologies 
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and speed up the use of the advanced teclmology (see for example Jaikumar 1986, 
Colombo and Mariotti 1987, Cainarca et al. 1990, and also Colombo and Mosconi 
1995, for empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis). 
The presence of interactions among best practice teclmologies and different spheres of 
the firm's activity is tested via the inclusion of dummy variables indicating whether, 
by 1993, the firm has adopted: Computer Aided Production Management system 
(CAPM); Total Quality Management principles (TQM) and Just in Time principles 
(JIT). Another variable accounting for quality of the production practice of the firm is 
whether the firm has been awarded the BS5750lIS09000 accreditation (BS575) by 
1993. Given that they are plant and technology specific, their significance and their 
sign will be determined empirically. 
A!lowing all these effects to enter the model, one can approximate the productivity 
ratio as: 
=log (Charcteristicsj)+log (liquiditYj}+log(Prod-systemj) 
+log(Technologiesj+ other innovationsj)+log(Managerialj) 
There are no a priori reasons to eliminate any of these variables31, Their significance 
will be tested empirically when the final model is estimated. 
31 Lagged values of the independent variables, such as employment, turnover in previous 
years, are not explicitly specified but they are being used to correct for endogeneity. 
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5.6.2. Time dimension of(cot/cnt ) 
The second element of the rhs of (5.38) represents the impact over time of changes in 
costs upon the level of use of a new technology and can be rewritten as (5.39): 
(5.39) 
where log(c*jJ V j=old, new, are the log of the Jorgensonian user cost of capital of the 
new and the old technologies, corrected for uncertainty, that can be written more 
explicitly as: 
j = old, new 
The user cost of capital is not directly estimable as some of its components, i.e ci and 
PI, are not directly observable. However, making use of the approximation, log(x +1)= 
x, it can be rewritten as: 
(5.40) 
Moreover, substituting (5.40) into (5.39) yields: 
or 
The equivalent parameterised version being: 
(5.41) 
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where 13 = r +0 + 112 (J2 PI' d%t and qjt/dqjt are the difference and the reciprocal of the 
relative change in price of the two sets of technologies j=new, old, while r +0 are 
respectively the interest and the depreciation rate, (J2 is the volatility of profitability, 
PI is the root of the Bellman equation. 
One of the problems arising with the estimation of (5.41) is that prices do not change 
across firms but change over time, while the level of technology ownership is available 
only in 1993. In order to overcome the lack of cross-sectional dimension the change in 
price has been specified as the difference in the price at time of first adoption (t='to) 
and the current price (t=1994). However, to avoid the price effect (in absolute value) 
being larger for early adopters than for latecomers, it has been assumed that the 
change in the price dqt=qt-qt-I can be approximated by the average incremental change 
. 
from the date of first adoption (t-'t), so that: 
Taking the log of this expression it yields log(qt-qto) -log (t-'to), where the second 
term can simply be approximated by a time tend. In other words, it is here assumed 
that the sum of the smoothed incremental variations over time would reasonably 
approximate the current capital ownership of the firm, i.e. the dependent variable in the 
final model specification. Although this assumption might be regarded as one of the 
weaknesses of the model testing, this is the best approximation of the price effect one 
can get from the data available to this study. In fact, this allows one to add, an 
otherwise absent, time dimension to the cross sectional dimension of the study. 
The first implication of this assumption is that the time trend is also the term used to 
pick up the epidemic effect, but with opposite expected sign. As such it should be 
distinguished in the final interpretation of the time coefficient. The second implication 
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is that it is implicitly assumed that price expectations are firm specific, being based 
upon the firm specific experience of price changes since its first adoption. Again, if we 
assume that expectations are influenced by past values of prices, to use this expression 
might reflect the fact that earlier adopters have greater experience of past pattern of 
price changes, while later adopters might have based its decision upon a shorter 
observation period. For these reasons the interpretation of the expectation coefficient 
should be considered only as a reasonable approximation due to the limitations of the 
cross-sectional nature of the information available in the CURDS data set. 
In this study the variables used for the testing of the price effects have been specified 
as follows: 1) the growth rate of the price of the advanced technology (dqjt= qj (t-1994f 
qj (t-to) , j=NC, CNC, Micro); 2) the growth rate of the price of the firm's existing 
capital stock (dqot= qO(t=1994fqo(t=to» measured by the Index of the price of Real 
Domestic Fixed Capital Formation; 3) The reciprocal of the relative growth rate in 
the price of the existing and new technology since first adoption (qot /dqot -qnl /dqllJ or 
alternatively, using the absolute value of the price derivatives: [qot /(-dqoJ -qnt /(-dqnJJ. 
The price effect in (5,41) is tested using the prices of the technologies (qNC , qCNC' and 
qMICRO) at the factory gate adjusted for inflation and the quality content of the product 
over time (Quality adjusted real price index) 32. 
32 Quality adjusted prices are used when a technology, or any other producer or consumer 
good, has been on the market for several decades. A technology is a good for which quality 
changes can be spectacular (like in the case of computers) and the price that a producer 
charges at the factory gate for a machine in 2000 is much less than in 1950 (Stoneman et 
a1.1992). For some goods, it is reasonable to expect that the price fall over time while 
technological improvements do increase the quality of the final products. If one wants to 
compare prices over time it is therefore important to correct prices for quality changes and to 
use a factory gate price at 'constant quality' and constant prices. Some of the quality adjusted 
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The adjustment for the different purchasing power is quite straightforward and can be 
done using a deflator such as the retail price index calculated by the National 
Statistical Office. The adjustment for quality improvements of the product over time is 
not straightforward and needs some further elaboration. The basic approach used to 
calculate the quality adjusted prices of the technologies included in the CURDS data 
set refers to the Hedonic price method (see Griliches , 1971, Triplett, 1989, Stoneman 
et al. 1992) in which the product prices are related to the characteristics that the 
products embody. Unfortunately, the price index of Coated and Carbide tools 
machines was not available. Consequently, CoT had to be excluded from the testing of 
the model (see Appendix D for more details). 
The expected sign of the parameters can be derived looking at each single component 
. o( the price effect. The first two elements of the rhs of (5.41) measure the impact of a 
change in the price of the existing (-dqot) and the new (-dqnJ technology upon the level 
of adoption of the advanced technology33. In both cases the elasticity to price changes 
should equal 1, but with opposite sign (Y1=1, Y2=-1)34. An increase in level of 
ownership of the new with respect to the old technology is directly proportional (Le. 
price series have been outsourced from existing studies such as the price of Microprocessors 
(Tyson (1992) Gruber (1992), Dosi (1984), Stoneman et at. (1992), Stoneman (1976), 
Triplett (1989), Parking and Bade (1988» and the price of Computers used to derive the price 
series of quality adjusted of CNC and NC. 
33 For the logarithmic property the term in brackets (-dqid=n,o) must be always positive and 
this is true for at least quality adjusted prices of the technologies that do normally decline over 
time. 
34 When both dependent and independent variables are in logs then the coefficient of the 
variable is simply the elasticity of substitution, e.g.logS=y.logQ then y =dlogS/dlogQ, where 
the log ratio can be rewritten as dlogS/dlogQ = [d(log S)/dS.dS/dQ. dQ/ d(logQ)] yielding 
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positive unit elasticity of substitution) to the decrease in the price of the old technology 
(dqoJ, while it is inversely proportional (negative unit elasticity of substitution) to a 
decrease in the price of the new technology (dqIlJ. This indicates that while low prices 
(qjJ speeds up intra-finn diffusion, rapidly decreasing prices (dqjJ increase the shadow 
cost of capital and create a sort of expectations about future reduction and this slows 
down the intra-finn diffusion process. Consequently, the expected sign of the 
coefficient of the change in price is positive for the old (11)0) and negative (12<0) for 
the new technolo~5. 
The coefficient of third element on the rhs of (5.41), i.e. 13 measures the (negative) 
impact, corrected for uncertainty, of the relative growth rate of the price of the 
(existing and the advanced) technologies. It also indicates that the relative impact of 
relative prices is proportional to depreciation and devaluation (r +0) ofthe capital stock 
owned by the finn and uncertainty surrounding future profits (l/2 cr2 PI). In absence of 
uncertainty, the marginal impact would be simply equal to the interest rate plus the 
depreciation factor (r +0). 
Unfortunately the impact of uncertainty in 13 cannot be isolated from the other factors, 
i.e. (r +0) and the empirical estimates will provide only an aggregated measure 
accounting for both factors. One way to overcome this problem is to subtract from the 
estimate of 13 the current interest rate for 1993 and to outsource the estimate of the 
dlogS/dlogQ=dS/dQ.Q/S which is by definition of the point elasticity of substitution of S with 
respect to Q. Consequently E=y. 
35 The role of price expectations have been addressed by the theoretical model presented by 
Ireland and Stoneman (1986) and also by the empirical work of Stoneman and Kwon (1994) 
and Karshenas and Stoneman (1993). In the latter paper it is found that price expectations 
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depreciation rate from existing empirical studies. The discount rate could be measured 
by the yield on Treasury Bills expressed as an annual interest rate (i.e. r1993= 0.0495 
source: NSO) while the depreciation factor can be, for example, outsourced from 
Jeorgenson (1963) which assumes that a unit of capital looses about 85% if its real 
value in 18 years (Le. &=0.025)36. This would yield (r+&)=0.075. Whether the 
coefficient 'Y3 is significantly different from this value can be tested empirically. 
Alternatively, given that devaluation and depreciation are constant across firms, the 
size of uncertainty effects can be derived by comparing the size of the price 
coefficient 'Y3 across technologies37. According to equation (5.41) the firm knows 
exactly what prices will be from one year to another (dqj' j= n, 0) and it decides the 
optimal level of adoption according to the observed prices for the current and the past 
period. However, it is more likely that the firm plans each year the optimal investment 
for the following year according to its own expectation rather than the certainty about 
future price movements.38 It might also be possible that the firm holds expectations 
such as (Pt+l-PJ play a major role in technology diffusion, suggesting that myopic type of 
studies such as Hannan and McDowell (1987) where Pt.l=Pt may be seriously misspecified. 
36 This figure is also very similar to the one used by Shapiro (1986) in his empirical study on 
investment output and cost of capital. Specifically he uses an average depreciation rate of 
0.024 a quarter, implicitly modelled in the Bureau of Economic Analysis's net capital stock 
figures when one takes the gross flows from the national income and product account 
(NIPA). 
37 See for further studies on uncertainty and capital investments such as Devereux (1995 and 
1989) on the impact of taxation; Scaramozzino (1997) and the relationship between 
Investments and q models under uncertainty, etc. see also and Carruth et. al (1997) for a 
survey on empirical studies in the area. However, contrary to the intra firm model, these 
studies do restrict the attention to the aggregated investments rather than investments in two 
competing gods. 
38 The firm also ignores that there might be any gap between the decision to invest and the 
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about future change in prices (i.e. decline) and each year the level of investment is 
decided upon the difference between the expected and the observed prices. 
Furthermore, there might exist minimum (maximum) expected price thresholds that 
might speed up (delay) the firm's investment decision, like for example under the 
asymmetric response type of expectations (see section 5.5 for a full discussion about 
price expectations). In summary, there are reasons to believe that the firm plans its 
investment according to its price expectations rather than the price at the time the 
investment is made. 
Expectations are assumed to affect the investment decision via the price of the 
technologies and this hypothesis can be tested empirically via (5.41). 
The information concerning the level of ownership of the advanced technology in the 
CURDS sample is available only for 1993. The resulting cross sectional nature of the 
available data constrains the range of formulation of possible price expectations and 
their impact upon the adoption of the new technology. This lack of time dimension 
can be reasonably overcome simply assuming that each firm owns an expectation 
about what the price will be when planning its investment. Consequently, the firm's 
expectations (dqeijJ of the observed price change (d%J may be under or over estimated 
by a factor (y) so that: 
capital acquisition within the production system of the firm. The time lag being due, for 
example, to the time required to the delivery and installation of the new capital good. 
However, dynamic adjustments in the demand for the new technology are not explicitly 
considered here due to the lack of data upon technology use over time. For this reason the 
study is limited to price expectations (see Section 5.5 for a discussion on this issue). 
190 
This fonnulation assumes that the current level of technology adoption is a function of 
the expected prices (which might also be an optimal threshold price under asymmetric 
response) rather than the observed current price. The discrepancy between the expected 
and the current price being measured by Yj where j=new, old. In the standard 
specification Yj =1 (see equation 5.41) meaning that the expected price equals the 
current price and the finn operates under 'quasP myopia as assumed by the neo-
classical literature. This also indicates that the finn operates under rational 
expectations with perfect infonnation. However, if Yj is significantly different from 1, 
the hypothesis of price expectations cannot be rejected and it can approach 1 from 
above or below (Yj ><1) depending on whether the firm expectations do over-estimate 
or under-estimate the change in prices. The nearer is Yj to 1 the lower is the 
discrepancy between the expected and the current price. 
In summary, allowing both uncertainty and pnce expectations to be explicitly 
modelled within the user cost of capital, the shadow price ratio log(c·nl c·oJ can be 
rewritten as: 
log C*nl -log c* 01 = f( price, expectations, uncertainty) = 
+Y I (EXPECTATION) log (-dPRICEo) -Y2(EXPECTATION) log (-dPRICEn) 
-Y3(UNCERTAINTY. interest rate and depreciation) ( PRICEoIn) 
This specification allows testing the impact upon the use of a new technology of: 
(i) price effect via testing of Y1=1 and Y2=-1 
(ii) price expectations (lYjl >1) as an alternative to the neo-classical specification of 
'quasi myopia'(i) 
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(iii) uncertainty «j2) via the magnitude of "13 ,i.e (r+8) significantly different from 
0.075. 
Previous empirical evidence based on inter firm study (see Hannah and McDowell 
(1984), etc .. ) has found a strong negative relationship between the relative price ofthe 
technology and the adoption probability. The same result was found by Baldwin 
(1998) in relation to technology extent of use. The role of price expectations has been 
explored in Stoneman and Kwon (1994) and Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) and in 
both studies, they have found a significant impact of price expectation upon adoption 
times. The expected sign and the significance of the price effects is in line with these 
findings (even if expectations are tested using a different specification). 
Price expectations upon intra-firm diffusion have never been studied before. Moreover, 
contrary to the several empirical studies, this model provides a solid theoretical 
fra~ework as to why the price effect is important. Its significance will be tested 
empirically. 
5.6.3. Other inter firm effects 
The inter-firm literature would predict that stock, rank , order and epidemic effects 
determine the spread of adoption of a new technology across firms. 
The possibility that intra -firm rank effects might affect the level of technology over 
time has been explored in section 5.6.1. where the productivity ratio (un.!uo) as been 
modelled in terms of firms characteristics and core competencies of the firm. 
The inter-firm literature also assumes that the stock effect provide the rationale as to 
why some firms might delay the first adoption of a new technology over time on the 
basis that incremental profits gained from the adoption of a cost-reducing innovation 
decline with the number of rival firms which are already using it (Reinganum, 
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1981 aIb/c, ). This can be due, for example, to effects of technology adoption on the 
price in the final market (PJ, that lowers the gross benefits from adoption as the 
number of users increases or through effects on prices in factor market ( in this case qjl 
or cjJ, In terms of intra-firm diffusion the stock effect would predict that there exist 
decreasing profits from the further use of a new technology (by the finn and the 
industry) and this might justify why the finn does not immediately replace all its 
capital stock with the new technology. 
In Chapter 4 the possibility of decreasing profit gains from further use of a technology 
have been explored without reaching a conclusive answer. Profits can be bounded or 
unbounded depending on the type of model, the market structure and the specification 
of the demand curve of the final good. The Intra finn equilibrium model presented in 
this chapter, overcomes this problem as it already incorporates both input and output 
prices effects via the Hamiltonian marginal product of capital rule: 
In fact, a reduction in the price of final output, due to increasing adoption, leads to an 
output expansion which in tum increases profits. On this basis the firm might decide to 
further invest in the new technology however, from the first order Hemiltonian 
condition (i.e the constate equation of motion), the marginal benefit associated with 
further adoption of the new technology is equal to: 
where AI se-rd PilI. is the constate variable (see Chapter 5 pp.lIO). 
However, after some manipUlations, one could also rewrite the more familiar 
expression in terms of the corrected user cost of capital 
• C nt= (r + 8 + 112 cr2 PI) q _ dq 
nl nl 
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stating that incremental profits per unit of capital are proportional to the user cost of 
capita139 whose magnitude depends upon the relative changes in prices and the 
volatility of future profitability. 
The impact of the stock effect (i.e. output price reduction) upon intra-firm diffusion 
can be twofold: 1) the impact of the level of industry use ( 'intra-inter firm effect) and 
2) the impact of incremental use by the firm itself (intra firm stock effect). 
The first reflects the impact upon a firm of the industry (rival firms) extent of use of 
the cost reducing technology. The second concerns the impact on firm's profitability 
of increasing use of the technology by the firm itself, given the current level of prices. 
The intra-firm model estimating equation is specified in terms of the proportion of 
stock (K,i(Kut+KaJ) rather than flow (y/KnJ of technology ownership incorporated 
into capital good. 
39 In economic terms the change in the acquisition costs (user cost of capital) is captured via 
the change in the acquisition price (dqnt) whose impact is smoothed by uncertainty about 
future profitability (112 cr2 PI)' Low uncertainty reduces the rental cost of capital and fastens 
the diffusion process. The same happens in presence of a price decrease (dqit). Uncertainty 
affects the expected profit of adoption via the parameters (tiJ,a2 ) in 
PI=1I2 -UJ/cr2 +...J [UJ /cr2 - 112]2 + 2 (p+3)/a2, where tiJ and cr2 are the drift (i.e. growth rate) 
and the volatility of the value of the investments i.e. d1tt = tiJ 1tt dt +cr 1tt dz. One might be 
tempted to use tiJ as an indicator of the performance of the investment in the new technology. 
However, seen in section 5.4.1, there are several other elements of uncertainty that might 
affect the investment decision that are not necessarily technology specific. They can be 
related to uncertainty about future demand or input (or competitive output) prices, interest 
rate, performance of the new technology, etc. For this reason UJ cannot be simply used as a 
measure of stock effects due to further extent of use of the new technology. 
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Being built around the intra-finn stock effects, it also implicitly accounts for the 
impact of a price change upon the profitability of further adoption. As a result its 
specification will be independent of market concentration. 
The inter finn order/stock effects can alternatively be captured by the proportion of 
industry output produced on the new technology over the total industry output 
produced by rival finns (Iusers/Jdiff). To take into account that finns belonging to 
different industrial sectors might face different profitability of adoption one could also 
hypothesize the above variable has also been split by multiplicative dummies into 
within industry stock differences (shd d=1,2, ... 15). 
These variables are allowed to enter the model as a pure empirical exercise. However, 
if the predictions of the intra firm equilibrium model are correct, their coefficients 
should be insignificant. 
The Order effects traditionally present in the inter firm literature assume that the return 
to a firm from adopting a new technology increase the higher is the firm position in the 
order of adoption due to pre-emption or first acquisition of prime geographic sites, or 
limited pools of skilled labour (Funderberg and Tirole, 1985: Ireland and Stoneman, 
1985: etc.). On this reasoning, order effects would suggest that for a finn would also 
be optimal to immediately replace all its existing capital stock at time of first adoption, 
i.e. profits are unbounded. As seen in Chapter 2, only few adopters do immediately 
adopt all the technology. 
At the intra firm diffusion level, the extent of adoption (and the benefits from further 
use) is spread over time and is not limited to the first mover advantages considerations. 
For this reason, they are not specified in the tested model. 
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The inter firm epidemic effects are related to learning as a process of self-propagation 
of information about a new technology that grows with the spread of the technology 
(Karshenas-Stoneman, 1993). In fact information based models often assume that it is 
mainly the spread of information about the new technology that drives the diffusion 
process. Contrary to stock and order effects the higher the number of users the greater 
is the chance for a firm to first adopt a new technology40. An alternative approach has 
been proposed by Stoneman (1981) which assumes that the firm learns about the 
technology in a Bayesian manner from its past experience of adoption. Even though it 
is difficult to explicitly model this approach proves that the role of information should 
have some importance upon the decision to use a new technology. 
The intra firm model presented in this chapter predicts that neither the epidemic nor 
the Stoneman types of model determine the adoption of a new technology. It is rather 
the way in which the firm processes the information available on the market what 
determines the adoption of a new technology. This is reflected by the production 
system characteristics and the choice of the production means (L, Kn, Ka) used for 
producing the current output. Firm specific learning capability, such as increasing 
skills, know how in handling the innovation and general capability to process 
information are already implicitly included in the model via ao/ant 
However, information and learning effects, of the Mansfield and the Stoneman type, 
have played such a major role in the existing literature that they cannot be ignored. 
For this reason they are included into the model and their significance has been tested 
empirically. 
40 There are several examples of empirical applications of learning effect in the inter-firm 
literature where the firm acquires information about the existence of a technology by contact 
with earlier adopters (Colombo and Mosconi, 1995, Stoneman and Kwon, 1993, etc.). 
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The variables specified are: 
1) endogenous learning from the finn past experience - the Stoneman (1981) type of 
model- proxied by the number of years since first adoption of the first unit of the new 
teChnOIOgy((y-j where j= NC, eNC, CoT); 
2) Infonnation spreading within the industry, related to the knowledge about the true 
perfonnance of the new technology based upon the experience of other finns 
(epidemic model) proxied by the cumulative number of users at the time the decision 
to increase one of the technology is mad;fusERS). 
The inter finn literature would predict that these have a positive sign. However, if the 
predictions of the intra-finn model are correct, they should show an insignificant 
coefficient. 
A word of caution should be stated on these last two variables. They might also pick 
up other indirect effects like: a) positive spillovers from the increasing supply of 
technical services to the innovation, e.g. an increasing number of technician; b) 
acquisition of transferable human capital, via the employment of individuals that have 
received their training somewhere else or c) epidemic effects. 
For this reason their presence in the model may be doubtful but it will be left to the 
empirics to detennine their significance. 
5.6.4. The final model specification 
The equilibrium intra finn model of technology replacement derived in section 5.2. 
indicates that for a finn i the proportion of total capital stock of the firm incorporating 
the new technology (Kj<Kt, +~» is a function of both technological «1n;(1o) and 
economic factors (c'" nt; c ... oJ and this is true from the moment immediately after first 
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adoption, i.e. when the finn uses at least one unit of each technology, until the 
diffusion is almost completed for the finn: 
~ e]O-lOO%[ V j=n,o (5.35) 
where an and ao are the productivity parameters (Le. Yt=At Kotllo ~tan Lh and c' ot and 
c'ot are the shadow prices or the user cost of capital corrected for uncertainty. 
Expression (5.35) is inherently non linear and, as such, it is difficult to handle 
econometrically. However, it has been shown in the previous section that applying a 
logarithmic transfonnation and expressing ~ in tenns of percentages so that kot+ 
kot= 1 00%, the reduced fonn estimating equation can be expressed in terms of the 
optimal accumulation path of the new over the existing technologies, leading to the 
linearised version of(5.35): 
(5.38) 
The advantage of this specification is that the model can now be easily estimated by 
OLS. The detenninants of adoption g!! and a!! are finn specific. They are a function of 
the firm core competencies or rank effects proxied by the finn characteristics such as 
liquidity, size, R&D, production system characteristics, etc. On the contrary, c* ot and 
---
c* !!!.. do not change across finns but do change over time. They are the user cost of 
capital of each technology corrected for uncertainty, i.e. c'jt={(r+o+1I2cr2~1)qjt -dqjt} 
j= new,old , and are a measure of intra firm price effects. 
The above model can be further extended as to explicitly measure the impact of 
uncertainty and expectations. After simple manipulation and applying a 
parameterisation, (5.35) can be rewritten as (5.39): 
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(5.39) 
This is the final estimating equation indicating that the optimal proportion of new 
technology is a function of: a) technological performance of the two technologies, i.e. 
0../0.0 (rank effect -leI); b) price changes i.e. d%, and dqj,' and relative growth rate in the 
level of prices of the set of technologies, i.e. [(qn/(-dqnJ-qo/(-dqoJl (price effect-y); 
The model as in (5.39) assumes that the parameter K I , Yo and Y2 equal 1 (in absolute 
value), while Y3 equals the sum of the interest rate ( r), depreciation factor (8) minus 
uncertainty via the volatility of profitability (cr2, PI) about future profit growth. In 
(5.39) the uncertainty effect is measured by the size of Y3, once (r+8)=O.075 is 
subtracted or alternatively it can be derived by comparison of its estimate across 
technologies. 
The presence of price expectations can be tested via the hypothesis of YI .Y2 being 
equal to (+/-) unity. If this hypothesis is accepted, it provides evidence that the firm 
operates under rational expectations with perfect information about future price 
changes. On the contrary, if this hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypotheses 
that the firm decides the optimal level of ownership according to price expectations 
must be accepted. 
The traditional learning effects (epidemic effects- l;), widely present in the existing 
literature do not enter (5.41). However, given the importance they have been given in 
the literature they cannot be ignored and are allowed to enter the estimating equation in 
a multiplicative way. The prediction being that they do not play any relevant role in 
the spread of adoption, consequently their coefficient should not be significant. 
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The intra finn model is built around profitability considerations and, even if the sign 
remain undetennined, it already incorporates the intra finn and intra industry stock 
effect. However, similarly to the epidemic effects, the 'inter finn stock effects' (~) are 
allowed to enter the model multplicatively. According to the· inter finn literature, 
contrary to the epidemic effects, they should exert a negative impact upon inter-finn 
diffusion. Their inclusion into the model can be considered only as a further 
crosscheck, even if they should not have a significant impact upon adoption. 
Furthennore, inter finn stock effects are traditionally proxied by the within industry 
share of adopters or alternatively by the within industrial sector share of adopters. 
This measure has been severely criticised for its lack of representativeness (see 
Chapter 2). Consequently, the proportion of total output produced on the new 
technology is used instead. 
Replacing the rank (K) effects in log (at! an) and the price and intra finn stock effects 
(y), in log (c*nt )-log (c*ot) and further allowing for epidemic (~) and inter-finn 
effects (~), equation (17) can be rewritten as: 
10g[1s/(lOO-knJ]= f(Rankj"Pricet, Uncertaintyt, Intra-stoc~, Epidemict, Inter stockJ 
= K log(~)+ 
+YI{EXPECTATION) log (-dPRICEo) 
-Y2(EXPECTATION) log (-dPRICEn) 
-Y3(UNCERTAlNTY) log( PRICE oIn) 
+ S 10g(EPIDEMIC) 
- ~ 10g(INTER-STOCKJ 
+Et (5.42) 
where: IKI=I, Iyjl =1 Y3 < 0, s =0 and ~=O(?). 
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The intra-firm model (5.39) would predict that rank effects are significant and their 
coefficient equal to 1 (11(1=1). The price effect, in absence of expectations, should be 
significant and equal, in absolute value, to 1 (y.=1 Y2= -1) Expectations, if present, 
should affect the estimates of YII2, in which case will show a value different from 1 
(positive or negative according to the under or overestimate of the observed price 
change). 
Uncertainty is expected to influence the size ofY3, once (r+8)=O.075 is subtracted. 
The sign of Y3 is negative and its size undetermined depending upon the significance 
of uncertainty. Epidemic and inter stock effects should have opposite (t;>O and S<O) 
but insignificant signs. 
The intra firm model in equation 5.39 will be tested over a sample of 434 
establishments in the UK Engineering and metalworking sector (CURDS data set) for 
the following technologies: 1) Computerised Numerically Controlled machine tools; 2) 
Numerically Controlled machine tools; 3) Microprocessors in Processes. 
The list of the variables used in the model specification has been discussed in the 
previous sections and is summarised in Table 5.2. 
The details of the estimating procedure are presented in the following chapter. 
5.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented an equilibrium inter firm model based on the neo-classical 
theory of investment. It aims at explaining the optimal replacement of an old with a 
new technology by a firm over time. On the basis that the advantages of adoption of a 
new technology can be determined by its profitability (i.e. stock effect), it suggests 
that the spread of new technology is mostly driven by changes in costs and 
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Table 5.2. The determinants of intra-firm technology diffusion: variable 
definitions and expected sign 
Dependent Variable 
KnKo • (Kn/(I-Kn» 
DTOT, 
DKn 
QNQTOT 
Employment 
Et 
Ez 
~ 
Age 
Export 
Ex20, 
R&D 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
RDE, • 
R&D, • 
Turnover 
turnoverNy, • 
RT, • 
Liquidity 
PT, • 
PI... • 
PRICE Effect 
Price differential of Ko : Po(t+ I )-Po(t) 
Real Index of quality adjusted Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
Price differential of Kn: Pn(t+I)-Pn(t) where Kn=new technology (CNC. NC. MICRO) 
Real Quality Adjusted Produced Price Index of Kn 
Relative price change (Pn/( -dPn) - Po/( -dPo» 
RANK Effect 
Nnumber of employees t= 1993. 1986. 1981. 1975. 1970 
Nnumber of employees z "small. medium. large 
Years from start-up (l993-sturtup year) 
Dummy -Exports in 1993 (>20%=yes; O=otherwise) 
In House R&D employeesITotal employees in 1991; 1986; 1991 
In House R&D dummy (yes=l. no=O) in 1991; 1986;1991 
N years Average Real Turnover in 1990/91; 1986/86; 1980/81 (deflated by RPI) 
Real turnover in 1990/91; 1986/86; 1980/81 (deflated by RPI) 
Current ProfitslTurnover in 1993; 1986; 1981 
Dummy - Profits or loss in 19911198611981 (1= Profits; 0,. Loss) 
Production System Characteristics 
PSI, • Dummy - Firm Prod. System (Yes=l; 0= otherwise) 
• l=engineering to order; Make to order. Make to stock. Job shop. Mixed 
BATCH • Average batch size 
Ownership 
GROUPt 
Industrial Sector 
Di, 
• Dummy (I .. Group establishment; 0 - Independent) 1'"1993. 1986. 1981 
• Dummy-Industry the firm belongs to (I-sector code. i.e. 1.2 ... 15» 
Complementary and/or substitute technologies 
DJ, • Dummy - adoption of J (I=Yes; 0= No) of J=Cot; Micro; Robot; CAD. CNC. NC. etc 
Managerial Innovation 
DJM • Dummy (I=Yes; 0= No). - adoption of JM • JM=CAPM. JIT.TQM;BSISO-IS0900 
EPIDEMIC and other INTER-FIRM STOCK EFFECTS 
YSTUR • Years from startup to fisrt adoption 
Expected SIgn 
+ 
+1-
+/-
+/-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+1-
Tech specific 
+1-
+/-
Tech specifi 
Tech specifi 
TJ 
Jy 
IFout93 
JDIFF 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Years from firm first adoption up to 1993 ('93-I"adopt). J - new technology + 
Years from first appearance of the technology to first adoption by the firm (I"adop -1970). J .. new technology + 
Average within industry Firms output produced on the new technology in 93 (INTRA-IND. average firm level of us ) 
Average industry output produced on the new technology in 93 (INTRA INDUSTRY average total level of use) 
lusers93 • Within industry share of adopters in 1993 + 
sh)"· • Within Industry I (1=1.2 .... 15) share of adopters at time of the firm first adoption. i.e. lusers93*DI +1 
luserst • Within industry share ofadopters at time of firm first adoption (to) + 
Ish·· • Within Industry I (1=1.2 .... 15) share of adopters at time of the firm first adoption. i.e. luserst*DJ + 
NOTE: * Variables are NOT log transformed; ** Wlthm Industry related variables (I.e. where 1 ..... 15 variables are 
specified) are in some cases aggregated in sub groups (i.e. Sh678=Sh6+sh7+sh8 or shgroup. etc). The details and the tests 
of parameters homogeneity and validity of the restrictions are detailed in the discussion of the specific models. 
technological perfonnance (see section 5.1 and 5.2). This is equivalent to saying that 
the internal rate of return depends upon the direct benefits of a new technology, i.e. 
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time saving, costs reduction, etc., as well as its compatibility with existing equipment. 
The higher the performance characteristics of the advanced technology andthe greater 
the reduction in its shadow cost, the faster the replacement process of the old with the 
new technology will be. Moreover, whatever definition of intra firm diffusion is used 
(i.e. optimal capital output ratio or proportion of output produced on the new 
techndlogy) the optimal level of adoption is the same for both monopolistic and 
competitive cases (section 5.3) and the optimal combination of capital inputs, in 
absence of output expansion, is independent of the two types of markets the firm may 
face. This model has also been extended to incorporate the impact of uncertainty 
about future profitability (section 5.4) and the role of expectations (section 5.5) 
among the factors that might delay the decision to further invest in a new technology. 
Both uncertainty and price expectation, if present, could significantly affect the speed 
of intra firm diffusion reducing the positive impact of the reduction in prices of a new 
technology. The model specification indicates that the implementation of the new 
technology is lead by physical benefits (via the finn specificity- 0./0.0) and economic 
costs (acquisition costs under uncertainty and rational expectations- c* oIc* oJ. The 
first detennines the heterogeneous level of use across finns (rank effect), the second 
detennines the within finn extent of further use of the new technology over time 
(price effect). This chapter has also discussed how the above space and time 
dimension have been combined into the final model specification using the 
infonnation in the CURDS data set. Further comments upon the possible existence of 
other effects already tested in the inter finn literature (stock, rank, order and epidemic 
effects) has lead to the estimating equation of the intra finn model (presented in 
section 5.6.). The next chapter presents a discussion of the empirical testing 
(econometrics) of the model. 
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Chapter 6. 
SAMPLE SELECTION PROBLEMS IN TilE TESTING OF TilE 
INTRA-FIRM MODEL 
6.1 Introduction 
The equilibrium intra finn model of technology replacement indicates that the firm's 
current level of ownership of capital stock incorporating the new technology CKn) is a 
function of both technological (an;ao) and economic factors (c* nt; c· oJ: 
(5.35) 
The lhs of (5.35) is the proportion of capital stock incorporating the new technology 
(~I) while on the rhs an and a o are the productivity parameters (i.e. Yt=At Kotao K"tan 
• 
Lt~) and c·nt and c·ot are the shadow prices of the user cost of capital corrected for 
uncertainty, so that: 
where qjt and dqjt (j= new, old) are the levels and the relative changes in the prices 
of the two sets of technologies, (r+8) are the interest rate and a depreciation factor, 
and 1I2O'2p 1 is a factor reflecting the uncertainty about future profits, measured via 
the volatility of profitability (0'2), and the larger root of the Bellman quadratic 
Moreover, (5.35) is assumed to hold for the whole diffusion period, from the point 
immediately after first adoption i.e. when the firm uses at least one unit of each 
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technology, until the firm has almost replaced all its capital stock with the new 
technology. 
The final estimating equation of the intra firm technology replacement (TR) model 
was derived in Chapter 5, yielding: 
10g[k,i(l00- k"J] = 1(1 log(a/ao) + Yl log (-dqoJ-Y210g (-dqn' )-Y3 (qn,/dqn'- qo,/dqoJ 
(5.39) 
where k" is the percentage of capital stock incorporating the advanced (new) 
technology; ~ or equivalently (100-k,,), is the percentage of capital stock 
incorporating the existing (old) technology; an and a o reflect the core competencies of 
the firm i.e. a rank effect -1( ; c* n,/c* at are the price effect-y, incorporating uncertainty 
about future profitability of the investments (via the significance and the size of the 
parameter Y3) and rational expectations (via the assumption that Yl=land Y2=-I)I. 
One of the problems arising from this specification, is that (5.39), similarly to (5.35), 
is defined only for those firms that have started the process of technology transfer 
currently owning at least 1 % of k" , with the exclusion of those firms that are 
saturated with the new technology, i.e. owning 1 00% of k". This condition imposes 
some constraints on the estimating procedure as the decision to use a new technology 
is conditional to the irreversible choice of having adopted it in the past and not using 
it at 'extreme' levels (0 and 100%). 
The CURDS sample, for each of the four technologies, provides the firm's date of 
first adoption (tij), the proportion of capital stock of the firm incorporating the 
1 See Chapter 5 for more details about the derivation of the estimating equation and the 
assumption of the model. 
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advanced· technology in 1993 (~it=Kn.i.199/(Koi.1993+Kni.1993)) and whether the 
advanced technology is compatible with the production system of the firm. This 
allows one to classify the sample of firms into three different categories: 
1) Non adopters:the firms that may but have not yet adopted the new technology; 
2) Adopters: the firms that by 1993 have adopted at least one unit of the new 
technology; 
3) Non eligible: the firms for which the technology is not suitable to their production 
system. 
In this study, the non-eligible firms are excluded for obvious reasons. The remaining 
two categories define the status of the firm and the decision taken at some point in 
time (before or by 1993) to adopt or not to adopt the technology. As being an adopter 
does not necessarily mean to be a current user in 1993, one can further classify the 
firms in that category according to their level of use of the advanced technology (see 
figure 6.1). In particular one can distinguish between: 
1) Non users that despite having in the past adopted the new technology, in 1993 are 
no longer using it ( ~. 1993 =0)2; 
2) Current users that in 1993 are using at least one unit of both new and existing 
technology, (O<~. 1993 <100% and 0<~.1993 <100%), and are still undertaking the 
process of technology replacement; 
3) Total users that have replaced all the existing capital stock with the new technology 
(~=100%), reaching the maximum point of technology transfer. 
2 This might be due to a temporarily suspension or the dismissal of the use of the new 
technology ,i.e. post diffusion stage of technology transfer, without non necessarily having 
reached 100% of technology replacement 
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Figure 6.1 Mapping the decision path of the firm and the final status in 1993. 
Non User 
IKn=o") 
Adoptcr 
Current User 
(o<Kn<l ~O'') 
Firm 
Total User 
(Kn=l ~O,,) 
Non Adoptcr 
The theoretical intra-firm model (5.35) defines the determinants of technology 
substitution from a point immediately after first adoption, that is when the firm has 
already changed its production process and uses at least one unit of both old and new 
technology. This assumption does not hold at the saturation (~=100%), pre (~=O-) 
and post diffusion period (~=O+) or whenever the firm owns only one of the two 
technologies. Consequently the testing of the model must be restricted to the sample 
of current users (owning at least one unit of one of the two technologies) currently 
undertaking the process of technology transfer.3 However, to use only the sub-sample 
of current users can cause two types of errors. Firstly, one would ignore the firm's 
choice whether to become or not to become an adopter (see first level in figure 1). 
This possibility not being observable after 1993 leads to a truncated probability 
distribution of adoption (and use). This type of error will obviously be reflected in the 
3 In mathematical terms this means that the production possibilities of the firm must lye in the 
iperplan defined by a three factors production function, i.e. Y=f(L; Kn; Ko). The model does 
not hold at the pre i.e. Y=f(L; Ko) and post diffusion i.e. Y=f(L; Kn) period when the 
production possibility set is defined by a two factor production function 
Further to this assumptions there is also a mathematical constraint arising from the log 
linearisation of the original model (5.35) where the LHS variable is specified as: log(Kn/Ko), 
or equivalently in terms of proportions as log(kn/(ko). As a result the Non adopters 
(kn,1993= 0-), Non-users (kn,1993= 0*), and Total users (kn,1993= 100%) must necessarily 
be excluded form the testing of the model (5.39). 
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final model of ownership of the technology. Secondly, among the sample of adopters 
one would have to ignore those finns that are currently using the 'extreme levels' of 
technology (see second level in figure 2). Their exclusion from the testing of the 
model would cause both right (~ =100% use) and left (~ =0% use) censoring of the 
sub-sample of adopters/users. 
The potential misspecification error resulting from ignoring the conditional 
probability to use a technology (conditional on being an adopter and a current user) 
can cause systematic heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the final intra-firm model. 
The parameter estimates and the marginal impact of the detenninants of adoption 
would be biased toward the specific sub-sample (Le. truncated and censored) and 
might over or under estimate the overall impact upon the whole sample of firms. 
This type of sample selection bias is particularly dangerous if one wishes to control 
for some of the variables and their marginal effect upon the whole industry. 
Only once these problems are dealt with can one proceed with the testing of the 
decision model on how much to use the new technology and the detenninants of 
technology transfer. The following sections present a series of methodological 
approaches used to overcome these types of conceptual and empirical problems. 
Section 6.2 presents the two stage sample selection approach used to overcome the 
sample selection bias arising when looking at the adopters up to 1993 (truncation). It 
also discusses the problems caused by the exclusion of the extreme users from the 
subsample of adopters (censoring) and introduces the multinomial probability model. 
Section 6.3. derives an ad hoc specification of the selection criterion equation, 
proposing a time versus a space specification of the detenninants to be an adopter in 
or by 1993. 
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A final section concludes the chapter summarising the derivation of the final 
estimating equation of intra-finn technology replacement corrected for both 
truncation and censoring of the sample. 
6.2 Regression models with sample selection: the self-selectivity two stage 
approach. 
This section deals with the sample selection bias that might arise in modelling the 
determinants of technology substitution in (5.39) using only the sub-sample of current 
users. In fact, the level of use of the advanced technology is conditional on the firm's 
choice to have become an adopter in or by 1993 (truncation) and on the decision to 
currently use the new technology with the exclusion of the pre and post diffusion 
stages (censoring) . 
. . 
The most straightforward way to eliminate this type of potential error is to use a two 
stage procedure. In the first stage the firm' decision to be an adopter is modelled and 
its variability summarised in a new variable. This variable is then modelled within the 
decision on how much to use the new technology, correcting the technology 
replacement specification for the sample selection of adopters. 
The correction for censoring can occur at different steps of the selection process. 
It can be introduced either in the Sample Selection stage (6.1) or in the final 
Technology Replacement equation (6.2). The details of the final model specification 
corrected for both truncation and censoring are given in the following sections. 
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6.2.1. Sample selection and the binary selection model 
From (5.39), rewriting the log of the ratio of the new (kn) over the existing technology 
(100-kn) as the proportion of new technology j owned by the firm i (vi), the theoretical 
intra firm model can be rewritten as: 
Yj e]O-l[ 
(Technology replacement equation) 
The TR equation predicts that yj=log(kj(100-~» with kj e]O-lOO%[ is a function of 
technological and economic factors (Xi) and a residual Ei with variance 0"6' It also 
predicts that this is true from when the firm adopts the first unit of advanced 
technology up to when it is almost saturated with it and eventually owns only one unit 
of the old technology, i.e. from the point immediately after first adoption until the 
diffusion is (almost) completed for that firm. Moreover, Xi is the set of regressors 
accounting for rank, order, stock and epidemic effects. 
One of the problem with the OLS estimation of this equation is that E(Ej I Xi)= J..le but 
~E*O due to the selection of the sample of adopters from the total sample of firms. In 
fact, the level of use of a new technology is a consequence of the decision to belong to 
the group of current adopters but it is not observable for those firms that decide in the 
future to first adopt and use the technology. The lack of observations about future 
behaviour leads to a truncated probability distribution and a biased sample selection of 
the group of adopters. One way to solve this problem is to correct E( Ej) by using the 
conditional probability to become an adopter by 1993 and then to proceed with the 
OLS estimation (Maddala, 1994)., 
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By specifying the choice to adopt a new technology as a function of a set of 
independent variables, one can define the equation that detennines the sample 
selection as4 : 
and 
. (selection criterion equation) 
Zj=1 if finn i has adopted technology j by 1993 
Zj=O if finn i has not adopted technology j by 1993 
(6.1) 
where z*j is a binary variable ,Wj is the vector of the detenninants of first adoption and 
uj is a nonnally distributed residual correlated by an amount p to the residual of the 
Technology Replacement equation such that: 
E( E; Ix ;, W ;)=0, 
The link between the residuals of both selection criterion and the technology 
replacement equation is provided by Olsen (1980a) who suggests assuming that the 
conditional expectation of E;, given U;, is linear. so that 
and 
This allows one to derive the corrected expected current level of use of the new 
technology conditional on the decision to adopt or to have adopted the technology by 
1993. 
4 In this section, for clarity of presentation, the subscript j is omitted from the specification of 
the variables 
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Given that the current use (Yij) is observed only when the firm has decided to become 
an adopter (zij>O), then the corrected expression for the reduced sample becomes: 
= E[yjl \jI'Wj>Uj] = WXj + E[E/Uj>- \jI'wd 
= (3'Xj + (3).. Alsj) 
where (3).. =p au. Sj is the normal score of Yj (y -N(\jI'w;a2) evaluated at zero, i.e. Sj=-
Wj \jI/au• and Aj is the truncated mean E(Yiluj< \jI'wi). The latter is usually called the 
Inverse Mill's Ratio -IMR- (see Greene 1993 and Maddala 1994 for more details). 
More in general, the first part on the RHS, i.e. xi(3, accounts for the determinants of 
technology replacement, while the second, i.e. (3).. Ai(si), accounts for the sample 
selection of users among the total population of firms. Furthermore, just assuming 
that f.lu=O and that 0'1;=1, and that the conditional expectation OfEi given Ui is linear, the 
. original TR equation corrected for the sample selection bias (6.1) can be rewritten as: 
(6.2) 
(6.2) indicates that the level of use of a new technology (Yi) conditional on the choice 
of becoming an adopter (zt> 0) is determined by the level of exogenous factors (Wi) , 
via a parameter p, and by the level of sample selection (Ai) via the parameter (3)... 
The statistical distribution o(the Sample Selection Equation 
This far no assumption has been made with respect to ui, except that its mean is zero 
and its variance equals unity. The assumption about its distribution is a crucial one as 
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it determines the specification of the sample selection equation and allows one to 
estimate the correction factor A. in the second step of the model. 
From an economic point of view the empirical evidence based upon the inter -firm 
diffusion literature suggests that over time the cumulative number of adopters, i.e. the 
probability to be an adopter, follows a sigmoid path, such as a logistic or a Gompertz 
density function, rather than a Normal distribution (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
However, the model in (6.2) is a snapshot of the firm behaviour at one specific point in 
time, i.e. 1993, and not over time. Consequently, the traditional theory on time 
dependent patterns of technology adoption is of little use. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the sample, it is quite reasonable to assume that the 
probability distribution across a heterogeneous sample of firms at a specific point in 
time is symmetric and bell shaped, such as the Normal or the Logistic probability 
distribution. The Logistic curve is very similar to the Normal except that its tails are 
much thicker. 
In statistical terms, assummg that t1j is Normally distributed then it is quite 
straightforward to prove that A.i in equation (6.3.) equals the ratio of the density and the 
distribution function evaluated at '¥'w/cru : 
This is the exactly the result one would get if the sample selection equation were 
modelled by a Probit model. However, the assumption that ui is normal is a strong one 
because, as Goldberg (1980) has proved, to assume Normal selection-bias adjustment 
can be quite sensitive to departures from Normality. 
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Lee (1982b, 1983) has presented an alternative to the Probit method. He suggests that 
whatever the distribution of11j and Ej , it is possible to apply a general transformation to 
Normality such that: 
Ej·=J1 (E j)= <I>0I[F(E j)] 
11j*=J1 (uj)= <I>0I[G(U j)] 
where Ej* and uj* are the new standard normal random variable NCO,I) after the 
transformation of the distribution function of the original 'uj ' (G(uJ) and £ i (F(E j». 
For the rest the procedure is the same as for the Probit model in the two-stage 
estimation except that now \jIW is substituted by J1(\jI'w j), so that: 
U j <\jI'Wj 
and 
Thus, conditional on Zj =1, the final estimating equation corrected for selectivity bias 
and with distribution of11j equal to F(uj ) is: 
where Aj = ~l [(\jI'W J]IF(\jI j'w) and sij = F(\jI' W j). This means that if one believes that 
U follows a Logistic curve then the Logit model is the best specification of the 
selection criterion equation with the corresponding correction factor being A Lj (s\): 
SLj = ~ol [Plogjt] = ~ol [eO"'W / (1+ eo"')] 
ALj = ~{SLJI<I>{SLJ 
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Whatever the probability distribution, the parameters of the sample selection model 
could be estimated by ML. However, this can be quite cumbersome and the 
alternative Heckman's two step estimation method (Heckman 1979) is used instead. 
The former is efficient whereas the latter is consistent and based on the method of 
momentsS (see also Greene 1995 'Limdep7- User Manual'). In summary the 
Heckman's procedure (Heckman 1979) used in this study consists of: 
i. Use the selection equation to estimate \If i and for each observation calculate the 
corresponding Iv i • 
ii. Linearly regress Y i on Wi and Iv i to estimate ~ and ~A. =pa 
iii. Adjust the standard errors and the estimate of a2e , which are inconsistent. 
This procedure allows one to correct the coefficient estimates of the final Technology 
Replacement model for the sample selection bias arising when selecting the sample of 
adopters from the total popUlation of eligible firms in the sample (i.e. truncation). 
However, this approach takes into account only the first step of the sample selection 
problems. The theoretical model is also defined only for those adopters which are 
currently using the technology. This means that one has to estimate the probability to 
observe an adopter who is also a current user (with the exclusion of non users and 
total users). 
The following section details how the left and right censoring of the subsample of 
current users can be modelled within the conditional probability of having adopted the 
technology, leading to the corrected technology replacement equation. 
5 More details about this approach can be found in Maddala (1994), Heckman (1979), Greene 
(1981), etc. 
215 
6.2.2. Censoring and the multinomial selection rule. 
The results of the previous section suggest that the model of technology replacement 
should be specified via a two step procedure. The first step defines the probability for 
a firm i to become an adopter in or by 1993 (Selection Criterion equation): 
Z*j= \jI'Wj+ Uj U j - Normal/Logistic (6.1.) 
Zi=1 if Adopter inlby 1993 
Zj=O if Non-Adopter in 1993 
The second step defines the Technology Replacement (TR) equation corrected for the 
selection of the sub-sample of adopters, assuming a Logit (L) or a Probit (P) 
specification: 
(6.2) 
For both theoretical and mathematical reasons, the Technology Replacement equation 
is defined only for those firms that are currently using both technologies. 
Consequently, those firms that are no longer using the new technology (y=0 ->ku=O) 
and those who own all the technology (y=1 ->ku=100%) must be excluded from the 
second step of the two stage sample selection procedure. 
This is equivalent to first partitioning the sample of eligible firms in two categories, 
adopters and non adopters (6.1), and then, among the adopters, select the sub-group 
of users that are currently using both old and new technology (6.2) as seen in Figure 
6.1. However, the elimination from the second step of the analysis of the extreme 
values of 0 and 100% use of a technology can cause left and right censoring that can 
seriously invalidate the coefficient estimates. 
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This section presents three alternative routes that could be followed in order to 
overcome this type of problems, namely: visual inspection, Tobit model and 
multinomial selection rule. 
Visual Inspection 
A measure of the magnitude of the error committed by ignoring the censoring in the 
second step of the analysis can be preliminarily investigated by visual inspection, that 
is by comparing the estimates with and without the inclusion of the censored firms 
also from the first step of the analysis (Le. from the Sample Selection equation). 
This type of rudimentary test can give us an idea of the size of the misspecification and 
the different parameter estimates but does not provide corrected coefficients. 
Tobit Model 
A less arbitrary approach would be to use in the second step equation (6.2) the Tobit 
model (see Tobin, 1958 and also, Amemiya, 1984 and 1994) rather than the standard 
regression model, as it would account for the left and right censoring. In order to do 
so the left hand side of the original intra firm model (In[ kul (100-ku») must be 
specified differently, as the current variable is observable over a range of negative and 
positive values whose censoring points are not estimable: 
Yi= In(O) = -oc 
Yi= In( oc)= +oc 
if 
if 
ku=O; 
ku=lOO% 
The specification suitable to the censoring requirements of non negative observations 
Ln(LHS»O would imply rewriting the TR equation, corrected for sample selection 
(6.2) as: 
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In(kJ = ~K In(1 OO-~) +~X + ~A A. + Vi 
In(~) = 0 
ifO<~<1 
otherwise 
The above equation would satisfy the Tobit model except for the simultaneity 
problems arising from the existing proportion of old capital stock (1n(100-~» in the 
RRS of the equation. As this amount is complementary to ~ it would not satisfy the 
exogeneity requirement of independent variables. 
To overcome this problem would require an instrumental variable approach. This can 
be done by simply introducing the lagged value of In(100-~). Unfortunately, this 
possibility is ruled out by the lack of data on ~ before 1993. 
For these reasons the Tobit model approach has been abandoned. 
Multinomial probability model 
Another approach that provides the parameter estimates corrected for the censoring 
problem is the multinomial probability model. 
Instead of dealing with the censoring of the sub-sample of adopters in the second step 
of the estimating procedure (Technology Replacement equation) it assumed that the 
firm faces a mUltiple choice in the first step of the model (Selection Criterion 
equation) and chooses where it wants to position itself. As suggested by the 
equilibrium approach, the extreme cases are just one of the possible mutually 
exclusive choices the firm can make (see Figure 6.2.). The probability to be a current 
user is then straightforward and can be used to correct the TR equation for sample 
selection. 
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Figure 6.2 The Multinomial selection rule 
Nnn Arlnll1'r.r 
[Kn=O-%] 
Firm 
(IIrrr.:nt lJ!lr.:r Tn1ftl lJ!lr.:r 
IU<K.n<l Ulll(il IKn=l UU~I 
Classifying the finns in tenns of their possible choices is equivalent to partition the 
original sample into 4 different categories: 
Choice Status 
0 non adopter if kn=O· 
1 current user if 0<1<" <100% 
2 total user if 1<" =100% 
3 no longer if k =O+ 
According to this classification, both non adopters and no longer users use 0% of the 
new technology. However, the corresponding probability to adopt the technology for 
the first time or the chance to end its use are quite different. In one case, one might 
deal with an innovative finn while in the second with a finn averse to changes. For this 
reason, they have been classified into two different categories. 
The multinomial model has been chosen as an alternative to the ordered choice model 
as the disequilibrium model would suggest. The ordered choice model would 
implicitly assume that a finn moves from lower to higher levels of adoption up to 
saturation (i.e. sequentially from 1 to 4). On the contrary, the Multinomial Selection 
rule is path free and the finn can decide, under both technological and financial 
constraints, what is the best in the short and medium run. This is in line with the 
equilibrium model that allows the adoption path to be discontinuous and non-strictly 
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(or weakly) monotonous. One adopter can just temporarily suspend the adoption or 
dismiss the use of the technology due to current market conditions and the current 
economic and financial status of the firm. Under the hypothesis of irreversible 
investment, the firm can stop the replacement process and scrap the advanced 
technology by obsolescence before reaching 100% of adoption. 
Using the multinomial specification the left and right censoring of the sample, which 
occurred in the second step of the estimation (TR equation), is now transferred to the 
first step of the model (SC equation) where it is explicitly modelled by the 
positioning of the firm among a set of possible choices. In this way, both 0% and 
100% of use of the technology become simply part of the decision as to whether to use 
the technology. 
The Selection Criterion equation is here modelled by the multinomial Logit I Probit 
model giving the conditional probability for a firm to belong to one of the mutually 
exclusive status. In the second step, the resulting Inverse Mills Ratio is then used as a 
correction factor in the Technology replacement equation which is now, for obvious 
reasons, uncensored: 
In statistical terms, let's assume that the possibilities for firm i with respect to the 
technology j, can be classified as: O=decision not to adopt; 1 =decision to use; 2= 
decision to fully use; 3=decision to no longer use the technology. The multinomial 
probabilistic model attributes a set of probabilities for the s+ 1 choices for a firm with 
characteristics W, and it is specified as: 
Z*· = lII'W·+ u· I 't' I I 
Zj= 0 if ~=O-
Zj= I if 0<~<100% 
Zj= 2 if~ =100% 
Zj= 3 if ~ =0+ 
u· - Normal I 
(Non Adopter) 
(Current User) 
(Total User) 
(No Longer User) (6.3) 
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(6.3) defines the Multinomial Selection Criterion Equation (accounting for previous 
sample selection and censoring) while the resulting Corrected Technology 
Replacement equation will be: 
(6.4) 
As for the binomial model, the multinomial selection criterion equation (6.4.) defines 
the probability that the finn belongs to the in the s-th sample and Uj determines the 
type of probabilistic model. 
For ease of presentation let's assume that the finn faces three alternatives instead of 
four6 and also that Uj is nonnally distributed, N(O, 1); then the Multinomial Probit 
model for the s-th sample, can be specified as?: 
6 For most of the technologies the number of firms belonging to 2 is very small, sometimes 
accounting for less than 1% of the adopters. Moreover, the presence of missing values in 
their record can further reduce their presence in the estimating sample. This causes 
insufficient variation in the classification variable to be used for the estimation. For most 
technologies, 2 and 3 had to be merged one category, i.e. 2=completed substitution or, not 
being significant, (2) has been completely omitted from the analysis and a dummy variable 
used instead. 
7 For the three probabilities the marginal effects of changes in the regressors would be: 
a Prob(zj = 0)/ Ow = -</>(-\II'wj) J3 
a Prob(Zj = 1)/ Ow = (<l>(-\II'Wj)- </>(J.l-\II'w j» J3 
a Prob(zj= 2)/ Ow = </>(J.l-\II'Wj) J3 
It is worth emphasising that with this specification the interpretation of the marginal effects is 
not straightforward. The impact of an increase in one of the W on s=2 does have the same 
sign of J3 upon the corresponding probability while the opposite sign upon the probability of 
s=O. The interpretation of the coefficients of the middle range is however ambiguous as it 
depends on the combination of the shift in the other two probabilities. Moreover if a dummy 
variable is specified the standard marginal effects are no longer meaningful. The right 
procedure would be to compare the probabilities that result when the variable takes its two 
different values with those that occur with the other variables held at their sample means. 
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Prob(zj = 0) = 1- <l>(-\II'wJ 
Prob(zj =:= 1) = <l>(J.1-\II'w j) - <l>(-\II'wi) 
Prob(zi = 2) = 1- <l>(J.1-\II'W i) 
If Uj in (6.3) follows a logistic distribution the extension of the Probit to the Logit 
probability model is straightforward and requires very little change in the previous 
procedure. 
Once the Selection Criterion Equation has been estimated it is possible to estimate the 
Corrected Technology Replacement Equation as: 
[yj I zj=l] = p'xj + (PIC1I) ~[HI('I'I 'Wj)]! <I> [HI ('1'1' Wi] + vr 
= P' Xi + (PIO'I)\II 1M + VjM 
= P' Xi + ~IA \111M + VjM 
The two-step estimating technique used to test this model is detailed in Lee (1983) and 
the Limdep7 User's manual (see Greene, 1995). In the first step the estimates of the 
Multinomial model (i.e. coefficients and the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix 
and predicted probabilities) are obtained by Maximum Likelihood.Then for the selcted 
observation for which Zj equals the desired value, A.jM is computed by: (i) selecting the 
predicted probability, PI (ii) calculating the inverse of the standard normal (or logit) 
cumulative density function (H) evaluated at PI' i.e. HI = ~-t(PI) ; and (ii) using this 
information to calculate the IMR, i.e. A.t M = ~[Ht]/<I>[Ht1. 
In the second step the consistent estimates of ~ and ~tA are derived by least squares 
regression ofYI on x and A.I. 
The next sections define the corrected variable specification of the two step sample 
selection model. 
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6.3. THE SELECTION CRITERION EQUATION SPECIFICATION 
The estimating model discussed in the previous section considers the decision to 
further use a new technology in time t via a two stage model: the selection criterion 
equation accounting for firm i's probability to have adopted the technology j 
sometime before or during time t (6.1); and the technology replacement equation, 
defining the determinants to further use a technology in time t (6.2). The two can be 
defined as follows: 
Selection Criterion equation: (6.1) 
Corrected Technology Replacement equation: 
[Yitl z\] = WtXit+ PXAi(a)+vit (6.2) 
This indicates that the decision as to how much to use the technology (6.2) is 
conditional on the decision of the firm to be an adopter (6.1). 
The selection criterion equation can be modelled via a binary or a multinomial 
selection rule (see section 6.1 for a full discussion) and it is a function of the 
determinants of first adoption. 
The existing literature upon inter firm diffusion has widely explored the possible 
factors (wJ leading a firm to adopt a technology for the first time and these can be 
classified as: rank, stock, epidemic and order effects (see Chapter 3). They reflect the 
market and firm specific characteristics at time t, and as they change over time, so does 
the probability to adopt. 
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Part of these effects, with the exception of the order effect, also affect the 
determinants of technology replacement (xJ in time t (see equation 6.2t. 
Consequently, given the cross-sectional nature of the model specification, a large part 
of the variables determining both adoption (wJ and the level of use of a new 
technology (xJ at time t affect simultaneously the Selection Criterion Equation and the 
Technology Replacement equation. 
Common to many economic studies, the lack of variability between the two steps of 
the model and the simultaneity problems might cause possible spurious significance of 
sample selection effects. 
Not much can be done with respect to the choice of the dependent variables, but the 
simultaneity problem due to the time specification of the two sets of regressors (wt and 
xJ can be overcome. 
According to (6.1.), Zit defines the probability that a firm has reached the status of 
adopter by 1993 as a function of the determinants of adoption in 1993. However, by 
definition, a firm becomes an adopter as soon as it adopts for the first time at least one 
unit of the new technology and the firm remains an adopter even if subsequently 
decides to no longer use the new technology. This is because the decision to first 
adopt is irreversible and thus the innovator's characteristics and experience will always 
be different from a non-adopter, which has never used the new technology. 
Consequently the total sample of adopters, i.e. when Zit= 1, is made up not only of first 
adopters in 1993, but also of firms that have adopted before 1993 (earlier adopters). 
For those earlier adopters that have adopted the technology between say 1970 and 
1992,' it is more likely that the explanatory variables in 1993 are the effect rather than 
the determinants of first adoption, as defined by the Selection Criterion equation in 
8 see Chapter 5.6 for the specification of the determinants of intra firm adoption 
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equation 6.1. To ignore this might cause serious problems of endogeneity in the 
selection criterion equation. 
A better specification would use a different set of variables measuring the probability 
to be an adopter by 1993 as a function of the variables at the time of first adoption 
(t='t j), when the decision is actually taken. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the model, the introduction of this type of time 
dependent variables is not straightforward. 
The statistical details of the time dimensional Selection Criterion Equation is given in 
the following session. 
6.3.1. The Statistical Derivation of the Time Vs Space Specification of the 
SC Equation 
The Selection Criterion equation (6.1) defines the probability to be an adopter in or by 
1993 as the unconditional probability to observe an adopter in or by 1993: 
where T=1993 (6.7) 
However, this is too restrictive as it does not take into account the characteristics and 
the timing of the decision process to first adopt a new technology. 
The corrected conditional probability to observe an adopter m or by 1993 is 
represented in figure 6.3. The two vertical axes delimit the observation interval from 
when the technology first appeared on the market (t=t
o
) up to 1993 (t=T). Each 
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horizontal line represents one firm in the sample (i=1..N) and its length determines the 
time of first adoption by the firm ('tj) 
The labels on the right axis define the status of adoption in 1993, where the firm's 
probability to become an adopter in or by that date is specified as zij=l and zij=O 
otherwise. 
Figure 6.3. Intertemporal probability to become an adopter 
T-1993 
1 1 
~ 1 0 3 
1 
· 
· 
· 
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If 
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to 't2 'tl 't3 T TIME 
Given that the adoption time is heterogeneous, the corrected conditional probability to 
be an adopter by 1993 should take into account that: 
- The number of adopters in or by 1993 (Zr=1 where Zr=~-1 N ZjJ reflects the decision 
to first adopt in 1993 plus the decision taken some time in the past by those firms 
which have first adopted before 1993. This is equivalent to saying that the current 
number of adopters in 1993 is given by the sum of those who adopted before 1993 
and those who adopted in 1993: 
PAzrl]: {L [i I Zjl =1 for each 'tj < T] + L [i I Zil =1 for each 'tj =T]} 
- To become an adopter is an irreversible decision (but not to be a user) due to the 
different characteristics that might differentiate an ex-user from a firm that has 
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never adopted the technology. The firm becomes an adopter as soon as it adopts 
at least one unit of the new technology and it remains in that status thereafter. 
Although the firm might discontinuously use the technology the change in the 
status from non-adopter to adopter occurs only once, at the time of first adoption 
(t='ti): 
PiT [ziT=lIzi ti=1 where'ti :S;T] 
and is conditional to not having used the technology before first adoption: 
PiT [Zi'r=lI ZitO=O for each to:S; t ] 
- The probability to be an adopter by time T is conditional on the sample of potential 
adopters and must be corrected for those firms eligible for first adoption who 
might first adopt the technology after 1993. Consequently one has to face the 
problem oftruncation in the sample of users. 
PiT [Zir 11 ~t=O for each t <T and <p= 1,,, .N- <p]] 
In summary, defining Zit=1 as the condition for a firm i to be an adopter at time t and 
Zit=O if the firm has not yet adopted the technology, the total probability to be an 
adopter BY 1993, i.e. t=T, is given by the two conditional composite probabilities: 
a) the probability for a firm i to be an adopter by and in time T=1993 conditional on 
having first adopted sometime before or in time T=1993 (tl:S;T) and to have not 
adopted before the date of first adoption, 'ti , i.e. uniqueness of the event (time 
dimension for firm i): 
al) 
a2) 
PiT[ziT=lI (ziti=I)] where 'ti g 
PiT[ziT=ll (Zit=O)] where t ~'ti 
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yielding: 
b) The probability to be an adopter by or in time T= 1993 conditional on the sample of 
potential adopters at that time 0 This is equivalent to correcting the RHS for the 
right truncation of the sample of non adopters at time T (ZT=O) who might decide 
to first adopt the technology after time T (cross-sectional or space dimension): 
Condition (a) can be rewritten as the Cumulative probability (PiT) given by the sum of 
the probabilities to have not adopted before 'tj (P') plus the conditional probability to 
. 
have adopted at time 'tj (P") plus the conditional probability to adopt after tj (P"'): 
The probability in (6.8) is simply the sum of the probabilities of adoption over time, 
where: Zit=O before first adoption (t<'ti) and Zjt=! at the date of first adoption (t=t j) 
conditional on not having used the technology before tjo After that date (t>tj) the 
probability to adopt for the first time is zero, the decision to first adopt already being 
taken and not repeatable (P'''i,t [~] = 0 'V t<t)o 
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This allows one to rewrite (6.8.) as: 
PjT[ ZjT= 11 {Zj'tj= 1 (J Zjt=O} where Tj ~T and t <TJ = P' it[ Zjt=O for each toS t < Tj] + 
P"jt[zjtI=l!Zj.t.cp=O where <P=(Tj -to),"] 
Or equivalently as (6.9): 
(6.9) 
From (6.9.) condition (a) can be simply rewritten as the conditional cumulative 
probability distribution at time of first adoption (t=T): 
(6.10) 
Under the assumption of continuous probability, (6.10) is equivalent to: 
PjT[ZiT=l! {Ziti=1 (J Zit=O}] = Fit I [1- Fit] (6.11) 
In (6.11), F is the cumulative probability function of adopting by 1993, which is 
equivalent to the conditional probability to adopt at time tj , while the denominator 
reflects the probability not to have adopted before first adoption and can be written as 
one minus the probability to have adopted before that date: 
229 
The intuition behind this can be better grasped by looking at figure 6.4. where the 
probability of adoption by time t is represented by a tree diagram. At each moment in 
time the decision of the finn is conditional on the decision taken in previous years. 
This implies that the conditional probability of not having adopted by 1993 can be 
written as: 
= [I-Pi,to]* [1-Pi,tI]*··· = 
= 1- Pi,to. Pi,tI + (Pi,to Pi,tI) + .... 
The equilibrium approach also suggests that this decision is independent of the 
decision taken in the past, consequently all the cross products equal zero yielding: 
From (6.10) it is now straightforward to show that for a firm the probability to be an 
adopter by time T equals the conditional probability to adopt at the time of adoption. 
where ti :S;T and t :S;ti . 
This also implies that for a firm i: 
FiT / [1- FiT]= Fi'ti / [1- Fi'ti] (6.12) 
The conditional probability to be an adopter by or in 1993 (T) therefore equals the 
probability of becoming an adopter at the time of adoption (t) 
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Figure 6.4. Conditional probability of adoption at time t='t, 
Zi 
I-PI 
'to 
1 
> 
time 
The cross-sectional dimension probability (b) takes into account that the decision to 
adopt is truncated at time T. This implies that the total probability to adopt at time T 
should be adjusted to account for those potential adopters that might adopt the 
technology sometimes after T. This is equivalent to correcting the probability of 
being an adopter at time T for the presence of non-adopters or future potential 
adopters: 
(6.13) 
The denominator of the RHS of (6.13) defines the cumulative probability that the sub-
sample of firms has not adopted the technology by time T and can be rewritten as one 
minus the cumulative density probability to have adopted in or by 1993 
(6.14) 
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After substitution of (6.11) and (6.12) in the denominator of (6.14) the probability to 
adopt of a single firm becomes: 
PI ,T = Pi,T [Zi,T =1 ]/[1- {1/ [l-FT} ] 
or equivalently: 
(6.15) 
This is the cross sectional probability Pi,T that a firm is an adopter in the 1993 cross-
section. [1-FTJ is the correction factor for the sample of those firms that might adopt 
at a later stage. 
The probability Pi,T is firm i cumulative conditional probability of adoption by 
T=1993 (condition a). But again from (6,11) and (6.12), PiT =Fi,.l(1-FiT). This implies 
that at sample level (i.e. PT= LPi.T i =1 .. N), this probability becomes: 
(6.16) 
where from (6.11) 
and 
(6.17) 
This shows that for a sample of firms the probability of adoption by or in time T 
equals the probability of adoption at the time of first adoption. This result justifies why 
in the Sample Criterion Equation it is better to use the detenninants of adoption at time 
of adoption rather than the state of the variables at time T. 
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This finding gives rise to a different specification of the two step sample selection 
procedure. The TR equation remains unchanged while the Selection Criterion 
Equation in the first step of the model is specified as (6.18): 
z* ijt = \jI' Witi + u it (6.18) 
where Witi defines the set of regressors at time of adoption. 
The variables used in the corrected time dependent specification are presented in the 
following session. 
6.3.2.The Time Dependent Determinants of the SC Equation 
The results of the previous session (see equations 6.16. and 6.17,) indicate that the 
probability to be an adopter in or by 1993 is a function of the determinants of adoption 
at the time the decision is taken (wt ), the corresponding selection equation having 
being specified as (6.18): 
(6.18) 
(Time Dependent Selection Criterion Equation) 
Contrary to the specification of the technology replacement equation (see Chapter 5) 
the Selection Criterion equation refers to the decision to become an adopter, rather 
than to extensively use the new technology. The factors that can affect the decision to 
first use a new technology have been extensively looked by the inter finn literature. 
This turns out to be very useful as its predictions can be used to specify of the RHS 
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variables of the Sample Criterion Equation9• The inter-finn literature, indicates that 
what detennines the first adoption of a new technology are rank, stock, order and 
epidemic effects at the time the decision is taken. 
Most of the technologies in the CURDS sample are quite old, appearing on the market 
between 1950 (NC) and 1970 (CNC, Microprocessors in processes). Consequently 
not all the information in the 1993 sample is available from the date of first adoption. 
This has lead to some reduction in the set of variables that could be used for the testing 
of the model. They are summarised as follows. 
Rank Effect (characteristics of the firm) 
The inter finn literature predicts that (potential) adopters do differ in some important 
dimensions detennined by the characteristics of the firm (David, 1969, 1991; Davies, 
1979, etc). As such they are firm specific they can be approximated by: 
- Number of employees (LE) at the time just before or nearest to first adoption (data 
are available for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1991, 1993). As a further test the size 
variable can be split, by multiplicative dummies, into three different size categories: 
less than 50 (LEsmall), between 50 and 500 ( LEmedium) and more than 500 
employees (LElarge). Their predicted sign is positive (see for empirical evidence on 
9 It is worth noticing that those factors have also been used as a guideline in the derivation of 
the possible intra finn effects (see Chapter 5) and in the preliminary empirical exploration of 
the intra-finn diffusion (see preliminary analysis in Chapter 3). However, in the fonner cases 
they have been used as a categorizer for the intra finn effects, while it is only in the SS 
equation that their original specification, i.e. inter finn effects, is used straightaway. 
234 
relationship between firm size and speed of adoption, Mansfield, 1968, Romeo, 1975, 
Davies, 1979, etc. and more recently Colombo and Mosconi, 1995). 
-Age of the establishment at time of first adoption, i.e. the difference between the 
date of start up and the date of first adoption (LAGE). This is included on the basis 
that the age of the establishment might influence adoption. However, the impact is 
dubious. The accumulated experience of a firm might have a positive impact upon 
adoption, but at the same time older firms might be less flexible than young firms in 
adopting new technologies (Baldwin, 1998). Empirical studies do yield contrasting 
results. Dunne (1994) has found that diffusion is independent of the age of the 
establishment, while Little and Triest (1996) have found a negative relationship 
between the number of new technologies adopted by the firm and the firm age. On 
the contrary, Noteboom (1993) has found that age is significant and with a positive 
coefficient. For this reason its sign and significance will be left to the empirics. 
-Industry dummy (D1 ,i=l, .. n-th industrial sector) 
Dii is a dichotomous variable taking value one if firm i belongs to the i-th industrial 
sector and zero otherwise. Fifteen sectors (according to the SIC classification) are 
initially specified in the model. However, in order not to lose too many degrees of 
freedom some of the industries have been grouped based upon the significance of an 
equal parameter restriction. This variable takes into account that each firm faces 
different markets for its products and different input costs depending upon the sector it 
belongs to. It is here implicitly assumed that the within sector market demand and 
supply, as well as market concentration, can lead to (faster or slower) adoption 
patterns. Reinganum (1981) suggests that greater market power would speed the 
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diffusion process. Similar result were found by Gotz (1999) indicating that high 
competition often promotes diffusion. On the contrary Quirmback (1986) suggests 
that in a more concentrated industry a small number of users could slow down the 
pace of diffusion. More recently, the empirical studies of Karshenas and Stoneman 
(1993) found a positive relationship between market structure and technology 
diffusion, while Colombo and Mosconi (1995) found no significant impact of the 
Herfindahl index on the speed of adoption. For this reason sign and significance are 
left to the empirics. 
-Characteristics of the management at time of first adoption. 
These are specified as dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a managerial 
innovation had already been introduced at the time of first adoption of the advanced 
technology, and zero otherwise. The innovations are: Computer Aided Production 
Management system (CAPM), Just in time production (1IT) , Total Quality 
Management principles (TQM), and whether the firm possess the BS57511S0 9000 
accreditation (BS575). These variables are introduced on the grounds that managerial 
practices, managerial innovations and organisational innovations might generate 
complementarities from the use of other existing technologies and speed up 
technology extent of use (see Colombo and Mosconi, 1995 as well as Cainarca et aI, 
1990 on the adoption of flexible automation systems). Given that these variables are 
plant and technology specific their sign will be determined empirically. 
-Characteristics of the firm production system at time of first adoption. 
This is defined by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, at the time of first 
adoption, the firm was already using other technologies, and 0 otherwise. The set of 
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technologies is: Numerically controlled (NC) and Computerised numerically 
controlled (CNC) machinery, Microprocessors incorporated into manufacturing 
production processes (MICRO) , Coated Carbide or ceramic tools or inserts for metal 
cutting (CoT), Programmable Robot (ROBOT) and Computer Aided Design/draught 
system with graphics (CAD). This variable should account for any substitutability and 
complementarity arising from the interaction with the existing production capital 
goods. 
Previous studies in the area have supported this hypothesis. For example Karshenas 
and Stoneman (1993) and Stoneman and Kwon (1994), using the CURDS data set 
found that the adoption of a technology is not only affected by variables related to the 
technology itself but also by variables relating to other technologies. Moreover, the 
degree of complementarity can affect the probability of simultaneous adoption, e.g. 
CoT and CNC. Other evidence can be found in Colombo and Mosconi (1995), that 
suggests that previous adoption of certain technologies can reduce the initial training 
and installation costs, i.e. retooling and set up time, of the new technology. Also 
Cohen and Levinthall (1989) (implicitly) suggest that there might be positive 
complementarities between technology generation and technology adoption. 
However, the opposite can also happen. The characteristic of the firm's existing 
production system might require radical changes in the production line making 
adoption of an innovative technology too expensive. Consequently the sign of these 
variables will depend upon the technology used and it is left to the empirics to 
determine its value. 
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The Stock and Order effects 
The traditional inter firm literature would suggest the existence of stock effects such 
that the incremental profit gains from adoption decrease with the number of rival 
firms already using the technology (Reinganum 1981 alb). Moreover, the order effect 
predicts that the returns to a firm from the adoption of a new technology depend upon 
the position of the firm in the order of adoption, so that first mover advantages make 
early adoption more attractive (Funderberg and Tirole, 1985 Stoneman and Ireland , 
1985). Both effects should be unambiguously negative. Following Stoneman and 
Kwon (1994), the stock effect can be proxied by the within industry cumulative 
number of adopters in 1993, while the order effect by the (total or within industry) 
cumulative number of users at date of installation (t). However, the cross sectional 
specification of this model assumes that the determinants of adoption are the variables 
at time of adoption, so both order and stock effects will be proxied by the same 
variable at time of firm first adoption: LSH" the series of within industry I (1=1..15) 
number of users, or LUSERS, its pulled version. 
Epidemic effect 
-Number of years between first appearance of the technology and technology adoption 
(LYtech) 
This variable should account for learning and spillovers from other firms' adoption 
On the basis that as time proceeds, either more potential users become aware of a 
technology, or firms in general become more aware of the characteristics of the 
technology, the information spreading mechanism is assumed to have a positive 
impact upon adoption. Epidemic or learning effects have been investigated in a 
number of studies and empirical applications have confirmed their predictions (see for 
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examples Mansfield, 1968, Hannah and McDowell, 1984, Karshenas and Stoneman, 
1993, etc.) 
Table 6.1. Time dimension specification (t='t'I) of the Selection Criterion equation: 
Label, variable definition and whether log transformed 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE at time t=tl 
D'j • 'Binomial variable (D'j' = t Adopted; D'j'=O Non Adopted) 
Multi • Multinomial variable (Multi e [0, t ,2,3]) 
RANK variables 
• Employees at time near to time tti (log) 
LEti Number of employees 
LEsmallti or 
LEmediumti let if number of employees less than 50 ; O=otherwise 
LElargeti let if number of employees between ]50,200[; O=othcrwise let if number of employees greater than 50; O=othcrwise 
Lageti • age of the establishment at time of adoption (log) 
Group • Establishment part of group (I =yes; 2=No) 
• Managerial Innovation at time t 
DCAPM ti Dummy -CAPM adoption (t=Yes; 0= No) 
DJITti Dummy -JIT adoption (t=Yes; 0= No) 
DTQMti Dummy -TQM adoption (I ""Yes ; 0= No) 
DBS575ti Dummy -BS575 -IS09000 adoption (t"Yes; 0 .. No) 
• Complementary and/or substitute technologies at time t 
DNCti Dummy -CN adoption (l=Yes; 0= No) 
DcoTti Dummy -CoT adoption (I=Yes ; 0= No) 
Dmicroti Dummy-Microprocessors adoption (I""Yes; 0= No) 
Drobotti Dummy -Robot adoption (I ""Yes; 0= No) 
DCADti Dummy -CAD adoption (l"'Yes; 0= No) 
• Industrial sector 
Dit • Dummy ( t = firm belongs to industry I, O=- otherwise), 
i=I, .... IS - SIC classif. 
INTER FIRM EPIDEMIC variables at time t 
(skills, learning within firm and spillovers from adoption of other firms) 
LYTt • Within industry i number of years since the first firm adopte 
the new technology(log) 
• Years from first appearance of the technology and adoption b 
the firm(/og) 
INTER FIRM STOCK variables 
Lusersti 
Lshiti 
• Share of adopters at time of firm first adoption(log) 
• Within industry i share of adopters, 
i.e. Lshar*Di i=industry I, ... , 15 (log) 
Expected sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+1-
+'-
+1-
+1-
+1-
+1-
+1-
+1-
+1-
+ 
+ 
The information set of the time dimension Selection Criterion equation is smaller than 
for its space dimension version. This is due to the fact that some of the 1993 variables 
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are not available in the year of the firm's first adoption. Despite the theoretical time 
inconsistency of the determinants of first adoption, as a further check the space 
specification will be tested empirically, and its performance compared to the time 
dimensional specification. 
The full set of variables used m the time and space dimensional specification IS 
summarised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
Table 6.2. Space dimension specification (t=1993) of the Selection Criterion 
equation: Label, variable definition and whether log transformed 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE at time T=1993 
D'jt • Binomial variable (D'j' ... I Adopted; D'j'=O Non Adopted) 
Multi • Multinomial variable (Multi e [0.1,2,3]) 
RANK variables 
LeT 
LEsmallT 
LEmediumT 
LElargeT 
LageT 
DCAPMT 
DJITT 
DTQMT 
DBSS7ST 
DNCT 
DcoTT 
DmicroT 
DrobotT 
DCADT 
Di 
• 
or 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Employees at time near to time t (log) 
Number of employees 
let if number of employees less than SO ; O=otherwise 
let if number of employees between ]SO,200[ ; O=otherwise 
let if number of employees greater than 50; O=otherwise 
age of the establishment at time of adoption (log) 
Managerial Innovation at time t 
Dummy -CAPM adoption (1=Yes ; 0= No) 
Dummy -JIT adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Dummy -TQM adoption (I=Yes; 0 .. No) 
Dummy -8SS75-IS09000 adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Complementary andlor substitute technologies at time t 
Dummy -CN adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Dummy -CoT adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Dummy -Microprocessors adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Dummy -Robot adoption (I=Yes; 0= No) 
Dummy -CAD adoption (I=Yes ; 0= No) 
Industrial sector 
Dummy ( 1= firm belongs to industry I. 0 .. otherwise), 1=1 ..... IS 
INTER FIRM EPIDEMIC variables at time t 
(skills, learning within firm and spillovers from adoption of other firms) 
LinYT • Within industry i number of years since the first firm adopted the nev 
technology(log) 
LYt • Years from first appearance of the technology and adoption by th 
firm(log). 
• Otrher 
INTER FIRM STOCKJordwer variables 
Luserr • Share of adopters in 1993 (log) 
ShT • Within industry i share of adoption in 1993, i.e. Lshar·DJ 1=1,15 
Expected sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+/-
+ 
+ 
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6.4. Conclusion 
One of the problems associated with the testing of the intra firm equilibrium model 
derived in Chapter 5, is that it is defined only for a restricted sample of firms, i.e. 
those currently using the technology, with the exclusion of ex adopters (using 0% of 
kn) and full users (using 100% ofkn). 
However, the decision to currently use the technology is just one of the possible 
outcomes of an irreversible conditional choice made sometime in the past to become 
an adopter. 
In the CURDS data set the variable accounting for intra firm diffusion is available 
only for 1993, restricting the testing of the model to a single cross section of firms. 
To model only the current status of the firms in 1993 might cause serious truncation in 
the probabilit~ distribution, as it would not consider that some of the firms might adopt 
the technology sometime in the future, while to look only at some of the possible 
outcomes generates sample censoring. 
The probability of using a technology, conditional on the irreversible choice of 
adopting it, and the selection of possible outcomes (i.e. the current level of use) 
should be used instead. If ignored, this might cause serious bias in the parameter 
estimates. 
The solution proposed in this chapter is to use the Heckman's two step procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). This specification allows one to model, in the first step, the 
decision to be an adopter in or by 1993 via the specification of a selection criterion 
equation (see section 6.2.2). 
In the second step the actual intra firm estimating equation is corrected' for the 
truncation of the sample (using the information in the first step of the analysis) 
yielding the corrected technology replacement equation. 
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This chapter has also discussed different ways of dealing with the censoring of the 
sample caused by the exclusion of the 'extreme users'. It has also proposed a 
multinomial two step selection rule capable of accounting for all types of problems, 
namely: a) the sample selection of the eligible unit whose choice is observable; b) the 
truncation caused by the unobservable future choice; c) the censoring in each 
specification of the subset of outcomes (see section 6.2.3.). 
Whatever specification is used, the arguments of the SC equation can be outsourced 
from the inter firm literature, that has extensively explored the factors that lead a firm 
to first adopt a new technology (see section 6.3). The determinants of the TR equation 
are specified according to the prediction of the intra firm model presented in chapter 5 
(see section 5.6). However, one of the problems, common to several applications of 
this type of model, is that the determinants of both steps are often defined over the 
same information set and several variables are used in both steps of the specification. 
The simultaneity of their impact upon the sample selection and the final model 
specification, can easily yield spurious and insignificant sample selection correction 
factors (Inverse Mill's Ratio). 
A further problem is that the current level of the dependent variables in the modeling 
of the decision to become an adopter can be the consequence rather than the 
determinant of the status of the unit, generating endogeneity and misspecification 
problems. 
By means of probabilistic tools, this chapter has derived an alternative specification 
of the Selection criterion equation, showing how the cross sectional nature of the 
model can be combined with the time specification when the dependent variable is 
observable only at one specific point in time (see section 6.3.2). 
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In summary, this chapter has presented different ways to deal with the sample 
selection, truncation and censoring problems that might arise in the estimation of the 
intra firm model of technology replacement. It has also shown how the time 
dimension can be combined with the space dimension when the dependent variable is 
available at only one specific point in time. Once all these factors are taken into 
account in the model specification one can proceed with the testing of the firm's 
decision to extensively invest in a new technology, under uncertainty and conditional 
to having in the past used at least one unit of the new technology and not having 
completed the replacement process (Le.l00% use). 
The next chapter presents the results of the empirical estimates of the intra firm model 
for the technologies available in the CURDS data set for the cross section of UK 
engineering and manufacturing firms in 1993. 
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Chapter 7. 
TESTING OF TIlE INTRA FIRM DIFFUSION MODEL: EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims at testing the validity of the intra firm diffusion model of 
technology replacement whose predictions indicate that the firm's optimal level of 
technology ownership is determined by technological (aof an) and economic factors 
(5.17) 
By the means of econometric tools, the model will be tested for the technologies 
available in the CURDS data set for the cross section of UK engineering and 
manufacturing firms in 1993. 
However, three main problems associated with the original derivation of the model, 
have to be solved: 
1) its non-linear nature makes it difficult to handle econometrically; 
2) its aggregate nature does not allow one to directly measure the impact of some of 
its determinants, e.g. price expectations and uncertainty; 
3) some of its determinants (i.e. relative productivities) are not available in the 
CURDS data set; 
4) the model is defined only for those firms currently using the technology, with the 
exclusion of ex users and the 'extreme users', using respectively 0% and 100% of the 
new technology. 
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The first three problems have already been discussed in chapter 5 and how they have 
been overcome is summarised below . 
. The first problem has been overcome by applying a simple log linearization yielding 
the linearized version of the model, which can be easily estimated by OLS: 
(5.35) 
The second type of problem has been overcome by substituting the user cost of capital 
specification into (5.17) and explicitly modelling I the price effect, on the right hand 
side of(5.34), yielding: 
The final parameterisation being: 
log[knt/(IOO-knvl= KI log(an/ao) + 'YI log (-dqoV-'Y2 Iog (-dqnt )-'Y3 (qnt /dqnt - qot /dqoV 
(5.39) 
where 'Y3 = (r + cS + 1/2 ri PI) 
(5.39) is the final estimating equation of the intra firm model, where ~ is the 
proportion (%) of capital stock incorporating the advanced (new) technology; ko -or 
equivalently (1 OO-~)- is the percentage of capital stock incorporating the existing 
(old) technology. 
1 See Chapter 5 section 4 for the intermediate steps in this derivation. 
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In the intra firm model cx.n and cx.o are taken to be constant and firm specific. They 
reflect the core competencies of the firm i.e. a rank effect -K with a coefficient equal 
to one, (lKI= 1). On the contrary (c· ot Ic· nJ does not change across firms but does 
change over time (price effect-1). It is a function of changes in capital good prices, 
corrected for uncertainty about future profitability of the investments (via the 
significance and the size of the parameter Y3) and under rational expectations (via the 
assumption that YI=land Y2=-li. 
The impact of uncertainty reduces the probability of further adopting a new 
technology via an increase in the waiting option value and it will affect the size of13. 
Given that uncertainty is not known a priori it will be estimated empirically after 
subtracting from 13 the interest rate, outsourced from the NIS publications, and the 
depreciation factor used by Jorgenson (1965) in his empirical estimates (Le. 
r(t-'993)+8 = 0.05+0.025). 
The assumption of rational price expectations can be tested empirically, looking at the 
significance ofYI and Y2. If they are significantly different from one (in absolute value) 
then the hypothesis of rational expectations cannot be accepted. This means that the 
expected prices are different from observed prices, and that the firm forecasting error 
will be reflected in the size of 1112. 
In Chapter 5, epidemic (s) and inter firm stock effects (~) have also been allowed to 
enter the model. There are no theoretical reasons to justify their presence but it has 
been shown elsewhere they significantly affect the speed of first adoption among 
firms. Their expected signs should be opposite (s>O and ~<O) but insignificant. 
2 See previous Chapter for more details about the derivation of the estimating equation and 
the assumption of the model. 
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The third problem was that not all the variables specified in (5.39) are available in all 
or any of the three CURDS surveys. 
The CURDS data set contains data upon the level of technology adoption for different 
technologies, i.e. NC, CNe, and Micro, as well as other firm characteristics. This is 
rare information and allows one to test the theoretical model. However, the question 
relating to the intra firm level of ownership is present only in the 1993 questionnaire. 
This constrains the testing to a cross section of firms at a specific moment in time, i.e. 
1993. 
The intra firm model basically specifies the determinants of adoption as a function of 
the productivity parameters (an lao) and the price or user cost effects (c* no Ic* nl)' The 
relative productivity of the two types of capital inputs is not directly observable, but 
each being firm specific, they can be approximated by several firm specific 
characteristics present in the CURDS data set. This adds a cross sectional or space 
dimension to the diffusion phenomena and can explain the reason why different firms 
show different level of ownership at each point in time. 
The time dimension of the study is given by the price effect. However, given that the 
final model specification is restricted to a cross section of firms, c*jt would be 
constant. The lack of cross sectional variation has been overcome by defining the 
relative price change in terms of its change since the firm's first adoption (see section 
5.6 for a discussion). 
The last type of problem arising with the testing of the model is that equation (5.39) is 
defined only for those firms that have started the process of technology transfer 
currently owning at least 1 % of ku with exclusion of those firms that are saturated with 
the new technology, i.e. owning 100% of ku. This condition imposes some 
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constraints on the estimating procedure as the decision to use a new technology is 
conditional on the irreversible choice of having adopted it in the past and not using it 
at 'extreme' levels, i.e. 0 and 100%. This has yielded to the specification of a two 
step estimating equation accounting for the possible misspecification of the model 
arising from the selection and the truncation of the sample (see Chapter 6). 
A summary of the main variables used to test the time dimension and cross sectional 
specification of the Selection Criterion Equation, is given respectively in Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2 (Chapter 6, pp. 239-240). 
More details of the variables specification of the final TR Equation can be found in 
Table 5.2 (Chapter 5, pp.202) while their summary statistics can be found in 
Appendix D. 
This chapter presents the empirical estimates of the intra firm diffusion model and 
aims to model the firm's decision to extensively invest in a new technology, under 
uncertainty and conditional on having in the past used at least one unit of the new 
technology and not having completed the replacement process (Le.l00% use). 
Section 7.2. summarises the final estimating equation of the intra-firm Technology 
Replacement equation corrected for both truncation and censoring. Section 7.3. 
discusses the empirical results for the three technologies. A final section summarises 
the finding of the study. 
The econometric package used for the testing of the model is Limdep7 while all the 
manipulations of the data set are carried out using Stamp5 and SPSS. 
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7.2 The Two Steps Estimating Equation: Testing procedure 
The two-stage testing procedure derived for the intra firm model implies the 
specification of a latent factor model accounting for the determinants of sample 
selection (6.1) plus a second regression equation (6.2), corrected by the sample 
selection factor A. derived in the first step of the analysis: 
(Selection Criterion equation) 
[Yijt I Z·ij'] = WX it + ~A.A.it(CtJ+Vit 
(Corrected Technology Replacement equation) 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
The Selection Criterion Equation (6.1) defines the state of the firm in 1993 via a latent 
(binary or multinomial) variable (~jJ. In the case of binary choice models (Logit or 
Probit) it takes value 1 if the firm has adopted the technology and 0 otherwise (z=l 
adopter and z=O non-adopter). If the binary case is extended to the multinomial or 
ordinal case then the latent variable is specified as a discrete variable ranging from 0 
to s, where s is the number of possible mutually exclusive choices. 
The determinants of the decision to first adopt the technology (w) are the traditional 
inter firm effects such as rank, stock, order and epidemic effects. They can be 
modelled using the time or the space dimension of first adoption determinants (see 
Section 6.2. and Table 6.1.). The first one assumes that the chance to be an adopter by 
1993 has to be related to the determinants of adoption at the time when the decision to 
buy the first unit of the new technology t=t j is taken (time dimensional specification 
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ofwt), Le. Z*it=W'Witi+ uit· The second one assumes that what determines the number 
of adopters in T=1993 is simply the observed value of the independent variables in 
1993 , i.e. WiT (space dimension specification of wJ, i.e. Z*iT = 'Y WiT + ~T' This is the 
best specificatio~ that can be determined empirically. 
The Technology Replacement equation (6.2) defines the determinants of the level of 
use of a technology by a firm, corrected for the conditional choice to be an adopter. It 
is made up by two parts: the determinants of intra firm diffusion (x) and a sample 
selection correction factor (A.) derived from the Selection Criterion equation (6.1). 
The variables used to model the intra firm effects include rank, price effect (subject to 
uncertainty and price rational expectations) as well as inter firm epidemic and stock 
effects (see for a full discussion section 5.6.4 and Table 6.3). 
Once the correction factor (A.) is introduced among the list of independent variables of 
the technology Replacement equation, the model can be estimated by simple Least 
Squares regression. However, the LHS of (6.2) is the log of the ratio of the new over 
the existing technology (Yij=ln(kul(100-kij»' It is defined over the sample of adopters 
currently using the technology, with the exclusion of ex users (those that in the past 
have adopted the technology but have dismissed its use in 1993) and extreme users 
(those that have reached the maximum of the diffusion process and use 1 00% of the 
new technology). This means that the empirical estimates must be corrected also for 
the censoring caused by the further selection from the sample of adopters. 
The different model specifications used to overcome both sample selection bias and 
sample censoring of the eligible firms are summarised in Table 7.1. 
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Table7.1. Econometric models of the equilibrium intra-firm technology 
replacement 
TWO STAGES PROCEDURE 
z*y -IJI'WI+ UI 
(Selection Criterion equation) 
[yuI Zy) - ~'XI+ ~A).,I(al)+vl 
(Technology Replacement equation) 
i) Binary ProbltlLogit Selection Equation (sample selection) 
Selection Criterion equation: z*ij-IJI' WI+ UI UI - Normal or Logistic 
zi"l If Adopter in 1993 
ziDO if Non- Adopter in 1993 
Technology Replacement equation: [yU I z· y>O) - P'Xi + p). ).,P1I.1 (a'lI.l) + vtlL 
Censoring by visual inspection (total sample of firms with and without exclusion o/no longer and total users) 
Ii) Multinomial Selection Equation (sample selection + censoring) 
Selection Criterion equation: Z*U-YWI+UI ul-Normal 
z~O if 1<,."0· (Non Adopter) 
lj- 1 if O<k.<lOO% (User) 
zl-2 if k."'lOO% (Total User) 
zl-3 if k.-O· (No Longer User) 
Technology Replacement equation: [yrlzii"'ll- P'XI+ p),).,M1(aMI)+vMI 
The selection criterion equation refers to the decision to adopt a technology inlby 
1993 which has been modelled via: 
i) Binary ProbitILogit selection model 
ii) Multinomial selection model 
For both models the determinants of the choice of adopting the technology can be 
specified using the time (WiTi) versus space (WiT) dimension of the Selection Criterion 
Equation. 
The corresponding Inverse Mills Ratio (LAMBDA) is then used in order to correct the 
replacement decision due to the exclusion from the sample of both potential adopters 
and those firms that might decide to invest in the new technology after 1993, Le. when 
the last survey was carried out. 
The main difference between i) and ii) lies in the specification of the possible 
outcomes of the firm choice and the impact of censoring. 
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With the use of the binary approach only two outcomes (adopt/non adopt) are 
modelled via the Logit or Probit probability distribution, depending upon the 
technology under consideration. The impact of the extreme users exclusion 
(censoring) in the second step of the model is done by visual inspection, comparing 
the estimate obtained from (i) with and without the inclusion of the no longer users 
and those firms that have completely replaced 100% of their existing capital stock 
with the new technology. 
Model ii) combines both censoring and sample truncation in a series of mutually 
exclusive choices for which the technology replacement equation must be corrected. 
The model specification that best fits the behaviour of the firm will be tested 
empirically. The testing procedure can be summarised in the following steps: 
la) Sample selection criterion: Probit Vs Logit Model Specification; 
1 b) Censoring of current users: visual inspection of the restricted and unrestricted 
model, i.e. with and without extreme users; 
2) Multinomial two stages sample selection approach; 
3) Time versus space specification of the Selection Criterion Equation; 
The theoretical intra firm technology replacement model is tested on the sample of 
firms in the CURDS data set for three technologies: NC, CNe, and Micro4 
Given the complexity of the testing procedure, the results will be presented step by 
step for each model specification and for each technology. 
The main findings are summarised in the following section. 
4 Other technologies had to be excluded due to the lack of data on some of the determinants 
of adoptions, i.e. price of CoT. 
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7.3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
7.3.1 The Replacement Process of CNC technology 
CNC technology is a relatively young technology which appeared on the market in 
1970. Its spread of use has increased very quickly over the years and has overtaken 
the spread of ownership ofNC (the previous generation, non-computerised version, of 
CNC). 
In 1993 about 80% of the eligible firms in the sample have introduced CNC into their 
production process. The proportion of the machine tool stock that incorporates CNC is 
on average less than 20 % for 52 % of the firms, while only 7 % of the firms have a 
proportion in excess of 70 %. The determinants of the observed heterogeneity of the 
current level of current use of CNC are discussed below. 
The Selection Equation: Probit vs Logit Model Specification 
The first step in testing the theoretical model of technology replacement is to establish 
the probability distribution for the Selection equation, i.e. the probability for a firm to 
have adopted the new technology by or in 1993. Dealing with a cross section it seems 
reasonable to assume that the population of firms is Normally distributed. However to 
allow for departure from Normality, the hypothesis that the distribution is Logistic, 
i.e. with higher probability to observe extreme cases, has also been tested. In both 
cases the specification of the technology replacement equation remains the same, 
except for the correction term LAMDA derived from the first step equation. 
Table 7.2.a, columns one and two, shows the empirical estimates of the Probit model 
over the unrestricted total sample of firms and the restricted sample of users. In both 
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cases the Normality assumption can explain most of the variability of the model 
(pseudo R,/=O.91; R/=O.92)5. Using the Logistic distribution does not improve the 
explanatory power of the model. The predictions of both Logit and Probit 
specifications are exactly the same for all observations except one. Also the marginal 
effects of the two models, not explicitly reported here6, are not significant. 
The Selection Criterion equation of the unrestricted sample of firms (Table 7.2.a. 
column 1) indicates that the determinants of first adoption of a new technology 
before or in 1993 are directly related to firm size (LEsmall=ES50, LEmedium=ES500, 
LElarge=E>500), and the smaller the firm the more likely is to adopt it. The other 
factors which are inversely related to first adoption, are: age of the establishment at 
time of adoption (LAGE), whether the firm had adopted Computer Aided Production 
Management system (DCAPM) and whether it had received the BS5750lIS09000 
(DBS575) accreditation at time of first adoption. It also shows that the within 
industry share of adopters at time of firm' first adoption (LSH) exerts a significant 
but, unexpected, negative influence upon the decision to become an adopter of a new 
5 The pseudo R2 is calculated as : R2=var(yf)/(1+var(Yf), where yf=I3'x +lambda (see 
Zavonia and McKelvey, 1975) 
6 The parameters reported in Table 7.2.a are not the marginal effects one is accustomed to 
analysing but they are the coefficients dE(y)/dx =f(13 'x)I3, where f(.) is the density function of 
the specific probability distribution (Greene, 1993). Given the presence of dummy variables 
in the sample criterion equation, the marginal effects (or partial derivatives) defined at the 
regressors means may not be meaningful. This also explains why the size of the coefficients 
does not lie between zero and one, as it should be in the case of marginal effects. However, 
the significance of each regressor remains· unchanged whether one uses the coefficient or the 
slope (marginal effect) of the variables. In this section the discussion is limited to the 
significance and not to the size of the variables. 
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technology. Contrary to expectations none of the technologies used by finns in 1993 
is significant. 
Table 7.2.a. Time dimensional specification of the SC equation: CNC 
I 1 3 4 5 
Variable/Model Probit Probit Lo~it togit Multl-SS 
Sample Totallirms Current Tutal Current Current Tutal& 
Users flrml users u~erl ex-ulen 
Chuice z-I z-I z-I iii-I z-I z-l 
n /53 149 153 /49 ISO ISO 
Cunstant 
-6.52 -7.41 -12.40 -15.04 19.71 
-(2.981) (3.145) (6.06) (6.732) (7.010) 
LAGE 
-0.61 
- · · · · (.372) 
LEsmall, 3.69 3.73 6.76 7.10 9.28 
-(.927) (.953) (I.928) (2.11) (2.746) 
LEmedium, 3.21 3.25 5.86 6.14 7.99 
· 
.774 (.801) (\.615) (\,771 ) (2.302) 
LElarge l 2.39 2.39 4.34 4.47 S.67 
· (.551) (.559) (1.141) (1.220) (1.584) 
DMICR0 1 
· · · · · · DCAPM, -2.09 
· 
-4.24 
· · · (1.195) (2.269) 
D8S5751 -2.12 -3.35 -3.88 -6.27 ·7.81 
· (.828) (1.354) (\.525) (2.763) (3.650) 
DJIT 1 · · · · · · 
DCOT 1 · · · · -2.30 · (1.220) 
DNC 1 · 1.02· · 2.08 2.28 · (.353) (1.222) ( 1.265) 
LSH2 1 -0.70 -0.64 ·1.20 -1.06 ·1.27 
· (.254) (.249) (.533) (0.52) (.552) 
LSHJ 1 -0.79 -0.71 -1.48 -\,29 ·\.S8 -(.273) (.270) (.581 ) (.580) (.627) 
LSH5 1 -1.79 -1.76 ·3.28 -3.25 -3.98 
· (.581) (.564) (1.22) (\,214) (1.329) 
LSH6781 .1. OS -0.99 ·1.95 -1.82 ·2.34 4.73· 
(.289) (.282) (.608) (.590) (.727) (2.547) 
LSH9, -1.28 -1.20 -2.44 -2.26 ·3.14 -4.52· 
(.363) (.353) «(.75 I) (.720) (.896) (2.3S) 
LSHI0 1 -1.1 1 -1.02 -2.03 -1.S3 -2.67 -3.S7 
(.3 13) (.303) (.632) (.597) (.S05) (1.766) 
LSHll 1 -0.56 -0.52 -1.06 · -1.12 · (.313) (.3/1) (.626) (.665) 
LSHGROUP 1 (-0.43)" - n.S. n.s. n.s. 
· (.261) 
LSH!I n.s. n.s. 
· · 
-0.69 n.s. 
(.SSO) 
LSH41 n.s. n.s. -
· · 
n.s. 
LSHI5, n.s. n.s. 
· - - n.s. 
LSH131 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Log-Lik -26.88 -24.22 -26.14 
-23.50 -27.86 
L-ra tio ('X. z) 124.10 124.91 125.57 126.36 152.62 
NOTE: variables without star, all significant between 0 and 5% significant level; * significant between 
6% and 7%; ** significant between 8% and 9%; standard errors in brackets; n.s. not specified; Xl = 
calculated Likelihood ratio test that all the coefficients equal zero. 
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These results would indicate that young small firms are more likely to adopt CNC 
while the opposite happens for those firms using CAPM and with BS5750lIS09000 
quality accreditation. Moreover, the within order/stock effect (LSHi i= 
industryl,2,3, .. ) highly affects the adoption of a new technology, while the latter is 
independent of other technologies in use. 
The Technology Replacement Equation with Probit sample selection correction factor 
The information provided by the SC specification is only related to the determinants 
of first adoption and the firm probability to become an adopter by and in 1993. 
The next step of the model is to use this type of information in the second step of the 
estimating procedure, via the Inverse Mill's Ratio (LAMBDA). 
In Table 7.2.b. column 1 the Technology Replacement equation, corrected for the 
Probit sample selection (LAMBDAIProbit) shows that both prices (stock effect), and 
firm characteristics crank effects) are highly significant. 
The empirical estimates of the price variables coefficients 7 suggest that the use of the 
new technology increases the higher is the reduction in its real price (Pdqcn<:=-2. 46) 
7 All the price variables show the expected sign. In fact the original specification of the stock 
effect (see 5.39) was such that: 
In(cold/ccnd = Y1 log (-dqot)-y2 Iog (-dqnt )-Y3 (~t Idqnt - qot Idqot) 
(DQold) (DQcnc) (QNQTOT) 
where qj,t is the price of technology j at time t. The first tenn of the RHS is expected to have a 
positive sign being the relative change in the price of the old or existing technology from the date 
of the finn first adoption [dqold= qold (t) -qold(1994)]' The second tenn has a negative expected 
sign and is the relative change in the price of the new technology [dqcnc= qcnc (t) -qcnc(1994»)' 
The last tenn is the differential of the inverse of the relative reduction (RR) between the existing 
and the new technology [(qcnc/dqcncl- (qoldqo)]= [(llRRcncHIlRRold)]. Its expected sign is 
negative as it is expected that the relative reduction in the price of the new technology is higher 
than for the old technology (RRcnc>RRo=>RRcnc-1<RRo·l ).The parameter of QnQtot, reflect 
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and its impact is higher than the existing technology price reduction impact (Pdqtot 
= 1. 78). The Wald test of the hypothesis that (in absolute value) they equal one, cannot 
be rejected for the price of the old technology (x,2=O.618), while the contrary happens 
for the price of CNC (x,2=23.69). This indicates that prices are highly significant. 
Moreover, the finns seem to hold expectations about the change in the price of CNC. 
The price change of the existing set of technologies is not affected by any 
expectations. The latter indicates that the firm can access the whole infonnation set on 
the existing technologies to correctly predict the change in price of the set of old 
technologies, while for the new technology it holds incomplete information. In a 
broader sense this finding would also be similar to the Bayesian leaming approach 
used by Stoneman (1981). In fact, Stoneman (see Chapter 3) assumes the expected 
performance of the old technology is known by the firm with certainty and it equals 
its expected value, while the advanced technology, being new to the firm, is subject to 
an approximation degree that reduces over time as the firm accumulates experience. 
The empirical estimates also show that the higher the differential in relative price 
change of the new over the existing technology the more likely is for the finn to use 
the new technology extensively (Pqnqcnc= -0.51). The hypothesis that Pqnqcllc equals only 
depreciation and devaluation rates (r+B=0.075) cannot be accepted indicating that the 
uncertainty about future profits (112 .(i PI) perceived by the firms in the sample, on 
average, does affect the investment decision of the firms (and equals 0.435). In this 
case, as predicted by the theory, uncertainty does (negatively) affect the firm's 
decision to further invest in the new technology. 
the impact of interest rate, depreciation rate and uncertainty y = {p _'A.A +1/2 .cr2 PI} whose 
magnitude is uncertain depending upon the size of uncertainty (1/2 .cr2 PI)' 
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The j-test for the joint significance of the price effect (Ho: A -A -A =0) 
P dqcnc -P qntot-P qnqcnc -
cannot be rejected at 0% significance level (t=3.237). Their inclusion improves the 
goodness of fit (R2) from 0.63 to 0.72. 
The rest of the variables indicates that the rank: effects do affect the intra-firm 
diffusion process, especially for those firms doing in house R&D <pR&D9J=1.68) and 
belonging to an industrial group (POroup9J =0.53). However, those firms which are 
export oriented use the technology less extensively than those exporting less than 20% 
of their output (Pcx2o=-0.86). Among the rank: effects the size effect does not seem to 
be very significant except for small firms with less than 50 employees (PLEsmaU=0.45), 
which are slightly more likely to use the new technology extensively than other firms. 
There is no evidence of significant financial liquidity constraints like the average real 
turnover/profit ratio of the previous six years (LTURNOVER2y)8. It is instead highly 
significant if, prior to the date of first adoption of CNC, the firm has introduced 
technological innovations like: Computer Aided DesignlDraughting system with 
graphics (PocAo=1.38); Microprocessors incorporated in any of the Products 
manufactured in the factory (P80MICRO .0.80); Programmable robot (PORobol = 0.1.08) 
and microprocessors incorporated in manufacturing processes (other than CNC) for 
controlling, monitoring or inspection (POM-Prod = -0.69). 
The most dignificant production system is make/assemble to order, relative to 
Engineering to order (Pps2=0.88). It also appears that those firms which have met high 
quality standards via accreditation with BS575 or ISO 9000, are the most likely to 
extensively use the new technology (PoBsm=0.64) 
8 We have also tested the significance of the Profit-loss variable for 1981, 1985 and 1991 as 
an indicator of financial position of the firm but it was not significant. 
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Contrary to expectations the adoption of substitute technologies, like NC, is not 
significant in the extent of use of CNC technology. This indicates a possible lack of 
flexibility in shifting from early technology generations to later, due to the 
irreversibility of investments. 
Moreover, none of the variables accounting for the epidemic effect are relevant. 
The within Industry 10 share of adopters seems to be the only industry dummy effect 
significantly different from zero (x,2=1.705). Industry 10 is the Electrical Machinery 
Sector where almost 81 % of the firms have adopted CNC and are currently producing 
an average of 16% of their output on the new technology. However, when the industry 
and the share effects are specified separately, the current number of adopters at time 
of adoption is no longer significant. This. confirms the prediction of the intra firm 
equilibrium model about the insignificance of the level of adoption by other firms 
(SH1 where 1=1, ... 15), due to the fact that intra firm stock effects are already indirectly 
picked up by the intra firm model specification. 
The sample selection factor (PLambwJ derived from the first step of the model does not 
exert any direct impact upon the level of use of the new technology. This would 
suggest that the decision to become an adopter does not directly affect the current 
optimal level of use of the new technology. This is coherent with the equilibrium 
theory suggesting that, in each moment in time, the optimal level of use of a new 
technology is firm specific and it is determined by the current environment and as 
such changes over time. Consequently, the decision to first adopt a new technology is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition to extensively using that technology9. 
9 As a further check the technology replacement equation has also been estimated using the 
correction factor (lambda), derived from a Logit sample selection equation (see table.7.2.b 
column 3). However, also in this case the sample selection factor is insignificant. 
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Table 7.2.b. Time dimensional specification of the TR equation: CNC 
I 1 3 4 5 
Model Probll SS Problt SS Loalt SS t...aIlSS Muill-SS Sample r"'lIIj/nu " .. " TOlaifinno Ulen TOlai 
Choice Zit-I Zil-I Zit-I Zit-I liI- l 
N 69 69 69 61 61 Conltant 
· · 
· LDCNC ·2.46 ·1.41 
·2.46 
·2.47 ·2.45 (.6S6) (.6H) (.655) (.649) (.640) 
LDTOT 1.78 1.19 1.79 1.64· 1.60· (1.024) (1.01) (1.02) (.971) (.973) QNQTOT 
..o." .0.51 ..o.51 
..o42 
..o.42 (0.112) (O.Jll) (0.112) (.137) (.1l5) 
LBATCH 
· · GROUP93 0.53 O.H 0.53 0.56 0.56 
(.253) (.JS1) (.253) (.257) (.257) 
R&D9] 1.69 1.69 1.61 1.66 1.65 
(.356) (.JS6) (.358) (.358) (.356) 
DLEom.1I 0.44 0.46 0.45· 0.51 0.50 
(.250) (.141) (.248) (.221) (.220) 
DLE,nedlum (0.21)·· (0.22)·· (0.21)·· 0.24· 0.24 
(.144) (.143) (144) (.Ill) (.130) 
DLElal'le (..o.12)·· (0.13)" (0.12)·· 
(.120) (.148) (.147) 
[XIO 
..o.86 .0.8S ..o.16 ..o72 ·0.73 
(.299) (.199) (.299) (.292) (.286) 
TURNOVERlY 
· · · DCAD 1.32 1.3J 1.31 1.44 1.44 
(1.316) (.198) (.298) (.279) (.31S) 
DCAPM 
· · 
DM·PROD ..o.67 
·0.68 ..o69 ..o73 ..o71 
(.288) (.189) (.286) (.292) (.288) 
DJIT 
· · DTQM 
· · · DBSS75 0.63 0.64 064 0.70 0.68 
(.628) (.338) (.338) (.340) (.331) 
DMICRO 0.87 0.81 0.10 0.79 080 
(.323) (.m) (322) (345) (.m) 
DCOT 
· · 
..o.77 I. ·0.74 
(.456) (.441) 
DNC 
· · · · DROBOT 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.11 1.08 
(.417) (.471) (.476) (.398) (.494) 
rS5 
· · · 
PS2 0.93 0.9J 0.92 0.91 0.91 
(.304) (.304) (.305) (.310) (.308) 
P53 
· · · · P54 0.1'· 
· · · (.557) 
PSI n.'. n .•. n .•. n .•. n .•. 
LAGE 
· · · 
LluHr"] n .•. n.l. n.L n.L n .•. 
LCNCY n .•. n.'. n .•. n.l. n .•. 
LTCNC n .•. n .•. n .•. n .•. 
· LIFOUT93 n .•. n.'. n .•. n .•. n .•. 
LAMBDA 
· · · · · 
Ihl n.L 
· · 
n .•. It.'. 
.hZ 
· · · · · Ih3 
· · · · · 
.h4 n .•. n.', n .•. n .•. 1t.1. 
• h5 
· · · · · 
,b6 n .•. OJ. n.L n .•. 11.', 
• h7 n .•. 11.1 • n .•. n .•. ".,. 
.h8 n .•. n.I, n .•. n .•. 11.1. 
,h9 
· · · 
If", 
,hlO 6.04 6.01 605 603 6.01 
(2.249) (1.143) (2.250) (2.260) (:!.lS6) 
• hll 
· 
I.., . n .•. n .•. ".1, 
shU 
· · · · 
• hl3 n .•. n.I. n .•. n .•. H.', 
• h15 n .•. ,.., . n .•. n.l. 11.1, 
Ih671 
· · · · · 
,hlroup 
· · 
Rl 0.72 0.11 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Rlc 0.40 0.40 040 0.39 0.39 
LoC·L -44.48 .44.49 -44.48 
-<1342 ·70.16 
F 2.27(1%) 1.17 (/%) 2.18(1%) 221 (I'!<.) 221 (1%) 
NOTE: variables without star all significant between 0 and 5% significant level;· significant 
between 6% and 7%; .. significant between 8% and 9%'; standard errors in brackets; n.s. stands 
for not specified 
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In summary, the two stage binomial specification confirms the prediction of the intra 
firm diffusion model, that is: price and rank effects do affect the replacement of the 
old with an advanced technology. Moreover, the investment decision has been proved 
to be affected by uncertainty and price expectation about the future CNC price level. 
Contrary to the disequilibrium approach to technology diffusion there are no epidemic 
effects driving the within firm spread of use of a new technology. 
This model also hints that the inter-firm stock effects do not affect the firm decision to 
extensively use a new technology. This has to be related to the fact that stock effects 
are already picked up by the intra finn model in other ways. Moreover, the 
insignificance of the sample selection factor indicates that the current level of 
technology adoption is independent of the decision to first adopt that technology. 
Censoring of current users: visual inspection of the restricted model 
In the two-stage sample selection model, those firms currently using 0 or 100% level 
of technology were excluded from the TR regression equation (6.2) on account of 
both theoretical assumptions and mathematical constraints. In order to have an idea of 
the magnitude of the left and right censoring this might cause, the whole analysis has 
been replicated excluding the non-eligible finns also from the first step of the 
analysis. This means that the Selection Criterion equation (6.1) is now estimated over 
the sample of adopters Inon-adopters with the exclusion of the no longer users and 
fully users, reducing the sample to current users and non-adopters. The specification 
of the Corrected Technology Replacement equation remains the same. 
The different estimates of the restricted sample Probit model can be found in column 
two of Table 7.2.a and 7.2.h. for the SC and the corrected TE equation respectively. 
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They are quite similar to the unrestricted case in column one, except that most of the 
significant variables do show a slightly higher coefficient. 
According to the Selection Criterion equation, it is more likely that a firm that had 
adopted NC in the past, is now an adopter and a current user of the technology (DNC). 
Contrary to the full sample estimates it also appears that the impact of intra industry 
effects (LSHi i=industry 1,2,3, .. ) is weaker while the size effects are stronger, 
especially for small and to a less extent also for medium sized firms (LEsmall and 
LEmedium). 
In the second step of the model, the TR regression equation corrected for to the 
Sample selection of the censored sample, shows a weaker impact of the price effects 
(LDTOT, QnQtot), R&D and export level (Ex20), while showing a higher impact of 
rank effects. :The test of the joint significance of the price effects can be rejected (j-
test: t=3.82). As in the previous model, the price effect is highly significant and they 
significantly contribute to explain the total variability of the modello, 
It also indicates that firms do choose the current level of advanced technology 
ownership based upon expectations on its change in prices (Ho:PLDCNC=-I, "1:== 4.929). 
The forecasting error between the observed (PLDCNC = -2.5) and the expected price 
being almost 1.50, i.e. dqcNc= y.d qecNc' where y =~LDCNC -I (see chapter 5 for more 
details). We are not able to reject the hypothesis of rational expectations for the 
existing technologies (Ho: PLDror= I, 1..2= 0.5997). 
10 The J-test (Davidson and McKinnon, 1981) is here used to compare the forecasts of the price effects 
(dp') against those of the Other effects (say do') on the basis that their combination should produce a 
level of technology ownership (y) with smaller forecast error. The compound model being y= (1- 'II) 
do' + 'II dp' .This model is estimated by OLS and if 'II is not significantly different from zero, then the 
model does not add anything to the explanation of y. If it is significant then the price effects 
significantly contributes to the explanation of y. 
262 
The testing for the presence of an uncertainty effect has led us to accept the hypothesis 
that it does affect the investment decision (Ho:J3LDQnQtot=0.075, "1:= 18.66) and equals 
0.435. 
The sample selection of the group of adopters (LAMBDA) does not exert any 
significant impact upon the intensity of the new technology use. 
Despite these differences, the magnitude of the parameter estimates of the restricted 
and unrestricted model and the explanatory power of the two models is almost the 
same. This is mostly because only 4 firms are no longer using the technology or have 
reached the saturation level. By visual inspection this would suggest that their 
exclusion, does not significantly change our results and the impact of censoring is 
negligible. 
Censoring of current users: Multinomial two stages sample selection approach 
The visual inspection approach does not provide us with the final estimates corrected 
for censoring. A more statistically grounded approach to account for censoring and 
sample selection is provided by the Multinomial two stage sample selection approach. 
Estimates are produced in column 5 ofTable7.2.aIb. 
According to this formulation, the dependent variable In the Sample Selection 
equation in the first step of the model is specified such that: 
Selection Criterion equation: 
and 
Z·=O I 
Zj= 1 
zj=2 
zj=3 
if ~=O-
if 0<~<100% 
if ~=100% and 0+ 
if ku=O+ 
u·-Normal I 
(Non Adopter) 
(User) 
(Total User) 
(No Longer User) 
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Technology Replacement equation: 
In the first step, due to the very small sample size, the group of Users and No Longer 
Users has been pulled together into one categoryll, 
The empirical estimates of the SS equation and the TR equation can be found in Table 
7.2.a and 7.2.b column 5 and 6. 
The impact of the regressors upon the probability to become an adopter still using the 
technology in 1993, is highly significant (see Table 3a column 5 for zj=1)12, The 
intensity of the impact of the regressors upon the decision to be a current user is much 
stronger than in the binary case. This is true for all the variables except for the age of 
the establishment (LAGE) and the adoption of the CAPM management innovation, 
that are no longer significant. Another difference is that now the presence of CoT and 
NC (complementary and substitute technologies), is highly significant even if with a 
sign opposite to predictions. 
On the contrary the probability to be an 'extreme user' (fully or not currently using the 
technology but having used it in the past), with respect to the probability not to be an 
11 Dummy variables have been used to pick up the different impacts of each of the two 
groups to but none of them was significant. 
12 It is worth emphasising that with this specification the interpretation of the marginal 
effects of U= 1) is not straightforward. In fact the impact of an increase in one of the Wi on 
s=2 does have the same sign of p upon the corresponding probability while the opposite sign 
upon the probability of s=O. The interpretation of the coefficients of the middle range is 
however ambiguous as it depends on the combination of the shift in the other two 
probabilities. 
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adopter is significantly affected only by a few intra industry share effects (see Table 
7.2.a column 5 for zj=2). 
This result suggests that none of the factors leading to first adoption exert a significant 
impact either upon those firms that have decided to dismiss the use of a new 
technology or those that are fully using the technology, 
The TR equation, corrected for the sample selection of the current users provides 
results intermediate but not significantly different from the Probit specification with 
and without the 'extreme' users. The explanatory power of the model is good 
(R2=O.72 ; R2 corrected=O.39) and the residuals are well behaved. In this case, as well, 
sample selection (LAMBDA) does not significantly affect the level of use of the new 
technology. 
Similar to the Probit two stages approach rank, price and inter firm stock effects do 
significantly affect the intra-firm diffusion process. None of the epidemic effects 
exerts a significant impact upon diffusion. 
The Time versus space specification of the Selection Criterion Equation 
As a further test of the validity of the time dimensional specification of the S~ 
equation, the same exercise has been repeated for the space dimensional specification 
and the corresponding corrected technology replacement equation. 
As in the cross sectional case, the estimates of both the Probit and Logit specification 
are very similar and with the same predictive capability (Le. yielding the same 
predicted probabilities). For this reason, also in this case the hypothesis of Normality 
cannot be rej ected. 
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The estimates of the binary Selection Criterion equation in Table 7.2.c . (column 1,2) 
suggest that in 1993 the probability to observe an adopter is mostly determined by the 
financial position of the firm before first adoption (LTURNOVER2Y) and whether 
the firm is export oriented (EX20). The significant characteristics of the production 
system are: whether the firm has already adopted CAD and the average batch size of 
its production. Also the within industry 10 effect (LSHI0) turns out to be significant. 
The predictions of the Corrected Technology Replacement equation are robust across 
the bivariate Logit, Probit (see Table 7.2.c. column 4,5). The size and significance of 
the variables confirm the predictions of the time dimensional model Table 7.2.b. that . 
is: the price and rank effects but not the epidemic effects, nor the stock/order effects 
are significant in the process of technology replacement and in none of the cases is the 
sample selection significant (LAMBDA) 
The cross sectional specification of the multinomial selection criterion equation 
indicates that only the average batch size (Lbatch) is significant at 5%. This leads one 
to conclude that, overall, in 1993, very few factors seem to affect the probability to 
currently use the technology. This result is difficult to accept and indicates that there 
might be a misspecification problem possibly due to the nature of the variable 
definitions. The space dimension specification basically assumes that the probability 
to be an adopter inlby 1993 is related to the level of factors in 1993 while it is more 
likely that those factors are the consequence rather than the cause of first adoption 
(see Chapter 6.3 for a discussion of this issue). On this ground, the space dimensional 
specification is abandoned in favour of the time dimensional specification of the CNC 
model. 
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Table 7.2.c. Cross Sectional dimension of SC and TR equation: CNC 
Sampl, en/,riII" l;,.",i"" T «I",.lou Replac .... ,,' litllllll." 
1 Z J 4 5 6 
Lo&11 Problt Mulll-SS Mulll-SS Mud.1 LoIIISS Problt SS Multl-SS 
Simple All All All All Simple All All All 
Choice II-I II-I II-I 11-2 Choice II-I II-I II-Ill 
n 131 131 IJI 131 
" 
69 69 61 
Const.nt 
- · · · 
Conltant 
· · · 
· 
LDCNC ·2.73 
·266 ·1.46 
(.671) (.672) (.1lS7) 
· 
LDTOT 1.84" 1.80·· 1.110·· 
(1.0') (1.060) (1.0') 
· 
QNQTOT -044 ·0.42 .0.44 
(.142) (.143) (./J8) 
LBATCH. 2.13' 1.23 :1.76 
· 
LBATCH 
· · · (.967) (.577) (I.J64) 
GROUP93. 
· · · 
GROUP9] -0.48·· 0.47· 0.51 
(.260) (.264) (.16') 
R&D93. 
· · · · 
R&D9) 1.74 1.74 1.6' 
(.365) (.371) (.J60) 
1.93, 
· · · 
DLElmin 0.48 0.43 0.41· 
(.240) (.239) (.1H) 
· 
DLEmedlum 
· · 
· 
DLEln" 
· · · EX20, -4.49 
-2.56 
· · 
EXZO -O.BI 
-092 ·0.80 
(2.106) (1.J77) (.329) (.324) (.J04) 
L TURNOVERly, 1.94" l.ll** 
· · 
LTURNOVERlY 
· · · (1.137) (.661) 
OCAD. 6.38 3.66 '.69· 
· 
DCAD 1.44 1.'0 1.4J 
(2.744) (1.584) (J.102) (.328) (.325) (.m) 
DCAPM, 
· · · · 
DCAPM 
· · · DMPROD. 
· · · · 
DM·PROD -061 -0.71 -0.1/ 
(.298) (.298) (.186) 
DJIT. 
· · · · 
DnT 
· - · TQM, 
· · · · 
DTQM 
· · D8S575, 
· · · · 
DBSS" 
· · 
0.6' 
(.J16) 
DMICRO. 
· · · · 
DMICRO 0.77 0.83 0.80 
(.343) (.343) (.J") 
DCOT. 
· · · · 
DCOT 
· · · DRobol. 
· · · · 
DNC 
· · · 
· 
DROBOT 
· · 
1.14 
POOl 
· 
PSI n .•. n.'. 11.1. 
· 
PSZ 0.79 0.85 0.90 
(.321) (.318) (.J08) 
· 
PSJ 
· · 
· 
PS4 
· · · 
· · · · · 
P5S 
· · · (.AGE. 
· · Lyiad. 
· · · · 
LAGE 
· · · 
· 
U.oon93 n .•. 
· 
LeNCY n .•. 
· 
LTCNC 
· · · 
· 
LlFOUT n .•. n .•. 11.', 
· 
LAMBDA 
· · · 
dl ·8.96 -5.27 
· · 
.hl 
· · · (4.'94) (2.76) 
dl n.1 n .•• n .•. n .•. 1hZ 
· · · d3 
· · · · 
1h3 
· · · d4 n .•. n .•. n.l. 11.1, .h4 n .•. n .•. ,..,. 
dS n .•. n.l. " ... If". IhS 
· · d4S 
· · · · 
.h6 n.'. 
· · d6 n .•. .... 
"." 
If.I. Ib7 n .•. 
· d7 n .•. .... ,,.,. u. Ih. n .•. 
· d8 n .•. n.'. If.I. 
"." 
Ib9 
· · · d678 
· · · · 
IhlO 
· 
5.88 '.69 
(2.331) (1.511) 
d9 
· · · · 
.hll 
· 
n .•. If,I. 
diG -11.3 -6.68 
- · 
IhlZ 
· - -(4.851) (2.92) 
dll 
· · · -
Ihl3 n .•. n .•. n .•. 
dU 
· · -
.hlS n.J. n .•. n .•. 
dl3 ... n .•. 
· · 
Sh671 
- · diS n.1 n .•. 
- · Shlrnup · - · 
Rl 0.74 0.7J 0.71 
R2c 0.41 0.41 0.38 
Lol-Llk ·17.78 -17.53 ·16.57 LoI-L -40.04 
-41.59 
-69.96 (..rlllo (X') 86.86 86.68 IJ5.09 F (prab) 225(1%) 2.30(0%) 2.10(1%) 
NOTE: variables without star significant between 0 and 5% significant level; * significant 
between 6% and 7% . ** significant at 8%; standard errors in brackets; n.s. not specified 
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In summary, this study suggests that the probability to first adopt CNC in/by 1993 is 
fairly Normally distributed and the time dimensional specification better models the 
determinants of first adoption. Among the determinants of adoption of CNC, the 
significant variables are age (with negative coefficient) and size of the establishment, 
and in particular smaller firms seems more likely to first adopt than bigger firms. 
Other technologies in use do not playa significant impact upon adoption, except when 
the sample is restricted to the current users, in which case, those firms that are 
currently using also NC seem to be more prone to further invest in CNC. These result 
seems to be in line with the evidence found by Rees, Briggs and Oakey (1984) over a 
sample of Canadian firms, indicating that there might be contagious effects in the use 
of NC and CNC machines for small plants or single-establishment firms, but not for 
the entire sample. It also seems that those firms that use Computer Aided Producti.on 
Management System are less likely to adopt CNC in favour of other type of 
production methods. In the time dimensional specification to have received the 
BS57511S09000 accreditation shows a negative sign. However, in the cross sectional 
specification it shows the right (positive) sign. Confirming that firms with high 
quality standards are more likely to adopt than other firms. 
Some of the results of the Selection Criterion equation are contrary to expectations. 
This might be because the specification used defines the probability to adopt the new 
technology in 1993, conditional on not having adopted it in the past. In this respect 
some of the predicted effects are less intense or show the wrong sign. In fact in 1993 
only about 80% of the firms in the sample had already adopted the new technology 
and only a small proportion of the potential adopters might end up adopting it. 
However, it is, in a certain way, reassuring that the impact of the decision to first 
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adopt never turns out to significantly affect the ownership level of the new 
technology. 
Despite the several specifications of the selection criterion equation, the persistent 
insignificance of the sample selection correction factor (LAMBDA) indicates that the 
decision to first adopt a new technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
extensively using CNC. In fact, whether one uses a time or a (improper) space 
definition of the selection Criterion equation neither the truncation nor the censoring 
of the sample significantly affects the level of use of the CNC technology. 
The estimates of Technology Replacement are consistent across the different 
specifications, confirming the prediction of the intra firm diffusion model. Both rank 
and price effects are highly significant in the process of technology substitution. The 
price effects are all significant and show the correct sign. Uncertainty about future 
profits seems to significantly slow down the decision to further invest in a new 
technology, via the increase of the negative slope of the price effect (1I2cr2p-0.4). It 
has also been shown that the firm reacts to expectations about future prices (or 
expected threshold price) of CNC, while it seems to operate under rationality for the 
price of the old technologies. The latter, being old and known to the firm, can be 
correctly forecasted, contrary to the advanced technology, that is only partially known 
by the firm. This result, seem to be in line with to the prediction of the Stoneman 
(1981) model, where it is assumed that the firm knows with certainty, some of the 
properties of the old but not of the new technology. 
The rank effect indicates that CNC is a technology used mostly by small and medium 
firms, not export oriented, with 'make to order' production system, and that belongs to 
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an industrial group. Moreover users do use, among other technologies, 
microprocessors incorporated in their products, robot, and Computer aided design 
machines. They also carry out a significant amount of R&D confirming the production 
of Cohen and Levinthall (1989) who illustrate that firms which spend upon R&D are 
more easily able to assimilate new technologies. It also appear that whether they have 
received the BS5750lIS09000 accreditation, plays a significant role in the extent of 
use of the new technology. 
Epidemic effects do not affect the intra-firm diffusion of the technology, while inter-
firm stock effects are significant only in one sector, but are not significant when the 
industry effect is separated from the stock effect. This is in line with the prediction of 
the model indicating that the intra firm stock effect is already picked up by the 
technology replacement equation. 
7.3.2. THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS OF NC TECHNOLOGY 
NC technology is a very old technology which first appeared in 1955. Among the 
sample of adopters almost 31 % are no longer using NC and only 3.3% of the firms in 
the sample claim that NC represents more than 50% of the machine tool stock of the 
establishment. 
Moreover, none of the firms is fully using 100% of the technology. 
The rational for this is going to be related to the appearance on the market of CNC, 
the computerised advanced version of NC. As one might expect, as soon as CNC 
technology is adopted, it replaces NC technology. CNC appeared on the market in 
1971 and since then the NC replacement process (by obsolescence as assumed by the 
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economIC intra-finn theory) has been taking place. As shown below, the empirical 
estimates of the theoretical replacement model do reflect the obsolescence of NC 
technology. 
The Selection Equation: Probit vs Logit Model Specification 
For NC technology the assumption of a nonnal probability distribution of the 
Selection Criterion equation does not hold. The Normality assumption causes lack of 
convergence of the estimator. This is because the distribution is very skewed and with 
a high number of adopters (zjjt=l) with only few finns having still to adopt NC 
technology (Zjjt=O). The Logit specification better models the distribution of adopters 
in 1993. 
In Table 7.3.a. column 1, the Logit SC equation indicates that in 1993 very few 
factors still exert a significant impact upon first adoption of NC. Their joint 
significance is rejected at almost 15% probability (Likelihood ratio(x,2)= 87.2). 
In 1993 among the significant rank effects, the size of the finn at time close to first 
adoption (LEsmall,LEmedium, LElarge) indicates that the smaller is the finn the 
higher is the probability to have adopted the technology by that date. Similar to CNC, 
to be awarded the BS575IIS09000 quality accreditation reduces the chances to adopt 
the technology by/in 1993. None of the other technological characteristics of the firm 
are significant. 
On the contrary the within industry number of users (LSHi i=industryl,2,3,4,etc. ) is 
highly significant. It negatively influences the spread of adoption of NC providing 
evidence of inter finn stock/order effects, predicting that there are decreasing profits 
gains from the increasing number of adopters of a new technology. This is particularly 
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true for the probability of adoption of NC that has been on the market for nearly 30 
years and it is now considered almost an obsolete technology. 
Table 7.3.b shows the results for the Technology Replacement equation adjusted for 
the sample selection via the IMR (LAMBDA).The results for the TR equation with 
Logit time dimensional sample selection correction (LAMBDNLOGIT) are shown in 
column 1. According to this specification, those firms extensively using NC do a 
significant amount of R&D (~R&D93=1.36) and have received the BS5750lIS09000 
quality accreditation (~BS7S=1.48). They have also already introduced CNC 
(POCNc=1.73) as well as microprocessors (~M_prod=2.28) in their production processes. 
This result hints that those firms are highly innovative and willing to adopt and 
extensively use a new technology. However, perhaps due to the irreversibility' of 
investments, they find it more difficult to subsequently convert their production 
system once it superior technology appears on the market. Despite the significance of 
the rank effects, none of the price effects significantly affect the investment decision 
Contrary to the determinants of first adoption, at intra-firm level the within industry 
number of users at time of adoption exerts a positive impact upon intra-firm diffusion. 
13 The quality adjusted price series ofNC shows increasing values over time, reflecting the 
obsolescence ofNC (particularly with respect to CNe, its computerized version. 
Consequently, (qNC,rqNC,t-t> is positive and the price change log (-qNC,V, as specified in 
(5.39), is undetermined. Purely as an empirical exercise the price change (qNC t) rather than 
. , 
(-qNC,t) has been used in the specification of this price covariate. Even if it is not what the 
theory would predict, this variable has been thought to be able to pick up some of the 
variability of the price change over time (even if of the wrong sign). However, as it will be 
seen later in the discussion, none of the price effects, as well as the whole model 
specification, is not appropriate for this machine tool. 
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However, when the industry effects are separated from the share of adopters at time of 
adoption, the predictive capability of the model remains unchanged, while the share 
effects are no longer significant. 
This result can be interpreted in three different ways. It might pick up some 
underlying epidemic effects (whose predicted sign is positive). It might pick up the 
general trend leading to dismissal (by depreciation) of the use of the technology or, 
more likely, it simply suggests that the intra firm inter stock/order effects are not 
significant as they are already implicitly accounted for by the theoretical model. In the 
latter case the significance of the Industry dummies simply indicates that the extent of 
use of NC is related to the market and to the properties of the final product sold on 
that market. 
Common to CNC none of the variables, specifically designed to pick up epidemic 
effects, nor the sample selection effect (LAMBDA) do significantly affect the extent 
of use of the technology. 
Censoring of current users: visual inspection of the restricted model 
If we exclude from the testing of the selection criterion equation those firms that no 
longer own NC, the sample size reduces of about one third as the technology dismissal 
rate is quite high. The variables significant in the previous model are still significant 
(see Table 7.3.a column 2), and with slightly higher coefficients. This happens for 
both steps of the model, with the exception of the within industry share effects in the 
corrected technology replacement equation (see Table 7.3.a!b column 1 and 2). The 
latter suggests that the intra industry effects are stronger in determining the decision to 
dismiss the use of the technology than it is to extensively use it, or alternatively that 
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the inter firm stock effects affect the probability of first adoption but not the intensity 
of the use soon after first adoption. 
Contrary to the previous specification, the sample selection correction factor does 
slightly but not significantly affect the technology replacement equation at 7% 
(~LAMBDAILOGIT= 1.08). 
The Multinomial two stages sample selection approach 
The Multinomial Logit model should measure the exact impact of the determinant of 
adoption on those firms currently undertaking the process of technology substitution. 
The Sample Selection equation seems to indicate that the factors affecting the chance 
to adopt and currently use the technology are the same as those leading to the 
dismissal of the technology(see Table 7.3.a column 3 and 4). This result is not 
surprising, given the obsolescence ofNC. 
The size and the significance of coefficients confirms the results of previous 
specifications indicating that the only significant factors are size and stock/order 
effects. 
In the corrected TR equation (see Table 7.3.b column 3) only the growth rate in the 
price of the alternative technologies seems to exert a marginal significant impact. 
This suggests, once again, that in 1993 the technology replacement of NC is no 
longer significantly affected by the current economic and technological characteristics 
of the firm. The most innovative firms, which have in the past used NC, have already 
undertaken the process of technology replacement. What has driven this decision is 
mostly the change in the quality adjusted price of the alternative technologies 
(~LDToT=I.23), which should make their adoption more profitable than NC. However, 
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even if its sign is the right one, its significance can be rejected only at the 8% 
significance level. The theory would also predict that, its coefficient, in absence of .. 
price expectations, should equal 1. This hypothesis cannot be rejected (X2 =0.58), 
suggesting that the firm operates under perfect foresight and knows exactly what 
prices of the existing technologies are from one period to the other. This model also 
indicates that uncertainty plays no role upon further adoption ofNC. 
The determinants of the corrected Technology Replacement equation are reported in 
the last column of Table 7.3.b showing that the relative change in the price 
(~LDNc=1.5I) ofNC does weakly affect the level of use ofNC. Moreover, the firm is 
more likely to extensively use NC having already started the process of technology 
replacement with the most advanced technology CNC (~DcNc=1.81) and being export 
. oriented (~ex= 0.50), although the latter are significant at 7%. There is also some 
evidence of intra industry stock effect for Industries 5,7 and 10, although only one of 
them shows the right sign (~sHS=0.48, ~SH7= 0.30, PSHIO=-0.48). Moreover, similar to 
CNC, when the number of users is separated from the industry effect their 
significance disappear, indicating that these variables are only picking up some 
residual intra industry effects. The extent of use ofNC is inversely related to the time 
since first adoption (~LNcy=-2.05) and use 'make to order' production 
Using this specification there is no significant evidence of sample selection effects 
(LAMBDAIMUL TI). 
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Table 7.3.a. The selection criterion equation: NC 
Time dimensional specification of the SC equation Cross-sectional specification of the SC equation 
1 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 I 8 
Model Logit Logit MULTI-SS Model LOllit Logit MULTI-SS 
Sample Total Current Sample (Users& Non current firms users IIdopten) user 
z=1 z"l pI z-2 pI z-I z-I z-I z-Z 
n 169 101 166 166 n 140 140 136 136 
Constant -9.22 -11.97 -5.69 -6.70 Constant 
- - -
-16.72 
(2.835) (4.599) (2.64) (2.84) (7.183) 
LAGE" - - - LAGE, - - -
LEsmall., 4.12 4.98 4.24 4.44 1e93, 
- - -
0.25· 
(.993) (1.625) (1.055) (1.038) (1.345) 
3.08 3.62 3.21 3.22 
LEmedium .. (.724) (l.122) (.762) (.756) 
LElarge., 2.62 3.35 2.69 2.72 
(.588) (.992) (.614) (.612) 
DMICRO •• - -4.23 - - DMICRO, - . -
- -(1.72) 
DCAPM •• - - - - DCA PM, 
- - - -
D8SS75 •• -2.44 -2.65· -2.03· -2.68 D8SS7S, 
- - - -(.946) (1.54) (1.134) (1.151) 
DJIT •• - - - - DJIT, - - - -
DCOT •• - - - - DCOT. - - - -
DCNC •• - - - - DCNC, 2.43 - 5.29 . (1.027) (1.901) 
-
DCAD, 
- - - -
-
DM-PROD, -1.86 
-
. 
-(0.728) 
-
R&D93, 
- -
4.71 5,88 
- (2.729) (2.746) 
-
GROUP93. -1.43 
- - -(0.620) 
-
IBATCH, . 
- - -
PSI, ... PSS, n.s. 
-
n.s. n.s 
EX20 •• - - - - EX20, - - - -
Icnuh, 
- - - -
ISHI •• n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. SHI, 
- -
n.s. n.s. 
ISH2 •• -0.79 - ·2.07 -1.82 SH2, 
- -
-1.67 
-(.378) (.641) (0,654) (0.682) 
ISH3 •• -0.75· - -2.16 -\.75 SH3, 
- - - -(.399) (.656) (.667) 
ISH4 •• -\.01· - -2.12 - SH4, 
- -
n,l. n.s. 
(.460) (.838) 
LSH5 .. -0.81 -/.0/ -2.05 -\.80 SH5, 
- - - -(.382) (.529) (.638) (.640) 
LSH6" -1.01 -/.45 -2.26 -1.97 SH6, - - n.s. n.s. (.460) (.628) (,684) (.698) 
LSH7 •• - -2.01 -1048 SH7, 
- - - -(.620) (.627) 
LSH8 •• -0.95 -1.25 -2.38 -1.86 SH8. 
- - - -(0401 ) (.580) (.666) (.665) 
LSH9 •• -0.65· - -1.92 -1.62 SH9, -
- - -(.373) (.618) (.625) 
LSHIO •• -1.00 -1.31 -2.31 -\.96 SHlO. 
- - - -(.422) (.644) (.673) (.668) 
LSHII" n.S. -\.62 -1.26 SHll, -
- - -(.612) (.623) 
LSH I 2 •• - - -1.25 - SHll, 
- - - -(.633) 
LSH13 •• -0.94 -1.24 -2.30 -1.92 SH13, 
- - - -(.472) (.620) (.708) (.720) 
LSHIS" - - n.s. n.s. SHIS, - - n.s. n,s 
Log-Uk -44.25 -25.67 -123.22 Log-Llk 
-53.40 
- -68.49 
L-ratio(x.2) 81.20 77.70 104.85 L-ratio(x.2) 85.45 
- 137.38 
NOTE: The vanables wIthout star are slgmficant between 0 and 5% SIgnificant level; * slgmficant between 6 and 
7%; standard errors in brackets; n.s. not specified; X2 is the calculated Likelihood ratio test that all the 
coefficients are zero 
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Time Versus Space Dimension of the Determinants of Adoption 
Using the cross-sectional dimension (t=1993) instead of the time (t=t j) dimension 
specification of the SC equation, the results are quite different. First of all the model 
only converges if the total sample is restricted to the sample of current users and non 
adopters, with the exclusion of those firms that, despite having in the past adopted the 
new technology, are no longer using it in 199314• Column 4 in Table 7.3.a shows the 
results of the binary choice Logit model specification. 
None of the effects significant in the previous time dimension specification are 
significant. In 1993 the probability to be an adopter is inversely related to the 
probability of belonging to an industrial group (GROUP93) and to have introduced 
micro-processors into the production processes (DMICRO). In 1993 none of the 
epidemic, while only a few stock variables, with opposite signs, are significant. 
Moreover, the number of firms that are still using NC have already adopted also CNC 
(DCNC) . This is a clear indicator that the adopters of NC are independent 
establishments that are slowly undertaking the process of technology substitution of 
NC with CNC and microprocessors. 
Table 7.3.b. column 4, shows the estimates of the corresponding technology 
replacement equation. Contrary to. the estimate of the probability to first adopt the 
new technology, the introduction of microprocessors (~DM_PRoc=O.91) and CNC 
(~DCNc=1.81) in the production system of the firm does increase the probability to use 
NC, as it does whether the firm is export oriented (~Ex2o=1.01). 
14 In the sample there are no firms owning 100% of the technology. So the sample of 
extreme users is restricted only to the no longer user of the technology. 
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Intra-industry stock effects are significant but of the 'wrong' sign via the level of 
current users in Industry 5 and 7 , i.e. Mechanical Handling equipment and 
Agricultural Machinery and contractors plant and machinery (PsHs=O.52 and 
PSH7=0.47). 
The model also shows the significance of epidemic effects, such as the years from the 
'within industry' date of first adoption (PLNcsH=1.19) and the years between first 
appearance of the technology and first adoption (PLYNc=-4.44). However, its 
coefficient shows the wrong sign indicating that later adopters of NC use the 
technology less extensively than early adopters (moreover, their joint significance is 
only accepted at a 6% significance level (x,2=5.473». 
It also emerges that old firms are less likely to extensively use NC (PLAGE=-l). 
Within the price effect only the impact of the growth rate of the price of NC 
technology is slightly significant (PLDNC=1.77*). The theory would predict that PLDNC 
should equal minus one. This hypothesis cannot be accepted (x,2 = 8.057) contrary to 
the hypothesis that PLDNc=1 (x,2 =0.622). The explanation for this is that contrary to 
other technologies whose quality adjusted price decreases over time, the price of NC 
increases due to the obsolescence of the product. NC machines require cards , rather 
than computerised control as in the advanced version CNC. Moreover, as pointed out 
by Geoff Noon from the UK Technology Machine Tools Association, NC is now only 
available in the second hand market and its (quality adjusted) price increase reflects 
the obsolescence of the technologyts. This is also reflected by the insignificance of 
the price of NC with respect to the existing technologies (QNQTOT) as well as the 
IS see footnote 1 
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absence of uncertainty related to further investments in NC. A further test on the 
relative contribution of price effect upon the total variability of the model (i.e. J-test 
for subset of coefficients) leads one to reject the hypothesis that prices significantly 
'affect the spread of adoption on NC (estimated fitted values t=O.76). 
From this model specification one would conclude that what affects technology 
replacement are mainly rank effects related to the technological characteristics of the 
production system of the firm. Those firms export oriented (EX20) and young firms 
(LNCY) that have recently adopted NC are more likely to extensively use NC. The 
only other significant factors are the technological characteristics of the production 
system and a few within industry share of users and epidemic effects. In none of the 
, models presented so far, the variables accounting for prices significantly affect the 
intra finn diffusion ofNC. 
The cross-sectional dimension of the SC specification has yielded coefficients 
significantly different from the time dimensional specification. This is due to the 
different specification of the latent variable and to the different samples used in 
testing the models. This makes it impossible to compare the two models. 
The process of NC technology replacement is difficult to model as it represents an 
obsolete technology at the end or close to the end of the diffusion process. Most of 
the problems are the consequences of the high number of adopters and the marginal 
level of use of the new technology leading to lack of robustness of the estimates. 
The several steps of the testing procedure, it has emerged that the probability to adopt 
NC follows the Logistic curve (with Normality assumption the estimators do not 
converge). However, it is very difficult to determine what are the determinants of intra 
firm adoption. They cannot be uniquely defined as they change with the model 
specification and with the definition of the variables. 
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Table 7.3.b. The Technology Replacement Equation: NC 
Time t/iMelfsi."aI speciflCllli",. _I the SC ell"Gtio" (t-d) C,oss-ucti.na/ .p«IjlclltUJn 0/'.' SC 'quttl/on (,..1) 
I 1 3 4 5 6 
Mod.1 L.tiJ L",iJ MULTI-SS Mod.1 LIllie LIllie MULTI-SS 
Sampl. Tota/firMs Curren' users. Total Users Sample Choice Total Users CU"tnt Users Ust.r • 
Choice ... - 1 ... - 1 ... - 1 ... - 1 ... - 1 
... - 11 ... - 2 
1/ 47 47 59 n 61 61 59 
ConSIIRt 
- Constant 
LDNC. LDNC, 1.77' /. 5 / 
(.976) (.7/9) 
LDTOT. 1.23' LDTOT, -(.915) 
QNQTOT. -0.004 QNQTOT, 
(.014) 
LBATCH. LBATCH, 
CROUP93. CROUP93, -
R&D93. 1.36 1.21 R&D9J, 
( .550) (.53 /) 
LE93 .. LE93, 
DLE. maU. n.S. ".s n .• DLElmall, n.s. 
DLEmrdiumtt n.s. ".S n .• DLEmfdium l n.s. 
DLElng • • n.S. I/ .S n.s LEla" ., n.S. 
EX20. EXZO, 1.01 0.50' 
(.329) (.0/4) 
LTURNOVE RZ Y. n.S. II .S LTURNOVERZY, n.s. 
PL9091 . PL909I, n.S. 
DCAD . DCAD, -0.818 
(.34/) 
DCAPM. DCAPM, 
DM-PROD. 2.28 1.3/ DM-PROD, 0.91' 
(.376) (.643) (.485) 
DJ IT. DJIT, 
DTQM . n.s. n.s. DTQM, n.s. -
DBSS7S. 1.48 / .73 DBSS7S, 
(.598) (.555) 
DM ICRO. DMICRO, 
DCOT . DCOT, 
DCNC. 1.73 DCNC, 1.8 1 / .61 
(.974) (.878) (.116) 
DRO BOT. n.5. DROBOT, n.s. " • .1. 
r S I . -1.39 ' PSI , 11 .5 . 
(.843) 
PSZ. -1.50' PSZ, 1.096' 
(.795) (.6/4) 
PS3. PSJ, 
P54. PS4, 
PSS" n .S. n.s. n.s. PS5, -
LACE. LACE, -1.00 
(.363) 
LNCS II R. n.s. LNCSHR, 1.1 9' -
(.649) 
LNCV. 11 .5 . LNCY, -4.44 -].05 
(1.987) (.8 78) 
LTNC. n.5. LTNC, n.s. 
Ll FOUT9J. n.s n.s. n.s. LlFOUT93, n.s. 
LAMBDA 1.08 ' LAM BDA 
(.619) 
s ill ... 1.19' II .S. sh i t II .S. 
(. 795) 
• hZ.I,hJ. ,hZ.,I,hl • 
sh4tl n.S. II ,S. II .S. ,h4, n.s. t' .S. 
sh5" 1.01 0.99 , hS, 0 .52' 0.48 
( 361) (.199) (.302) 
sh6" 11.1. . h6, 
sh71.1 107 0.96 . h7, 0.47 0.30 ( 444) (.399) (.217) 
5h81.1 , h8, 
5h9,. 0.85 0.73 , h9, 
( 328) (.154) 
shl0 1.l . h lO, - -0.48 
!li hll . 1.1 6 1.05 I hl l . 
( 457) (.375) 
sh12 l.1 1 05 0.88 sh lZl -
( 400) (.354) 
sh l 3" '0 69' 0.60' sh l3. ( 404) (.344) 
shl S" ".s. , hiS, II .S. 
R] 0 89 0.91 R2 0.55 0.70 
R2c o 15 0.18 R2c ·0. 13 0.14 
LGg-L 27 06 30.80 -67.58 LGg-L -44.07 
-58 .58 
F 1 21 I .U 1.02 F 0.80 1.52 
, NO [ E: varIables WIthout star slgmficant between 0 and 5% slgmficant level; * slgmficant between 6% 
and 7% . ** significant at 8%; standard errors in brackets ; n.s. not specified 
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However, as one would expect from an obsolete technology, the price effects are no 
longer the main detenninants of adoption. They are rarely significant and if they are, 
they show the 'wrong' sign. The same applies to the stock effects. In same cases, 
some technological conditions are significant. However, this results should not be so 
surprising as NC is an obsolete technology that is slowly moving (by obsolescence) 
towards its post diffusion stage. 
In fact, the joint significance of the variables cannot be rejected in any of the models 
presented so far (F -test in table). 
7.3.3. The Replacement Process of Microprocessors Incorporated into Processes 
Microprocessors incorporated into processes (Micro-p) appeared on the UK market at 
the beginning of the seventies. By 1993, similar to CNC, it has been adopted by about 
76% of the British engineering and manufacturing finns in the CURDS sample. 
However, the spread of use of Micro-p has occurred at a slower and more constant 
rate than CNC and it has been differently affected by the market and finn 
technological conditions. About 66% of the current users report that the proportion of 
the machine tool stock incorporating CoT technology is less than 30%. Only 7 % have 
a proportion in excess of 70 %~ among them only 2% are using 100% of the 
technology. 
The Selection Criterion equation: Probit vs Logit Model Specification 
The first model specification looks at the shape of the probability for a firm to be an 
adopter inlby 1993. The time dependent specification of the SC equation indicates 
that both Logit and Pro bit specification model the data equally well (pseudo ~2=0. 70 
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and R/=O.68). In fact, the predicted probability of the two models is exactly the same, 
except for two observations. Consequently, the assumption of Normality cannot be 
rejected. The joint significance of all the coefficients of the Probit specification are 
highly significant (L-ratio (;(2)= 77.37) 
The parameter estimates of the Probit specification (see column 1 in table 7.4.a) show 
that among the rank effects, what determines the decision to first adopt Micro are: 
size, age and both technological and managerial characteristics of the establishment. 
In particular the smaller is the firm at years just before adoption the less likely is to 
use Micro-p (LEsmall) while medium firms (LEmedium) are more likely than large 
firms (LElarge) to adopt Micro-p in their production processes. 
The older 'is the establishment at time of adoption the less likely is to adopt the 
technology (YmicST). Among the adoption of the other technologies, it is significant 
whether, at time of first adoption, the firm has already introduced NC tools. 
Moreover, firms that have already introduced COT tools (DCoT) and have adopted 
TQM management innovation (DTQM) are less likely to adopt Microprocessors in 
their production processes. 
The within share of adopters at time of adoption, i.e. stock/order effect, is significant 
only for two industrial sectors: sector 5 and 9 which are respectively mechanical 
Handling Equipment and Industrial Plants and Machinery. 
The Technology Replacement Equation with Probit sample selection correction factor 
The estimates of the TR equation corrected for the Selection Criterion effect are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 7.4.b. The empirical estimates show that both price 
and rank effects do affect the speed of technology replacement. The introduction of a 
new technology is higher the greater is the change (reduction) in its price (~LDQM =-
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0.24) and the lower is the reduction in the cost of the existing technology 
(PLDQTOT=2.69). The intra finn model would indicate that in the absence of price 
expectations the coefficient of both prices equals, in absolute value, 1. This 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the price of the existing technologies (PLDQTOT: 
X2=2.249) while it is rejected for the price of Micro (PLDQM: X2=4.369). This would 
indicate that the finn fonnulates its investment decision upon expectations about 
future prices of the new technology, but not for the existing set of technologies. 
The difference between the relative rate of change in its price and the price of the 
existing technology (PQDTM= -0.29) is significant. Its coefficient reflects the impact of 
uncertainty, interest and devaluation of the existing capital stock, i.e. (r+o+1I2cr2Pl). 
This means that in absence of uncertainty PQDTM should equal (r+8), i.e. 0.075. This 
hypothesis cannot be accepted (X2=14.4) implying that uncertainty affects the 
investments decision. One can further calculate the marginal impact of uncertainty 
(l12cr2pI} after subtracting from PQDTM the estimate of the interest rate and 
depreciation, (r+8). This yields an estimate average uncertainty (1I2cr2Pl) of 0.215. 
The joint significance of the price effect (J-test: PQDTM =~QDTot =~QM-TOT=O) would also 
indicate that it significantly contributes to the explanation of the total variability of the 
model (t=7.992) and its inclusion leads to an increase in the goodness of fit (R2) from 
0.68 to 0.78. 
As in the decision to become an adopter the younger is the establishment the more 
likely it is to use Micro-p extensively (L YSTURTUP=-2.07).The size effect is 
significant only for small finns (~DLEsmal1 =-0.53) and its sign is negative.It is also 
significant whether the finn does in house R&D (PR&D=-3.07) and whether it belongs 
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to a group (~GR0UP93= 1.09). Also the financial position in years just before 1993 plays a 
significant role (~LTURNOVER2Y = 0.42). Among the other rank effect the characteristics of 
the production system playa relevant role such as: the dimension of the average batch 
size (~BATCH= -0.19), whether the finn has introduced technological innovations 
(~DCOT=-I.48, ~DCNc=2.14, ~DCAD= 1.59) , managerial innovations (~DJIT=-0.91; 
~DTQM=2.44; ~DBS57S=-0.92) and whether the finn has the production system 
characteristics Make to stock (~ps3=-1.58), Job shop (~PS4=3.14) and Mixed systems 
(~ps5=-1.33). 
The within industry share of users, i.e. stock effect is significant only for sector 6 and 
12, which are respectively General Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Machinery. 
However, if the industry effects are specified separately from the within industry 
number of users, the first are still significant while the second are totally 
insignificant. 
The sample selection effect, i.e. LAMBDA, is not significant. 
In summary, one can conclude that what detennines the extensive use of this new 
technology are rank and stock effects via the relative cost of the technology, while 
epidemic effects are absent. 
Censoring effects in the TR equation. 
The preliminary investigation of the magnitude of the censoring is carried out by 
visual inspection, comparing the previous results for the total sample of finns with 
those obtained using only the sample of current users (excluding from the SS equation 
those finns that are using 0% and 100% of the new technology). 
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The parameters of the reduced sample estimates of the corrected TR equation do show 
slightly lower but not significantly different values than in the unrestricted case (see 
Table 7.4.a column 1). This is confirmed by the plotting of the predictive value of the 
two models which yield exactly the same result and by the goodness of fit of the 
Sample Criterion (R/=O.7 and Ru2 =O.68) and Technology Replacement equation 
(R/=R}=O.78). 
Table 7.4.a. Time dimension specification of the SC equation: Micro-Processors 
I 1 3 
Model Probit Probit Logit Logit Multi-SS 
Sample Tota/firms Current Tota/firms Current To/nlfirms 
Usen Use" 
Choice zit=1 ziI=1 zit=1 zit=1 zit"'l ziI=2 
N 158 138 158 138 158 158 
Constant 3.46 2.86 5.93 4.84 5.09 S.27 
(.981) (1.051) (1.756) (1.84) (1.809) (2.993) 
-0.79 -0.72 -1.34 -1.21 -1.21 -1.87 
LYSTURTUP •• (.264) (283) (.460) (.450) (.472) (.604) 
LEsmall •• -0.13 -0.12 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 
-(.044) (.048) (.078) (.084) (.080) 
LEmedium .. 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.63 
(.070) (0.071) (.129) (.128) (.129) (.369) 
LElarge •• 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.20 -
(.044) (.048) (.078) (.084) (.670) 
DCAPM'I - - - - -
DBSS7Stl - - - - - -
DJIT'I - - - - - -
DTQM .. -1.03 - - - - -
(.623) 
DCOT •• -0.63 -0.62· -1.05 -1.04* -1.\0 -
(.360) (.372) (.624) (.642) (.640) 
DNCtl 0.78 0.82 1.27 1.36 1.34 -(.387) (.411) (.677) (.721) (.701 ) 
DCNC'I - 0.60* (.370) 
- - - -
Ishl.l - - -
Ish3 •• - - -
LshStl -0.30 - -0.53 - -0.61 -(.183) (.312) (.345) 
Lsh678.1 - - - - - -
Lsh9tl -0.38 -0.37 -0.65 -0.61 -0.65 -(.142) (.142) (.253) (.249) (.345) 
LshlOtl - - - - - -
Lshll.. - - - - - -
Lshgrouptl - -0.26 - -0.43 - -(.150) (.261) 
Log-Lik -60.69 -54.94 -61.26 -55.49 
-101.01 
L-ratio (Xl) 77.37 71.93 76.24 70.82 99.81 
NOTE: variables without star significant between 0 and 5% significant level; ·significant at 6%; 
standard error in brackets. n.s. not specified; -i = calculated Likelihood ratio test that all the 
coefficients are zero. 
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From this preliminary intuitive approach, one could say that the impact of censoring is 
not significant as almost no firms are using extreme values of micro-po 
The multinomial selection rule allows one to explicitly modelling the censoring in the 
first step of the model (i.e. SC Equation). This specification shows a higher 
explanatory power ofthe total variability of the model (R2=0.79 -R2c= 0.26) (see Table 
7.4.a. column 5). 
The censoring correction shows that, in 1993, the probability of extensively using the 
technology is determined by the same factors as in the binomial model. However, the 
size of the coefficients of those firms that decide to currently use the technology in 
1993 are slightly higher than in the binomial case. Also in this case the significant 
positive effects are the size of the firm and whether the firm uses NC, and significant 
negative effects are related to the age of the establishment and whether the finn has 
already adopted CoT. There is also evidence of stock/order effects within Industry 5 
(i.e. Mechanical Handling equipment) and 9 (industrial (including process) plant and 
steelworks). 
The Sample selection criterion hints that those firms more likely to currently using the 
new technology are relatively young and medium sized firms. The adoption of Micro 
is only affected by whether the firm already owns NC and CoT. 
The correction for censoring also shows that the probability to move to the extremes 
of the technology adoption (Le. 0% or 100%) is significant only for medium size 
finns (~IEmcdium=O.63) and it is inversely related to age (~LAGE =-1.87). This would 
suggest that the technology is still widely in use and few factors affect its dismissal. 
The technology replacement equation yields results consistent with the previous 
model specifications. What determines the further extent of use of a new technology is 
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both rank and price effects. Among the rank effects the significant variables are: 
composition of theexisting'''set of technologies, average batch size, managerial 
innovation, characteristics of the production system, financial position of the firm in 
years before 1993 and whether the finn belongs to a group. It also shows that size is 
not relevant except for small firms that are less likely to extensively using the new 
technology. 
The variables accounting for the price effect are also significant and their joint 
significance can be rejected (Ho: I3wMicroo=I3LDToT=l3wM-ToT=O, J-test:t=11.S3). 
Moreover, they joint specification in the technology replacement equation increases 
the goodness of fit of the model (R2) from 0.72 to 0.78 and lowers the max likelihood 
from -28.71 to -16.67. 
The price effects also indicate that there exist expectations about the price of the new 
technology (Ho:I3WQM=-I, x,2=0.042) but not about the price of the existing 
technologies (Ho:l3wToT=I, x,2=2.216). Also uncertainty, even if not as large as for 
CNC, does significantly affect (Ho:I3LM_Tor=-O.07S, x,2=14.23) the decision to further 
invest on Micro and equals 0.185. 
Finally, the model predicts that Industry effects are significant for industry 6 and 12, 
while the hypothesis of stock effects has been rejected, given the insignificance of the 
separate estimate oflndustry and share of adoption effects. 
In none of the specifications the epidemic effects or the Sample Criterion\Effect 
(lambda) tum out to be significant. 
287 
Table 7.4.b. Time dimension specification of the TR equation: Micro-Processors 
I Z 3 4 5 
Probll SS Probil SS Lolli SS LoIIISS Mulli-SS 
Tfltttljl,.. Usa TOlal firms Ulen Total finns 
"ita I Zil-I Zit-I 
.-54 
Zit- I Zit-I ZiI-2 
Coastlnt 
- - - - -
- - -
..•. .... 
LDQM -0.24 -024 -O.U -0.13 -0.24 -0.24 -O.lJ -0.13 ..0.36 
..0.36 
(.122) (.122) (.115) (.115) (.206) (.206) (.1/6) (.//6) (.116) (.116) 
LDQTOT 2.69 2.69 1.67 1.67 2.71 2.71 2.69 1.69 2.66 2.66 
(.122) (.122) (1.115) (1.115) (1.140) (1.140) (1./35) (I.m) (1.01) (1.01) 
QDM-TOT -0.29 -0.29 -0.19 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.19 -0.19 -0.31 ..031 
(2.709) (2.709) (.083) (.083) (.084) (.084) (.084) (.084) (.084) (.084) 
LBATCH -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -1.91 -1.91 -0.11 
-0.11 
(.085) (.OB5) (.083) (.083) (.085) (.085) (.083) (.083) (.21>4) (.264) 
GROUF91 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.13 1.13 
(.322) (.322) (.309) (.309) (.322) (.322) (.3/5) (.315) (.304) (.304) 
R&D93 -3.01 -3.07 -3.06 -3.06 -3.09 -3.09 -3.09 -3.09 
-3.21 -3.21 
(.663) (.663) (.658) (.658) (.663) (.663) (.668) (.668) (.644) (.644) 
LE .... U -0.52 -0.52 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.5J -O.H -0.54 ·0.14 
(.253) (.253) (.150) (.150) (.253) (.253) (.1jJ) PH) (.234) (.234) 
LEmedlum (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.11) (-0.11) 
(.133) (.133) (.119) (.IJ9) (.133) (.133) (132) (132) (.120) (.120) 
LEI.rp (0.08) (0.08) (O.IO) (O.IO) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
(.149) (.149) (.144) (.144) (.149) (.149) (.141) (.141) (.144) (.144) 
EXlO 
- - - - - - - - -
Lturnover2y 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.39 
(.206) (.206) (.101) (.101) (.206) (.206) (.101) (.J01) (.204) (.204) 
CAPM 
- - - - - - -
MPROD 
- - - - - - - - -
JIT -0.91 -0.91 -0.87 -0.67 -0.92 -0.92 -0.90 -0.90 -096 ..0.96 
(.386) (.386) (.J61) (.J61) (.386) (.386) (.3/5) (.J/5) (.347) (.341) 
TQM 2.44 2.44 2.41 1.41 2.46 2.46 2.U 1.U 2.50 2.SO 
(.419) (.419) (.406) (.406) (.419) (.419) (.668) (.668) (.407) (.407) 
DBS!1! -0.92 -0.92 -0.93 -0.9J -0.93 -0.93 -0.95 -0.9' -0.97 -0.97 
(.394) (.394) (.40J) (.40J) (.394) (.394) (.407) (.407) (.388) (.388) 
DCAD 1.59 1.59 1.S5 1.55 1.61 1.61 1.58 1.58 1.69 1.69 
(.S2S) (.S2S) (.506) (.506) (.525) (.525) (.S14) (.514) (.504) (.504) 
DCNC 2.14 2.14 1.10 2.10 2.11 2.11 2.U 1.U 2.41 2.41 
(.813) (.873) (.841) (.841) (.173) (.873) (.860) (.860) (.783) (.783) 
DCOT -1.41 -1.48 -1.49 -1.49 -1.41 -1.47 -1.47 -1.47 -1.39 -1.39 
(.412) (.412) (.411) (.411) (.412) (.412) (.4/7) (.4/7) (.391) (.391) 
DNC 
- - - - - - -
-1.45 -1.45 
(.136) (.136) 
ROBOT 
- - - - - - - - -
<-
PSI 
- - - - - - - - -
<-
PSJ -1.58 -I.SB -1.56 _1.59 -1.S9 -1.59 -1.'7 -1.57 -1.70 -1.70 
(.57B) (.S7B) (.571) (.57B) (.'7B) (.578) (.576) (.$76) (.504) (.504) 
PS4 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.16 3.16 3.16 J.17 J./7 3.22 3.22 
(.149) (.749) (.750) (.749) (.749) (.749) (.7'6) (.7'6) (.738) (.138) 
PS5 -1.33 -1.33 -I.n -1.35 -US -1.35 -1.14 -1.14 -1.42 -1.42 
(.125) (.125) (.719) (.125) (.125) (.125) (.719) (.719) (.100) (.100) 
LAGE -2.07 -2.07 -2.09 -2.08 -2.08 -2.08 -1.08 -J.08 -1.14 -1.74 
(.347) (.347) (.J46) (.347) (.347) (.347) (.348) (.348) (.821) (.821) 
Lhuen 
-
II.S. 
-
.... 
-
n .•. 
-
R.I. 
-
II.' . 
05 -2.69 n .•. -].61 If.'. -2.70 n ... -2.64 u. n ... -2.92 
(.958) (.931) (.958) (.944) (.878) 
06 -5.14 a .•. -5.82 It.I. -5.86 n .•. -5.87 " ... n .•. -6.38 
(1.416) (1.416) (1.42) (1.431) (1.355) 
09 -1.47 n ... -1.46 ".,. -1.48 n .•. -1.44 ".1. n .•. -1.51 
(.136) (.711) (.736) (.730) (.114) 
DlO -1.14 ft .•. -1.5, ,1.1. -1.14 n.s. -J.J5 n.l. n .•. -1.72 
(.691) (.686) (.963) (.691) (.686) 
011 -2.16 n.l. -1.66 ",1. -2.76 n .•. -1.7J ,..,. n .•. -3.05 
(.963) (.939) (.963) (.9.56) (.928) 
011 -7.11 n.l. -6.99 .... -7.11 n.l. -7.09 H.I. n.' . -1.60 
(1.586) (1 . .564) (I.5B6) (1 . .59) (1.500) 
LAMBDA 
- - - - -
-
- - - -
• b6 n.l. -1.47" IU • -1.43 n.'. -1.48 ,1.1. -1.4.5 -1.75 n.'. 
(.842) (.8J9) (.842) (1.506) 
shl1 n.s. -1.83 n.l. -/.78 n .•. -1.85 H.J. -1.61 -2.12 n .•. 
(.844) (.817) (.844) (1.509) 
liZ 0.78 <- 0.78 <- 0.78 <- 0.78 <- 0.79 <-
112c 0.13 <- 0.14 <- 0.14 <- 0.1l <- 0.26 <-
LoC-L -16.62 <- -1641 <- -16.58 <.. -16.62 <- -S008 <-
F 242 2.42 1.4~ 2. SO 
NOTE: variables shown are all significant between 0 and 5% significant level; standard error in 
brackets; n.s. not specified 
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Time V s space specification of the Sample Selection model specification 
The time versus space specification does not yield good results. 
Whether the SC equations are binomial or multinomial, the coefficients are hardly 
significant, except for the adoption of CAD (~CAD=O.35) and the possession of 
BS5750lIS09000 accreditation (~DBSS7S=O.20). Moreover, in the second step of the 
model, none of the lambda's (selection correction factors) are significant. For this 
reason the results are omitted. Thus in this case as well, the time dimension 
specification has been shown to be superior to the space dimension specification of 
the determinants of first adoption. 
In summary, the testing of Micro-p has shown that the probability to become an 
adopter is Normally distributed. The model estimates are 'consistent across 
specifications and what determines the replacement of the old with the new is mostly 
driven by Rank and price effects. There is no evidence of Epidemic or other stock 
effects and the extent of use of a technology is independent of the decision to adopt a 
new technology. As for CNC, the intra firm technology replacement model has been 
shown to reasonably well explain the heterogeneity in the level of use of 
Microprocessors for a sample of UK British and manufacturing firms. 
7.4. Summary ofthe results 
The technology replacement model has been used to model the adoption pattern of 
three technologies available in the CURDS data set (CNC, NC, Micro-p). The final 
empirical estimates indicate that the theoretical intra firm model can explain the 
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process of technology substitution of the old with the new technology, for two out of 
three technologies. They are Computerised Numerically Controlled and 
Microprocessors incorporated into processes. 
The testing of the Numerically Controlled tool machine case is very problematic. It 
often yields inconsistent parameter estimates, wrong sign for the coefficients and most 
importantly never explains a relevant proportion of total variability (see joint 
significance of the coefficients). This has to be related to the fact that NC appeared on 
the market in 1955 and in 1993, after about 40 years, only few firms are still using it. 
Being an obsolete technology, most of the current users are dismissing its use in their 
production system and introducing more advanced technologies, like for example 
CNC. Consequently NC can no longer be considered an advanced technology as 
required by the intra-firm model. NC is rather a technology that has reached its post 
diffusion stage and is no longer sold on the market (except the second hand market). 
The high presence of ex-users has in fact led to the rejection of the hypothesis of 
Normality of the probability of adoption. Also the overall extremely low level of 
ownership has created several problems in the testing of the model, such as the non-
convergence of the estimators or parameters inconsistent across the different model 
specifications. This is mostly because we were trying to model the introduction of 
further technology instead of its dismissal, which, given the irreversibility of the 
investments, occur in the theory only by obsolescence. Moreover, NC machines are 
out of production. They can be bought only in the second hand market. That is 
probably why none of the variables accounting for the stock, or price effects, are 
relevant. It also explains why the determinants of adoption were not consistently 
significant. 
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In the case of CNC and Micro-p the empirical results are very satisfactory. For both 
technologies the probability to become an adopter (Le. the sample selection criterion) 
is Normally distributed, and using the time or space specification of the independent 
variables does not significantly affect the estimates of the corrected technology 
transfer equation. In fact, the sample selection correction factor (LAMBDA) is never 
significant ,whatever specification of the sample selection model is used. This 
suggests that the extent of use of the new technology is independent of the decision to 
first adopt the new technology. Confinning the prediction of Chapter 2, to become an 
adopter does not necessarily imply to be an extensive user (even if both effects are 
necessary to the spread of the use of a new technology). 
Table 7.5. The determinants of the Intra Firm Technology Replacement 
Rank effect: 
-Adoption of other technologies 
-Managerial innovation 
-Production system 
- Liquidity 
- Size 
- Within industry effects 
CNC 
Micro in processes (+) 
Micro in products (-) 
CAD (+), Robot (+) 
Make to order 
Small firm (E<50) (+) 
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Micro in processes 
Micro in products (-) 
CAD (+), CNC(+), COT(-) 
Just in time (-) 
Total quality management (+) 
BS575 Quality Accreditation (-) 
All but Make to order (various) 
Average batch size (+) 
Average Turnover 
Small firm (E<50) (-) 
15, 16, 19,11 0,111,112 
- Other R&D (+), 
Export(-) 
Group (+), R&D (-), Group (+), Age (-) 
Price effect: 
-growth rate (dqo) significant (+) 
- growth rate (dqn) significant (-) 
_ relative difference[qn/dqn- significant 
qn/dqn] 
- Uncertainty (Y20"2p I) 
- Expectations (Y3=forec. error) 
Epidemic effects 
Inter firm Stock effects 
Sample selection LAMBDA 
significant (0.4) 
new technology Yn= 1.5 
old technology Yo=O 
(shIO) 
significant (+) 
significant (-) 
significant 
significant (0.2) 
new technology Yn= -0.8 
old technology Yo=I.66 
(sh6, shl2) 
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The estimates of the Technology Replacement equation confirm the predictions of the 
intra firm model presented in Chapter, suggesting that what determines the 
replacement of the old with the new technology are price and rank effects. For both 
technologies, in both models these two effects are highly significant. They are firm 
and technology specific and they are also consistent across the different specifications 
used in the model specification. They are summarised in Table 7.5. 
The rank effects reflect the core competencies arid the technological characteristics of 
the production system of the firm. For CNC they would indicate that extensive users 
are small firms, doing in house R&D, not very export oriented and with production 
systems that make to order. 
Micro tends to be adopted more extensively by younger and larger firms, not export 
oriented, not doing internal R&D and without quality accreditation. Its adoption is 
influenced by the financial position of the firm in previous years and, contrary to 
CNC, is compatible with different production system. 
The empirical estimates have also shown that, for both CNC and Micro, the intensity 
of adoption is not independent of the adoption of the other technologies, whose 
significance and sign are technology specific. This indicates that technological 
compatibility and cumulative knowledge from the experience of previous 
technologies playa relevant role in the extent of use of a new technology. Among the 
rank effects, whether the firm belongs to an industrial group has tum out highly 
significant and positive in both technologies. This confirms the predictions of 
Cainarca et al. (1990) indicating that firms belonging to large groups do show higher 
rates of adoption than independent firms. 
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Also the price effect, as predicted by the intra finn model, is highly significant in 
determining the current level of use of the technologies. The coefficients are all 
significant and of the right sign. 
The hypothesis of expectations about the price of the advanced technology (CNC 
!MICRO) cannot be rejected, while they do not seem to hold for the prices of the 
existing capital stock. 
Also uncertainty about future market conditions has turned out to be significant for 
both technologies (slowing down the diffusion of CNC and fastening the diffusion of 
Micro-processors). This, together with the price expectations, seems to significantly 
affect the process of technology replacement. 
As predicted by the intra finn model, none of the epidemic effects affect the intra finn 
diffusion process. The same can be said for inter-firm stock effects, whose 
significance disappears if substituted with industry dummies effects. The reasons for 
this is that the stock effects are already picked up by the intra finn model. The 
information spreading mechanism, suggested by the epidemic effects, does not 
explain the dynamic of technology replacement, while the rank effects are highly 
significant. This confirms the hypothesis that it is the capability of the firm to process 
information, via its own core competencies (i.e. finn specificity), and not the amount 
of information, that is the right learning mechanism. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has tested the new intra finn model of technology replacement presented 
in this thesis. The estimating procedure has required some statistical caveats due to 
the characteristics of both model specification and the data set. 
The intra finn model looks at the detenninants of technology replacement from a 
point immediately after first adoption until the diffusion is completed for the finn . 
This implies that it is defined only for the current users of the new technology, with 
the exclusion of non adopters and extreme users, (i.e. those using 0%, but having 
used higher levels in the past) and 100% of the new technology). Consequently the 
model must be modified to take into account both the sample selection due to the 
exclusion of non adopters, as well as the censoring due to the exclusion of extreme 
users. 
The first type of problem has been overcome using the two step Heckman procedure 
(Heckman 1979) , the first step modelling the probability to be an adopter inlby 1993 , 
the second modelling the final estimating equation corrected by the sample selection 
factor derived in the first step of the model. One of the problems in using this 
approach is that both steps are defined simultaneously over the same infonnation set, 
causing overparametrization and endogeneity, and spurious significance of the sample 
selection correction factor and final parameters estimates. For this reason an 
alternative 'time dimensional' specification has been proposed based upon the fact 
that the adoption decision is irreversible and is detennined by the market and finn 
condition at the time the decision is taken. The second type of problem, i.e. the 
censoring, has been overcome using a multinomial specification for the selection 
criterion equation in the first step of the model. 
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After a meticulous testing of each step of the model specification, the empirical 
estimates have shown that the prediction of the new equilibrium intra firm model are 
correct and what determines the extensive use of a new technology are rank and price 
effects. The former are firm specific and reflect the core competencies of the firm 
such as: technological characteristics of the existing production system; management; 
production organisation; size; whether the firm do R&D, etc. The second is a function 
of price reduction, uncertainty and price expectations about the new technology. 
Contrary to the inter firm literature, this model suggests that epidemic type of learning 
does not effect the intra firm diffusion of a new technology. 
Among the other inter firm effects, the order effect does not apply to intra firm 
diffusion, while inter-firm stock effects, as expected, do not influence the process of 
technology substitution. In fact, as a further cross check, they were specified into the 
empirical model. However, when industry dummies are introduced, the effect of the 
stock variable vanishes. 
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Chapter 8. 
CONCLUSION 
In the economy one can observe many examples of the spread of new technology 
(where, by new technology we mean here a process innovation or an advanced cost-
reducing technology incorporated into capital goods). In most firms and for most 
technologies the time period between first use of a technology and 100 percent use of 
that technology, is often many years (see Stoneman and Karshenas (1995) for a 
survey). If one believes that technological progress is the key to success or in some 
cases survival for firms, why do they not immediately transfer all their production to 
the new technology, but instead wait? Why does the firm's replacement of old by the 
new technology take so long (and sometimes not even reach full completion)? 
This thesis is aimed at answering such questions by looking into the black box of the 
almost unexplored process of technology transfer at the firm level. 
The process by which the use and/or ownership of a new technology spreads over 
time has been the major interest of a specific research area traditionally referred to as 
technology diffusion. However, most of this literature is concerned with the inter-
firm diffusion of innovations, that is the process that leads firms to first adopt 
innovative technologies (See for example the game theoretical approach of 
Reinganum (1981), or Funderberger and Tirole (1985), also the empirical evidence 
provided by Colombo and Mosconi (1985) on the spread of ownership of flexible 
automative technologies, the several studies of Stoneman and various co-authors 
(1994, 1995, 1997,etc) on the spread ofNC, CoT and CNC, etc.). Intra-firm diffusion, 
that is the process determining the time path of use of a technology within a firm from 
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a point immediately after first use until diffusion is complete for that firm, has been . 
almost completely ignored. 
The paucity of suitable data for analysing the diffusion of this phenomenon is one of 
the main reasons why intra firm diffusion has been relatively ignored in the literature. 
The CURDS data set used in this thesis is one of the rare data sets that provides 
information on intra firm diffusion, in this case for a sample of 343 establishments in 
the UK Engineering and metalworking sector on the pattern of ownership and use 
over time of four technologies: Numerical control of metal cutting, forming or joining 
tools (NC); Computerised numerical control of metal cutting forming or joining tools 
(CNC); Coated Carbide or Ceramic Tools or Inserts for metal cutting (CoT); and 
Microprocessors incorporated in processes (MICRO). 
In Chapter two of this thesis it has been shown that if one is interested in the extent of 
use of a new technology in an industry then it is just as important to understand the 
development of technology use within the firm after first use (intra-firm diffusion) as 
it is to understand the pattern of first use across firms (inter-firm diffusion). Using the 
information in the CURDS data set, the differences between these two aspects of 
technology spreading has been shown. Inter-firm diffusion has been represented by 
the distribution of the number of firms that have adopted the new technology, with 
intra-firm diffusion by the extent of use of the new technologies by each firm in 1993. 
The main findings indicate that: i) the diffusion path across firms over time is 
technology specific and occurs at different speeds; ii) at each moment in time the 
level of new technology ownership across firms is quite heterogeneous. Consequently, 
if one wants to measure the industry benefits from a new technology, to look only at 
the number of adopters (inter firm diffusion) could be highly misleading (as each firm 
might produce only a very small proportion of its output with the new technology). 
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What detennines the total industry output produced with the new technology (and 
thus the industry benefits from adoption) is a combination of both the number of 
adopters (inter finn diffusion) and the proportion of output produced on the new 
technology by the adopters (intra finn diffusion). 
This chapter has also shown that in the early years of technology spreading, the inter 
firm effects exert a slightly greater impact on diffusion than intra finn effects, while 
the opposite is true for the remaining period. The impact of intra-firm diffusion on 
total industry output produced on the new technology is persistently greater than the 
inter firm level of adoption and its importance also greatly increases over time. For 
these reasons, and because the intra finn effect has been widely overlooked, this 
thesis has concentrated on the spread of the new technology within finns rather than 
the spreading across finns. 
Chapter three has looked at the limited literature upon intra finn diffusion where 
there are only two principle pieces of work: the Mansfield (1968) and the Stoneman 
(1981) models. As in many inter-finn diffusion studies, the Mansfield Model assumes 
that the spread of use of a new process embodied in a new capital good follows an S-
shaped curve and what detennines the spread of adoption over time is infonnation 
acquisition about the true perfonnance of the technology. This is basically a 
disequilibrium process driven by passive infonnation acquisition. Stoneman (1981) 
presents an alternative equilibrium learning model showing that diffusion is faster the 
greater is the true profitability of the new technology. However, despite the 
sophisticated theory, the Stoneman Model is intractable empirically. 
Using the infonnation in the CURDS data set, the predictions of the milestone 
Mansfield model have been tested empirically. The results reported in chapter 3 have 
shown that there is little support for the predictions of this seminal disequilibrium 
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model and that infonnation spreading explains only a small part of the observed 
diffusion pattern. This, together with other theoretical and empirical weaknesses, has 
led us to abandon this type of approach in favour of an alternative equilibrium 
approach incorporating the intra finn version of rank, stock, and epidemic effects. 
Those effects have been detennined for inter-finn studies (see Davies 1979, David 
1991, Reinganum 1981, Stoneman and Kwon 1998, Mansfield 1995, etc) but have 
never been applied before to intra finn studies. A preliminary empirical approach is 
based around the use of a Tobit model (Tobin, 1957) which takes into account the role 
of technology complementarities; it better exploits the infonnation in the CURDS 
sample and the censoring due to observations with zero use of technology (Le. ex 
users). The empirical estimates indicate that diffusion does not strictly follow a 
Logistic curve as suggested by Mansfield. Information spreading, it seems, is not the 
main determinant of the spread of adoption. The replacement of old with the new 
technology is better explained by an equilibrium approach, the factors that drive the 
intra-firm diffusion process of a new technology being basically time since first 
adoption, firm size, and other technologies in use. The results also suggest that as 
newer technologies are introduced, older technologies will be used less extensively. 
In essence this preliminary analysis suggests that what is significant in the 
determination of the use of a new technology within the firm are rank effects while 
there is some ambiguity as to whether epidemic effects also pick up stock effects. So, 
even if the Mansfield type epidemic effects are significant they are not the only 
determinants of adoption. 
The stock effect plays a major role in inter-firm studies and predicts that it is mainly 
profitability considerations and changes in the returns from adoption over time that 
determines the adoption of a new technology (see for example Reinganum, 1981a, 
1981b, 1983, Quirmbach, 1986,etc.). Similarly, one would expect that at the intra firm 
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level, for a given cost of the technology, what leads the firm to further invest in a new 
technology are mainly the expected profit gains from its extended use. If the expected 
benefits from adoption decrease with the within firm extent of use, they may be a 
disincentive to immediately replace all the existing capital with the more advanced 
type. On the contrary, ifprofits are unbounded, Le. increase with the extent of use of a 
new technology, the firm might want to extensively use the new technology right 
from the start. This could explain why firms do not immediately switch to the new 
technology but wait. Moreover, if it were assumed that profit gains are firm specific 
and that some firms might find it profitable to switch only when costs reach a certain 
level, this approach could also explain the heterogeneity of technology ownership 
across firms and over time. This aspect of technology transfer has been neglected by 
the existing intra-finn literature. 
Chapter four has explored this possibility via a model based upon 'intra firm stock 
effects'. The derivation of the model was not straightforward. Basically, two types of 
approaches have been used to model the shape of the relationship between profit gains 
(and the total production costs) and the adoption of a new technology. These are the 
cost function approach and the multiple technology approach. The former defines the 
impact from the extended use of a new technology via a reduction in total production 
costs, the latter via its impact upon the total capacity of the firm. However, neither of 
the two specifications allows one to determine whether profits gains are decreasing or 
increasing with the level of adoption of a new technology. In particular the shape of 
the profit-cost curve has been proved to depend upon the type of demand function for 
the firm's final output. In the case of constant elasticity of demand, profit gains are 
unbounded, whereas when using a linear demand function, profits are bounded. 
Moreover, while following the cost approach it was not possible to define the optimal 
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combination of the new and the existing technologies, the multiple technology 
approach has resulted being independent of the shape of the demand curve and 
yielding the same results in both the monopolistic and the competitive case. 
In summary, neither of the approaches followed in chapter 4 provides a rationale as to 
why it is rational for a firm not to immediately switch to a new technology but wait. 
The results indicate that there may well exist stock effects, but their impact is not 
consistent across different specifications and in particular depend upon the shape of 
the demand curve. However, the models consistently suggest that the decision of the 
firm to increase the proportion of more advanced machinery in use is mostly driven 
by: a) the relative reduction in the price of the technology over time and b) the higher 
productivity of the new technology with respect to the existing. What these models 
neglect is that a reduction in costs might itself have a cost. In fact, neither of the 
specifications takes into account the investment cost of buying the new technology. In 
this respect the inter firm literature would suggest that not only the acquisition cost of 
a new technology but also relative price expectations (see for example Stoneman and 
Karshenas, 1994 and Stoneman and Kwon, 1996), will play an important role in 
diffusion. Moreover, given the long time path of adoption of a new technology, a 
model of intra firm diffusion should take into account that the firms operate under 
different scenarios at each point in time and this may generate uncertainty about the 
outcome of ~y investment decision. 
Chapter 5 presents a new theoretical equilibrium intra-firm model that overcomes 
some of the limitation emerged in previous chapters. This model is built upon the 
standard neo-classical economic theory of investment and can be considered an 
extension of the milestone Jorgenson model (1970 and 1965). The innovative 
contribution with respect to the neo-classical model is that: a) the investment decision 
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is derived under different market scenarios and not just under perfect competition; b) 
the total capital stock of the firm is no longer treated as homogeneous and unique but 
it is explicitly modelled as a stock incorporating new, K." and old technology Ka, each 
characterised by different productivity, ao and an respectively. This has involved 
using a three rather than a two factor production function, such that Y=f (L, Ka, Kn; 
p, ao• an), where an> ao due to the advanced property of Kn with respect to Ko. 
This modelling, by the means of optimal control theory, shows that there exist stock 
effects in intra firm diffusion. Their influence depends upon the expected profit gains 
from further adoption which, in tum, are a function of the type of demand curve the 
firm faces for its product (market conditions). This model also shows that the spread 
of new technology is driven by changes in costs of the two types of capital (economic 
condition) and relative productivity of the new and the existing capital stock at the 
plant level (technical conditions). The higher are both the performance characteristics 
of the advanced technology and the reduction in its relative price; the faster will be the 
replacement process of the old with the new technology. This model also indicates 
that the extent of use of a new technology is not independent of the firm's level of 
ownership of existing technology and is influenced by complementary and substitutes 
technologies in use by the firm. Moreover, while the cost effect is exogenous, the 
technological characteristics is endogenous and reflects the core competencies of the 
firm in processing information and combining and efficiently using the inputs in its 
production system. This result shows that the role of information acquisition is 
important. However, the firm is neither a passive recipient of information, as in the 
Mansfield (1968) approach, nor a simple processor of information about the true 
profitability ofthe firm, as in the Stoneman model (1981). It is rather a processor of 
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infonnation about how to efficiently organise its production, implement its plant and 
how to efficiently use the new technology. In this framework, the speed of adoption 
reflects the finn's speed of learning from its own experience. This would explain 
why, even if finns can access the same amount of infonnation (especially after 
decades from the appearance of a new technology), they own different levels of new 
technology. In this model the impact of the market position of the finn (monopoly, 
competition) is endogenised via the demand curve. 
This model is basically an equilibrium model where the firin decides upon the 
combination of inputs according to their technological characteristics and their prices, 
via the user cost of capital, at the time the decision is made. It also implicitly assumes 
that the finn holds rational expectations and decides how much to invest in the new 
technology based upon perfect infonnation about the characteristics of the market and 
the technology itself. However, given that investments are irreversible once the finn 
decides to inves4 it cannot just disinvest should the market conditions change 
adversely. Consequently, the finn might find it more profitable to wait for new 
infonnation about prices, costs and other market condition before it commits its 
resources. In this light, following the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) approach to 
irreversible investments, the intra finn investment model presented in Chapter 5 has 
been further modified 'to allow for the inclusion of uncertainty. 
Given that the replacement process takes several years, there are several elements of 
uncertainty that might affect the investment decision. They are not necessarily 
technology specific but concern uncertainty about: future demand or input (or 
competitive output) prices, interest rates, perfonnance of the new technology, etc. To 
select only one factor would have yielded biased results while to include too many 
would have made the mathematical derivation of the model too complicated. For 
these reasons, following Bertola (1988), the intra finn model has been modified 
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introducing a generic specification of uncertainty: uncertainty about the firm's future 
revenue. Under this assumption the model remains basically unchanged except that 
uncertainty acts as a smoothing factor for the economic variables affecting the 
decision to invest, i.e. the relative change in the shadow cost of capital. Consequently, 
the higher is the volatility of future revenue the higher is the value of the option of 
waiting. In the absence of uncertainty the option value of waiting is zero and the value 
of the investment simply equals its shadow cost of capital at the moment the 
investment decision is taken. This result indicate that, further to uncertainty, the 
decision to invest in a new technology is also influenced by the relative reduction of 
acquisition costs over time, i.e. changes in the user costs of capital. One might assume 
that the firm has perfect information and formulates its investment decision under 
prefect foresight about future changes in input prices; as such the firm operates under 
'rational expectations' and knows exactly what prices will be from one period to 
another. This assumption is quite strong. In fact, it is more likely that the firm does 
not know exactly the price of the technology from one period to another and it bases 
its investment decision upon partial information, so that its decisions are based upon 
'price expectations'. Furthermore, under the assumption of irreversible investments, 
the profit maximising firm is more likely not to respond instantaneously to changes in 
price but rather adjust its current level of use of each capital stock to the desired 
optimal level based upon expected future price changes. This is an important aspect of 
the model as it directly affects the intra-firm level of use of the existing technologies 
via the changes in the user cost of each type of capital. This implies that the type of 
price extrapolation the firm bases its decision upon may be a crucial element in the 
derivation of the optimal intra firm level of use of a new technology. In other words, 
acquisition prices are important and expectations about future (quality adjusted) prices 
might have a role in the decision to further invest in a new technology. Chapter 5 
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section 5 presents a series of alternative specifications for the firm's price 
expectations and how the theoretical intra firm model has been modified to explicitly 
account for this possibility. 
In summary, the intra firm diffusion model (derived in chapter 5) is basically an 
equilibrium model solidly grounded in economic theory. It is built upon profitability 
considerations and as such can be considered an intra firm stock effect model. It 
predicts that the implementation of the new technology is driven by physical benefits 
(via firm specificity- un/uo); economic costs (acquisition costs under uncertainty and 
rational expectations- c* ot/c* nt) and market conditions (implicitly modelled via the 
type of demand curve). The first determines the heterogeneous level of use across 
finns (rank effect), the second detennines the within firm extent of further use of the 
new technology over time (price effect) while the third affects the expected profit 
gains from adoption (stock effect). 
The optimal accumulation path of the new technology is in essence a function of 
economic, technological and market conditions. This is an important result that, 
contrary to Takayama's (1991) critiques to the Jorgenson model, proves that the 
marginal product of capital is bounded and investments cannot grow to infinity as 
prices decrease. However, Jorgenson did consider only the perfect competitive 
scenario and did not consider the technological constraint a new type of capital stock 
would impose. In several of his papers, he specifies the optimal capital ownership as a 
function only of capital productivity, current acquisition cost (user cost of capital) and 
the final output price. The intra firm diffusion model encompasses this specification 
showing that even if the demand curve were not binding (i.e. under perfect 
competition) optimal investment would not be unbounded, being constrained by the 
relative change in the acquisition price and the technological characteristics of the two 
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sets of technologies. This can be better seen if one uses a relative measure of intra 
finn diffusion such as the proportion of capital stock incorporating the new 
technology over the total capital stock of the finn. In this case the spread of new 
technology, for a given level of output, is mostly driven by the relative shadow cost 
(cnt/cot) and the technological perfonnance (aJ an) of the new relative existing types 
of capital, while the demand constraint does not enter directly this expression but is 
implicitly modelled in the derivation of the model. This result remains unchanged 
whether a finn is a monopolist or it operates on a perfectly competitive market. 
In summary with respect to the Jorgenson's model, the intra finn investment model is 
also capable of dealing with: (i) different types of capital stock, i.e. advanced and old 
technologies (ii) technological constraints to adoption such as the technological 
characteristics of the current production system and complementarities between 
technologies; (iii) the influence of the relative cost of the two technologies and the 
expectations about their future prices; (iv) uncertainty and (v) market structure, i.e. 
monopoly or competition between finns. 
In Chapter 6, the capital accumulation equation derived in the new intra firm 
diffusion model has been rewritten in a way suitable to empirical testing. The testing 
procedure used to estimate the model parameters was not straightforward as the 
decision to currently use the technology is just one of the possible outcomes of an 
irreversible conditional choice made sometime in the past to become an adopter. 
Moreover, in the CURDS data set, the variable accounting for intra firm diffusion is 
available only for 1993, restricting the testing of the model only to a single cross 
section of finns. 
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The nature of the decision model and the characteristics of the data set had to be 
modelled in order to correct for both censoring and sample selection. These effects, if 
ignored, might have caused serious bias in the parameter estimates. In fact, to model 
only the current status of the firms in 1993 causes serious truncation in the probability 
distribution, as it would not consider that some of the firms might adopt the 
technology sometime in the future, while to look only at some of the possible 
outcomes generates sample censoring. 
Chapter 6 has presented alternative ways to deal with this type of problems. The 
Heckman's two step procedure is used to correct for the sample selection of the sub-
sample of firms as those that have in the past adopted the new technology and are 
currently using it in 1993. In the first step of the model, the decision to be an adopter 
in or by 1993 is modelled via a selection criterion equation. In the second step the 
actual intra firm estimating equation is then corrected for the truncation of the sample 
(using the information in the first step of the analysis) yielding the corrected 
technology replacement equation. 
The determinants of the selection criterion equation, i.e. the probability to be a user in 
or by 1993, have been outsourced from the inter firm literature that has looked at the 
factors that lead a firm to first adopt a new technology (see section 6.3). The 
determinants of the corrected technology replacement equation have been specified 
according to the predictions of the intra firm model presented in chapter 5 (see section 
5.6). However, one of the problems, common to several applications of this type of 
model, is that the determinants of both parts of the model are defined over the same 
information set and several variables were used in both steps of the specification. This 
could have caused simultaneity upon the sample selection and the final model 
specification, yielding spurious and insignificant sample selection correction factors 
(i.e. the Inverse Mill's Ratio). A further conceptual discrepancy was that the current 
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level of the dependent variables in the modelling of the decision to become an adopter 
can easily be the consequence rather than the determinant of the status of the units, 
generating endogeneity and misspecification. 
By means of statistical and probabilistic tools, chapter 6 has derived an alternative 
specification of the probability of using a technology, conditional to the irreversible 
choice of adopting it, and the selection of possible outcomes (i.e. the current level of 
use). This has yielded to a redefinition ofthe Selection criterion equation as a function 
of the level of the variables at time of adoption. This has also shown how the cross 
sectional nature of a model can be combined with the time specification when the 
dependent variable is observable only at one specific point in time. 
This chapter has also discussed different ways of dealing with the censoring of the 
sample, caused by the exclusion of those firms that have in the past adopted the new 
technology but in 1993 have completed the process of technology transfer (Le. those 
firms using 0% or 100% of the technology). It has also proposed a multinomial two 
step selection rule capable of accounting for all types of problems, namely: a) The 
sample selection of the eligible unit whose choice is observable; b) The truncation 
caused by the unobservable future choice; c) The censoring in each specification of 
the subset of outcomes. 
In chapter 7 the new intra firm model of technology replacement been tested over 
three out of the four technologies in the CURDS data set, namely: NC, CNC and 
Micro (CoT being excluded due to the lack of some of the relevant variables). 
After a meticulous testing of each step of the model specification, the empirical 
estimates have shown that the prediction of the new equilibrium intra firm model are 
correct for two out of the three technologies. The results for NC are very 
unsatisfactory and inconsistent. This is not surprising as NC is an almost obsolete 
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technology, available now exclusively on the second hand market. By 1993, it had 
reached its post diffusion stage. 
For the other technologies, it is found that what determines the extent of use of a new 
technology is mainly rank and price effects. The former are firm specific and reflect 
the core competencies of the firm such as: technological characteristics of the existing 
production system; management ; production organisation; size; whether the firm 
does R&D, etc. The latter reflect price reductions, uncertainty and price expectations 
about the new technology. Contrary to the inter firm literature, the model indicates 
that epidemic learning does not effect the intra firm diffusion of a new technology. 
Among the other inter firm effects, the order effect does not apply to intra firm 
diffusion, but stock effects, already implicitly incorporated into the model, are highly 
significant in the process of technology substitution. The empirical results also shows 
that uncertainty about future revenues reduces the impact of the changes in ratio of 
relative prices of the new and the old types of capital by about 75%. This means that 
if there exist uncertainty about the future this will lower the extent of use of the new 
technology. 
Also price expectations of the new and old technologies tum out to significantly affect 
the decision on further use of Microprocessors incorporated into processes, while in 
the case ofCNC the firm's act as if they know, with certainty, the price of the old but 
not the new technology. 
For all technologies the sample selection correction factor (of the sub-set of adopters 
currently using between 1 and 99% of the new technology -IMR) is never significant. 
This indicates that the decision as how much to use the new technology is 
independent of the probability of being an adopter. This result is in line with the study 
carried out in Chapter two suggesting that intra and inter firm diffusion are both 
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important and that intra finn diffusion is independent of the inter finn diffusion of 
new technology. 
In this model, supply side effects and the possible impact of the increasing demand 
for the technology upon its relative price have not been explicitly included, the latter 
being assumed exogenous. However, one might argue that interaction effects between 
inter and intra finn processes do exist, but they have been picked up by supply side 
effects, i.e. changes in prices. This hypothesis has not been considered here for two 
main reasons. Firstly, as seen in chapter 2, supply side effects can be better explained 
by the aggregate demand for new technology of each individual finn rather than the 
number of finns of the industry that have adopted the technology. The latter, despite 
being widely used in inter finn studies, often overestimates the demand for the new 
technology and would not be representative of the real demand for that good .. 
Secondly, in an open economy it is difficult to isolate the impact of internal demand 
when the technology is imported from abroad. Supply side effects are interesting area 
that needs further research. However, this is beyond the scope of this study. 
One might be tempted to use the findings of this study to draw policy guidelines. In 
fact, although the diffusion of new technology is of major public policy concern, 
public policy has been primarily concerned with the generation of innovations 
(invention and R&D) rather than their spreading within and across economies. 
Consequently, policy relating to the application of innovations (adoption! extent of 
use) has been largely overlooked even though it is key to the realisation of benefits 
from technological change. 
This thesis has important policy implications for industrial development in that if 
diffusion is largely a learning phenomenon then infonnation provision policies could 
affect the diffusion process. However, given that it is found that the equilibrium 
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effects dominate, then information stimulation will have little impact on the diffusion 
process and the appropriate instrument would be a subsidy to the cost of the 
technology. In particular we have seen that what drives the diffusion process is the 
relative cost of the new over the old technology. This means that price intervention 
and fiscal incentives together with stabilisation policies to lower uncertainty would be 
the most effective way to speed up technology transfer. Given that the process of 
technology transfer is mostly the result of intra firm effects, rather than inter firm 
effects, it is advisable that policies should no longer concentrate on incentives to first 
adoption, but instead on incentives proportional to the level of intra firm adoption by 
each firm. 
However, is it really socially optimal to speed up the diffusion process and the rate of 
technological adoption? This thesis has not addressed welfare analysis, consequently 
such policy recommendations need to be handled with care. 
Overall this thesis aimed to shed some light on the under researched process of 
technology adoption within the firm. Using statistical and econometric tools, this 
thesis has proved why it is important to look at intra firm diffusion. It has also 
presented a theoretical model that provides a rationale to explain why, for the firm, it 
is not profitable to transfer immediately all of its production to the new technology, 
but wait. This model determines, for a single firm, the optimal replacement path of the 
old with the new technology, taking into account how changes in costs, price 
expectations, technological constraints, existing and previous technologies, 
uncertainty and market structure can influence the degree of technology adoption by a 
firm. The impact of uncertainty, process expectations and market structure play upon 
the firm's investment decision in a new technology has never been explored before. 
Using sophisticated statistical and econometric tools, the validity of this theoretical 
approach has been proved across a cross section of firms in the UK. engineering and 
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metalworking sector. The theoretical model presented in this paper can be seen as a 
unique contribution to the understanding of the determinants of the adoption of new 
technology, and the empirical analysis provides considerable insight into a area where 
to date, little research has previously been completed. 
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APPENDIX A 
AI. The CURDS data set· 
At. The CURDS data set 
The main data sources used in this study are three surveys (1981, 1986, 1993) of 
technology adoption in nine Minimum List Headings Industries in the UK. 
engineering and metalworking sector undertaken by the Centre for Urban and 
Regional Development Studies (CURDS) at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
(see Alderman et aI., 1988). 
CURDS contains longitudinal data for a sample of firms in the UK. engineering 
industry on firm characteristics, first adoption dates for five different technologies, the 
proportion of output produced using the new technologies in 1993 and some other 
relevant information about the determinant of the diffusion process as well as the 
production system characteristics and the managerial innovations. 
The 1993 survey followed on two earlier surveys in 1981 and 1986 of the same 
sample of firms which although they do not contain questions relating to intra firm 
diffusion do contain information that enables us to track the date of first adoption of 
new technologies by the firms in the 1993 sample. 
The 1993 questionnaire has been slightly modified with respect to the other two. In 
addition to the other two questionnaires it contains information upon the intra-firm 
level of use of a new technology. The main information on intra firm diffusion relates 
to the percentage of the machine tool stock of the firm that in 1993 incorporated each 
of the four advanced technologies. 
II 
All the three surveys have been carried on every six years by the means of a postal 
questionnaire. 
With sample attrition and non response the sample size has decreased over time from 
1127 in 1980 to 814 in 1986 and 345 in 1993. However, investigation of the causes of 
this attrition has provided some relevant information about the diffusion process, 
suggesting that there is no evidence of sample selection bias in the response to the 
1986 survey (see Stoneman and Kwon, 1994). Moreover, there are rather good 
reasons to believe that the sample restriction is due only to the low response rate 
typical of postal questionnaires (cfr. M.Colombo personal experience on a similar 
survey carried on in Italy). 
The hypothesis of sample selection bias over the three surveys (up to and including 
1993) has also been investigated by Silvia Sgherri in her Italina Doctoral thesis. She 
came to the conclusion that the sample bias is not significant and the exit of firms 
from the sample was random (see S.Sgherri, a.y. 1997-78, 'Empirical Models of New 
Technology Adoption: A Critique', Tesi di Dottorato, Scuola Superiore degli Studi 
Universitari e Perfezionamento S.Anna, Univerista' di Pisa, Italy) 
The variable definitions and the original codification of the data set are presented 
below. 
The data set contains information for each of the three sample dates (unless otherwise 
specified). 
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SIX-YEARLY SURVEY OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
ADOPTION IN BRITISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYME 
Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NEI7RU 
tel. (0191) 222 8017 
Establishment Characteristics 
ySturtUp = Year of start up ( -99 = missing; -1 = pre 1900 some dates have been stimated) 
Status93 = Status change (I=Yes; 2=No) 
Nstatus93= Nature of change (1 = Take-over/merger; 2=management buy-out; 3=soldlspun off, 
4= change in share ownership/directors, 5=bought from receivers; 6=no change) 
Status86 = Status in 1986 (1 = Group establishment; 2 = Independent) 
Status81 = Status in 1981 (l = Group establishment; 2 = Independent) 
Industry = to which the establishment belongs (1968 SIC): 
1 = MLH 331 = Agricultural Machinery; 
2 = MLH 332 = Metal working machine tools; 
3 = MLH 333 = Pumps, Valves, compressors, fluid power equipment; 
4 = MLH 336 = Construction and earth-moving equipment; 
5 = MLH 337 = Mechanical handling equipment; 
6 = MLH3393/4 Refrigerating machinery, space-heating, ventilating, Air-conditioning equipment, 
Scales and weighting machinery and portable power tools. 
7 = MLH 3391/2/5/6/7/8 = Mining, Printing, bookbinding and paper goods, Scales and weighting 
machinery and Portable power tools; Food and drink processing and packaging 
machinery and bottling machinery 
8 = MLH 3399 = miscellaneous (non electrical) machinery 
9 = MLH 341 = industrial (including process) plant and steelworks, i.e. Boilers and boiler-house plant, 
constructional steelworks, fabricated iron and steelworks. ; 
10 = MLH 361 = Electrical machinery; 
11 = MLH 390 = Engineers small tools and gauges; 
12 = Subcontractors; 
13 = MLH 349 = Ball, roller, plain, and other bearings; Precision chains and other mechanical 
engineering; 
15 = Other mech. Engineering 
Metal81= Metalworking activity at the establishment in 1981 (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
E93 = Number of employees in 1993 
E86 = Number of employees in 1986 
E81 = Number of employees in 1981 
E75 = Number of employees in 1975 
E70 = Number of employees in 1970 
(-999 = missing) 
(-999 = missing) 
(-999 = missing) 
(-999 = missing) 
(-999 = missing) 
R&D93 = R&D onsite, i.e. work designed to produce new or improved product or processes 
in 1993 (I=Yes; 2 = No; 0 = Missing) 
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R&D86 = R&D onsite, i.e. work desiged to produce new or improved products or processes 
in 1986 (1 = Yes; 2 = No; -999 = missing) 
R&D81 = R&D onsite, i.e. work desiged to produce new or improved products or processes 
in 1981 (1 = Yes; 2 = No; -999 = missing) 
R&Dem93 = number of employees engaged full time on R&D in 1993 (-999 = missing or 
not applicable, i.e.no R&D onsite) 
R&Dem86 = number of employees engaged full time on R&D in 1986 (-999 = missing or 
not applicable, i.e.no R&D onsite) 
R&Dem81 = number of employees engaged full time on R&D in 1981 (-999 = missing or 
not applicable, i.e.no R&D onsite) 
T90/91 = Turnover in 1990/91 
T85/86= Turnover in 1985/86 
T80/81 = Turnover in 1980/81 
P90/91 = Pre tax profit in 1990/91 
P85/86= Pre tax profit in 1985/86 
P80/81 = Pre tax profit in 1980/81 
PL90/91 = Profit or loss in 1990/91 
PL85/86= Profit or loss in 1985/86 
PL80/81 = Profit or loss in 1980/81 
Financial Status 
Production System Charateristics 
PRDSYSTM = Production system main characteristic (1 =EngineeringlProject based 
2=Make/assemble to order;3=Make/assemble to stock 4=Job shop (subcontr.» 
BACTCHSIZE = Average batch size for the product or service described above (-99 missing) 
Introduction of new technology/systems 
Process innovations 
NC = adoption of NUMERICAL CONTROL of metal cutting, forming or joining machinery 
(1 =Yes; 2=No ; 3=not applicable; 4=planned ; O=rnissing) 
CNC = adoption of COMPUTERISED NUMERICAL CONTROL of metal cutting, 
forming or joining machinery (1=Yes; 2=No; 3=not applicable; O=rnissing) 
CoT = adoption of COATED CARBIDE or CERAMIC TOOLS or INSERTS for metal 
cutting (1=Yes; 2=No; 3=not applicable; O=rnissing) 
MICRO = adoption of MICROPROCESSORS incorporated in manufacturing PROCESSES (other 
than CNC) for controlling, monitoring or inspection, adoption 
(1= Yes; 2= No; 3= not applicable; 4= planned for 1993; 0= missing) 
Robot = adoption of PROGRAMMABLE ROBOT 
(1= Yes; 2= No; 3= not applicable; 4= planned for 1993; 0= missing) 
v 
Other innovations 
CAD = adoption of COMPUTER AIDED DESIGNIDRAUGHTING system with graphics 
(1= Yes; 2= No; 3= not applicable; 4= planned for 1993; 0= missing) 
M-prod = adoption of MICROPROCESSORS incorporated in any ofthe PRODUCTS 
manufactured in the factory 
(1= Yes; 2= No; 3= not applicable; 4= planned for 1993; 0= missing) 
INTER FIRM DIFFUSION 
Year o/first adoption o/the advanced technology byfirm i 
Process innovations 
yNC = Year ofNC first adoption (-99=missing) 
yCNC = Year ofCNC first adoption (-99= missing) 
yCoT = Year of CoT first adoption (-99= missing) 
yMICRO = Year of MICRO first adoption (-99= missing) 
Other innovations 
yCAD = Year of CAD first adoption (-99= missing) 
yM-prod = Year ofM-prod first adoption (-99= missing) 
INTRA FIRM DIFFUSION 
Percentage 0/ machine tools 0/ the firm i that incorporates the following technologies 
Process innovations 
NC = Estimated proportion of machine tool stock that incorporates NC (%)(-99= missing) 
CNC = Estimated proportion of machine tool stock that incorporates or uses the CNC (%) 
(-99= missing) 
CoT = Estimated proportion of machine tool stock that incorporates or uses the CoT (%) 
(-99= missing) 
MICRO = Estimated proportion of machine tool stock of the manufacturing processes 
(excluding CNC) that incorporates or uses Microprocessors for controlling, monitoring or 
inspection MICRO (%) (-99= missing) 
Managerial innovation 
CAPM = adoption of Computer Aided Production Management system (l=yes; 2=No; 
O=missing) 
yCAPM = timing of adoption of CAPM (-99=missing) 
TIT = Adoption of Just in Time principles (1 =yes; 2=No; -99=missing) 
yJIT = timing of adoption of Just in Time 
TQM = Total Quality Management principles (I=yes; 2=No; -99=missing) 
yTQM = timing of adoption of Total Quality Management principles 
BSISO= possession of BSS7S0lIS09000 accreditation (I =Yes;2=No; 3 =Planned or pending) 
yBSISO= Year ofBSISO first awarding (-99= missing value) 
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Bl. Relative importance of inter vs intra firm effects: weighted 
analysis 
The analysis of the inter and intra finn effects have been carried out also taking into 
account the different size of the establishments. Two different weights have been 
used: the number of employees (WEit) and the turnover (WTit) of the firm i. 
In order to do so the original equations 2.112, 2.3 and 2.4 detailed in Chapter 2 have 
been modified so that for each technology j: 
Level analysis: 
(2.1I2w) 
Relative analysis: 
(2.3.w) 
Growth rate analysis: 
(2.4.w) 
where: 
i=1..N r=E,T 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 reports the results for j=CNC using weights (Writ) for each r= 
Employees, Turnover. As one can see the figures do not change significantly from the 
results in Table 2.1 discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table B1.a. CNC inter and intra firm effects, weighted by the size of the 
establishment i.e. Number of employees (Wei) 
LEVEL ANALYSIS LOG ANALYSIS GROWTH RATES ANALYSIS 
Industry Proportion Usage per INTER-firm INTRA-firm Industry INTER-firm INTRA-firm 
Usage of adopters adopter (%) (%) Usage (%) (%) 
(DE) (N/N) (Y Ejt!YEt) log(N/N) log( Y Ejt! YEt) d(yjENE) ( dN/NrdNIN) (dYE/YErdYErI YEt) 
1993 0.361 0.82 0.44 -0.09 -0.36 0.361 0.152 0.567 
(19.49%) (80.51%) (21.1%) (78.90%) 
1986 0.230 0.70 0.33 -0.16 -0.48 0.701 0.372 0.858 
(24.55%) (75.45%) (27.61 %) (72.39%) 
1981 0.069 0.47 0.15 -0.33 -0.83 0.957 0.912 0.651 
(28.31%) (71.69%) (58.32%) (41.68%) 
1975 0.003 0.04 0.07 -1.39 -1.15 . 1.000 1.058 
(54.72%) (45.28%) (48.58%) (51.42%) 
Source: personal elaboratIOn from CURDS data set. 
Table BI.b. CNC inter and intra firm effects, weighted by the size of the 
establishment, i.e. Turnover (WTi) 
LEVEL ANALYSIS RELATIVE ANALYSIS GROWTH RATES ANALYSIS 
Industry Proportion Usage per INTER-firm INTRA-firm Industry INTER-firm INTRA-firm 
Usage of adopters adopter (%) (%) Usage (%) (%) 
(DT) (N/N) (Y Ejt/YEt) log(N/N) log( Y Ejt! YEt) d(YjENE) ( dN/NrdNIN) dYE/YEj-dYBrI YBJ 
1990 0.16 0.80 0.44 -0.\0 -0.706 0.529 0.23 0.288 
(12.07%) (87.93%) (44.45%) (40.71%) 
1985 0.054 0.62 0.33 -0.21 -1.06 0.754 0.439 0.64 
(16.42%) (83.58%) (40.71%) (59.2%) 
1980 0.007 0.35 0.15 -0.46 -1.698 
-
. . 
(21.30%) (78.70%) 
1975 
- - -
. . . . . 
NOTE: Turnover is only available for the following years: 1990/91; 1985/86; 1980/81. 
The sample size reflects the missing values. Dates have been adjusted accordingly. 
Source: personal elaboration from CURDS data set. 
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C 1- Testing of Logit and Tobit models: 
Variable definition 
C2- Testing the Mansfield Model: 
Summary of the model specifications 
x 
C.1. Variables definition 
The definition of the variables used for the testing ofthe Mansfield model are: 
Dij = proportion of machine tool stock of establishment i that incorporates each of the three 
new technologies in 1993 where j = NC, CNC or COT. 
Tij = for eachj the number of years between first adoption of the technology by the 
establishment and 1993 
Lij = for eachj, the proportion of firms in the whole sample that used technology j at the 
date of first adoption by establishment I 
Mi(t) = employment level of the firm in 1993 (data also available for 1970, 1975,1981 and 
1986) 
R&Ddumj = dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the establishment undertakes in house 
R&D and zero ifit does not (data available for 1993, 1986 and 1980). 
Expdumi = dummy variable, equal to 1 if the percentage of total output going for export is 
greater than 20% and 0 otherwise (data available for 1993, 1986 and 1980). 
Further variables included in the Tobit model: 
Ri (t)= turnover ofthe firm (data available for 1991, 1986 and 1980). 
ISHAREij = proportion of firms in the industry the firm i belongs to, that have adopted 
the technology j by 1993 
Djy = technology state dummies taking value 1 if the technology y (other than j), has been 
adopted by the firm i, i.e. NC case: DCNC (l=yes; O=no), DCOr (l=yes; O=no) 
Table C.l. shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms that have adopted the 
technology by 1993. 
Other variables not included in the CURDS data set were: the technology real quality 
adjusted price series. 
Data on the prices of the technologies in the CURDS data set were not ready available. 
The price series of NC-CNC, CoT, Micro have been outsourced from Ufficial Statistical 
Sources and ad hoc studies. They all have been adjusted to take into account of: i) changing 
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(decreasing) purchasing power of the sterling over the years; and ii) quality improvements in 
the technology. 
Table C.l.a SAMPLE STATISTICS (Mansfield and Stoneman-Battisti !Tobit model) 
Variables CNC CoT 
Mean Cases Mean Cases 
(Std.dev) (Std.dev) 
Oij 0.2595 223 0.4148 222 
(0.216) (0.3506) 
O;j>O - 208 - 176 
log[O;j 11- Oij 1 -1.2513 208 -0.3124 176 
(1.261) (1.8169) 
T;j 12.19 220 15.4916 179 
(4.464) (7.052) 
l;j 44.83 220 47.1554 179 
(23.65) (26.219) 
M;(1993) 205.81 237 185.08 264 
(307.58) (292.302) 
RDdum; (1993) 0.7657 239 0.7256 266 
(0.425) (0.447) 
EXPdum; (1993) 0.5294 238 0.5227 264 
(0.500) (0.500) 
R; (1991) 19170.56 203 17133.26 226 
(89364.21) (84831.37) 
ISHARE 0.8556 240 0.9433 267 
(0.0791) (0.053) 
ONC 0.9750 240 0.8352 267 
(0.1565) (0.372) 
DCNC - - 0.7865 267 (0.411) 
DCOT 0.8667 240 -- -(0.341) 
Number of Adopters 240 267 
Notes: Sample A - allfirms that have adopted the technology by 1993. 
Standard deviation in parenthesis 
NC 
Mean Cases 
(Std.dev) 
0.0825 228 
(0.144) 
-
116 
-2.1104 116 
(1.269) 
15.3452 168 
(9.396) 
30.999 168 
(17.22) 
195.1739 253 
(300.56) 
0.7579 252 
(0.429) 
0.5320 250 
(0.500) 
18370.62 
(87306.48) 
0.8790 168 
(0.768) 
- -
0.9130 253 
(0.282) 
0.8656 253 
(0.342) 
253 
The changing purchasing power has been eliminated by deviding the series of current 
producer price index i.e. output- homesales, annual averages1• by the purchasing power of 
number Index (1985-100) sourced from Economic Trends2• 
J Those figures are calculated taking the inverse ratio of the respective annual averages of the general 
index of retail price (Source:CSO 'Annual Abstract of Statistics') 
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The Statistical sources and the methodological caveat used to built the quality adjusted price 
series are summarised below for each technology. 
NC-CNC 
Price data ofNC-CNC machine tools for the period 1969-92 were supplied by the CSO but 
unfortunately for a number of years the data for the two types of machines are not separately 
distinguished. The fundamental difference between the two technologies is that CNC is more 
advanced, being the computerised version ofNC. 
CNC first appeared on the market in 1970 and being a computer based technology should be 
adjusted for quality improvements over time. Following Stoneman et al. 1992, this has been 
done using the trend underlying the quality improvements of computers (see below the details 
about the series). The resulting adjusted price series has then been used to proxi the real 
quality adjusted CNC computer prices from 1972, the date of first firm adoption up to 1992. 
NC is a very old technology appeared on the market in 1950. For this technology (non 
computer based) the quality improvements have been decreasing in recent years as it is 
slowling moving towards obsolescence. Nowadays its impact upon the CSO price series is 
only marginal being mainly available only in the second hand market. 
By detrending the CSO price series using the quality adjusted CNC series we have derived the 
price series ofNC. The gap between 1950 and 1969 has been covered using backward 
forecasts based upon the structural time series specification (see Harvey, 1989). The package 
used was Stamp5. However, given the small number of observations the price series of both 
NC and CNC must be used only as a proxi for the real unobserved prices. In order to avoid 
spurious results the series has also been derived using ratios of price indexes. This analysis is 
2 The Producer Price Index of output of manufactured products. could have been use instead. Both 
deflators account for inflation. however given that some of the technologies might be imported from 
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preferred as it gives more smoothed results and allows to visualise the frequency domain and 
some of the possible errors. 
CoT Prices 
Being unable to locate a published domestic price series for the price of Coated carbide tools 
this tool has been excluded from the testing ofthe intra firm model. 
Computer Prices 
The CSO calculates a price series for EDP equipment that does contain some corrections for 
quality improvement. As shown by Stoneman et al.(1992), that series considerably 
underestimates the extent of the improvement. In alternative to this they have produced a 
quality adjusted price series, for the period from Dec. 1986 - May 1992, for computers in the 
UK using hedonic methods. For earlier years, i.e. before 1986, there are no reliable estimates 
of quality adjusted computer prices in the UK. The final series were provided by Kwon and 
Otto Toivanen based upon the result of the considerable literature relating to the US. This 
literature is summarised by Triplett (1989) which also provides a series quality adjusted prices 
for computer systems in the US for the periods 1957-1972 and 1972-1984 (Tables 4.13A and 
4.14, pp. 194 and 196). This US price series corrected for changes in the dollar/sterling 
exchange rate (taken from Parking and Bade, 1988, p.38-39) has been used for the period 
from 1957-1984. The gap between 1984 and 1986, has been covered using the CSO index. 
However, given that this fails to adequately take into account quality improvement it has been 
adjusted using the average underestimate of the fall in the quality adjusted computer price 
shown in the CSO series compared to the Stoneman et al. estimates for the period from 1987-
1992. 
abroad the first deflator has been preferred to the second. 
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In summary the price series of quality adjusted computer prices has been carried out using the 
outcome of the study of Triplett (1989) for the period 1957-1972 and 1972-1984 (Tables 
4.13A and 4.14, PP: 194-96), Stoneman et al (1992) for the years 1987-1992 and the 
corrected CSO index for the period 1984 and 1986. 
Microprocessors in processes prices 
Similar to computers the price index for Microprocessors has been adjusted for quality 
improvements over time and the complete time series has been outsourced from the research 
of Karsh en as and Stoneman (1993). The series they use is based upon the average selling 
prices in US dollars in the US Market. These prices are translated into sterling prices via the 
$/£ exchange rate. Using three different data sources, for each generation, in each period in 
which it on the market, they calculated the cost (average selling price in S) per K of memory. 
For the period from 1985 - 1992 data has been taken from Tyson (1992) on the average 
selling price in US $ for 256K and 1M EPROMS (the data originally coming from 
Dataquest). For the period from 1978 - 1984 the data used in Gruber (1992) has been kindly 
supplied to us by the author (although again the original source is Dataquest), and covers the 
average selling prices of 8, 16, 32, 64, 128 and 256K EPROMS. For the period from 1973 -
1977 we have relied upon the data contained figure 2.3 (p.4D) ofDosi (1984). 
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C.2. TESTING OF THE MANSFIELD MODEL: Summary of the model 
specification 
Each model specification has been estimated using ad hoc statistical techniques or each each 
technology, i.e. NC,CNC and CoT. The statistical packages used are Limdep7 for the non 
linear and two stages Least Squares and Stamp for structural approach! 
The testing procedure of the Mansfield model can be summarised in the following steps: 
Testing the shape of the statistical distribution 
a. The Logistic model (NLS -weighted I unweighted) 
a.I Fixed s.1.: 
a.2. Variable s.1.: 
Dijt = 11 (I+exp(-a-~ijTij)+eij 
Dij = «1>/ (1 +exp( -a- Pij Tij)+ eij 
a.3. weighted logistic curve wirh weight =T 
h. The Gompertz growth curve (NLS -wIn) 
b.I Univariate non linear model Dijt= exp( -exp( a+~. Tijt)+ eij 
b.2. Linearised model with explanatory variables 
log D =c+J3\log (T*j)+J32Iog (T*R&Ddum)+J331og(T*Expdum)+J341og(T*M) + J3s1og (f*jshare) + eij 
Testing the final model 
c. The Mansfield Approach (Two Stages Weighted Least Squares) 
Dij = eo / (1 +exp( -el-e2i*Tij) + eij 
e2i = go+ gl *RDdumj+ g2*Expdumj+ g3*Mj+ g4*Lij + eij 
d. Multivariate Logistic with unknown saturation level ( NLS approach) 
Dij= bol(l +exp( -bl-(b2*RDdUIDi+b3*Expdumi+b4*Mi+bs*Lij)*Tij» + eij 
e. Logistic linearization (OLS approach) 
fued (tPij= 1) or variable (tPijsl) saturation level 
log[Di/C c!>ij-Dij)] = bl+ b2*RDdumi+ b3*Expdumi+ b4*Mi+ bs*Lij + eij 
f. Structural approach (ML and the Kalman filter) 
-log[Di/(l-Dij)] = Ilit +bl*RDdumi+b2*ExpdUIDi+b4*Mi+bs* Lij +b6*Tij+ Eijt 
J!it- = J.!i,t-l- +~i,t-l +l1it 
~it = ~i,t-l + ~it 
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Estimating the Final Technology Replacement Equation 
D 1. Variables definition 
D2. Summary statistics 
Table n.1.a The determinants of intra-firm diffusion: variable definitions· 
Dependent V.riable 
KnKo • (Kn/(I-Kn» 
PRICE Effect 
DTOT. • Price differential of Ko : Po(t+ I )-Po(t) 
Real Index of quality adjusted Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
DKn • Price differential of Kn: Pn(t+I)-Pn(t) where Kn""llew technology (CNC, NC, MICRO) 
Real Quality Adjusted Produced Price Index of Kn 
QNQTOT • Relative price change (PnI(-dPn) - Po/(-dPo» 
RANK Effect 
Emf!.lorment 
Et • Averagenumberofemployees 1= 1993.1986.1981.1975,1970 
~ 
Age • Years from start-up (1993-sturtup year) 
EXf!.Orl 
Dummy -Exports in 1993 (>20%=yes; O=otherwise) Ex20. • 
R&D 
RDE. • In House R&D employeesf[otal employees in 1991; 1986;1991 
R&D. • In House R&D dummy (yes= I. no=O) in 1991; 1986; 1991 
Turnover 
tumoverNy. • N years Average Real Turnover in 1990/91; 1986/86 ; 1980/81 (deflated by RPI) 
RT. • Real turnover in 1990/91; 1986/86 ; 1980/81 (deflated by RPI) 
Li~uidi~ 
PT, • Current Profitsffurnover in 1991; 1986; 1981 
PI.. • Dummy - Profits or loss in 1991/1986/1981 (1= Profits; 0= Loss) 
Production S,r.stem Characteristics 
PSI. • Dummy - Firm Prod. System (Yes=l; 0= otherwise) 
• l=engineering to order; Make to order. Make to stock. Job shop. Mixed 
BATCH • Average batch size 
Ownershil!. 
Group t • Dummy (1 =Group establishment; 0" Independent) 1=1993,1986.1981 
Coml!.tementa~ and/or substitute technologies 
OJ. • Dummy - adoption of J (I=Yes; 0= No ) of J=Cot; Micro; Robot; CAD, CNC, NC, etc 
Managerial Innovation 
DJM • Dummy (I=Yes ; 0= No). - adoption of JM ,JM=CAPM, J1T,TQM;BSISO-IS0900 
EPIDEMIC other INTER-FIRM STOCK EFFECTS 
YSTUR • Years from startup to fisrt adoption 
TJ • Years from firm first adoption up to 1993 ('93-I"adopt) ,J '" new technology 
Jy • Years from first appearance of the technology to first adoption by the firm (I"adop - 1970), J. new technology 
lusers93 • Within industry share of adopters in 1993 
shI~ • Within Industry I (1=1.2 •... 15) share of adopters at time of the firm first adoption, i.e. lusers93*Dl 
IFout93 • Average within industry Firms output produced on the new technology in 93 (INTRA-INDUSTRY average 
level of use) 
JDIFF • Average industry output produced on the new technology in 93 (INTRA INDUSTRY average total level of use) 
Note: a) Variables are NOT log transfonned; b) 'shI' being the product Dl*Iusers93 (1=1,2 etc) is 
not included in the summary statistics. 
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Table D2.a Summary statistics: CNC (Current users) 
N Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Variance Min Max Percentile 
Valid! Missing 25% ! 50% ! 75% 
Dependent variable 
KNKO 208 1 .65 .25 .11 .17 1.36 .01 18.00 .11 .25 .67 
Price effect 
DCNC 198 11.00 25.97 17.46 41.05 16.13 260.11 -.53 56.33 10.93 17.46 41.05 
DTOT 198 11.00 18.40 20.58 22.37 4.42 19.57 2.27 23.96 14.40 20.58 22.37 
QNQTOT 198 11.00 -2.13 1.12 -1.71 26.50 702.15 -206.43 70.47 -1.71 t.12 1.81 
Rank effect 
Employment 
E93 205 4.00 220.99 90.00 25.00' 324.57 105346.12 10.00 2300.00 39.00 90.00 260.00 
E86 205 4.00 297.22 115.00 100.00 464.27 215551.07 10.00 3500.00 46.50 115.00 340.00 
E81 207 2.00 378.38 140.00 35.00' 633.24 400998.48 9.00 5304.00 46.00 140.00 430.00 
E75 183 26.00 496.97 150.00 40.00 877.20 769484.69 2.00 6790.00 50.00 150.00 610.00 
E70 165 44.00 588.86 150.00 60.00 1112.38 1237388.07 2.00 8479.00 50.00 150.00 650.50 
~ 
AGE 179 30.00 50.27 54.00 50.00 19.74 389.81 .00 81.00 39.00 54.00 65.00 
Export 
EX20 207 2.00 .53 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 
RDE93 163 46.00 .03 .02 .00 .04 .00 .00 .25 .00 .02 .04 
RDE86 200 9.00 .02 .01 .00 .04 .00 .00 .29 .00 .01 .03 
RDE81 158 51.00 .03 .02 .00 .03 .00 .00 .15 .01 .02 .04 
R&D93 206 3.00 .78 1.00 1.00 .42 .17 :00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 86 208 1.00 .79 1.00 1.00 .41 .17 .00 \.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 81 209 .00 .76 1.00 1.00 .43 .18 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Turnover 
TURNOVER3Y 175 34.00 30.45 25.95 10.52 22.32 498.34 2.93 158.41 18.44 25.95 36.55 
TURNOVERZY 121 88 34.2566 29.672 2.93 23.0140 529.6426 2.93 158.41 21.S797 29.6721 40.586 
RT91 175 34.00 14255.05 3549.77 709.95' 67777.874593839846.27 191.69 851945.38 1273.66 3549.77 9650.41 
RT86 150 59.00 11010.22 3492.00 970.00 25155.70 632809210.26 242.50 192059.97 1200.37 3492.00 11349.00 
RT81 130 79.00 12195.57 2889.25 1270.0028833.49 831369966.42 254.00 209549.99 889.00 2889.25 10160.00 
LiH'uidity 
PT91 71 138.00 .10 .06 .10 .16 .02 .00 1.26 .03 .06 .10 
PT86 72 137.00 .27 .06 .03' 1.69 2.85 .00 14.40 .03 .06 .10 
PTSI 54 155.00 .29 .07 .10 1.53 2.35 .00 11.33 .04 .07 .11 
PUI 99 110.00 1.24 1.00 1.00 .48 .23 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PL86 81 128.00 1.07 1.00 1.00 .26 .07 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PLSI 75 134.00 1.28 1.00 1.00 .51 .26 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Production $vstem 
PSI 209 .00 .33 .00 .00 .47 .22 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
PS2 209 .00 .43 .00 .00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
PS3 209 .00 .10 .00 .00 .29 .09 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PS4 209 .00 .13 .00 .00 .34 .11 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PS5 209 .00 .01 .00 .00 .12 .01 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
BATCH 182 27.00 94.89 6.00 1.00 425.27 180853.69 1.00 5000.00 2.00 6.00 25.00 
XIX 
... Continue 
N Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Variance Min Max Percentile 
Valid I Missing 25% 1 50% 1 75% 
Ownership 
GROUP 86 208 1.00 .89 1.00 1.00 .31 .10 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GROUP 81 209 .00 .60 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
GROUP 93 200 9.00 .90 1.00 1.00 .30 .09 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Industrial sector 
INDUSTRY 209 .00 7.14 8.00 3.00 3.70 13.73 1.00 15.00 3.00 8.00 10.00 
Comf!.lementar:J!. and substitute technologies 
DCOT 209 .00 .89 1.00 1.00 .32 .10 .00 \.00 1.00 \.00 ·1.00 
DROBOT 127 82.00 .25 .00 .00 .62 .38 .00 \.00 .00 .00 .00 
DCAD 199 10.00 \.01 \.00 \.00 .92 .84 .00 0.00 \.00 1.00 1.00 
DM-PROD 161 48.00 .68 1.00 1.00 .67 .44 .00 0.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
Managerial Innovation 
DCAPM 189 20.00 .46 .00 .00 .53 .28 .00 0.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DJIT 181 28.00 .40 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DTQM 181 28.00 .41 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DBSISO 123 86.00 .S9 1.00 1.00 .32 .10 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Epidemic and other inter firm effect 
YSTUR lSI 28.00 43.28 40.00 43.00 20.33 413.25 12.00 93.00 28.00 40.00 55.50 
TCNC 198 11.00 12.32 13.00 15.00 4.36 19.03 2.00 23.00 9.00 13.00 15.00 
CNCY 198 11.00 11.68 11.00 9.00 4.36 19.03 \.00 22.00 9.00 11.00 15.00 
EPID 198 11.00 4.29 4.92 4.23 1.60 2.57 .17 5.89 2.93 4.92 5.79 
luser93 209 .00 86.24 88.12 94.04 7.24 10.34 63.76 100.00 83.35 88.76 93.02 
IFOUT93 209 .00 25.69 20.00 10.00' 21.25 451.61 1.00 100.00 10.00 20.00 40.00 
CNCDlFF 209 .00 22.17 21.21 38.15 • 80.12 750.23 1.00 38.00 18.00 21.00 .23.00 
NOTE: (a) Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
xx 
Table D2.b Summary statistics: NC (Current users) 
N Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Variance Min Max Percentile 
Valid I Missing 25% I 50% 1 75% 
Dependent variable 
KNKO 115 .00 .29 .11 .05 .52 .27 .01 4.00 .05 .11 .25 
Price effecf 
DNC 115 .00 .11 10.31 14.32 30.25 914.86 -67.10 42.23 -33.87 10.31 26.09 
DTOT 115 .00 15.86 17.10 17.20 4.55 20.73 2.27 23.96 12.37 17.10 18.39 
QNQTOT 115 .00 -6.80 .33 5.63 54.65 2986.66 -547.25 32.18 -11.62 .33 5.63 
Rank effect 
Employment 
E93 114 1.00 210.41 100.00 20.00 286.64 82162.00 1.00 1750.00 40.00 100.00 260.00 
E86 114 0.00 316.94 125.00 65.00 474.59 225237.55 3.00 2500.00 56.00 120.00 320.00 
E81 115 0.00 384.43 143.00 35.00' 576.87 332784.25 3.00 3550.00 50.00 143.00 550.00 
E7S 114 10.00 474.34 165.00 40.00 824.96 644738.01 4.00 5000.00 40.00 150.00 561.75 
E70 105 10.00 528.72 141.00 .00 1001.25 1002502.76 1.00 7000.00 36.00 141.00 585.00 
~ 
AGE 115 .00 50.57 44.00 100.00 25.90 670.86 12.00 100.00 31.00 44.00 63.00 
Export 
EX10 113 2.00 .57 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 
RDE93 112 3.00 .15 .01 .00 .01 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .01 .04 
RDE86 110 5.00 .02 .01 .00 .02 .00 .00 .08 .00 .01 .03 
RDE81 85 30.00 .03 .02 .00 .03 .00 .00 .14 .01 .02 .04 
R&D93 115 .00 .77 1.00 1.00 .43 .18 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 86 115 .00 .79 1.00 1.00 .41 .17 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
R&D 81 115 .00 .74 1.00 1.00 .44 .19 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
Turnoller 
~URNOVER3Y 97 18.00 101.95 34.07 4.10 239.20 57214.42 .36 1972.20 9.90 34.07 87.51 
rrURNOVER2Y 96 19.00 102.87 31.02 106.50 228.18 52065.81 .36 1627.05 9.44 31.02 97.41 
RT91 97 18.00 102.79 33.16 21.30 288.60 83290.58 .36 2662.50 11.20 33.16 95.47 
RTB6 79 36.00 91.73 31.72 9.70' 233.29 54423.05 2.43 1920.60 9.70 31.72 84.34 
RT81 70 45.00 125.65 30.16 25.40 319.59 102139.28 1.91 2095.50 10.00 30.16 83.19 
Liwuidity 
pn1 44 74.00 .12 .06 .10 .27 .07 -.07 1.25 .01 .06 .10 
PT86 33 82.00 .08 .04 .03' .25 .06 -.25 1.40 .02 .04 .07 
PTBt 33 82.00 .06 .05 .00' .06 .00 -.05 .24 .01 .05 .09 
PUt 48 67.00 .88 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PL86 39 76.00 .87 1.00 1.00 .34 .11 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PL81 37 78.00 .92 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Production system 
pst 115 .00 .39 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
PS2 115 .00 .37 .00 .00 .48 .23 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
PS3 115 .00 .10 .00 .00 .31 .09 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PS4 115 .00 .12 .00 .00 .33 .11 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PSS 115 .00 .02 .00 .00 .13 .02 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
BATCH 106 9.00 428.44 5.00 1.00 2731.25 7459720.13 \.00 20000.00 1.00 5.00 26.25 
XXI 
•....... Continue 
N Mean Median Mode IStd.dev'l Variance Min Max I Percentile 
Validl Missing T I I I 25% T 50% I 75% 
Ownership 
GROUPS6 115 .00 .62 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
GROUPS1 115 .00 .92 1.00 1.00 .27 .07 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GROUP 93 115 .00 .61 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
Industrial sector 
INDUSTRY 115 .00 7.10 8.00 3.00 3.53 12.49 \.00 15.00 3.00 8.00 10.00 
Complementary and substitute technologies 
DCOT 112 3.00 .91 1.00 1.00 .29 .08 .00 1.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 
DROBOT 96 19.00 .11 .00 .00 .32 .10 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
DCAD 112 3.00 .73 1.00 1.00 .44 .20 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
DM-PROD 100 15.00 .51 1.00 \.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
DCNC 112 3.00 .94 1.00 1.00 .24 .06 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 
DMICRO-pc 108 7.00 .65 1.00 1.00 .48 .23 .00 1.00 .00 \.00 \.00 
Managerial Innovation 
DCAPM 106 9.00 .45 .00 .00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DJIT 96 19.00 .33 .00 .00 .47 .22 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DTQM 100 15.00 .41 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DBSISO 112 3.00 .52 1.00 \.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 \.00 1.00 
Epidemic and other inter firm stock effects 
YSTUR 115 .00 77.60 76.00 88.00 9.16 83.93 55.00 92.00 70.00 76.00 88.00 
TNC 115 .00 15.40 17.00 5.00 9.16 83.93 1.00 38.00 5.00 17.00 23.00 
NCY 115 .00 27.60 26.00 38.00 9.16 83.93 5.00 42.00 20.00 26.00 38.00 
lusers93 115 0 82.62 85.29 83.33 17.04 290.53 14.29 100.00 81.40 85.29 90.91 
IFOUT93 \l5 .00 16.28 3.6592 4.34 1.0295 1.0599 1.08 4.45 3.1215 3.6592 4.343 
NCDlFF \l5 .00 7.07 6.62 8.76 3.20 10.23 3.00 14.33 4.81 6.62 ·8.76 
NOTE: (a) If multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown; (b) The price effect for NC is measured in absolute 
value as the quality adjusted price of this almost obsolete technology increases over time. The reasons for this 
empirical exercise are detailed in chapter 8. 
XXII 
Table D2.c Summary statistics: MICRO (Current users) 
N Mean Median I Mode IStd.dev·1 Variance Min Max I Percentile 
Validl Missing I I I 115% I 50% I 75% 
Dependent variable 
KNKO 229 51 0.65 0.11 0.11 1.976 3.87 .11 19.00 5.26e-2 0.111 0.49 
Price effect 
DMICRO 257 24.00 14.36 17.13 1.12 11.34 128.54 -1.52 37.69 1.12 17.13 23.11 
DTOT 257 24.00 12.66 13.89 1.01 8.03 64.50 1.01 23.61 2.27 13.89 20.58 
QNQTOT 257 24.00 -0.71 -1.59 -13.58 30.716 943.47 -91.90 119.71 -13.58 -1.60 -0.59 
Rank effect 
Employment 
E93 281 .00 195.75 75.00 40.00' 308.79 95351.09 10.00 2300.00 35.00 75.00 237.50 
E86 279 2.00 270.79 99.00 65.00 484.94 235169.87 10.00 3500.00 40.00 99.00 275.00 
E81 281 .00 312.98 101.00 40.00 561.42 315195.95 13.00 5304.00 40.00 101.00 355.00 
E75 273 8.00 364.67 80.00 .00 748.34 560009.62 2.00 6790.00 30.00 80.00 331.50 
E70 250 31.00 416.50 70.00 .00 940.63 884791.25 8.00 8479.00 22.75 70.00 330.50 
~ 
AGE 280 1.00 46.80 38.00 100.00 27.65 764.62 12.00 100.00 25.00 38.00 59.75 
Export 
EX20 278 3.00 .51 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 \.00 
R&D 
RDE93 273 8.00 .03 .01 .00 .04 .00 .00 .25 .00 .01 .04 
RDE86 274 7.00 .02 .01 .00 .03 .00 .00 .29 .00 .01 .03 
RDE81 203 78.00 .03 .02 .00 .03 .00 .00 .21 .01 .02 .04 
R&D93 280 1.00 .72 1.00 \.00 .45 .20 .00 \.00 .00 \.00 \.00 
R&D86 280 1.00 .76 \.00 \.00 .43 .18 .00 1.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 
R&D81 281 .00 .73 1.00 \.00 .44 .20 .00 \.00 .00 \.00 \.00 
Turnover 
TURNOVERJY 242 39.00 104.25 28.94 7.10 306.19 93754.05 1.68 3739.80 9.61 28.94 84.09 
TURNOVER2Y 239 42.00 96.01 28.22 7.10' 219.84 48330.64 1.68 1627.05 8.93 28.22 8\.64 
RT91 242 39.00 127.46 27.34 17.75 • 587.88 345597.21 1.42 8520.00 10.56 27.34 85.20 
RT86 208 73.00 93.01 29.54 9.70' 219.49 48174.43 .19 1920.60 9.70 29.54 87.30 
RT81 184 97.00 101.03 25.40 12.70 251.57 63289.07 \,27 2095.50 7.62 25.40 76.20 
Liwuidity 
PT91 113 168.00 .09 .05 .00 .18 .03 -.10 1.25 .01 .05 .10 
PT86 99 182.00 .09 .05 .03 .19 .04 -.25 1.40 .02 .05 .09 
PT81 91 190.00 .09 .04 .to .29 .08 -.31 2.10 .01 .04 .10 
PL91 130 151.00 .89 \.00 \.00 .57 .33 .00 3.00 1.00 \.00 \.00 
PL86 109 172.00 .94 \.00 1.00 .40 .16 .00 3.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 
PL81 102 179.00 .89 \.00 1.00 .58 .33 .00 3.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 
Production system 
PSI 281 .00 .35 .00 .00 .48 .23 .00 1.00 .00 .00 \.00 
PS2 281 .00 .43 .00 .00 .50 .25 .00 \.00 .00 .00 \.00 
PS 3 281 .00 .09 .00 .00 .28 .08 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PS 4 281 .00 .12 .00 .00 .32 .10 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
PS 5 281 .00 .01 .00 .00 .12 .01 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
BATCH 249 32 372.44 5.00 1.00 2249.00 5057975.13 1.00 20000.00 1.00 5.00 25.00 
XXIII 
..... Continue 
I N Mean Median Mode IStd.dev. Variance Min Max I Percentile 
IValidl Missing I I 25% I 50% T 75% 
Ownership 
GROUP81 281 .00 .57 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
GROUP86 271 10.00 .90 1.00 1.00 .30 .09 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GROUP93 273 8.00 .60 1.00 1.00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 \.00 1.00 
Industrial sector 
INDUSTRY 281 .00 7.09 8.00 10.00 3.54 12.54 1.00 15.00 3.00 8.00 10.00 
Complementary and substitute technologies 
DCOT 271 10.00 .80 1.00 1.00 .40 .16 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DROBOT 225 56.00 .12 .00 .00 .33 .11 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 
DCAD 262 19.00 .69 1.00 1.00 .46 .21 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 \.00 
DM-PROD 242 39.00 .55 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 \.00 .00 1.00 \.00 
DNC 254 27.00 .65 \.00 1.00 .48 .23 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 \.00 
DCNC 273 8.00 .75 1.00 1.00 .44 .19 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 \.00 
Managerial Innovation 
DCAPM 249 32.00 .40 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DJIT 244.00 37.00 .39 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DTQM 247.00 34.00 .42 .00 .00 .49 .24 .00 \.00 .00 .00 1.00 
DBSISO 276 5.00 .51 1.00 1.00 .50 .25 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
Epidemic and other inter firm stock effects 
YSTUR 280 1.00 46.80 38.00 100.00 27.65 764.62 12.00 192.00 25.00 38.00 --S9~7J 
TMICRO 203 78.00 8.55 9.00 13.00 4.54 20.59 .00 21.00 S.OO 9.00 12.00 
MICROY 257 24.00 10.63 11.00 .00 6.81 46.40 .00 22.00 7.00 11.00 15.00 
lusers93 281 .00 75.31 78.26 82.93 12.24 149.71 50.00 100.00 66.67 78.26 84.21 
IFOUT93 281 .00 21.67 22.32 22.32 8.09 65.41 6.00 39.67 18.20 22.32 27.07 
MICRODIFF 281 .00 13.75 14.55 15.08 4.63 21.48 3.00 23.13 10.00 14.55 15.26 
NOTE: (a) Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
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